农产品质量安全论文：基于标准的农产品质量安全管制的进化博弈分析.docx
农产品质量安全论文：基于标准的农产品质量安全管制的进化博弈分析【中文摘要】农产品质量安全不仅关系到人们的身体健康、生命安全,也关系到国家的经济发展、社会稳定,各国政府都非常重视农产品质量安全问题。但近年来,从三聚氰胺到地沟油再到瘦肉精,安全事件的屡次发生反映了农产品质量安全的形势相当严峻。一边是国家相关法律法规的不断出台,多个部门的联合监管,对农产品质量安全的高度重视,一边是层出不穷的农产品(食品)安全事件,说明生产者没有尽到社会责任,监管者没有做好本职工作,说明现有的农产品质量安全监管体系还不够完善,需要改进。农产品质量安全标准是政府履行农产品质量安全监督管理职能的基础,是农产品生产经营者自控的准绳,是判断农产品质量安全的依据,是开展农产品产地认定和产品认证的依据,更是各级政府部门开展例行监测和市场监督抽查的依据。本文以农产品质量安全标准的约束为前提,作为管制的依据,研究什么样的市场环境造成农产品生产者群体与政府监管部门的现状,什么样的市场激励能够促使生产者更好的遵循农产品质量安全标准。本文的主体内容有三个部分：(1)农产品质量安全管制的理论依据；(2)通过进化博弈分析研究促使农产品生产者和政府监管部门向积极方向演化的影响因素；(3)通过案例分析研究发生农产品(食品)安全事件的原因。通过分析得到如下结论：(1)农产品生产者方面,减少生产者执行农产品质量安全标准时的成本,加强监管力度,加大对消极执行农产品质量安全标准企业的惩罚力度,增加出现安全事故时企业的处罚额度、赔付额度,将有利于企业向积极执行农产品质量安全标准方向演化。(2)监管部门方面,加大对消极监管的监管人员的处罚力度,减少积极监管时的成本费用,有助于监管部门向积极监管部门方向演化。管制的是通过改变农产品生产者和政府监管部门的成本收益比进而改变两者对于执行农产品质量安全标准和监管的主观态度,促使他们向社会期望的方向转化。在上述分析和已得结论的基础上,提出了完善我国农产品质量安全监管体系的对策建议,主要包括四个方面：一是降低生产者积极执行农产品质量安全标准的成本；二是完善农产品质量安全标准体系和检测体系；三是如何对监管者进行监管；四是给予消费者监督足够的重视。【英文摘要】Agricultural products quality safety to which governments have attached great importance not only related to peoples health, life safety, but also to the countrys economic development, social stability. But in recent years, from the melamine to the waste oil and then to clenbuterol, the repeated occurrence of security incidents reflects the situation of agricultural products quality safety is quite grim. The relevant laws and regulations rolling out, the joint supervision of several departments, great importance attached to agricultural products the quality safety; while the endless stream of agricultural products (food) security events, indicates that producers are not doing social responsibility, regulators did not do their job, that existing agricultural products quality safety supervision system is not perfect, needs improvement.Agricultural product quality safety standards is the foundation of the Government to fulfill the functions of agricultural product quality safety supervision and management, is the criterion of self-control of producers and operators of agricultural, a basis for judging the quality and safety of agricultural products, basis to carry out agricultural produce certification and product certification, even more basis for government departments at all levels to carry out routine monitoring and market supervision and inspection. This paper, with the constraints of agricultural products quality and safety standards as a precondition, as the regulation basis, researches what kind of market environment causing the situation of agricultural and government regulators, what kind of market incentives to encourage producers to better follow agricultural product quality safety standardsMain content of this article has three parts:(1) the theoretical basis of agricultural product quality safety regulation; (2) By evolutionary game analysis research the influence factors to promote agricultural producers and government regulators evolved to the positive direction; (3) Through case studies the causes of agricultural products (food) security incidents.The following conclusions by analyzing:(1) On agricultural producers, to reduce the costs of the producers implementing quality and safety standards of agricultural products, to strengthen supervision and to increase the punishment of negative implementation of agricultural product quality safety standards, to increase the penalty amount and compensation amount of enterprises when security accident, will help enterprises to evolve to the direction of actively implementing agricultural product quality safety standards.(2)On regulators, to increase the punishment of the negative regulators, to reduce the cost of active monitoring, will help regulators to evolve to the direction of actively monitoring. Purpose of regulation is by changing the cost benefit ratio of the agricultural producers and government regulators thus to change the subjective attitude for the implementation of agricultural products quality safety standards and regulation, urging their conversion to the direction of social expectations.In the basis of above analysis and results, puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions for supervision system of agricultural products quality safety, mainly including four aspects:reduce costs of producers actively executive standard of produce quality safety; perfect standard system and inspection system of produce quality safety; how to monitor regulator; gives consumers supervision and enough attention.【关键词】农产品质量安全 管制 标准 进化博弈【英文关键词】Agricultural products quality safety Regulation Standard Evolutionary Game【目录】基于标准的农产品质量安全管制的进化博弈分析 摘要 4-5 Abstract 5-6 1 导论 9-16 1.1 研究背景与意义 9-11 1.1.1 研究背景 9-10 1.1.2 研究意义 10-11 1.2 研究目的与研究内容 11 1.2.1 研究目的 11 1.2.2 研究内容 11 1.3 概念界定 11-14 1.3.1 标准 11-12 1.3.2 农产品 12 1.3.3 无公害农产品、绿色食品、有机食品 12-13 1.3.4 农产品质量安全标准 13-14 1.3.5 管制 14 1.4 研究方法与技术路线 14-15 1.4.1 研究方法 14-15 1.4.2 技术路线 15 1.5 可能的创新之处与不足之处 15-16 1.5.1 可能的创新之处 15 1.5.2 不足之处 15-16 2 文献综述 16-21 2.1 农产品质量安全标准研究 16-17 2.1.1 农产品质量安全标准体系研究 16-17 2.1.2 具体农产品质量安全标准研究 17 2.2 农产品质量安全生产者行为研究 17-18 2.3 农产品质量安全政府行为研究 18-19 2.4 博弈及进化博弈在管制方面的应用 19-20 2.5 简要评述 20-21 3 农产品质量安全管制的理论依据 21-24 3.1 信息不对称理论 21-22 3.1.1 理论简介 21 3.1.2 信息不对称与农产品质量安全管制 21-22 3.2 外部性理论 22 3.2.1 理论简介 22 3.2.2 外部性与农产品质量安全管制 22 3.3 交易成本理论 22-24 3.3.1 理论简介 22-23 3.3.2 交易成本与农产品质量安全管制 23-24 4 农产品生产者生产行为与政府监管行为选择的博弈机理 24-27 4.1 农产品质量安全中生产者现状与政府监管现状 24 4.2 农户的生产行为及影响因素 24-25 4.3 企业的生产行为及影响因素 25 4.4 政府的监管行为及影响因素 25-26 4.5 农产品生产者与政府监管部门行为选择的博弈机理 26-27 5 农产品质量安全生产者行为的进化博弈分析 27-37 5.1 进化博弈概述 27-28 5.2 农户生产行为的进化博弈分析 28-30 5.2.1 基本假设 28 5.2.2 支付分析与稳定点分析 28-29 5.2.3 小结 29-30 5.3 企业生产行为的进化博弈分析 30-34 5.3.1 基本假设 30 5.3.2 支付分析与稳定点分析 30-31 5.3.3 考虑贿赂情况下企业生产行为进化博弈分析 31-32 5.3.4 考虑质量安全附加值情况下企业生产行为进化博弈分析 32-33 5.3.5 小结 33-34 5.4 农户与企业生产行为的进化博弈分析 34-37 5.4.1 基本假设 34 5.4.2 支付分析与稳定点分析 34-36 5.4.3 小结 36-37 6 农产品质量安全管制的进化博弈分析 37-53 6.1 政府监管部门与农户的进化博弈分析 37-39 6.1.1 基本假设 37 6.1.2 支付分析与稳定点分析 37-39 6.1.3 小结 39 6.2 政府监管部门与企业的进化博弈分析 39-45 6.2.1 基本假设 39-40 6.2.2 支付分析与稳定点分析 40-44 6.2.4 小结 44-45 6.3 存在贿赂情况下政府监管部门与企业的进化博弈分析 45-50 6.3.1 基本假设 45 6.3.2 支付分析与稳定点分析 45-49 6.3.3 小结 49-50 6.4 消费者与企业的进化博弈分析 50-53 6.4.1 基本假设 50 6.4.2 支付分析与稳定点分析 50-52 6.4.3 小结 52-53 7 案例分析 53-59 7.1 基本情况 53 7.2 事件经过 53-55 7.3 事件原因 55-57 7.4 三鹿事件案例分析 57-59 8 结论与对策建议 59-62 8.1 结论 59 8.2 对策建议 59-62 参考文献 62-65 致谢 65-66 附录 66
