《新政治经济学分析》教学大纲.doc

1新政治经济学分析新政治经济学分析教学大纲教学大纲课程简介课程简介：习近平总书记在 2016 年 5 月 17 日哲学社会科学理论工作座谈会上指出： “在解读中国实践、构建中国理论上，我们应该最有发言权，但实际上我国哲 学社会科学在国际上的声音还比较小，还处于有理说不出、说了传不开的境地” 。本课程以马克思主义政治经济学为指导，通过带领学生研读新政治经济学 的经典论文来正确理解“生产力和生产关系” 、 “经济基础和上层建筑”之间的 矛盾。本课程旨在教授学生如何正确运用新政治经济学的分析方法来理解中国 经济过去 40 年所取得的高速增长、归纳总结导致中国经济成功的经验并上升到 理论，撰写出高质量的学术论文。该课程除了要求选课学生在课堂上报告新政 治经济学的经典论文外，还要求选课学生在学期结束后提交一篇学期论文。其 中*为任课教师所讲授的论文，*为选课同学在课堂上报告的论文。任课教师任课教师：姚洋 张鹏飞教材：教材： 1.姚洋、 中国道路的世界意义 、北京大学出版社、 2011 年。 2.姚洋、 作为制度创新过程的经济改革 、格致出版社、2016 年。 3. 姚洋、席天扬主编：中国新叙事 、上海人民出版社、2018 年。参考书：参考书： 1.德隆阿西莫格鲁，詹姆斯A.罗宾逊、 （李增刚译，徐彬校，国务院副总理 刘鹤推荐） 国家为什么会失败 、湖南科学技术出版社、2015 年。考核方式：考核方式：课堂陈述+学期论文第一部分：理论模型第一部分：理论模型 （张鹏飞主讲）（张鹏飞主讲）(1.1). 问题与基本框架问题与基本框架* Besley, T. (2004). “The New Political Economy”, the Keynes lecture delivered at the British Academy on October 13th 2004.* Zhang, P., V. Shih and M. Liu (2018). “Threats and Political Instability in Authoritarian Regimes: A Dynamic Theoretical Analysis”, UCSD 21st Century China Center Research Paper No. 2018-05, http:/dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3218676.Acemoglu, D. (2010). “Theory, General Equilibrium and Political Economy in 2Development Economics”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24 (3): 17-32.Acemoglu, D. (2018). “Political Economy Lecture Notes”, mimeo.Acemoglu, D. and L. Fergusson (2018). “Political Economy of Institutions and Development: Syllabus”, Department of Economics, MIT.(1.2). 制度、技术与经济绩效制度、技术与经济绩效* Acemoglu, D., P. Antràs and E. Helpman (2007). “Contracts and Technology Adoption”, American Economic Review, 97(3): 916-943.* Acemoglu, D. (2008). “Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 6(1): 1-44.Acemoglu D. and T. Verdier (1998). “Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium”, Economic Journal, 108(450): 1381-1403.Acemoglu, D. and J. A. Robinson (2000). “Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development”, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 90(2): 126-130.(1.3). 国家能力与经济绩效国家能力与经济绩效* Acemoglu, D. (2005). “Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(7): 1199-1226.* Acemoglu, D. and J. A. Robinson (2000). “The Emergence of Weak, Despotic and Inclusive States”, working paper, May 2018.Acemoglu, D., C. Carcia-Jimeno and J. A. Robinson (2015). “State Capacity and Economic Development: A Network Approach.” American Economic Review, 105(8): 2364-2409.Acemoglu, D. (2010). “Institutions, Factor Prices, and Taxation: Virtues of Strong States?” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 100(2): 115-119.(1.4). 利益冲突与战争利益冲突与战争* Acemoglu, D., D. Ticchi and A. Vindigni (2011). “Persistence of Civil Wars”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(2-3): 664-676.* Acemoglu, D., M. Golosov, A. Tsyvinski and P. Yared (2012). “A Dynamic Theory of Resource Wars”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(1): 283-331.3Acemoglu, D., G. Egorov and K. Sonin (2008). “Coalition Formation in Non- Democracies”, Review of Economic Studies, 75(4): 987-1009.Acemoglu, D., G. Egorov and K. Sonin (2012). “Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs”, American Economic Review, 102(4): 1446- 1476.Acemoglu, D., G. Egorov and K. Sonin (2011). “Political Model of Social Evolution”, PNAS, 108(4): 21292-21296.Acemoglu, D., G. Egorov and K. Sonin (2009). “Do Juntas Lead to Personal Rule?”, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 99(2): 298-303.(1.5). 制度的形成及演化制度的形成及演化* Acemoglu, D. and J. A. Robinson (2000). “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4): 1167-1199.* Acemoglu, D. and J. A. Robinson (2017). “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? A Correction”, January 2017.* Acemoglu, D. and J. A. Robinson (2001). “A Theory of Political Transitions”, American Economic Review, 91(4): 938-963.Acemoglu, D. and J. A. Robinson (2000). “Democratization or repression?”, European Economic Review, 44(4): 683-693.Acemoglu, D., J. A. Robinson and R. Torvik (2016). “The Political Agenda Effect and State Centralization”, working paper.Acemoglu, D., G. Egorov and K. Sonin (2015). “Political Economy in a Changing World”, Journal of Political Economy, 123(5): 1038-1086.Acemoglu, D., G. Egorov and K. Sonin (2018). “Social Mobility and Stability of Democracy”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 133(2): 1041-1105.Acemoglu, D., D. Ticchi and A. Vindigni (2010). “A Theory of Military Dictatorships”, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2(1): 1-42.(1.6). 无效制度的长期存在无效制度的长期存在* Acemoglu, D., D. Ticchi and A. Vindigni (2011). “Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient States”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(2): 177208. 4* Acemoglu, D., G. Egorov and K. Sonin (2010). “Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(4): 1511- 1575.Acemoglu, D. (2003). “Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflicts, Commitment, and Politics”, Journal of Comparative Economics, 31(4): 620-652.Acemoglu, D. and J. A. Robinson (2006). “Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective.” American Political Science Review, 100(1): 115-131.Acemoglu, D. (2006). “A Simple Model of Inefficient Institutions”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108(4): 515-546.(1.7). 西方民主的乱象西方民主的乱象* Acemoglu, D. and J. A. Robinson (2008). “Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions”, American Economic Review, 9 (1): 267-293.* Acemoglu, D., J. A. Robinson and R. Torvik (2013). “Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?”, Review of Economic Studies, 80(3): 845-875.Acemoglu, D. and J. A. Robinson (2006). “De Facto Political Power and Institutional Persistence”, American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, 96 (2): 325- 330.Acemoglu, D., G. Egorov and K. Sonin (2013). “A Political Theory of Populism”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(2): 771-805.(1.8). 税收与公共财政税收与公共财政* Acemoglu, D. M. Golosov and A. Tsyvinski (2008). “Political Economy of Mechanisms.” Econometrica, 76(3): 619-641.* Acemoglu, D., M. Golosov and A. Tsyvinski (2010). “Dynamic Mirrlees Taxation under Political Economy Constraints”, Review of Economic Studies, 77(3): 841-881.Acemoglu, D., M. Golosov and A. Tsyvinski (2011). “Power Fluctuations and Political Economy”, Journal of Economic Theory, 146(3): 1009-1041.Acemoglu, D., M. Golosov and A. Tsyvinski (2011). “Political Economy of Ramsey Taxation”, Journal of Public Economics, 95(7): 467-475.5第二部分：中国的新政治经济学研究第二部分：中国的新政治经济学研究 （姚洋主讲）（姚洋主讲）（2.1）农村政治农村政治 （I）1. Yao, Yang and You, Wuyue. “Womens Political Participation and Gender Gaps of Education in China: 1950-1990.” World Development, forthcoming.2. Monica Martinez-Bravo, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Nancy Qian and Yang Yao. “The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China: Theory and Empirical Evidence on the Autocrats Trade-off.”（2.2） 农村政治（农村政治（II）1. Xu, Yiqing; and Yao, Yang. “Informal Institutions, Village Elections, and Public Investment in Rural China.” American Political Science Review, 2015, Vol. 109, No. 2: 371-391.2. Monica Martinez-Bravo, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Nancy Qian, Yiqing Xu and Yang Yao. “Making Democracy Work: Formal Institutions and Culture in Rural China.”（2.3）分权与选拔体制：理论问题）分权与选拔体制：理论问题1. Xu, Chenggang. “The Fundamental Institutions of Chinas Reforms and Development.” Journal of Economic Literature, 2011, 49, no. 4: 10761151. 2. Yao, Yang. “The Chinese Growth Miracle.” In Handbook of Economic Growth, 2014, 2B:943-1031. 3. Yao, Yang. “An Anatomy of the Chinese Selectocracy.” 4. Zheng, Yongnian. “Is Communist Party Rule Sustainable in China?” Discussion Paper 22, China Policy Institute, the University of Nottingham, 2007. 5. 姚洋、秦子忠：“人性的多样性和儒家政治结构”，开放时代，2017 年第 6 期：146-165 页。（2.4）选拔制研究）选拔制研究 （I）1. Li, Hongbin; and Zhou, Li-An. “Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China.” Journal of Public Economics, 2005, Vol. 89, No. 9-10: 1743-62. 2. Yao, Yang; and Zhang, Muyang. “Subnational Leaders and Economic Growth: Evidence from Chinese Cities.” Journal of Economic Growth, 2015, 20: 405- 436.63. Jia, Ruixue; Kudamatsu, Masayuki; and Seim, David. “Political Selection in China: the Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance.” Journal of European Economic Association, 2015, 13 (4): 631-668.（2.5）选拔制研究）选拔制研究 （II）1. Landry, Phillip; Lü, Xiaobo; Duan, Haiyan. “Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political Selection along the Chinese Administrative Ladder.” APSR forthcoming. 2. Xi, Tianyang; Yao, Yang; Zhang, Muyang. “Bureaucratic Capability and Political Opportunism: An Empirical Investigation of City Officials in China.” 3. Li, Lixing; Wan, Feng; Xi, Tianyang; Yao, Yang. “Sponsored Promotion.”(2.6) 官员与经济增长官员与经济增长1.Yao, Yang. “Political Equality, Coalition Formation, and Economic Growth in Autocracies.” 2.Shi, Xiangyu; Xi, Tianyang; and Yao, Yang. “Leaders Experience and Economic Growth.”(2.7) 反腐及其后果反腐及其后果1.Chen, Jie; Kung, James. “Busting the Princelings.” 2.Xi, Tianyang; Yao, Yang; Zhang, Qian. “Performance, Rent Sharing, and Loyalty: An Anatomy of the Anti-corruption Campaign in China.”