欧洲的绿色工业政策.docx
About the authors3Foreword5Executive summary6Defining green industrial policy121 The history of industrial policy in Europe17Classic arguments for industrialpolicy232 New industrial policy27A new green industrial policy372.1 A bold green industrial polici/: urgency, risk-taking, experimentation372.2 A balanced mix of green industrial policy instruments402.3 A global green industrial policy: avoiding the tragedy of the commons412.4 Addressing green industrial policy government failures422.5 Summary: lessons for green industrial policy 44Green industrial policy in practice472.6 Germany472.7 Netherlands512.8 Denmark53as a portfolio, in which certain initiatives will inevitably fail. A portfolio with no failures entails no risks, and a portfolio with no risks is unlikely to provide breakthrough innovation. More new policy initiatives designed and monitored as experiments should be tried.EU investment is important for financing green industrial policy initiativesEU green investment will play an important role in realising the green transition, including by mobilising funds from national budgets and the private sector. The decision to devote 30 percent of the EU 2021- 2027 budget and 37 percent of Next Generation EU funding to climate action is good news. However, the European Commission should develop a solid methodology for monitoring climate spending to avoid risks of greenwashing. The European Investment Bank (EIB) should be allowed to truly become Europe's climate bank, notably via a capital increase that will increase its firepower. The EIB should also further develop its role as financier of the green transition, including by playing the important role of connecting, as an intermediary, the relevant public and private stakeholders and supporting their interactions.Finally, the EU should seize the current opportunity to become a global standard-setter for green bonds, given that it is the biggest player on this rapidly growing market.EU green industrial policy should go beyond Europe's borders Europe produces less than 10 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. To really make a difference in terms of climate protection, the European Green Deal has to go beyond Europe's borders. It is of paramount importance for Europe to fill the current global leadership vacuum in climate terms, and to initiate and build global partnerships with other countries. In its relations with developing countries, we recommend that the EU should focus its external development policy more on supporting green projects financially and with capacity-building activities. Such an approach would provide a triple benefit. First, it would help meet the EU's climate finance obligations and thus help to achieve the conditional emission-reduction commitments made by most developing countries under the Paris Agreement. Second, it would help EU industry to enter into new, rapidly growing markets. And third, it would help economic development in the EU's partner countries, providing an invaluable foreign policy dividend for the EU.1 Defining green industrial policyIn December 2019, the then-newly appointed President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, published amid great fanfare a proposal for a European Green Deal, which has the fundamental aim of making Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050. In September 2020, it was followed up with a proposal to achieve net-zero emissions, centred on the acceleration of the European Union decarbonisation process over the next ten years, with a steeper EU emissions reduction target for 2030 of at least 55 percent relative to 1990 (compared to a 40% reduction target currently). The plan also addresses the economic and industrial transformation this necessarily implies, and aims to make the overall process socially inclusive.It will not be an easy ride. A successful European Green Deal will have to foster major shifts in the European economic structure, including transitions from fossil fuels to renewable energy and from diesel to electric cars. This will be a broad, paradigmatic, change to our economies and a historic major socio-economic transformation. For good reason, this challenge is often referred to as an industrial revolution against a deadline.As in any major transformation, there will be winners and losers, particularly in the short-run. With the European Green Deal, the EU recognises that climate and energy policies alone are not sufficient to pursue climate neutrality. For instance, a strategy only based on raising the price of carbon would not deliver on the goals if people will fiercely reject it - as seen in France with the gilets jaunes movement. Only a much broader policy - also encompassing economic, industrial, fiscal, labour, innovation and social policy aspects - can meet such a vast challenge, creating more winners than losers. The European Green Deal seeks to facilitate this challenging broader process by providing a clear sense of direction to investors and citizens and by putting in place mechanisms to ensure that the most vulnerable segments of society are supported and not left behind.It is often said that the European Green Deal must turn decarbonisation into an opportunity to revitalise the European economy, and thus to ensure long-term economic growth and jobs. That is, while heading towards climate neutrality by 2050, the European economy has to remain highly competitive at global level, in the context of increasing competition from other major economies. This puts green industrial policy in the spotlight, in the context of a debate about it that has gathered fresh momentum in recent years (see Lane, 2019; Rodrik, 2014; Rodrik and Sabel, 2019; Aiginger and Rodrik, 2020; and Cherif and Hasanov, 2019, among many others).A first challenge when entering into this debate is to define what green industrial policy is about. It is already a challenge to define industrial policy. Any government policy will have some impact on the economic structure of a country. To narrow down the focus of the analysis, it is useful to start by discussing the objectives of industrial policy This is also how, for instance, Ambroziak (2017) approached the issue, in a literature review covering more than 110 publications. The falling share of manufacturing and the digitalisation of the economy, among other factors, are changing the nature of industry itself. Ambroziak (2017) concluded that the definition of industrial policy is subject to the same transformation the definition of'industry' itself faces.In the established literature, a common factor in all definitions of industrial policy is that it targets a set of economic activities to achieve long-term benefits for society. New tendencies in the industrial policy literature, which we label /new industrial policy1 (NIP), stress that industrial policy should have aims beyond short-term competitiveness and economic growth. It should have a broader multi-dimensionalobjective, which can be captured in the notion of long-term social welfare. This is the case, for instance, in Rodrik and Sabel (2019), who set out to rethink and investigate “a set of interventions' which should have as their goal a “good jobs economy”.Delineation of a 'green' version of industrial policy becomes necessary once decarbonisation is set as a societal goal, as Europe has done with the European Green Deal. While the goal of climate policy is decarbonisation and the goal of (new) industrial policy is social welfare, green industrial policy must reconcile the goals of decarbonising the economy (like climate policy) and social welfare (like industrial policy) (Figure 1). We can thus define green industrial policy as an industrial policy in which climate change mitigation becomes a binding constraint in achieving the social welfare goal.Figure I: Green industrial policyClimate policyClimate policyIndustrial policyDecarbonisationDecarbonisationSocial welfareGreen industrial policySource: Bruegel.This combination of objectives immediately identifies the challenge of green industrial policy, which is to meet both goals simultaneously. This becomes particularly challenging when they conflict, when tradeoffs have to be decided on, and when costs must be attached when one of the goals is not being met.Furthermore, green industrial policy will operate alongside climate policy and industrial policy more generally and therefore raises the issue of coordination of the various policies, particularly when they are overseen by different institutions or departments. Climate policy and industrial policy each have their own instruments. Is coordination of the already existing climate change and industrial policy instruments sufficient to establish a green industrial policy? Does green industrial policy need its own policy instruments? If so, how should they be coordinated with existing instruments?Green industrial policy, like any policy, is a public intervention aimed at correcting problems. Industrial policy addresses problems including financial market imperfections that lead to constraints on access to finance, research externalities Research and development (R&D) activities are widely considered to have positive effects beyond those enjoyed by the funders of R&D (normally, the companies that pay for the research). This is because R&D adds to the general body of knowledge, contributing to other discoveries and developments. However, the returns to a firm selling products based on its own R&D typically do not include the returns to others who benefited indirectly. that cause constraints on access to knowledge, labour market imperfections that limit access to skills and network externalities that hinder partnerships Network externalities are the phenomenon by which the value or utility a user derives from a good or service depends on the number of users of compatible products. Network externalities are typically positive, resulting in a given user deriving more value from a product as other users join the same network. These constraints may lead to markets failing to grow, while preventing new markets from emerging and developing.In addition to tackling market failures, which is the core of classic industrial policy, green industrial policy must also address market failures associated with climate change. The main market failure in climate terms is that greenhouse gas emissions are a side-effect of economically valuable activities, but those responsible for the emissions do not pay the costs. The adverse effects of greenhouse gases are therefore /external' to the market, which means there is usually only an ethical - rather than an economic - incentive for businesses and consumers to reduce their emissions. Consequently, the market fails by over-producing greenhouse gases. Economists have long argued that the first-best policy to correct this market failure is to apply a cost to greenhouse gas emissions in order to encourage reductions. Without a high enough carbon price, policymakers must fall back on second-best policy interventions, including regulation. Being generalised and technology-neutral, carbon pricing represents a superior policy tool, also because it avoids the risk that more targeted policies might bring of selecting wrongly (eg subsidising certain industries that ultimately go bankrupt).The combination of classic market failure externalities and the greenhouse-gas externality represents a significant challenge for green industrial policy. It implies that green industrial policy requires the deployment of specific instruments that go beyond typical general industrial policy measures. These instruments do not need to be new instruments, but should at least be tailored to fit into a green industrial policy. A green industrial policy mix should in any case be developed in coordination with the policy instruments used for climate policy and industrial policy. Carbon pricing, for example, is an important part of the green industrial policy mix because if the price of carbon remains too low to drive low-carbon technology innovation in industry and other sectors of the economy, green industrial policy will have to fallback on second-best options.This Blueprint set out green industrial policy design guidelines, based on an in-depth review of the academic literature and a critical assessment of past policy experiences2 The history of industrial policy in EuropeThe industrial policy debate has historically been a debate on the role of the state in the economy: why, how and to what degree should governments intervene in steering markets? Should governments support 'winners'?Before 1914, the main aim of industrial policy in Europe was to protect economies via tariffs (Foreman-Peck, 2006). Government intervention focused on the provision of infrastructure, favouring specific manufacturing businesses in which the state had an ownership and investment interest. Sectors targeted for intervention were largely natural monopolies, including railways and utilities. Tariffs on industrial and agricultural products were the main tools of industrial policy, with significant variation between, and competition among, countries. Less-developed countries had typically higher tariffs than advanced countries, which had more open economies. Another instrument was the protection of intellectual property, aimed at incentivising innovation. Countries that wanted to catch up technologically exploited the absence of intellectual property protection.Between 1914 and 1950, European states intervened increasingly in economies devastated by war. The state played a major role in steering resources, not only under the dictatorships in Europe, but also in more traditionally liberal countries including France and Belgium. The 1929 crisis led to several industrial crises, which required state intervention. This was also legitimised in national debates by the successful experience of economic planning in the Soviet Union in terms of avoiding the deep economic downturn (Foreman-Peck, 2006). The role of the state in the economy thus emerged from war considerably strengthened in Europe. A prime example from this era was the creation of the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI), an Italian public holding company established in 1933 by the fascist regime to rescue banks and private companies from bankruptcy during the Great Depression.After the Second World War, the process of European reconstruction began, with a focus on strategic industries including coal, steel, electricity and railways. The period between the 1950s and the 1980s is referred to as the heyday of industrial policy, during which there was an increasing preoccupation to match United States levels of competitiveness (Owen, 2012). Industrial policy was extremely interventionist, as European governments ventured into picking
