税收征管对董事会监督与代理成本关系的调节作用研究,企业管理硕士论文.docx

税收征管对董事会监督与代理成本关系的调节作用研究,企业管理硕士论文The corporation is the product of principal-agent relationship, and its healthy development is inseparable from the governance work, which involves a series of internal and external institutional arrangements. Moreover, as the core of the mechanism design, the board supervision is crucial for ensuring the company s scientific decision-making and proper operation, suppressing the agency costs even enhancing the company s value. In fact, whether the board can effectively play a role in supervision, not only depends on its own some characteristics (such as the structural features that reflect independence and operation characteristics of diligence) but also influenced by external environmental factors. In countries with economies in transition, the relatively unfavorable external environment will weaken the role of formal institutional arrangements for corporation governance, including board supervision. Scholars have turned to seek informal institutional arrangements for supplement or even substitution effect, which successively involved in multiple themes including taxation system.Taxation System is an important legal system of the nation, including taxation system design and tax administration. Compared with taxation system design, the change cycle oftax administration is shorter and the frequency of change is higher. Therefore, it is easier to observe and measure theimpact on corporation governance. So, thepresent literature are mostly focuses on the potential impact of tax administration oncorporation governance. At present, China is undergoing a period of economic and social transformation. The effect of the formal institutional arrangements for corporation governance is unsatisfactory, and the sustainable development of corporation is obviously restricted by the bottleneck of governance. How to improve the corporation governance in the existing institutional framework is an urgent task to be solved. Based on it, this article takes the A-share non-financial listed company in Shanghai and Shen zhen stock markets as a research sample from 2018 to 2021, which adopts the checking rate to depict the level of tax administration, and combines the theme of the board supervision to empirically investigate the corporation governance effects of the tax system. Contrary to the direct effect of present literature that mainly concentration on and support the tax system, we are more interested in indirect effects and believe that it is more theoretically logical. The results of statistical analysis also confirm this point that effective board supervision can significantly reduce two types of agency c o s t s ( a d m i n i s t r a t i o n e x p e n s e a n d c o n n e c t e d t r a n s a c t i o n ) . H o w e v e r, t a xadmi nistr a tion doe s not dire ctly affec t the two types of a gency cos t s, but plays a positive regulatory role in the relationship between the board supervision andthe agency costs. More precisely, the level of tax administration is adjusting the negative relationship between the board supervision of directors and the two types ofagency cost, which is consistent in the two dimensions of the board structure and operating characteristics. The research work of this article will help us better acquaintance and evaluate the corporation governance effect of taxation system, at the same time, it provides a useful reference for improving the corporation governance mechanism design during the economic transformation period in China. KEYWORDS: board supervision; tax administration; agency cost。 (银广夏陷阱揭开了银广夏丑恶的面纱、2001 年 10 月蓝田造假案的案发，类似的例子还有很多。丑闻的屡屡发生究其根本原因，显然是与公司治理、尤其是正式治理没有能发挥应有的作用存在着千丝万缕的关系。 在以中国和俄罗斯为主要代表的处于经济转型特殊时期的国家，由于法律制度的不完善、股权的过度集中、市场的监管不力等多种原因的存在，公司内外腐败现象频发已成为不可否认的事实，治理主体经常被治理客体所俘获，长此以往，既有的治理体系本应该发挥的作用被逐步弱化，治理效果差强人意，于是便出现了 Stiglitz(1992)所描绘叙述的公司治理构造普遍失败的不良现象。基于此种情况，在进一步寻求正式治理优化与完善的的同时，学者们也渐渐开场在非正式治理层面找寻具有补充、或是具有替代作用的制度布置，当前学术界认可的有：市场竞争、新闻媒体以及宗教文化等一系列主题，税收制度也成为学者们争相研究的对象。尽管税收制度是国家一项非常重要的法律制度，但是税收制度之所以能够发挥公司治理效应主要是由于税收制度在运行经过中具有独特的正外部性，正因如此，在公司治理研究领域中，专家学者们将税收制度纳入法律外制度，也就是非正式治理的范畴。 税收制度包括税制设计与征收征管两个维度，而税制设计与征收征管对公司和高管行为的可能影响在机理上存在些许的差异，并且税收征管相对于税制设计来讲更具有弹性，因而本文主要以我们国家经济转型为研究背景，结合董事会监督这一主题，聚焦税收制度运行而非税制设计即征收管理活动对公司治理产生的作用，以期能够为进一步完善我们国家现行的公司治理机制设计提供理论上的根据以及政策上的建议。 第二节 研究意义。 公司能够健康有序的运行直接关乎国民经济的持续稳定发展，这需要公司治理的保驾护航，而公司治理机制的完善对于维持公司的健康发展具有重大的促进作用。公司治理的主要问题无非是代理成本问题，近年来，怎样有效的抑制代理成本问题不仅仅仅是理论界研究的热门课题，也是实务界争相寻找的答案:。本文在既有公司治理制度框架下，结合了董事会监督主题，探寻求索税收征管的治理效应，不仅具有积极而重要的理论意义，同时也具有现实意义。 一、理论意义。 第一，有助于深化对公司治理法律外制度的认知和理解，找到法律制度与法律外制度，正式治理与非正式治理的契合点，丰富公司治理的理论研究工作。 公司治理的理论体系，通常更重视法律制度正式治理。即使是关注法律外制度的研究，也往往是从主效应视角展开验证，对新闻媒体、税收征管乃至宗教文化治理作用的考察皆是如此。事实上，法律外制度非正式治理，更多属于环境因素，在公司治理中发挥调节效应，具有强化或者弱化既有法律制度正式治理的作用，可能更为符合基本的理论逻辑。本文基于此种思路，对税收征管即税收制度的运行层面的治理作用进行研究，有助于愈加深入认识公司治理法律制度与法律外制度的关系，丰富公司治理的理论研究工作。 第二，有助于更为全面地理解董事会监督与代理成本的关系，厘清外部影响因素，完善公司治理的机制设计。 董事会监督作为公司治理机制设计的核心部分，有效的董事会监督对于降低无论是第一类代理成本还是第二类代理成本都具有正面的作用，这在理论界大量文献中是得以具体表现出的，研究结论已经得到普遍认可，然而董事会的监督作用除了取决于本身的构造特征和运行特征外，外部环境因素的影响也是不可否认的现实存在。本文将税收征管引入董事会监督与代理成本关系的研究中，意在考察特定外部环境因素在二者关系间存在的潜在调节效应，为完善公司治理机制设计找寻全新的线索和根据。 二、现实意义。 第一,有助于在既有制度框架下改善我们国家企业的公司治理实践。我们国家当前正处于经济社会转型的特殊时期，公司治理的正式制度所起到的作用并没有到达预期的效果，而税收制度尤其是税收征管能够有效的发挥公司治理作用，主要源于税收制度所具备的在运行经过中的正外部性。本文研究意义在于为低成本甚至无成本地提升公司治理效果提供了愈加宽阔的思路和现实选择。 第二，为加强税收征管提供税收之外的根据。税收制度作为国家一项非常重要法律制度，无论是优化税制设计还是加强税收征管，其目的都是为了维护国家税收利益，保障国家职能实现所需要的物质资源。税收制度公司治理效应的存在，使得加强税收征管，有了微观企业层面的根据。