希腊：从海上边缘政策到对话.docx

Table of ContentsExecutive SummaryiI. Introduction1Turkey-Greece: Old Rivals, New Tensions3A. Fifty Fraught Years3B. A Multi-faceted Dispute 6The View from Turkey 9A. Cyprus and the Nationalist Turn9B. A Convergence of Adversaries 12C. A Two-pronged Approach 14The View from Greece18II. From Brinkmanship to Dialogue 26A. Steer Clear of Red Lines and Provocations26B. Avoiding the Worst28C. Improving Bilateral Ties and Cooperation30D. Bringing a Constructive Attitude to Cyprus Talks31E. Outside Actors32Conclusion 36APPENDICESMap of Maritime Delimitation Areas37A. List of Issues in the Turkish-Greek Aegean SeaDispute 38About the International Crisis Group 41B. Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Europe and Central Asia since 2018 42Crisis Group Board of Trusteesvmic research in uncontested waters until 15 June 2021 (see the map in Appendix A listing Ankara's navigational advisories for Oruq Reis and depicting the ship's exploration areas).B. A Multi-faceted DisputeAs it has evolved over the years, the Greek-Turkish maritime dispute has come to encompass a web of intertwining disputes and overlapping issues.First there are disputes over Turke/s maritime boundaries with the Greek islands off its Aegean and southern coasts, where Ankara and Athens have each stretched to make claims over rocks, seas and skies. Among the most far-reaching are Greece's assertion that Kastellorizo, a 12 sq km island within swimming distance of Turkey, may claim an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extending 200 nautical miles from its coastline, drastically cutting into the zone that Turkey would claim for itself.1R In a declared EEZ, according to international law, coastal states have the right to explore and exploit natural and living resources while other states cannot do so without the coastal state's permission. Coastal states can also build artificial islands, installations and other structures, and conduct scientific research. All other states continue to enjoy freedom of navigation and overflight in EEZs and can also lay submarine cables and pipelines. While often the term EEZ is used interchangeably with '"continental shelf there are some differences between the two. First, the continental shelf includes only resources in the seabed and subsoil - and not living resources in the water column, such as pelagic fisheries, and the water surface. Secondly, the maximum extent of the EEZ measured from the baseline of the territorial sea limit of a coastal state is 200 nautical miles, while a state's continental shelf may extend beyond that limit up to 350 nautical miles depending on a number of geographic characteristics. Compared to the continental shelf, EEZ is a new concept, having emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. Since then, states have usually preferred to delimit their EEZs/shelves together with a single delimitation line. See the relevant applicable international legal instruments, including Articles 55, 58 and 76 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Crisis Group correspondence, maritime lawyer, May 2021. For its part, Turkey negotiated a maritime delimitation (ie, boundary) agreement with the UN-recognised government in Tripoli in 2019 that ignores the potential zones that might extend from sizeable Greek islands, including Rhodes and Crete" Many other delimitation issues also arise with respect to the jigsaw puzzle of more than 2,400 islands (most of them Greek) scattered across the Aegean Sea.Secondly, the parties disagree about what should be on the agenda between them. Beyond delimitation issues, Turkey wants to add to the list two more items. One is the demilitarisation of certain Greek islands in the eastern Aegean and the status of “grey zones"，hundreds of uninhabited Aegean islets and rocks not explicitly mentioned in international treaties. Ankara says Greek military deployments on islands near Turkey have shifted the delicate security balance in the region.19 Where EEZ boundaries butt up against one another, UNCLOS (to which Greece is a party and Turkey is not) says the parties must demarcate them through negotiation. But it does not prescribe how they should do so. See “UN Convention on the Law of the Sea”, op. cit.20 Crisis Group interviews, Turkish officials, September 2020-March 2021. Crisis Group correspondence, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, April 2021. It fears Athens5 possible extension of its territorial waters in the Aegean and claim of large continental shelf areas for its eastern Aegean islands; should Greece do so, it would block Turkey out of shipping lanes traversing the Aegean high seas that Ankara sees as an economic and security lifeline. See Crisis Group Europe Briefing N°64, Turkey and Greece: Time to Settle the Aegean Dispute, 19 July 2011； and Galip Dalay, uIs There a New Window of Opportunity in the Eastern Mediterranean Crisis?”，Brookings Institution, 9 December 2020.Greece refuses to consider either issue. In the former case, Athens argues that demilitarisation would undermine Greek national security in the face ofTurke/s continued threat. Athens cites Turkey's 1974 military intervention in Cyprus and the presence of the Turkish 4th Army in Izmir as evidence of a credible threat. It also notes Turkey's statements that Greek extension of maritime sovereignty claims to 12 nautical miles would be casus belli. uThere is political consensus in Greece on this, history has shown Turkey's aggressive tendencies. In the case of emergency, it's not as easy to transfer units to the islands as it is for mainland Greece, via roads. In order for any fruitful discussion to be held on that, trust has to be built up in other domains, and this will take many years (certainly more than a decade)”, said a retired Greek lieutenant general. Crisis Group online interviews, Greek military experts, April and March 2021. See also Appendix B. A declaration from Greece to the court in 2015 outlines the issues that Athens sees as outside the courts jurisdiction. See "(Declarations Recognising the Court's Jurisdiction as Compulsory”, 14 January 2015. To apply to the ICJ, the sides would need to jointly submit questions they cannot agree on bilaterally. See uAegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece V. Turkey), Request For The Indication of Interim Measures of Protection"，ICJ, 11 September 1976. "Turkey's Views Regarding the Settlement of the Aegean Problems”, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d. In the latter case, it says international treaties offer sufficient guidance as to which isles belong to whom. (For a description of the parties' technical positions concerning the Aegean Sea dispute's various dimensions, see Appendix B.)Thirdly, in addition to differing about what should be part of prospective negotiations, the parties cannot agree on a framework through which to address their disagreements. Officials in Athens have long insisted that the ICJ adjudicate delimitation issues.23 Turkey sees the countries, maritime disputes as something that the parties must first try to resolve bilaterally; it does not rule out arbitration or recourse to the ICJ but says whatever mechanism the parties choose should cover all Aegean issues over which the two differ - not just delimitation.Beyond these issues, the unresolved dispute over Cyprus and Turkey See “The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and Future Scenarios”, PRIO Cyprus Centre, 2013; and “Egypt's Natural Gas Crisis"，Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 January 2016.s concerns about the growing economic and military cooperation among its regional rivals are stoking tensions. The discovery of gas in the Mediterranean seabed by Israel in 2008, Cyprus in 2011 and Egypt in 2015 raised the stakes, with Turkey worried that it will be cut out, along with its allies the Turkish Cypriots.25But the MID-2020 escalation was not about gas per se. In fact, the waters where Turkey and Greece deployed naval forces are far from any known deposits. The acrimony that comes from festering clashes over sovereignty fuels and is fuelled by bilateral spats over military manoeuvres, minority rights and cultural heritage. On the two sides5 differences on such issues, see Ali Dayioglu and Ilksoy Aslim, '"Reciprocity Problem between Greece and Turkey: The Case of Muslim-Turkish and Greek Minorities”, Athens Journal of History, vol. 1, no. 1 (January 2015); and Eleni Gavra, Anastasia Bourlidou and Klairi Gkioufi, uMan- agement of the Greeks, Ekistics and Cultural Heritage in Turkey”, European Regional Science Association, August 2012. Meanwhile,Greece accuses Turkey of permitting migrants from across war-torn regions of South Asia and the Middle East to leave its shores for Greek islands or the mainland border as a means of leverage. Turkey retorts with allegations that Greece is harbouring individuals whom Ankara views as terrorists, including alleged members of the PKK and . the group it labels the Fethullahist Terrorist Organisation, or FETO.27 In looking for ways to find common ground, it is necessary to examine the drivers of the parties' behaviour, including how domestic politics in Ankara and Athens are thwarting attempts at reconciliation. 27 Since 2016, the Turkish state has used the designation Fethullahist Terrorist Organisation, or FethuUahqi Teror Orgiitii, abbreviated in Turkish as FETO, to refer to followers of Fethullah Giilen, a Turkish Islamic preacher self-exiled in the U.S. since 1999. Ankara holds what it calls FETO responsible for the 15 July 2016 coup attempt and accuses it of infiltrating state institutions. Gulen,s followers refer to him as their spiritual leader and to the movement as the Giilen, or Hizmet, movement. See Crisis Group Europe Report N0258, Calibrating the Response: Turkey's ISIS Returnees, 29 June 2020.III. The View from TurkeyAnkara's increasingly assertive approach to defending its maritime interests, particularly since early 2019, has been driven by two major frustrations: it believes, first, that Turkey and Turkish Cypriots are being excluded from potential energy riches, including by a pipeline plan; and, secondly, that other Mediterranean states are pursuing a containment policy that will chip away at Turkey's sovereignty, economic security and geopolitical reach. But Ankara is also clearly uncomfortable with the idea of being isolated.J Ilhan Uzgel, ''Turkey and the Mediterranean Imbroglio: The Stoiy of an Aspiring Regional Power”, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, November 2020. SeePolicy of Zero Problems with Our Neighbours, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, n.d. See Mesut Yegen, uThe Kurdish Peace Process in Turkey: Genesis, Evolution and Prospects,) Istanbul §ehir University, May 2015. Crisis Group interview, Istanbul, January 2021. Recently, it has begun making diplomatic overtures to rebuild bridges with regional powers and the West and to undercut backing for Greece.A. Cyprus and the Nationalist TurnThe failure of Erdogan's efforts to reconcile with adversaries at home and abroad in his first decade in power led to disillusionment among Turke/s political elite and his embrace over time of harder-line approaches.29As prime minister from 2003 to 2014, Erdogan took steps to address some of the grievances of Turkey's Kurds and pursued negotiations with the PKK - albeit fitfully 一 which drew the ire of Turkish nationalists.3° He also took relatively conciliatory positions concerning Cyprus reunification, talks with Athens and normalisation of ties with Yerevan - widely described as a policy of “zero problems with neighbours” 一 that upended Ankara's foreign policy traditions. He was bolstered in these initiatives by a vibrant economy, friendly relations with Washington and Brussels, and support from Kurds and liberals in Turkey. But Erdogan won no diplomatic victory on any of these fronts, and in the meantime found himself bleeding votes from nationalists who argued that Ankara's concessions were not serving Turke/s interests. uAny more compromise and he wouldnl have been able to maintain power”, said a presidential palace source.31The situation in Cyprus, which is foremost among the issues shaping Turkey's approach to the eastern Mediterranean today, has played into Erdogan's political evolution. Following the 1974 invasion that divided the island, Ankara became the only country in the world to recognise the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which was declared in 1983 on the third of the island where Turkey maintains a military presence. Nationalists in Turkey have fiercely defended the de facto republic and its claimed prerogatives ever since. But in the period between 2003- 2014, Erdogan made a volte-face. In the face of nationalist resistance, he supported a settlement plan championed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to reunify the island at UN-sponsored talks. In tandem, the EU offered Nicosia a path to accession in 2003, with some inside the bloc arguing that the prospect would encourage Turkish Cypriots to support reunification. Turkish Cypriots did in fact vote for the Annan Plan in a referendum. Greece backed Nicosia's accession and also supported Turke/s EU aspirations.32Still, the settlement plan ultimately failed. In their own referendum, Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan; nevertheless, the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU in 2004.33 The Turkish foreign ministry warned the EU that the Greek Cypriots did not have "au- thority to represent the whole of Cyprus or the Turkish Cypriots”.34 Leaders in Ankara were also disturbed that the EU failed to fulfil its promises to increase aid and start trade with the de facto Turkish Cypriot entity following the Turkish Cypriot vote in favour of reunification in 2004. (EU leaders at the time had pledged to “put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community”.35) Despite these disappointments, Erdogan's AK Party government started its own EU accession negotiations in 2005.36The unresolved feud over Cyprus fed maritime disputes between Turkey and Greece, and vice versa. Turkey does not recognise the Republic of Cyprus and holds that it cannot enter delimitation agreements or exploit natural resources in the eastern Mediterranean without sharing revenues with the de facto republic in the north. Turkish officials say they began voicing concerns about the rights ofTurkish Cypriots when Cyprus signed its first maritime delimitation deal with Egypt in 2003.37 After its EU accession, the Republic of Cyprus went on to sign new delimitation deals, with Lebanon in 2007 and Israel in 2010.38 These all became sources of friction with Ankara.Turkey also grew embittered by the influence that Greek Cypriots gained over the EU's approach to Turkey. a European countries, in addition to missing opportunities for diplomacy, gave in to the spoiled actions of Greece and the Greek Cypriot admin-"Greece was