从移民视角看COVID-19危 机的恢复力.docx

ContentsSummary xAcknowledgementsRemittance Flows Proved to Be Resilient in 2020 21. Outlook for 2021 -22 14Policy Issues162. Regional trends in Migration and Remittance Flows 20Remittances to East Asia and the Pacific declined in 2020202.1 Remittances to Europe and Central Asia Fell Sharply in 2020 amid the Consequences of the Coronavirus and Lower Oil Prices.22Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean Were Resilient in 2020 and Are Expected to Continue Their Positive Growth in 2021252.2 Remittances to the Middle East and North Africa continued to rise in 202028Remittances to South Asia Unexpectedly Grew in 2020.302.3 Remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa Declined in 2020331 - Remittance Flows Proved to Be Resilient in 2020Defying predictions, remittance flows have proved to be resilient during the COVID-19 crisis. In 2020, remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) reached $540 billion, only 1.6 percent below the $548 billion seen in 2019 (figure 1.1 and table 1.1). The decline was smaller than the predictions published in April and October 2020 (see World Bank 2020a and 2020b). It was even smaller than the rate of decline registered during the global financial crisis in 2009. And the decline in remittances is far lower than the 11 percent decline in foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to LMICs seen in 2020.Thus, the gap between remittances and FDI widened further (figure 1.1 a). Excluding China, FDI flows to LMICs declined by over 30 percent in 2020. As a result, remittance flows to LMICs other than China surpassed the sum of FDI and official development assistance (ODA) in 2020 (figure 1.1b).Among regions, remittances to Latin America and Caribbean grew by 6.5 percent in 2020 and were supported by a recovering economy and moderately improving labor market in the United States. In South Asia, there was a slight moderation in the growth of remittance flows in 2020, to 5.2 percent, while flows to the Middle East and North Africa grew by a modest 2.3 percent Flows to Europe and Central Asia are estimated to have fallen by 9.7 percent, to East Asia and the Pacific by 7.9 percent, and to Sub- Saharan Africa by 12.5 percent.In 2020, in current US dollar terms, the top five remittance recipient countries were India, China, Mexico, the Philippines, and Egypt India has been the largest recipient of remittances since 2008 (box 1.1). As a share of gross domestic product, by contrast, the top five recipients in 2020 were smaller economies: Tonga, Lebanon, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan,and El Salvador. The United States was the largest source country for remittances in 2020, followed by the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and the Russian Federation.There was a sharp temporary drop in remittance flows in the second quarter (Q2) of 2020, as lockdowns and travel bans imposed in response to the COVID-19 crisis also shut down remittance services (figure 1.2). It is pos- sible that migrants postponed sending money during the initial chaos in late March and April 2020. But even if they had money to send, they could not send cash, as money transfer operators had temporarily closed their offices. Travel restrictions affected in-kind or cash remittances carried by hand by travelers. However as some of the strict lockdowns were lifted, there was a recovery in Q3 and Q4 in Latin America and the Caribbean (and other regions).The initial decline in remittance flows affected almost all countries, especially those in the Europe and Central Asia region. There were a few exceptions, however; remittance flows to Bangladesh, Mexico, and Pakistan continued to increase, for reasons discussed below. Among regions, Latin America and the Caribbean and South Asia were more resilient to the crisis and saw the strongest growth (table 1.1). Remittances to Latin America and Caribbean grew by 6.5 percent in 2020 and were supported by a recovering economy and moderately improving labor market in the United States. In South Asia, there was a slight moderation in the growth of remittance flows in 2020, to 5.2 percent, while the Middle East and North Africa grew by a modest 2.3 percent Flows to Europe and Central Asia are estimated to have fallen by 9.7 percent, to East Asia and the Pacific by 7.9 percent, and to Sub- Saharan Africa by 12.5 percent.Estimates and Projections of Remittance Flows to Low- and Middle Income RegionsSoL/rce: World Bank-KNOMAD staff estimates. See appendix in Migration and Development Brief 32 for forecasting methods (World Bank 2020c).Region20092015201620172018billion20192020e2021 f2022fLow- and Middle-Income countries302446441478524548540553565East Asia and Pacific80128128134143148136139142Europe and Central Asia334243525962565450Latin America and Caribbean556873818996103108112Middle East and North Africa315049525355565759South Asia75118111117132140147152158Sub-Saharan Africa284137414948424344World433602597640694719702713726(Growth rate, percent)Low- and Middle-Income countries-4.80.5-1.38.49.84.6-1.62.62.2East Asia and Pacific-4.83.7-0.55.16.83.0-7.92.12.1Europe and Central Asia-11.3-15.32.121.012.94.6-9.7-3.2-6.9Latin America and Caribbean-12.36.57.411.19.98.36.54.94.0Middle East and North Africa-6.0-6.4-1.25.32.33.42.32.63.1South Asia4.51.6-5.96.012.36.15.23.54.0Sub-Saharan Africa-2.16.6-8.310.817.4-0.4-12.52.61.6World-5.0-1.3-0.87.18.53.7-2.41.51.8Note: e = estimate, f =forecastFigure 1.1a Remittances, Foreign Direct Investment, and Official Development Assistance Flows to Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 1990-2022($ billion)Sources: World Bank-<-KNOMAD staff estimates; World Development Indicators; International Monetary Fund (IMF) Balance of Payments Statistics. See appendix in the Migration and Development Brief 32 for forecasting methods (World Bank 2020c).Note: FDI = foreign direct investment; ODA = official development assistance; e = estimate; f = forecastFigure 1.1 b Remittances, Foreign Direct Investment, and Official Development Assistance Flows to Low- and Middle-Income Countries, Excluding China, 1990-2022($ billion)Sources: World Bank*i-KNOMAD staff estimates; World Development Indicators; International Monetary Fund (IMF) Balance of Payments Statistics. See appendix in the Migration and Development Brief 32 for forecasting methods (World Bank 2020c).Note: FDI = foreign direct investment; ODA = official development assistance; e = estimate; f = forecasti ur( I 2 Remittances Plummeted in Q2 2020, but Recovered in Q3 and Q4Percent (year-over-year growth)50-3010 I I I I . I I I . Ill I I It -二 aBE_08 一n ussspzesme-sI eu>06BZBH pup PCSO8 pceq<pc9 I jo .d&Qss 一isqznp 一 SA0EWqluoouI P一 SBuopu-£noso6<vusuow p>opo工oppro山OPB>-PSUJQ4I SUBJ一s-CUO4B3P u_UP 一 ssnarUBPOI5.A6 山dOJx ZA6A>!- 1(uu豆taff. S3£dd三£dDst I E-PEsenDMA dpu 一No I 8UOOWk- I P 一O6UOWBa I PUB一至一orldI pAu B>| wI qscupp-6up8an dcyx ugu 一 Eoatic I -BdcvNnal I OUXBWer I uss&£Ha I POEBSce: 1 _np_8sou _ _ _ _ _ o o o o o 1 3 5 7 9The remittances industry has participated in the rapid acceleration of digitalization that is observable in multiple dimensions of firms9 and households9 reactions to the COVID 19 crisis. Starting June 2020, remittance flows through digital channels increased, especially for migrants with access to bank accounts and credit cards. Many leading money transfer operators reported double-digit growth in their digital services, in sharp contrast to a fall in their cash remittance services. The switch from cash to digital channels seems to have continued throughout 2020. Recent data showed that cross-border remittances processed via mobile money increased by 65 percent in 2020 (from $7.7 billion in 2019 to $12 billion in 2020), reaching over $1 billion in transactions sent and received each month (Andersson and Naghavi 2021, GSMA).It is believed that there was also a broad shift in flows from informal to formal channels in 2020. Since digital remittances are better recorded than cash remittances, especially those carried by hand or sent through other informal channels, official data are likely to record more remittances even if the true size of remittances may be falling. This observation is consistent with the fact that a large number of households surveyed in Q2 reported receiving lower remittances since the start of COVID-19 in Mexico (35 percent) and the Dominican Republic (54 percent) even as central banks recorded higher inflows (table 1.2).1 The true size of remittances, which includes formal and informal flows, is believed to be larger than officially reported data, though the extent of the impact of COVID-19 on informal flows is uncleanF h- l 2 A Shift from Informal to Formal Remittance-Sending Channels? Indications from Household Surveys% of households reporting a fall in Year-on-year change in remittance remittance receipts in Q2inflow in Q2Mexico35%10%Dominican Republic54%18%Source: World Bank, COVID-19 High Frequency Monitoring Dashboard; IMF Balance of Payments Statistics.Box 1.1 Top Remittance Source and Recipient CountriesIn 2020, in current US dollar terms, the top five remittance recipient countries were India, China, Mexico, the Philippines, and Egypt (figure B1.1.1). India has been the largest recipient of remittances since 2008. As a share of gross domestic product, by contrast, the top five recipients in 2020 were smaller economies: Tonga, Lebanon, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and El SalvadorData on remittance outflows typically get less attention than data on remittance inflows.The largest remittance-sending countries are a mix of high-income countries from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and large middle-income countries. The United States was the largest sender in 2020, recording around $68 billion in outflows, followed by the United Arab Emirates ($43 billion) and Saudi Arabia ($35 billion). Among middle-income countries, Russia is a large sender ($17 billion) due to its sizable immigrant stockfrom Europe and Central Asia, as the country's remittance outflows are more correlated with oil prices than are those from Saudi Arabia, which reported an 11 percent growth in outbound remittances in 2020.According to the United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA 2020), the worldwide number of international migrants (including refugees) was estimated at 281 million in 2020. The top host countries for migrants are the United States (51 million), Germany (16 million), Saudi Arabia (13 million), Russia (12 million), the United Kingdom (9 million), the United Arab Emirates (9 million), France (9 million), Canada (8 million), Australia (8 million), and Spain (7 million). These countries account for about half of the total international migration stock.Source: World Bank-KNOMAD staff.Figure Bl .1.1 Top Recipients among Low- and Middle-Income Countries($ billion, 2020)($ billion, 2020)(Percentage of GDP, 2020)8338This is not the first time that remittance flows have proved resilient during a crisis; the same thing was observed, for example, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. In fact, remittances often rise in times of financial crisis or natural disasters in the recipient country (Ratha 2009; World Bank 2010). Even during a crisis in the host country, migrants may try to reduce consumption (or rent payments) and draw on their savings to continue to send money home.2 During the COVID-19 crisis, the need for financial support for families back home has risen, for essential goods and services including health care. Remittances have provided a lifeline for families back home struggling with loss of income and pandemic-induced economic slowdown. Unable and perhaps unwilling to take the risk of traveling to home countries, migrants have tried to send as much money home as they can. Remittances have therefore become an important consumption smoothing mechanism for the recipient households and, as such, they form an increasingly important (private) element of global social protection systems.Counter-cyclical fiscal policy, especially cash transfer and employment support programs implemented in many large economies, also propped up activity and employment levels. In addition, even when people were laid off, such programs cushioned a fall in personal incomes and consumption, including those offoreign-born persons3. On the other hand, they supported businesses in continuing the employment of workers (Murthi and Rutkowski 2021 ).4The economic performance of major migranthost countries, especially those in North America and Europe, proved to be significantly better in 2020 than the growth rates projected in March and April. The International Monetary Fund 9s projection for the 2020 GDP growth rate was revised upwards in October last yean and again, the preliminary estimate of the GDP growth rate for 2020 released in April 2021 was even higher (table 1.3). A very large drop in GDP and consumption in South Asia-relative to declines in remittance-source countries9 GDP due to the pandemicis likely to be another factor behind an increase in remittances by migrants trying to support families needing help.5Consistent with this picture of sharper-than-ex- pected recovery, in the United States, the largest migrant-host country, the employment level of foreign-born workers fell by 21 percent in April 2020 compared to February 2020, but steadily recovered afterwards (figure 1.3). The recovery in employment levels together with cash transfers received directly from the government enabled migrants to send remittances to family and friends back in origin countries. This is an interesting distinguishing feature of the COVID-19 crisis, compared to the global financial crisis of 2009 (see table 1.4).Table 1-3 Revisions to IMF growth forecastsSource: IMF World Economic Outlook, 2020, 2021; Immigrant stock data from UN DESA.CountryImmigrant stock, 2020 (million)Apr.2020 forecastsOct.2020 forecastsApr. 2021 forecastsChange in 2020 forecast202020212020202120202021Oct20-Apr20Apr21-Oct20Apr21-Apr20U.S.A.50.6-5.94,7-4.33.1-3.56.41.60.82.4Germany15.8-75.2-64.2-4.93.611.12Saudi Arabia13.5-2.32.9-5.43.1-4.12.9-3.21.3-1.9Russian Fed.11.6-5-53.5-4.12.8-3.13.81.41.12.4U.K.9.4-6.54-9.85.9-9.95.3-3.3-0.2-3.4U.A.E.8.7-3.5