意大利的“一带一路”倡议：热那亚和的里雅斯特的港口.docx

1<二日。7。 6, 6 一 89g6800a6 N8SI - B0960 一 97 NSS1The Belt and Road Initiative in Italy: The Ports of Genoa and TriesteThe Belt and Road Initiative in Italy:The Ports of Genoa and Triesteby Francesca Ghiretti*IntroductionPorts and maritime infrastructures are some of the core elements of China's connectivity-boosting Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in that they help the People's Republic to access foreign markets and gain more control of trade routes. Jonathan Holslag, The Si Ik Road Trap. How China's Trade Ambitions Challenge Europe, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2019, p. 97.Ports and maritime infrastructures are some of the core elements of China's connectivity-boosting Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in that they help the People's Republic to access foreign markets and gain more control of trade routes. Jonathan Holslag, The Si Ik Road Trap. How China's Trade Ambitions Challenge Europe, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2019, p. 97. As such, BRI-related deals involving ports have been a special focus of the debate, and concerns, surrounding the Initiative.The greater relevance of Northern European ports over those in Southern Europe has long been a fact. Rotterdam in the Netherlands, Antwerp in Belgium and Hamburg in Germany have been thriving for decades as Europe's main maritime hubs, and future access to the Arctic route has the potential to further strengthen their position. This, to a certain extent, might come at the expense of other European ports.Yet, in recent years, Southern European ports have received growing attention. Their new attractiveness can be traced to two factors: the expansion of the Suez Canal, which has increased the volume of trade into and from the Mediterranean; and Chinese investments in maritime infrastructures in Southern Europe. The Suez Canal development was completed in 2016, the same year that China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) acquired 51 per cent of the Port of Piraeus in Greece. Kerin Hope, "Greece Picks China's Cosco in Port Deal"，in Financial Times, 20 January 2016, s:/ e5-846f-79b0e3d20eaf.Francesca Ghiretti is a researcher at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome and a Leverhulme doctoral fellow at King's College London., Paper prepared in the framework of the IAI project “When Italy embraces the BRI”，which aims to analyse the development of BRI agreements in Italy. The latter is the origin of most concerns regarding Chinese investments in European ports and, specifically, those located in Southern Europe. The argumentThe Belt and Road Initiative in Italy: The Ports of Genoa and Trieste1<二日。7。 6, 6 一 89g6800a6 N8SI - B0960 一 97 NSS1further railway connections to which the Connecting Europe Facility, a financial instrument supporting connectivity across and beyond the European Union, has added 6.5 million euro. "Port of Trieste, 39 Million Euros from EIB to Reinforce Railway"，in AdriaPorts, 9 December 2019, .Trihub is not the only potential collaboration between the Port of Trieste and a Chinese counterpart dating from before March 2019. In 2018, CMG showed an interest and opened talks to invest in the soon-to-be-completed Logistic Intermodal Platform. Worth 130 million euro, this was at the time owned by Francesco Parisi S.p.A., a shipping company, and ICOP S.p.A., a construction company. The new logistic pla廿0rm is built on an area of 120,000 square metres reclaimed from the sea and connected directly to railways and motorways. Nicola P. Contessi, "Italy, China's Latest Gateway to Europe", cit.5. The Memorandum of Understanding of March 2019The MoUs of the Port of Genoa and the Port of Trieste with CCCC are included in the list of commercial agreements signed in March 2019 within the framework of the broader Sino-Italian MoU in support of the BRI. Asked about the nature of these arrangements, stakeholders contend that they were nothing more than broad and general frameworks of cooperation, an expression of intent to further develop and enhance ties with CCCC in the context of an improved trade relationship between Italy and China. Point 2 of paragraph II of the MoU between the two countries which concerns transport, logistics and infrastructure indeed reads as follows:Italy and the People's Republic of China share a common vision about the improvement of accessible, safe, inclusive and sustainable transport. The Parties will cooperate in the development of infrastructure connectivity, including financing, interoperability and logistics, in areas of mutual interest (such as roads, railways, bridges, civil aviation, ports, energy including renewables and natural gas and telecommunications). Italy and China, Memorandum of Understanding., cit., p. 3.The wording does not suggest any precise objective or project; however, some more-specific ideas were being explored. The MoU then continues by directly mentioning the BRI and the potential "synergies" between the Chinese project and the development of Italy's transport system, which does not stop at ports. Notably, the explicit mention of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) and the “EU-China Connectivity Pla廿orm"，two European connectivity frameworks, has a double meaning. First, it underlines how the MoU was situated under the Ell umbrella, and was not a rogue Italian initiative as feared. Second, it suggests that for the Chinese, the MoU with Italy was one of a number of moves through which they intended to enjoy much greater participation in the Italian and EuropeanThe Belt and Road Initiative in Italy: The Ports of Genoa and Trieste1<二日。7。 6, 6 一 89g6800a6 N8SI - B0960 一 97 NSS1transport and infrastructure sector.Some more “pragmatic“ aspects are mentioned such as quicker customs clearance, more significant funding for sustainable and digitalised transportation, and transparent and non-discriminatory procurement. These objectives remain vague, however. The exception is the deliberate inclusion of transparent and non- discriminatory procurement, which underlines Italy's commitment to sign off on an agreement bound to existing legal and regulatory frameworks. Ibid., p. 4.Besides outlining broad and general future collaborations, the MoU included little to no detail. Yet, the more specific agreements and developments that followed were undoubtedly the result of the agreement signed in March 2019. If the offer made to the WLSPA and the EASPA were very similar, they were received differently leading to marginally different outcomes. Despite some developments, it will be shown how, to this day, what followed remains mostly inconsequential.6. After March 2019For clarity, this section will first look at the MoU developments with the WLSPA and then move on to the EASPA. It must be acknowledged that some of the developments might have been directly or indirectly impaired by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Alongside this, the change of government in Italy that took place in September 2019 when the populist coalition between the Five Star Movement and League gave way to a new coalition formed by, again, the Five Star Movement and mainstream centre-left parties (Democratic Party and Italia Viva) is also relevant. The change of government did not necessarily amount to a drastic change of view towards China but it did signal a return to an approach fully embedded in Italy's traditional system of alliances, both European and transatlantic. This return saw its consolidation in February 2021 with a new administration led by former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi.6.1 The Western Ligurian Sea Port AuthorityAfter March 2019, CCCC offered the WLSPA participation in a new logistics park in China in order to sell Italian products. This offer was complemented by the option for Italian enterprises to sell their products on an online platform operated by CCCC. These initiatives, while aimed at local enterprises, were expected to be coordinated by the Port Authority. To this day, however, the WLSPA has not participated in the creation of the proposed logistics park; it appears that this venture was not a viable option for the Port Authority, which at the time did not have the financial capacity for such an investment. Interview with an official of the Ports of Genoa.After March 2019, CCCC offered the WLSPA participation in a new logistics park in China in order to sell Italian products. This offer was complemented by the option for Italian enterprises to sell their products on an online platform operated by CCCC. These initiatives, while aimed at local enterprises, were expected to be coordinated by the Port Authority. To this day, however, the WLSPA has not participated in the creation of the proposed logistics park; it appears that this venture was not a viable option for the Port Authority, which at the time did not have the financial capacity for such an investment. Interview with an official of the Ports of Genoa.The Belt and Road Initiative in Italy: The Ports of Genoa and Trieste1<二日。7。 6, 6 一 89g6800a6 N8SI - B0960 一 97 NSS11<二日。7。 6, 6 一 89g6800a6 N8SI - B0960 一 97 NSS1The WLSPA organised meetings with its local confederation of employers in order to explore their interest in selling products in China through the proposed and/ or other online pla廿orms, but the relatively small size of most Italian enterprises made the process more complicated than its Chinese counterpart expected. Even if firms were interested in using the online platform offered by CCCC, getting their products to China constituted a rather tricky endeavour. The relatively limited amount of potential exports a reflection of the small-to-medium size of the exporting companies involved hardly covered the cost of shipping. In other words, the size of the Italian enterprises prevents them from conducting large- scale shipping making the Chinese offer ultimately difficult to capitalise on. The WLSPA has been exploring the possibility of gathering the products of all the enterprises willing to participate and then shipping them together, but has yet to make progress in this direction. In the meantime, similar agreements regarding the selling of Italian products on Chinese online pla廿orms have been brought forward by other Italian actors. Nicola Bilotta, “China's Belt and Road Initiative in Italy: An Analysis of Financial Cooperation”，in I A / Papers, No. 21|18 (April 2021), forthcoming.Another, more important reason behind CCCC's interest in the WLSPA concerns the Chinese company5s potential participation in a public bid to construct a new breakwater dam, the largest project at the port of Genoa (worth about 1 billion euro). CCCC may also be interested in further expanding COSCOS and Qingdao's activities, already present in Vado Ligure, to the Port of Genoa. "Porto Genova, con la nuova diga foranea unlnica banchina lunga 3,2 km”, in Telenord, 7 August2020, s:/telenord.it/porto-genova-con-la-nuova-diga-foranea-un-unica-barichina-lunga-3-2- km. Neither plan had gone ahead at the time of writing. CCCC participated in the public bid for the breakwater dam but ended up seventh among the candidates and was therefore excluded from the tender. Invitalia, Lotto 1 - Centrale di Committenza per AdSP - Nuova diga foranea del porto di Genova: servizio di progettazione di fattibilita tecnica ed economica afferente alTintervento di real/zzazione della nuova diga foranea, 6 November 2019, id/000151-2018/idL/1. An MoU between the Port of Qingdao and the Port of Genoa was under discussion but is yet to be finalised. Thus, as far as we know, the MoU between the Western Ligurian Sea Port Authority and CCCC has been largely inconsequential. Progress has only been made regarding the above-mentioned new terminal at Vado Ligure which, however, is not part of the MoU signed in March 2019 and does not involve CCCC. We can thus safely state that the MoU, thus far, has had little impact on the ports under the WLSPA and the authority's relationship with Chinese companies. Therefore, it has not led to any potential exposure of Italy to new risks.The Belt and Road Initiative in Italy: The Ports of Genoa and Trieste1<二日。7。 6, 6 一 89g6800a6 N8SI - B0960 一 97 NSS11<二日。7。 6, 6 一 89g6800a6 N8SI - B0960 一 97 NSS16.2 The Eastern Adriatic Sea Port AuthorityAfter the MoU signing in March 2019, the Port of Trieste signed a second and more specific MoU with CCCC in November 2019 in Shanghai, in the presence of Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio. "Porti: intesa Trieste con CCCC per aree industrial! Cina"，in Ansa, 5 November 2019, . ansa.it/friuliveneziagiulia/notizie/2019/11/05/porti-intesa-trieste-con-cccc-per-aree-industriali- cina_5db65b54-7a4a-4605-805b-536886926eb7.html.After the MoU signing in March 2019, the Port of Trieste signed a second and more specific MoU with CCCC in November 2019 in Shanghai, in the presence of Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio. "Porti: intesa Trieste con CCCC per aree industrial! Cina"，in Ansa, 5 November 2019, . ansa.it/friuliveneziagiulia/notizie/2019/11/05/porti-intesa-trieste-con-cccc-per-aree-industriali- cina_5db65b54-7a4a-4605-805b-536886926eb7.html. This latter agreement built on the premise of spring 2019, meaning developing the collaboration between the EASPA and CCCC.甲 Eastern Adriatic Sea Port Authority and CCCC, Accordo di cooperazione fra Autorita di s/stema portuale del Mare Adriatico Orientate port/ di Trieste e Monfalcone e China Communications Construction Company. 23 March 2019, uploads/2019/03/Accordo_AdSPTM-CCCC.pdf. Its specific areas of cooperation concerned the presence of the Port Authority in China, CCCC's presence in the Italian port and collaborations in third countries.The first collaboration plan covered opportunities for the Port of Trieste in China, and basically mirrored the offer made to Genoa: first, participation in new logistics parks in China involving Shanghai, Ningbo and Shenzhen; second, the option for Italian enterprises to sell their products on the online platform operated by CCCC. Like the offer to Genoa's ports, the proposal was made to local businesses, although the Port of Trieste's authority would coordinate trade.4/ Interview with an exponent from the Port of Trieste.Unlike the case of Genoa, officials from the EASPA travelled to China to assess the areas where the logistics parks could emerge. However, the latest update from the Port Authority shows that this section of the agreement has not progressed any further. In a pattern all too often seen with Chinese companies, promises are made but nothing follows. The Port of Trieste has nonetheless launched a pilot project for local wine producers to sell their goods on the online platform offered by CCCC. There is one prerequisite, however: companies wishing to avail themselves of this facility must be large enterprises. The pilot project selected ten entities that would send samples of their products to China to