外文翻译-西方银行企业单位治理改造对中国的影响.doc

,本科毕业论文外文翻译外文题目：The influence of western banks on corporate governance in China 出 处：University of Cambridge 作 者：Jane Nolan 原 文：The influence of western banks on corporate governance in ChinaAbstractThis study draws on in-depth qualitative interviews to investigate the variety of institutional forces which influence the adoption of western corporate governance mechanisms in Chinese banks. Following path dependency models of institutional change it was shown that cognitive and normative institutions, including a who you know or guan xi credit culture, mean that the practical influence of western banks on corporate governance reforms was perceived to be ineffectual in most cases. Given the failure of western credit-rating systems in the sub-prime crisis, it is likely that this perception will increase in the future. The majority of western actors believed that the main reason Chinese banks seek to co-operate with western institutions was to enhance the legitimacy of the Chinese bank in the global financial environment, rather than to actively change existing governance me chanisms. Keywords: banking,corporate governance,institutional change,legitimacy seekingIntroductionThe development of Chinas economy has, to date, been driven by its considerable supply of cheap lab our and its many and varied production opportunities. Whether or not capital was allocated efficiently has been of little consequence and, until fairly recently, the financial sector has been characterized by state-owned banks lending to state-owned enterprises on the basis of social policy principles rather than profitability and managerial competence. Yet as Chinas economy advances the development of the financial sector is set to become ever more important. Banks cannot indefinitely continue to make huge loans to inefficient enterprises which will never be repaid and many financial institutions remain compromised by the corporate governance problems associated with having the state as both official regulator and principal shareholder (IFC 2005, Li et al. 2008)That said, the reform of Chinas banks is now well underway and the basic methods employed for restructuring have been large capital injections, the setting up of bad-banks and asset management companies, initial public offerings, partnerships with foreign banks(with the aim of improving management and IT development) and the inclusion of overseas board members to help improve corporate governance. Some see these moves as part of a broader interest by Chinese officials in developing an economic institutional environment which is more reflective of the international business community (Guthrie 1998, Wang 2007). And, at a theoretical level, these adjustments raise some important questions about the nature of institutional change in Chinas economic transition, such as whether China will develop its own unique form of corporate governance, or whether it will converge towards the more market-based models commonly found in the west. While the opening of the market to western banks has been seen as a key plank of there form program me, at the time of writing, many economies in the western world are struggling to cope with the fall-out from the sub-prime mortgage debacle, and the credibility of western banks is under severe strain (Bloomberg 2009). Some have argued that recent events could see economic power shift from west to east and much attentions now focused on the nature of Chinas position in the global economic order (Brown 2008,Time 2009). Chinas banks are now very large, with three in the worlds top 10 by marketcapitalization.1 However, such large assets should not detract from the problems which remain in the Chinese banking system including a shallow talent pool, a shortage of managerial and technical expertise, a local currency that is not convertible and weak corporate governance mechanisms. This study aims to investigate the institutional forces which affect the adoption of western corporate governance mechanisms in Chinese banks. The data comes from a series of in-depth qualitative interviews with senior managers who were either employed in western banks with stockholdings in Chinese institutions, held non-executive directorships of Chinese banks, or had participated in other financial advisory roles. The following sections will enlarge on the corporate governance literature in relation to both western and Chinese banks and discuss the theoretical frameworks which can help explain how goals, beliefs and organizations are structured by institutions. Next, the research methodology will be outlined and the findings will be introduced structured around the institutional forces which influence both internal and external governance mechanisms as well as related technical assistance projects. The study concludes with a discussion of the importance of legitimacy-seeking in motivating Chinese banks to seek collaboration with western institutions and will underscore the importance of local informal institutions in ensuring path dependent change. Finally, some of the key assumptions of western models of governance will be challenged, particularly the belief that market forces alone can ensure the efficient allocation of credit.TheoryIn the west it is possible to distinguish at least two forms of corporate governance: International Finance Corporations (IFC) technical assistance to Chinese banks. Bank Pre-investment At investment Post-investment Bank of Shanghai Since 1995 IFC supported, with funding form Japan and EU, human resources management review, credit analysis, credit policies and procedures Arranged for the adoption of IAS* audits Review of credit procedures, stress test to monitor portfolio risks, SME business diagnostics and SME banking strategy. Bank of Beijing Credit risk management, business strategy development Arranged for the adoption of IAS audits Training for board members, portfolio stress test. China Minsheng Banking Corporation$700,000 in technical assistance at time of establishment; advice on strategic issues and business development, training of staff on credit analysis Arranged for the adoption of IAS audits At the request of Minsheng identified independent director, supported diagnostic review of SME lending and SME strategy development; supported energy efficiency loan program; introduced methodology for portfolio stress test. Nanjing City Commercial Bank Supported risk management training through Price Waterhouse and Coopers Arranged for the adoption of IAS audits With funding from Italy offered series of training programs on risk control; supported board members training; introduced portfolio stress test method . United Rural Cooperative Bank Arranged for the adoption of IAS audits Upgraded credit policy and loan recovery manuals, introduced new credit scoring system; set up a Risk and Compliance Department, and a Credit Review Centre; conducted training on credit management; started branch management and benchmark models. Xian City Bank Training for bank staff on credit analysis Arranged for the adoption of IAS audits Supported credit training program in 2005; advised on acquisition of credit cooperative. China Industrial Bank Arranged for the adoption of IAS audits Provided corporate governance technical assistance in 2004; portfolio stress test in2005; technical assistance on IT frame work; SME lending diagnostics and strategy; supported energy efficiency lending. Asia Pacific Business Review self-interest and decentralized markets are capable of functioning efficiently and fairly; the continental European model based on a stakeholder theory of the firm, where the interests of not just shareholders, but of other groups, such as trade unions and work councils, are also considered (Luo 2007). In East Asia there are also a number of distinctive models including the Keiretsu model in Japan (sets of companies with interlocking relationships and shareholdings) (Witt 2006) and the model in South Korea (Government-supported global conglomerates such as Samsung) (Sung 2003). Liu(2006) has argued that the corporate governance system in China is one which is control based, rather than market orientated because Chinas unique institutional setting means that the regulators and authorities still make extensive use of administrative measures to control developments in the economy.Cousin (2007) argues that corporate governance in Chinese banks poses a distinctive set of problems which are some what different to those encountered by other Chinese firms.First, the principal-agent relations are even more complex because they must take account of a wider range of stakeholders including depositors, lenders, supervisors and regulators(Cao and Zhao 2004). Second because of the importance of the financial system to economic growth and social stability bank failures will not be allowed and in the event of potential collapse they are likely to be saved (Wang and Huang 2004). Of course, recent events in the global economy have shown that this behaviour is not unique to the Chinese system, however the implications of a government guarantee to maintain financial security means that internal controls should, in theory, be much stronger than in industries where the threat of collapse is far more real (Cao and Zhao 2004, Wang and Huang 2004). Finally, information asymmetry is deeper in banks than in other companies because quality in financial intermediation cannot be assessed immediately. For example, non-performing loans tend to be discovered in the future not at the time of issuance (Wei 2005). It is clear that, in the Chinese case, the state has allocated to itself the main role in the banking system and, historically speaking at least, this differentiates Chinese corporate governance models from those found in Anglo-Saxon countries. Officials argue for the merits of this system on the basis that, at Chinas current stage of development, markets would not fairly allocate resources and the government has a responsibility for managing the financial system so that development occurs rapidly, but with stability (Zhou 2004). That there are differences between the Anglo-Saxon and the Chinese models of corporate governance is hardly surprising. The varieties of capitalism research tradition has produced numerous case studies demonstrating that there has been little convergence in terms of governance structures or economic policy making over the last 20 years despite extensive financial globalization (Clarke 2003, Nee 2005, Streek and Thelen 2005). Comparative organizational scholars have also produced many studies which show that firms adopt various modes of economic action and organizational forms which are largely based on the institutional structures embedded in their nation-state base (Boisot and Child 1998, Guillen 2001, Redding and Witt 2007). Moreover, Chinese thinking about international norms has been shown to vary across time, sector and issue (Wang 2007). In a study of policy documents and media commentary, Wang suggests that Chinese officials remain open to international norms in the economic and technical realms but less so to those governing other issues, especially political and military matters. Wang argues that it seems likely that China will abide by prevailing international economic and technical norms and will become an increasingly congruent and co-operative economic partner in the global arena. It is probably fair to say that, at the official level, the reform of Chinas banking system was partly influenced by the policy discourse link up with the international track (yu guoji jieguei) whereby Chinas banks were encouraged to move towards 422 J. Nolan international standards both in terms of product innovation, accounting procedures and corporate governance mechanisms (Cousin 2007, Calomiris 2007, Wang 2007). This publicly-stated objective, does, however, raise interesting questions as to the practicalities of transferring corporate governance practices across culture, and, following Aguiler and Jackson (2003), this study will argue that multiple institutions will interact to influence the perceived legitimacy and utility of western corporate governance practices in the Chinese context. Although there is some discussion over just quite what an institution is, it is probably fair to say that most would agree that an institution encompasses both the informal beliefs and behaviours of a given society and the formal organizations of the state that govern those beliefs and behaviours (Nee 2005). Within this general framework, it is possible to differentiate further between functionalist or rational choice theories and path dependency or varieties of capitalism approaches to institutional change (with the latter sometimes referred to as neo-institutionalism). Each approach rests on different behavioural assumptions (principally the degree to which rational action is limited and shaped by context), and foregrounds different explanatory mechanisms (social networks and ties, state regulations, collective action, transaction-cost economising, and so on) (Nee 2005, Campbell 2004). The fundamental premise of the functional approach is that, in a global arena, institutions tend to converge, or become similar in form, because markets create incentives for actors to replace poor institutions with more efficient ones and actors learn from the behaviour of institutions who survive in the face of competition (North 1990, Weingast2002). In other words, efficient institutions in some way or another promote rational behaviour and reduce transactions costs (Williamson 1981). There are, however, problems in accounting for the pace of institutional change within the functional framework, which, some argue, has been somewhat slower in certain countries than would be expected given efficiency and rational-choice assumptions (Furubotn and Richter 1997).译 文：西方银行公司治理对中国的影响摘要本研究即将深入定性探讨各种影响中资银行的西方银行治理体制。以下的研究需要依赖模型，研究结果表明，改变认知和规范机构，主要依靠知识水平和信用文化的提升，这意味着在大多数情况下实际影响西方银行公司治理的改革是无效的。鉴于西方信用评级在次贷危机系统中的失灵，这种危机在未来很可能会增加。大多数西方银行成员认为中资银行寻求与西方机构合作的主要原因是加强在全球金融环境中的合法性，而不是积极改变现有的管理机制。关键词：银行，企业治理，制度变迁，寻求合法性简介中国经济的发展，迄今为止，依赖于其相当大的廉价劳动力供给和许多不同的生产机会，无论资本有效分配是否有影响，以及当前金融业的特点是在社会政策原则的基础上国有银行贷款给国有企业，而不是在盈利能力和管理能力上。然而，随着中国经济的推进，金融部门的发展将变得越来越重要。银行不能无限期的持续作出巨大的贷款，效益差的企业将无法得到贷款，许多金融机构仍然由于官方调节和主要股东的相关治理问题受损。这就是说，中国银行改革正在顺利进行，它的方法是调整就业结构，注入大量资金，成立“呆账银行”和资产管理公司，公开发行股份，与外资银行建立合作伙伴关系（以改善管理及发展科技资讯为目标）和列入海外董事会成员，以帮助改善公司治理。一些人认为部分更广泛的利益是中国官员在经济体制环境上的发展，这种经济体制环境更重要的是反映了国际业务交流。而且，在理论层面，这些调整提升了中国制度变迁中经济转型的一些重要问题，如中国是否会发展自己独特形势的公司治理，还是会更靠拢常见于西方的以市场为基础的模型。虽然在西方银行公开市场被视为一个改革方案的关键木板，但是，许多西方世界的经济体都疲于应付次贷危机，次级抵押贷款崩溃使西方银行信誉遭受重大打击。有些人认为，最近发生的事件可以看到全球经济要求下经济强国对中国立场的转变，中国的银行现在非常庞大，在世界前10位的资本化市场上排名第三。然而，如此庞大的资产不应减损，其问题在于中国