两年半后的土耳其总统制：体制和政 治概述.docx

SWP Research PaperSinem Adar and Gunter SeufertTurkey's Presidential System after Two and a Half YearsAn Overview of Institutions and PoliticsStiftung Wissenschaft und PolitikGerman Institute forInternational and Security AffairsCentre for Applied 厂 ATQTurk谈 Stutfes m. 1 DSWP Research Paper 2April 2021, Berlinthe 2018 elections. Given the depth of polarisation within Turkish society, the AKP most likely assumed that this would almost automatically lead to the victory of the conservative bloc's presidential candidate.Moreover, the new constitution allows the president to be a member of a political party. Immediately after the referendum, Erdogan unsurprisingly resumed the AKP leadership, enabling him to control the largest parliamentary party as well as the executive. This combination permits the president and his party to exercise far-reaching influence over the judiciary as apparent in the composition of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, which appoints judges and prosecutors to the lower courts. Two of its members are the justice minister and secretary of state, who are appointed by the president. The president also appoints another four members, while parliament chooses seven. If no consensus is achieved in parliament, only a simple majority is required meaning that the governing party (or the group of parties backing the government) can ultimately determine all the members appointed by parliament. Website of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, :/ (accessed 15 September 2018). The same applies to the composition of the Constitutional Court. Twelve of its 15 members are appointed by the president, three by parliament, if necessary, by simple majority. Website of the Turkish Constitutional Court, s:/ (accessed 1() September 2020).Structure and Expansion of the ExecutiveOn 1 October 2018, in his address at the opening of parliament after the summer recess, Erdogan noted that he possessed sole executive power, and that all veto powers had been abolished. "President Erdogan in Parliamenf, Turkish, TakvimOn 1 October 2018, in his address at the opening of parliament after the summer recess, Erdogan noted that he possessed sole executive power, and that all veto powers had been abolished. "President Erdogan in Parliamenf, Turkish, Takvim The president's power over institutions is indeed enormous. He alone appoints all ministers and all senior civil servants in all departments. All the central agencies (generally known as bakanhk or 'presidiums') exercising direct control over the bureaucracy, the military, the economy, the media, civil society and public religious life are answerable to him: the State Supervisory Council (DDK), whose inspectors are responsible for investigations throughout the bureaucratic apparatus, including the military; the Secretariat-General of the National Security Council (MGKGS) which coordinates promotions within the armed forces; the Presidium of the Defence Industries (SSB) which manages procurement projects; and the Presidium for Strategy and Budget (SBB) which prepares the state budget. The Turkey Wealth Fund (TVF) established in August 2016 bundles the assets of major state enterprises and gives the president a crucial role in investment decisions, while the Presidency of Religious Affairs (DIB) defines the official version of Islam at home and forms the religious flank of Turkish diplomacy abroad.(pro-government newspaper), 1 October 2018, s: The president also heads four inter-ministerial "officesn (ofis) dealing with the cross-cutting issues of digitalisation, investment, finance and personnel. Together with the aforementioned presidiums they form a kind of parallel administration vis-a-vis the ministries, which they also oversee. In addition to his many advisors, President Erdogan has surrounded himself with new 'councils9 (kurul). These institutionalised gatherings of representatives of business, academia, politics and civil society are tasked to develop "long- term visions and strategies9 in almost all policy areas, to monitor the work of the ministries, to prepare "progress reports? and submit 'policy recommendations'.21 As such they assume functions that would normally fall in the domain of political parties and parliament. Yet, they serve only the President rather than the political sphere.The Presidents reach extends to theintelligence service as well, whose rolehas steadily expanded in recent years.The President's reach extends to the intelligence service as well, whose role has steadily expanded in recent years. An amendment to the Law on State Intelligence Services in 2014 led to the National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) assuming operational tasks, immensely expanding its access to documents19 On DIB see Gunter Seufert, The Changing Nature of the Turkish State Authority for Religious Affairs (ARA) and Turkish Islam in Europe, CATS Working Paper 2 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen- schaft und Politik, June 2020), fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/CATS_Working_ Paper_N r_2_G uenter_S eufert.pdf.20 Taken from: "New Ministries in the New System” Turkish, En son haber (pro-government website), 9 July 2018, liklar.html.21 Ibid.SWP BerlinTurkey's Presidential System after Two and a Half YearsApril 2021Structure and Expansion of the ExecutiveFigure 2The President as the sole center of powerMinistry of HealthState Supervisory CouncilTurkey Wealth FundMinistry of TradeInvestment OfficeMinistry of Foreign AffairsPresidency of Religious AffairsMinistry of Industry and TechnologyMinistry of Transport and InfrastructureMinistry of JusticeMinistry of InteriorCouncil of Security and Foreign Affairs PoliciesMinistry ofTreasury and FinanceMinistry ofYouth and SportsMinistry of Agriculture and ForestryMinistry of Family, Labor and Social ServicesMinistry of National DefenceMinistry ofNational EducationMinistry of Environment and UrbanisationMinistry ofCulture and TourismCouncil of Culture and Arts PoliciesPresidency ofAdministrative AffairsCouncil ofLaw PoliciesMinistry of Energy and Natural ResourcesFinanceOfficeCouncil of Food and Health PoliciesPresidency of Defence Industries (SSB)Council of Education and Training PoliciesSecretariat-General of the National Security CouncilPresidency of Strategy and BudgetPrivate I SecretaryNational IntelligenceOrganisationCouncil forSocial PoliciesDigital Transformation OfficeDirectorate of CommunicationsPresident of the RepublicCouncil of Local Government PoliciesScientific and Technological Research Council of TurkeyHuman ResourcesOfficeTurkish Armed ForcesGeneral StaffCouncil ofEconomic PoliciesPresident of the RepublicSources: ;Translation and adaptation: 2021 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP).Dsmurat, s:/c0mm0ns.wikimedia.0rg/wiki/File:Emblem_0f_the_President_0f_Turkey.svg, Emblem of the President of Turkey".Coloursand proportions changed by SWP, s:/creativecommons.Org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/legalcode.SWP BerlinTurkey's Presidential System after Two and a Half Years April 202111and resources of other agencies, and massively strengthening the criminal immunity enjoyed by its members.22 Legislative Decree No. 694 of 15 August 2017 further expanded its powers and placed it under the sole control of the president.23 Where the head of MIT had hitherto been appointed by the president6at the proposal of the prime minister, following consultations in the National Security CounciP, the president gained the right to make the appointment without consultation; the same also applies to the second and third management tiers.24Another point relates to the expanded influence of the intelligence service among the different elements of the security apparatus. Paragraph 41 of the aforementioned decree authorises MIT to operate within the armed forces and to gather intelligence concerning the military and civilian staff of the Defence Ministry. That power had previously been denied to it, as a legacy of the former institutional autonomy of the military complex and its resulting strong political influence in 'old Turkey, which has now been supposedly overcome. Today MIT's central role is not restricted to counterterrorism and monitoring the bureaucracy. President Erdogan apparently also uses it to keep his own party under control. For example, in January 2019 he stated publicly that the National Intelligence Organisation and the Police Intelligence Department would screen the AKP's candidates for the local elections 'from head to toe2522 Law No. 2937 of 1 January 1984, legal website Lexpera, barat-hizmetleri-ve-milli-istihbarat-teskilati-kanunu-2937 (accessed 18 March 2019).23 PDF of document on website of Turkish official gazette, (accessed 18 March 2019).24 Ibid.25 Cited from Orhan Uguroglu, Davutoglu, Intelligence Service, Police, Election Turkish, Yeniqag (nationalist newspaper, online), 22 January 2019, . com.ti7davutoglu-mit-emniyet-secim-50497yy.htm.SWP BerlinTurkey's Presidential System after Two and a Half YearsApril 2021Governance under the Presidential SystemThe last two and a half years have shown that bundling executive power in the hands of the president not only impaired elected bodies such as the parliament and the local government, it has also weakened bureaucracy and the judiciary.Parliament WeakenedStripped of parliamentary immunity, the criminalisa- tion and vilification of deputies is not uncommon. A total of 33 legal proceedings were sent to the parliament on 24 February 21, including those to remove the immunity of nine deputies from the pro-Kurdish left-leaning People's Democratic Party (HDP). "33 Deputy Proceedings Were Sent to the Commission” Turkish, Sozcii (government-critical newspaper, online), 24 February 2021, /gundem/33- milletvekili-fezlekesi-komisyona-sevk-edildi-6279702/.Stripped of parliamentary immunity, the criminalisa- tion and vilification of deputies is not uncommon. A total of 33 legal proceedings were sent to the parliament on 24 February 21, including those to remove the immunity of nine deputies from the pro-Kurdish left-leaning People's Democratic Party (HDP). "33 Deputy Proceedings Were Sent to the Commission” Turkish, Sozcii (government-critical newspaper, online), 24 February 2021, /gundem/33- milletvekili-fezlekesi-komisyona-sevk-edildi-6279702/. In June 2020, three MPs from the leading opposition party Republican People's Party (CHP) and the HDP were stripped of their immunity. "Turkish Parliament Strips Status from Three Opposition MPs”, Middle East Eye, 4 June 2020, . hdp-mp immunity-stripped. Ozgiir Mumcu, 4What Is Interior Minister Soylu In accord with the rhetoric that the president and his party alone represent the nation, the government again sharpened its tone towards the opposition following the elec- tions on 24 June 2018 as well as ahead of the local elections on 31 March 2019, accusing the CHP of supporting 'terrorist organisations'' Such accusa- tions have since continued. Yet, criminalisation of deputies goes far back. In 2016, the parliament voted (376 out of 550) to lift the immunity of HDP MPs.Since then, many deputies from the HDP have been arrested and some including the party's co-chairs Selahattin Demirta§ and Figen Yuksekdag were sentenced to jail.Doing?,? Turkish, Cumhuriyet (opposition newspaper),In open violation of the constitution, even speeches before parliament can lead to criminal investigations where laws are interpreted flexibly, and facts deliberately twisted. June 2018, Political and prosecutorial pressure on opposition deputies is heightened by the executive intervention against parliament's remaining rights. Turkey's Grand National Assembly, as it is officially called, finds its legislative monopoly gradually hollowed out by excessive use of legislative decrees. This trend began in summer 2016 with emergency decrees under the state of emergency,1013360/Soylu_ne_yapiyor_.htmL and continued with presidential decrees. According to the data collected by the CHP, President Erdogan, since the transition into the new system, wrote and approved 2,229 sections, whereas the parliament discussed only 1,429 sections of legislation.32The National Assembly's budgetary rights are also being further eroded in practice. Already before the transition into the presidential system, one key issue concerning the Assembly's budgetary rights was the29 "Turkey: Opposition Politicians Detained for Four Years”，Human Rights Watch, 19 November 202(), s: hrw.org/news/2020/11/19/turkey-opposition-politicians- detained-four-years.30 See the response to the speech by Cihangir Islam of the conservative religious Felicity Party (SP) on 31 October 2018, (accessed 19 March 2019).31 Mehmet Y. Yilmaz, “The New State, Founded by Negation of the Constitution, Turkish, Hiirriyet, 29 August 2017, anayasasizlastirilarak-kurulan-yeni-devlet 40564290.32 Pinar Tremblay, uIs Turkey Already Done with Executive Presidency? Al Monitor, 18 June 2020, tor /pulse/originals/2020/06/turkey-executive-presidency- proved-to-be-fail-in-two-years.html.SWP BerlinTurkey's Presidential System after Two and a Half Years April 2021growing lack of transparency.33 Similar to 2016 and 2017 budgets in which unspecified expenses were particularly high in "payments to construction com- panies the 2019 draft budget, which was the first to be presented by the President's Office, did not list payments to construction firms for public-private infrastructure projects.34 This is significant because these projects are especially susceptible to corruption. The executive's persistent oven uns without a supplementary budget also undermine the parliament's budgetary rights.35 Moreover, recent legal changes made in October 2020 to the budgetary classification rules also add to the existing ambiguities about transparency and accountability.36The government keeps its cards close to its chest on other issues as well. At the end of August 2018, 435 of 440 parliamentary inquiries to ministries or the President Office had received no response within the specified period.37 The government increasingly refuses even to accept questions, on the grounds that they are formulated in a 'crude' or 'hurtful' way, particularly referring to the use of expressions such as "assimilation9, "torture9, "discriminatory practices'JKurdish entity9 (in Iraq), "violation of rights of civilians, or "sexual violence'.38 In another restriction of parlia-33 On this and the following see the report by the secular business organization TUSIAD, Observations on the Budget of the Central Administration III Turkish (Istanbu