海湾国家主权财富基金的前景不确定.docx

Julien Maire was a research analyst at the Peterson Institute for International Economics from November 2019 through October 2020. He worked with C. Fred Bergsten Senior Fellow Olivier Blanchard on issues related to macroeconomic policy. Adnan Mazarei is nonresident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. He was a deputy director at the International Monetary Fund. Edwin M. Truman, senior fellow at the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government at Harvard's Kennedy School, was associated with the Peterson Institute for International Economics from 2001 to 2020. He joined the Institute as a senior fellow and was nonresident senior fellow from July 2013 through December 2020.An earlier version of this Policy Brief was presented at the Seventh Annual Gulf Studies Forum, on December 1, 2020. The authors are grateful for helpful comments and support from Mahmoud EI-GamaL Sean Hagan, Cullen Hendrix, Barbara Kami, Madona Devasahayam, Steve Weisman, Tim Willems, and Eva Zhang.21-4 Uncertain Prospects for Sovereign Wealth Funds of Gulf CountriesJulien Maire, Adnan Mazarei, and Edwin M. TrumanFebruary 2021Government-owned or controlled investment vehicles known as sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have become increasingly important players in the world economy in the last two decades. Among the best-known SWFs are those funded by hydrocarbon revenues in the member economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)Z which comprises all of the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf except Iraq, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the Un什ed Arab Emirates.Several factors, including the decline in oil prices in recent years, have slowed the growth of the GCC's SWFs. This slower growth could further diminish their governance and transparency standards, which are already weaker than those of other SWFs.Even before the recent sharp decline in oil prices and the COVID-19 pandemic, the GCC economies and their SWFs faced daunting challenges in adjusting to lower hydrocarbon revenues. The risk has increased that demand for energy exports by the world's oil-producing countries will decline, leaving these countries increasingly vulnerable to fiscal difficulties. These long-term pressures have been compounded by the sharp decline in oil revenues and the expected drawing on SWF resources to help cover the fiscal consequences of the pandemic.' Unless the GCC countries privatize some of their oil assets (as Saudi Arabia did with Aramco) and use the proceeds to fund their SWFs, the assets of the SWFs funded from oil and gas revenues are likely to decline, or at least grow at a slower rate, in the coming years. These trends could increase public scrutiny over their investment patterns, financial results, and governance. Efforts to improve their governance and accountability will be important to garner public support for these SWFs.A companion Policy Brief assesses improvements in transparency and accountability of SWFs globally (Maire, Mazarei, and Truman 2021). It describes1 See Global SWF Times newsletter; September 2020.1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW | Washington, DC 20036-1903 USA | +1.202.328.9000 | Table 5Selected economic indicators for GCC countriesActualProjectedAverageGCC = Gulf Cooperation Council Source: IMF (2020b).Indicator2OOO-1620172018201920202021Real GDP growth (percent)4.7-0.21.90.7-6.02.3Real nonoil growth (percent)6.42.11.72.4-5.72.9Current account balance (percent of GDP)14.32.88.65.8-1.80.4Overall fiscal balance (percent of GDP)7.6-5.6-1.5-2.0-9.2-5.7Government debt (percent of GDP)24.425.525.630.441.443.0External debt (percent of GDP)29.750.950.658.773.572.6Inflation (annual percent)2.90.22.2-1.51.52.9IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC POLICIES AND GOVERNANCE OF SWFs IN THE GCCThe pandemic effected a complex mixture of supply and demand impacts. It has interrupted global supply chains and caused a deep drop in demand around the world, especially for commodities, including oil. The unforeseeable path of the pandemic, of the speed and extent of adoption of vaccines, and of the resulting economic impacts has upset expectations regarding global economic prospects, creating very high levels of uncertainty that will complicate both economic and social policies.GCC policymakers have taken an array of actions to mitigate the impact of the double shock of the pandemic and lower oil prices. The IMF's COVID-19 Policy Tracker describes the measures the GCC countries took. These actions have included measures to stimulate the economy and cushion the impact of the twin shocks on nonoil output and employment. Some public investment plans are being delayed or reconsidered.Shrinking financial means and heightened social stress because of the pandemic will test the performance of SWFs (Bortolotti, Fotak, and Hogg 2020). Their governance will very likely become more central in economic policymaking and in social and political debates. Several issues could become important in those debates:1 The financial performance of SWFs could deteriorate. The global economy is experiencing a large negative tail event. An event with a small probability of occurring that has substantial consequences. Following the drop in oil prices and the pandemic, GCC SWFs are not only less likely to receive large inflows from their governments, they are also likely to contribute significantly to the defense of their countries1 economies. Their assets could lose value as a result of the decline in global asset prices. In March 2020, estimates of those losses were in the range of $225 billion to $300 billion; some of these losses has since been recouped. SWFs could experience further losses, however albeit probably less than feared in 2020. In addition to losses on their assets, in a world with much greater uncertainty (and with greater responsibility for domestic investmnts in their own economies), assessing long-term returns is much more difficult. SWFs other than stabilization-oriented funds have longer investment horizons than other investors, but it is likely that their owners and managers, as well as the general publics, will focus more on short-term performance, because governments may draw on their SWFs for near-term fiscal support.2 SWFs' investment strategies may become more difficult to explain and justify and subject to greater scrutiny. In a world of tail events, SWFs' investment strategies and performance will be more difficult to articulate and defend. In particular, issues will arise regarding investments abroad by SWFs that may be trying to take advantage of distressed international asset prices and diversify income sources. Questions will focus on the reasonableness of investing abroad while there are increasingly urgent needs at home, especially at a time when citizens are being asked to pay higher taxes.In addition, the management of various risks by SWFs will likely become more complicated and more closely scrutinized. These risks include market, credit, operational, liquidity, legal, regulatory, agency, governance, and reputational risks (Al-Hassan et al. 2013). In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, managers will need to explain and justify how they, as long- term investors, anticipate or modify their investment strategies with regard to tail events.3 SWFs may be under pressure to contribute to the economic diversification of their economies. With the expected long-term decline in oil revenues, SWFs will likely come under pressure to contribute more and more quickly to the diversification of their domestic economies. This new role could make assessment of the returns on their portfolios more complex, as not only the returns to the SWFs themselves but also the social returns from engaging in projects for diversifying domestic economies need to be measured.4 The relationships between SWFs and their governments are likely to become more complicated. Contributing to the fiscal costs of addressing the pandemic and lower oil prices should be viewed as broadly consistent w什h the SWFs1 mandates. There will, however, be questions about the size and pace of governments1 payments into and withdrawals from SWFs and whether they are based on rules or are ad hoc. The recent experience of Iran's National Development Fund (NDF) offers some insights. Iran In Kuwait, for example, the government and parliament have been at odds over withdrawals from the Kuwait SWF. suffering not only from the pandemic and the drop in oil prices but also from draconian US sanctions. In these circumstances, the guidelines for deposits into and withdrawals from the NDF have not been followed (Islamic Parliament Research Center of the Islamic Republic of Iran 2019).15 Attempts to resolve the conflict between the government and parliament led to a change in arrangements over the transfer of funds from Kuwait's SWF to the government. Only 2 of the 10 GCC SWFs on the 2019 SWF scoreboard (Mubodalo and Duboi Holding) have clear rules on the uses of their funds by the government. In contrast, 74 percent of non-GCC SWFs have such rules.5 Concerns about the political motivations of SWFs may rearise. Concerns about the contribution of oil exporters to global (current account) imbalances have declined since oil prices declined. However, concerns about the political motivations of SWFsvoiced vociferously before the global financial crisis could arise again in the new era of populism and protectionism in many host countries.'6It is likely that the governance and accountability of SWFs will become matters of greater public interest and concern, both at home and abroad.Against the background of these issues, it is likely that the governance and accountability of SWFs will become matters of greater public interest and concern, both at home and abroad. Examination of the aspects of the governance and transparency of SWFs that the SWF scoreboard captures will likely intensify. Questions will be raised about (1) modifying the mandates of SWFs to allow them to play greater roles in the diversification and domestic economic development of their host economies (as opposed to focusing on saving revenues for future generations), as well to deal with highly consequential tail events, in light of the short timeframe before environmental or other factors further reduce the oil revenues of the GCC countries; (2) the processes governing the making of decisions about the overall strategy of SWFs, especially with regard to their investments and budgetary contributions; and (3) the transparency and accountability of the funds. Further progress on governance and accountability, which the SWF scoreboard and the Santiago Principles New scrutiny could also follow attempts by SWFs to take advantage of distressed assets abroad. The aborted attempt of the Saudi Public Investment Fund to buy UK soccer club Newcastle United was one such example; both Labor and Conservative members of the UK Parliament resisted it, after scrutinizing Saudi Arabia's human rights record at home and its role in the Yemeni civil war. The Santiago Principles, or formally the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices, were drafted by the International Working Group of SWFs to promote transparency, good governance, and accountability of SWFs. See Das, Mazarei, and Stuart (2010). are designed to capture, will support SWFs in achieving their objectives by increasing the trust of their citizens, including by ensuring that SWFs operate at arm's length from their governments, with an appropriate set of checks and balances.REFERENCESAl-Hassanz Abdullah, Michael PapaioannoUz Martin Skancke, and Cheng Chih Sung. 2013. Sovereign Wealth Funds: Aspects of Governance Structures and Investment Management. IMF Working Paper WP/13/231. Washington: International Monetary Fund.Bagnall, Allie E.z and Edwin M. Truman. 2013. Progress on Sovereign Wealth Fund Transparency and Accountability: An Updated SWF Scoreboard. PIIE Policy Brief 13-19. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics.Bortolotti, Bernardo, Vejko Fotak, and Chloe Hogg. 2020. Sovereign Wealth Funds and the COVID-19 Shock: Economic and Financial Resilience in Resource-Rich Countries. Available at .Dqs, Udaibir S., Adnan Mazarei, and Alison Stuart. 2010. Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Santiago Principles. In Economics of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Issues for Policymakers, ed. Udaibir S. Das, Adnan Mazarei, and Han van der Hoorn. Washington: International Monetary Fund.Hendrix, Cullen S. 2019. Kicking A Crude Hob什：Diversifying away from Oil and Gas in the Twenty-First Century. International Journal of Applied Economics 33, no. 2.IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2020a. Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia. April. Washington: International Monetary Fund.IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2020b. Regional Economic Outlook Update: Middle East and Central Asia. October. Washington: International Monetary Fund.Islamic Parliament Research Center of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 2019. Analysis of the 2019/20 Budget Bill. 73. National Development Fund (in Persian). Tehran: Parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran.Moire, Julien, Adnan Mazarei, and Edwin M. Truman. 2021. Sovereign Wealth Funds Are Growing More Slowly, and Governance Issues Remain. PIIE Policy Brief 21-3. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics.Mazarei, Adnan. 2019. Efforts of Oil Exporters in the Middle East and North Africa to Diversify Away from Oil Have Fallen Short. PIIE Policy Brief 19-6. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics.Mirzoev, Tokhir, Ling Zhu, Yong, Andrea Pescatori, and Akito Matsumoto. 2020. The Future of Oil and Fiscal Sustainability in the GCC Region. Washington: International Monetary Fund.Stone, Sarah, and Edwin M. Truman. 2016. Uneven Progress on Sovereign Wealth Fund Transparency and Accountability. PIIE Policy Brief 16-18. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics.Truman, Edwin M. 2007. Sovereign Wealth Fund Acquisitions and Other Foreign Government Investments in the United States: Assessing the Economic and National Security Implications. Testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, November 14. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics.Truman, Edwin M. 2008. A Blueprint for Sovereign Wealth Funds Best Practices. PIIE Policy Brief 08-3. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics.Truman, Edwin M. 2010. Sovereign Wealth Funds: Threat or Salvation? Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics.Truman, Edwin M. 2017. Sovereign Wealth Fund Transparency and Accountability Explored. Wake Forest Law Review 52, no. 4: 997-1026.how the SWF scoreboard, originally devised by Truman (2007, 2008, 2010),