开放式创新演讲报告.ppt
开放式创新演讲报告 Still waters run deep.流静水深流静水深,人静心深人静心深 Where there is life,there is hope。有生命必有希望。有生命必有希望SelectedpublicationsservicesfirmsMiozzo,M.andYamin,M.(2012)Institutionalandsectoraldeterminantsofheadquarters-subsidiaryrelations:astudyofUKservicemultinationalsinChina,Korea,BrazilandArgentina,Long Range Planning,45,16-40.Massini,S.andMiozzo,M.(2012)Outsourcingandoffshoringofbusinessservices:challengestotheory,managementandgeographyofinnovation,Regional Studies,46(9),1219-1242.Miozzo,M.andGrimshaw,D.(2011)Capabilitiesoflargeservicesoutsourcingfirms:theoutsourcingplusstafftransfermodelinEDSandIBM,Industrial and Corporate Change,20,3,909-940.Grimshaw,D.andMiozzo,M.(2006)InstitutionaleffectsonthemarketforIToutsourcing:analysingclients,suppliersandstafftransferinGermanyandtheUK,Organisation Studies,27,9,1229-1259.Miozzo,M.andGrimshaw,D.(2005)Modularityandinnovationinknowledge-intensivebusinessservices:IToutsourcinginGermanyandtheUK,Research Policy,34,9,1419-1439.Miozzo,M.andSoete,L.(2001)Internationalisationofservices:atechnologicalperspective,Technological Forecasting and Social Change,67,2,159-185.2Researchinterests2.Science based firms:mergers and acquisitions,institutional effects on early firm formation,open innovation and governanceProjects InstituteforSmallBusinessandEntrepreneurship/ESRCResearchandKnowledgeExchangeRAKEgrant,Docrossborderacquisitionsaffectlocalandregionalknowledgecreation,exchangeandspillovers?:ananalysisofknowledge-intensivefirmsintheUK,2010ESRCFollowonFunding,Fundinggaportrap?Effectofforeignacquisitionsofscience-basedfirmsonlocalknowledgetransferandspillovers,2011ORA(ESRC,NSF,DFG),Comparative entrepreneurship:development of early technological and organizational capabilities of new high tech firms”(UK,USA and Germany),2014-2017?3Openinnovationandgovernance:Innovationpartnershipsbetweenindustryanduniversityinscience-basedsectorsMarcela MiozzoManchesterBusinessSchool,UniversityofManchester,UK(jointresearchwithSteve CasperKeckGraduateInstitute,USA)ClosedinnovationmodelSource:Chesbrough(2003:36)OpeninnovationmodelSource:Chesbrough(2003:37)Outside-inprocessInside-outprocessCoupledprocessClosed InnovationExclusivelyinternaltalentAllR&Dperformedinternally,commercialisationFirsttomarketbyoriginalR&DFirsttomarketmonopolisesCompanyperformsallfunctionsandsucceedsIPtopreventcompetitionOpen InnovationInternal&externaltalentFlexibletoincreasevalueNoneedfororiginalR&DBetterbusinessmodelfirsttomarketBestmixofinternal&externalfunctionsIPexchangedknowledgeFromclosedtoopeninnovation?MotivationandaimsofresearchOverthepast25yearspharmaceuticalcompanieshavespent$billionsonlong-termpartnershipswithleadinguniversitiesManypartnershipsfailedtoproduceimportantpatentableinnovationsforpharmaceuticalfirmsAimsoftheresearch:understandrelationbetweenopeninnovationandgovernance(incompletecontractingchallenges)showhowdifferenttypesofindustry-universitypartnershipsneedthecreationofvaryinggovernancearrangements,intermsofformalandinformalcontractualmechanismsusedtomanagepartnershipsTheoreticalbackground1Open innovation and governance:OpeninnovationhelpsexplainwhencollaborationorcontractingfortechnologyandR&Dcanimprovetheinnovativeperformanceoffirms(Chesbrough2003;WestandBogers,2011).Literaturetendstofocusonhowtoacquireanexistinginnovationfromanexternalsource,contractualissuesareoftenofashort-term,transactionalnature(HagedoornandRidder,2012).Wefocusonthegovernanceofthecreationofinnovationinanopeninnovationcontext.Mostoftheliteratureonopeninnovationisconcernedwiththesearchforexternalsourcesofinnovation(thatis,theidentificationofexternalpartnerswhichhavealreadydevelopedaninnovationandaccesstothisinnovation).Wefocusonopeninnovationinscience-basedsectors.Science-basedsectorsfaceprolongedperiodsofriskyinvestmentinresearchanduncertainoutcomes.Theoreticalbackground2Contracts and innovation,approachestoincompletecontracting:Importanceoflegallyenforceablecontracts:creationofmoresophisticatedlegalarrangementse.g.priceescalatordevicesinlong-termsuppliercontracts(Schwartz,1992;EasterbrookandFischel,1991).Importanceofrelationalgovernance:socialnormscreatedwithinthecontextoflong-termrelations(MacNeil,1978;Lamoreauxetal.,2003;Ellickson,1991),learningbymonitoring(Sabel,1993),partiesmaystructureprocessesoftechnicalcollaborationinwaysthatgeneratetherelationalcontractingnormsneededtocollaboratesuccessfully.Contractingforinnovation:braidingoflegallyenforceablecontractsandinformalorrelationalpracticestosupportcollaboration.Particularcontractsforinnovationcreateaprocessfortheregularandmutualexchangeofinformationabouteachpartyscompetencesandwillingnesstocollaborate,bindingthemtoimpreciselydefinedcommonprojectsthroughincreasedswitchingcosts(Gilsonetal.,2009;2010).MethodsInterviewswithalliancemanagers,bothfromindustryanduniversity,andseniormanagersofpharmaceuticalfirmsSecondary:pressarticles,programreviews(UCBerkeley-Novartis)Patentandbibliometricdata(USPTOandWebofScience)MethodsKeyroleoffourdimensionsofgovernance:whetherthereisco-locationornotthetypeoffundingprovidedbypharmaceuticalfirmsthetypeofagreementonintellectualpropertythetypesofcontractingInnovationpartnershipsofpharmaceuticalfirmswithuniversities1.Rights-orientedpartnershipsemphasizingformalcontracts2.Tapping-inpartnershipswithalightlegalframework3.Contractingforinnovationpartnershipswithbiotech-likegovernance1.Rights-orientedpartnershipsemphasizingformalcontractsMulti-year(unrestricted)fundinginexchangeforreach-throughrightsonIPdevelopedinuniversity(plusrestrictedfundsforparticularcollaborativeresearch)Examples:10-year$140min1982J&JandScripps,renewedin19925yearsand$70m;15-year$120min1985PPGandScripps;10-year$200min1997SandozandScripps;5-year$25min1997NovartisandUCBerkeley;and5-year,$100min2007PfizerandScripps.1.Rights-orientedpartnershipsemphasizingformalcontractsGoals:Company:Collaboratewithfacultyfromleadinguniversities/researchinstitutes(windowonscienceespeciallyforconglomeratechemicalfirms)AccesstoIPfromleadinguniversitydepartments/researchinstitutesUniversity:Generalfundstohirenewfacultyoroffersuperiorbenefitstoexistingfacultyandbuildinfrastructure(PPG-Scrippsledto40,000square-footadditiontomolecularbiologybuildingandadditional100scientists)Workingwithpartnershelpsensurethatdiscoverieswillbenefitsociety1.Rights-orientedpartnershipsemphasizingformalcontractsAgencyproblems:UniversitiesandfacultybothhaveincentivestopreservefreedomofactionoverIPUniversities:Receivemoney“upfront”(usuallyyearlypayments),haveanincentivetodominimumnecessaryto“service”partnershipbutotherwisemaintainownershipofpromisingIP(i.e.tolicenseelsewhere)Faculty:Ifaninventiondisclosureispicked-upbytheindustrypartner,thefacultymemberlosesfreedomofactionoverthatdiscovery,strongerfinancialincentivesareavailableforfacultymembertocontinuetodevelopthetechnologyandlicenseitatalaterstageofdevelopment1.Rights-orientedpartnershipsemphasizingformalcontractsChallengestoimplementagreements:Difficultforpharmaceuticalcompanytovetallinformationdisclosuresappropriatelywithintimeframe(60-90days)Gettingittothe“rightperson”“Notinventedhere”syndrome,especiallyduring1980sand1990swhenpharmaceuticalfirmsranlargeinternallyfocusedR&DdepartmentsDifficulttojudgethescientificandcommercialpotentialofveryearlystagedisclosures,especiallyinbiology1.Rights-orientedpartnershipsemphasizingformalcontractsStrategiestopreserveIPownershipbyuniversitydespiterightsdeal:Facultycandiscloseinventionsataveryearlystage(e.g.initialgrantproposal)inwhichthecommercialpotentialisnotatallclear,whichincreasesthe“odds”thatthepharmaceuticalpartnerwill“pass”onadealFacultycan“taketheinventionoutthebackdoor”(studybyGideonMarkhamfoundthatabout10%ofpatentsinventedbyuniversityfacultymaybe“backdoor”candidates)Alliancemanagerscanusesocialcapital/relationalnormstoaskfora“quickreview”inordertopreservefreedomofactionforfaculty1.Rights-orientedpartnershipsemphasizingformalcontractsProblemofadverseselection:FromtheperspectiveoffacultyNIHtypefundingpreservesfreedomofactionoverIP;“starscientists”canpresumablyfindfederalfundingformostresearchSponsoredresearchislikelytobemoreappealingtojuniorfaculty,orfacultywithoutstrongfederalfundingrecords1.Rights-orientedpartnershipsemphasizingformalcontractsProblemoftimeinconsistency:TheUCBPlantGeneticsandMicrobialBiologyDepartmentreceivedalargeportionofthe$25millioninfundingforsponsoredresearchinserviceofthepartnershipsAresearchcommitteewasformedtodecidehowtospendthemoney,butonlyUCBfacultyhadvotingrightsIntheend,all25facultymembersreceivedresearchfundsfromthepartnership,withlittlecontrol/directionbyNovartisCommentbyapostdocinthelabofMichaelFreeling:therewere“fewstrings”inacceptingthemoney,as“theynevertolduswhattodo”(Lau,2004).Novartisdecidednottorenewthepartnership1.Rights-orientedpartnershipsemphasizingformalcontractsEvidencethatcollaborationswerenotsuccessfulinleadingtoco-publicationsortechnologiesBibliometricevidenceNovartis-UCB:1co-authoredpapersPPG-Scripps:5co-authoredpapersJ&J-Scripps:19co-authoredpapersTechnologiesemergingfrompartnershipsforthecompanies:Atleast50start-upcompanieswerestartedbyScrippsfacultyduringthetimeofthePPG,J&JandSandoz/Novartisdeals(1985-2012)(SanDiegoBusinessJournal,2012)ProgramReviewfoundthatNovartisdidnotlicenseanytechnologyoverthecourseofthefiveyearagreementwithUCBerkeleyException:J&J-Scrippspartnershipresultedin4technologiesbeingin-licensed(J&Jcreatedapurpose-builtorganizationtoevaluateandcommercializetechnologyderivedfromScripps)1.Rights-orientedpartnershipsemphasizingformalcontractsRelationalnormsweakwithinformalcontracts:Amajorproblemwithlong-termrights-orientedpartnershipsisthatindustrypartnershadguaranteedlargesumsofmoneyupfrontthroughfixedyearlypayments,limitingtheirabilitytousefinancialincentivestosteerresearchEarlydealsallowedindustryparticipantstositinonuniversityresearchcommittees,butonlyasobserverswithoutvotingrights.Universityalliancemanagersspentconsiderabletime“arranging”researchcollaborationstohelpmeettermsofpartnerships1.Rights-orientedpartnershipsemphasizingformalcontractsSummary:GoalsofindustryanduniversityarenotfullyalignedTheupfront,formalcontractsplusreachthroughrightsusedbythesepartnershipsdonotcreatestrongenoughincentivesordecision-makingmechanismstoalignuniversities,andespecially“starfaculty,”withthegoalsofthepartnershipProblemsofadverseselectionandtimeinconsistencyInsuchcases,governanceagreementsneedtohelppartiesachievecooperationThelackofco-locationisanadditionalissuewithmanypartnerships-nexttopic2.Tapping-inpartnershipswithalightlegalframeworkOverthelast10-15yearspharmaceuticalcompanieshaveopenednewresearchfacilitiesnearbyleadinguniversities,withthegoalof“tappingin”touniversityresearchGoalofindustryistopromotecollaborationwithuniversityscientists,tapintoexternalsourcesofknowledgecreationwhilealsocreatingcapabilitiestointernalizeitNovartisanearlyproponent,openedlargeR&DcentersnearMITandUCSD/Scrippsinlate1990s2.Tapping-inpartnershipswithalightlegalframeworkExample:GenomicsInstituteoftheNovartisResearchFoundation(GNF)in1999incloseproximitytoScrippsandUCSDStrongacademicorientation,directorprominentchemistPeterSchultz,fullprofessoratScrippsSigned“masteragreements”withUSCDandScripps,nomonetarycontributionbutinkindcontributioninstead,jointproposalsreviewedbydecisionboard,standardrulesofinventorship2.Tapping-inpartnershipswithalightlegalframeworkCo-publicationsbetweenNovartisandregionalacademicscientists,1997-2010:Note,NovartisBostonismuchlargerthanGNF2.Tapping-inpartnershipswithalightlegalframeworkEvidenceofpublicationbutfewtechnologies:158articlesco-authoredbyGNFandUCSD2007-2012Donotgeneratetechnologiesforcommercialization:Only3patentsco-assignedtoScrippsandNovartisscientistsduring1997-2007timeperiod(i.e.patentsresultingfromcollaborations)PreliminaryevidencefromBostonsimilar(manypublications,fewpatents)2.Tapping-inpartnershipswithalightlegalframeworkProblemofconflictofinterests:Academicscientistspowerfulbargainingposition,havelowincentivestoorientcollaborationstowardscommercialaims.Juniorindustryscientistshaveastrongincentivetopublishinordertocreatecareerflexibility,privateincentivestoco-publishonimportantbasicresearchwithoutconsiderationofimportancetohisorheremployer2.Tapping-inpartnershipswithalightlegalframeworkSummary:TappinginpartnershipalignstheincentivesofbothacademicandindustryscientisttocollaborateinresearchProjectsoftenusedtogenerateearlystageorpreliminarydatathatcouldbeusedbyjuniorfacultyasthebasisoffederalgrantproposalsDuetothebasicresearchemphasis,thepartnershipisunlikelytoproducescientificfindingswithdirectcommercialapplicability,suchassmallmoleculedrugcandidatesPartnershipdoesnotattract“entrepreneurialprofessors”toengageincollaborations3.Contractingforinnovationpartnershipswithbiotech-likegovernancePharmaceuticalcompaniesseeuniversitiesasimportantpartnerswithinincreasinglydistributedinnovationnetworkstodevelopdrugsExample5-year,$85min2010Pfizer-UCSanFrancisco,partofaprogramtodevelopaseriesofdrugdiscoverypartnershipswithleadinguniversities(similarpartnershipshavebeenlaunchedbyPfizerwithUCSDandaconsortiumofNewYorkCityuniversities);7-year$90min2012Merck-ScrippstocreatetheCaliforniaInstituteofBiomedicalResearch(Calibr),ledbyScrippsprofessorPeterSchulz3.Contractingforinnovationpartnershipswithbiotech-likegovernanceComplexgovernancearrangementsthatincludeupfrontfundingplusdownstreampaymentstouniversities/participatingfacultydependingonmilestonesbeingachievedmodeledonbiotechCo-locationofanindustrylabnearuniversitycollaboratorsdedicatedtothepartnershipGovernancestructuresdesignedtocreatestrongrelationalcontractingnorms(braidingoflegallyenforceablecontractsandinformalorrelationalpracticestosupportcollaboration)3.Contractingforinnovationpartnershipswithbiotech-likegovernanceExample:Pfizer-UCSFpartnershipdescribedbyPfizerasmotivatedby“openinnovation”(inadditionto$85m,openresearchcentrenearUCSF)Fundingusedtohirepostdocswhocanfreelyworkinbothacademicandindustrylabs“ThePfizerandUCSFresearcherscanvisiteachotherslabs,conductexperimentstogetherandparticipateinjointteam-meetings”(quotefromUCSFalliancemanager,OBrien2011)MasteragreementdefinesclearIPrights,milestonepayments,IPjointlyowned,withPfizerhavinganexclusive(timelimited)option,termsoflicencenegotiatedMorefocused,basedonresearchatamoreadvancedstagethanpreviouspartnershipsandfocusedonproteinbiologics,noconflictbetweentheobjectiveofdrugdevelopmentandacademicmissiontopublish3.Contractingforinnovationpartnershipswithbiotech-likegovernanceGovernancedesignedtopromoterelationalmodeofdecision-making:JointgovernanceofprojectselectionandcontinuedfundingOversightcommitteewithequalmembershipofPfizerandUCSFscientists,allwithvotingpowerConsensusnormdevelopedinearlydecisionsPartnershiptermshaveincentivizedseniorscientistsatUCSFtosolicitproposals5ofinitial8technologiesfundedfromdepartmentheads,chiefsathospital,orcenterdirectorsatUCSF3.Contractingforinnovationpartnershipswithbiotech-likegovernanceGovernancedesignedtopromoterelationalmodeofdecision-making:Officeofinnovation,technologyandalliancesheavilyinvolved,facilitatingon-goingprojectwork,e.g.budgetmanagement,locati
