雪莱无神论必要性中英文(共9页).doc

精选优质文档-倾情为你奉上     （此文即是雪莱19岁时遭牛津开除之作）        对真理的爱是促使作者写这篇短论的唯一动机。因此，如果有的读者发现作者在推理上有任何缺陷，或者能够提出作者的心灵永远发现不了的证据，作者恳切地请求他们以同样扼要、同样严格和同样坦率的方式，发表他们的论据以及反对意见。       由于有神论的证据不足，本文作者是：一个无神论者。       严密地检验支持任何命题的证明是否有效，是获得真理的唯一可靠方法；关于这种方法的优点，是不需要多说的。我们关于上帝存在的知识；是一个极其重要的论题；无论怎样细致的研究，也决不会是过分的。就是根据这一认识，我们现在扼要地、无所偏袒地考察一下那些已经提出了的证明。我们首先必须考虑什么是信仰的本质。       当一个命题出现在心灵面前时，心灵就对构成这一命题的观念，产生同意或不同意的感觉。对于这些观念感到同意，就称为相信，有许多障碍往往阻止心灵产生这种直接的感觉；心灵就企图消除这类障碍，以便使这种感觉显得清晰。心灵为了对于构成命题的诸观念间的关系有完整的感觉，而对它们进行研究，这种研究是主动的；但是心灵对于这些观念间的关系的感觉，却是被动的。由于把心灵的这种研究和感觉混淆起来的缘故，就使许多人错误地以为心灵在信仰上是主动的，认为信仰是一种意志的活动，其结论就成为：信仰可以受心灵的制约。他们由于坚执着这种错误的观点，就进一步使不信仰带有一定程度的罪恶性质；但按不信仰的本质来说，是不可能带有罪恶性质的；它也同样不可能带有善的性质。因此，信仰是一种感情，这种感情的力量，就同其他各种感情一样，恰好同激动的程度成正比。       激动的程度有三种。       感觉是心灵获得一切知识的源泉；因而感觉的证据使人产生最强烈的同意。       心灵的判断是建立在我们亲身经验的基础之上的，这种经验来自感觉的源泉；因此，根据经验的判断，在激动的程度上属于第二等。他人的经验，传达到我们的经验中，那就属于程度最低的一种（可以制订一种在程度上逐步增加的标尺，其上可以标明各种命题经受感觉考查的不同能力，命题的这种能力，将能准确地表明它们应该得到的信仰的程度。）       因此，凡是有违理性的一切证明，都是不能接受的；因为理性就建立在感觉的证据上。       每一种证明都可以被归人上述这三类中的一类；我们要考虑这三类的论据中，有哪一个论据足以说服我们相信上帝的存在。       第一类，感觉上的证据。如果上帝能在我们面前现身，如果他能以他的存在来说服我们的感觉，这种启示就必然能造成信仰。如果神在哪些人面前出现过了，那么，这些人就可能具有对他的存在的最强烈的信念。但是神学家们的上帝是谁也看不见的。       第二类，理性。不能不认为，人们都知道：一切现存之物必然有其起源，或者亘古即有之；人们也知道，凡不是亘古即有的事物，都必然有其产生的原因。当这种论点用到宇宙上去，就必须证明宇宙是被创造出来的；除非清楚地阐明我们可以合理地假定宇宙是无始无终的。我们必须首先证明有一个设计，然后才能推论出有这么一个设计者。唯一使我们可以形成因果关系的思想，来自事物间的经常联系，从一事物推出另一事物的关系。在两个命题正好相反的情况下，心灵就相信比较好理解的一个；与其认为宇宙之外另有一个存在，这个存在能够创造宇宙，还不如假定宇宙是无始无终的存在为易解。如果心灵已被一种担负压得够沉重的时候，再去增加不能忍受的重量，这会是一种缓解吗？       另外一种论据是建立在人对其自身存在的知炽上的，大致如下：一个人不仅知道他现在存在，而且也知道他最初并不存在；因此，必然有其原因。但是，我们的因果观念只能来源于客观事物的恒常的联结，以及由此及彼的推理；而且，我们在实验地进行推理时，只能从结果推论出恰好适合于此种结果的那些原因。但是确有某种工具产生原动力，可是我们不能证明这种原动力是这些工具所固有的；相反的假设也同样没法阐明；我们承认这种原动力是不可理解的；但是如果假设这种结果是由一个永恒的、无处不在的、全能的存在所产生，也使原因变得同样模糊，而且使它更不好理解。       第三类，见证。见证决不能违反理性。上帝使人的感觉相信他是存在的，关于这一点的见证，如果要人承认的话，除非我们的心灵认为这些见证人见到上帝的可能大于他们受骗的可能。我们的理性永不可能承认这样一些人的见证，他们不仅宣布他们是奇迹的目击者，并且也宣布上帝是非理性的；怎么说他们宣布上帝为非理性的？因为上帝指挥着，要人们相信他，谁相信他，他就给谁以最高的奖赏，谁不信他，就永世受罚。我们只能指挥有意识的行动；但信仰并非有意识的行动；心灵是被动的，或者说无意识地主动的：由此可见，我们没有足够的证据，或者不如说，要证明上帝的存在，证据不足。我们在上文已表明，从理性不能演绎出这种结论。只有那些被感觉的证据所说服的人们，才能相信其存在。       因此，很显然，从这三类信仰的源泉都得到证明，心灵不能相信有一个创造一切的上帝的存在。同样明显的是，信仰既然是一种心灵的感情，对于不信者，即无罪恶可言；只有那些不愿消除错误观点，始终从这种观点来看待任何论题的人，才是不可恕的。每一颗能思考的心灵，必然承认关于上帝的存在世上没有任何证明。       上帝只是一个假设，作为一个假设，因此需要证明。“有责证明”（musprobandi），对有神论者们来说。艾萨克·牛顿爵士说：“我从来也不作假设，因为任何不是从现象中演绎出来的东西，都必须被称为假设；凡是假设，不论是形而上学的假设，物理学的假设，或带有神秘性质的假设，甚而至于力学上的假设从哲学上说来；统统都是不值一钱的。” 牛顿的这一条有价值的法则，也适合于一切关于创造主的存在的证明。我们看到具有各种力量的各种物体，我们仅仅知道它们的效果；关于它们的本质和原因，我们处于一种无知的状态。牛顿称这些为事物的现象；但是哲学的骄做不愿意承认哲学自己对于这些事物的原因无知。从我们的感觉对象这些现象，我们企图推出原因，这个原因我们称之为上帝，又无谓地赠给他各种否定的和矛盾的性质。从这个假设出发，我们发明了这个总的名称上帝，来掩饰我们对原因和本质的无知。被称为上帝的这个存在，根本不符合牛顿所开列的条件；上帝却带有哲学自大狂所织成的帷幕的一切特征，这片帷幕被哲学家们用来甚至让他们自己看不到自己的无知。他们从庸人们的“神人同形同性论”中借取了纺织这片帷幕所需的纱线。诡辩家们为了同样目的，使用了种种的字眼：从逍遥学派的神秘性概念，以至于波义尔的“媒素”（effluvium）和赫歇耳（Herschel）的“克里尼底”（Crinities）或“星云”。上帝被说成是无限的、永恒的、不可理解的；他被放在无知的逻辑所能编造的每一个“predicateinnon” （虚无的谓词）之中。甚至连他的崇拜者们也都承认，要形成任何关于他的观念是不可能的。他们学着一位法国诗人那样喊道：       “要说出他是什么，只有他自己才能够。”       培根爵士说，无神论给人们带来理性、哲学、自然崇拜、法律、荣誉，以及能够引导人们走向道德的一切事物；但是迷信破坏这一切，并且把自身建立为一种暴君统治，压在人类的悟性之上。因此，无神论决不会破坏政治，而只会使人们的眼睛更亮，因为他们能看到在现世的界线之外是什么东西也没有的。（见培根道德论文。）       Q.E.D.（证毕） The Necessity Of Atheism NOTE - The Necessity of Atheism was published by Shelley in 1811. In 1813 he printed a revised and expanded version of it as one of the notes to his poem Queen Mab. The revised and expanded version is the one here reprinted. There Is No God This negation must be understood solely to affect a creative Deity. The hypothesis of a pervading Spirit co-eternal with the universe remains unshaken. A close examination of the validity of the proofs adduced to support any proposition is the only secure way of attaining truth, on the advantages of which it is unnecessary to descant: our knowledge of the existence, of a Deity is a subject of such importance that it cannot be too minutely investigated; in consequence of this conviction we proceed briefly and impartially to examine the proofs which have been adduced. It is necessary first to consider the nature of belief. When a proposition is offered to the mind, It perceives the agreement or disagreement of the ideas of which it is composed. A perception of their agreement is termed belief. Many obstacles frequently prevent this perception from being immediate; these the mind attempts to remove in order that the perception may be distinct. The mind is active in the investigation in order to perfect the state of perception of the relation which the component ideas of the proposition bear to each, which is passive; the investigation being confused with the perception has induced many falsely to imagine that the mind is active in belief. - that belief is an act of volition, - in consequence of which it may be regulated by the mind. Pursuing, continuing this mistake, they have attached a degree of criminality to disbelief; of which, in its nature, it is incapable: it is equally incapable of merit. Belief, then, is a passion, the strength of which, like every other passion, is in precise proportion to the degrees of excitement. The degrees of excitement are three. The senses are the sources of all knowledge to the mind; consequently their evidence claims the strongest assent. The decision of the mind, founded upon our own experience, derived from these sources, claims the next degree. The experience of others, which addresses itself to the former one, occupies the lowest degree. (A graduated scale, on which should be marked the capabilities of propositions to approach to the test of the senses, would be a just barometer of the belief which ought to be attached to them.) Consequently no testimony can be admitted which is contrary to reason; reason is founded on the evidence of our senses. Every proof may be referred to one of these three divisions: it is to be considered what arguments we receive from each of them, which should convince us of the existence of a Deity. 1st, The evidence of the senses. If the Deity should appear to us, if he should convince our senses of his existence, this revelation would necessarily command belief. Those to whom the Deity has thus appeared have the strongest possible conviction of his existence. But the God of Theologians is incapable of local visibility. 2d, Reason. It is urged that man knows that whatever is must either have had a beginning, or have existed from all eternity, he also knows that whatever is not eternal must have had a cause. When this reasoning is applied to the universe, it is necessary to prove that it was created: until that is clearly demonstrated we may reasonably suppose that it has endured from all eternity. We must prove design before we can infer a designer. The only idea which we can form of causation is derivable from the constant conjunction of objects, and the consequent inference of one from the other. In a base where two propositions are diametrically opposite, the mind believes that which is least incomprehensible; - it is easier to suppose that the universe has existed from all eternity than to conceive a being beyond its limits capable of creating it: if the mind sinks beneath the weight of one, is it an alleviation to increase the intolerability of the burthen? The other argument, which is founded on a Man's knowledge of his own existence, stands thus. A man knows not only that he now is, but that once he was not; consequently there must have been a cause. But our idea of causation is alone derivable from the constant conjunction of objects and the consequent Inference of one from the other; and, reasoning experimentally, we can only infer from effects caused adequate to those effects. But there certainly is a generative power which is effected by certain instruments: we cannot prove that it is inherent in these instruments" nor is the contrary hypothesis capable of demonstration: we admit that the generative power is incomprehensible; but to suppose that the same effect is produced by an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent being leaves the cause in the same obscurity, but renders it more incomprehensible. 3d, Testimony. It is required that testimony should not be contrary to reason. The testimony that the Deity convinces the senses of men of his existence can only be admitted by us, if our mind considers it less probable, that these men should have been deceived than that the Deity should have appeared to them. Our reason can never admit the testimony of men, who not only declare that they were eye-witnesses of miracles, but that the Deity was irrational; for he commanded that he should be believed, he proposed the highest rewards for, faith, eternal punishments for disbelief. We can only command voluntary actions; belief is not an act of volition; the mind is ever passive, or involuntarily active; from this it is evident that we have no sufficient testimony, or rather that testimony is insufficient to prove the being of a God. It has been before shown that it cannot be deduced from reason. They alone, then, who have been convinced by the evidence of the senses can believe it. Hence it is evident that, having no proofs from either of the three sources of conviction, the mind cannot believe the existence of a creative God: it is also evident that, as belief is a passion of the mind, no degree of criminality is attachable to disbelief; and that they only are reprehensible who neglect to remove the false medium through which their mind views any subject of discussion. Every reflecting mind must acknowledge that there is no proof of the existence of a Deity. God is an hypothesis, and, as such, stands in need of proof: the onus probandi rests on the theist. Sir Isaac Newton says: Hypotheses non fingo, quicquid enim ex phaenomenis non deducitur hypothesis, vocanda est, et hypothesis vel metaphysicae, vel physicae, vel qualitatum occultarum, seu mechanicae, in philosophia locum non habent. To all proofs of the existence of a creative God apply this valuable rule. We see a variety of bodies possessing a variety of powers: we merely know their effects; we are in a estate of ignorance with respect to their essences and causes. These Newton calls the phenomena of things; but the pride of philosophy is unwilling to admit its ignorance of their causes. From the phenomena, which are the objects of our attempt to infer a cause, which we call God, and gratuitously endow it with all negative and contradictory qualities. From this hypothesis we invent this general name, to conceal our ignorance of causes and essences. The being called God by no means answers with the conditions prescribed by Newton; it bears every mark of a veil woven by philosophical conceit, to hide the ignorance of philosophers even from themselves. They borrow the threads of its texture from the anthropomorphism of the vulgar. Words have been used by sophists for the same purposes, from the occult qualities of the peripatetics to the effuvium of Boyle and the crinities or nebulae of Herschel. God is represented as infinite, eternal, incomprehensible; he is contained under every predicate in non that the logic of ignorance could fabricate. Even his worshippers allow that it is impossible to form any idea of him: they exclaim with the French poet, Pour dire ce qu'il est, il faut etre lui-meme. Lord Bacon says that atheism leaves to man reason, philosophy, natural piety, laws, reputation, and everything that can serve to conduct him to virtue; but superstition destroys all these, and erects itself into a tyranny over the understandings of men: hence atheism never disturbs the government, but renders man more clear- sighted, since he sees nothing beyond the boundaries of the present life. - Bacon's Moral Essays. The Beginning here, and to the paragraph ending with Systeme de la Nature," Shelley wrote in French. A free translation has been substituted. first theology of man made him first fear and adore the elements themselves, the gross and material objects of nature; he next paid homage to the agents controlling the elements, lower genies, heroes or men gifted with great qualities. By force of reflection he sought to simplify things by submitting all nature to a single agent, spirit, or universal soul, which, gave movement to nature and all its branches. Mounting from cause to cause, mortal man has ended by seeing nothing; and it is in this obscurity that he has placed his God; it is in this darksome abyss that his uneasy imagination has always labored to fabricate chimeras, which will continue to afflict him until his knowledge of nature chases these phantoms which he has always so adored. If we wish to explain our ideas of the Divinity we shall be obliged to admit that, by the word God, man has never been able to designate but the most hidden, the most distant and the most unknown cause of the effects which he saw; he has made use of his word only when the play of natural and known causes ceased to be visible to him; as soon as he lost the thread of these causes, or when his mind could no longer follow the chain, he cut the difficulty and ended his researches by calling God the last of the causes, that is to say, that which is beyond all causes that he knew; thus he but assigned a vague denomination to an unknown cause, at which his laziness or the limits of his knowledge forced him to stop. Every time we say that God is the author of some phenomenon, that signifies that we are ignorant of how such a phenomenon was able to operate by the aid of forces or causes that we know in nature. It is thus that the generality of mankind, whose lot is ignorance, attributes to the Divinity, not only the unusual effects which strike them, but moreover the most simple events, of which the causes are the most simple to understand by whomever is able to study them. In a word, man has always respected unknown causes, surprising effects that his ignorance kept him from unraveling. It was on this debris of nature that man raised the imaginary colossus of the Divinity. If ignorance of nature gave birth to gods, knowledge of nature is made for their destruction. In proportion as man taught himself, his strength and his resources augmented with his knowledge; science, the arts, industry, furnished him assistance; experience reassured him or procured for him means of resistance to the efforts of many causes which ceased to alarm as soon as they became understood. In a word, his terrors dissipated in the same proportion as his mind became enlightened. The educated man ceases to be superstitious. It is only by hearsay (by word of mouth passed down from generation to generation) that whole peoples adore the God of their fathers and of their priests: authority, confidence, submission and custom with them take the place of conviction or of proofs: they prostrate themselves and pray, because their fathers taught them to prostrate themselves and pray: but why did their fathers fall on their knee