公民社会研究所-走向战略一致：“无意中武装中国”后的改革建议？（英）-2021.7-66正式版.ppt

Civitas:Institute for the Study of Civil Society,First Floor,55 Tufton Street,Westminster,London,SW1P 3QL.For enquiries,please contact Radomir Tylecote.Tel:+44(0)20 7799 6677.Email:radomir.tylecotecivitas.org.ukTowards Strategic Coherence:A discussion of reform proposals followingInadvertently Arming China?Dr Radomir Tylecote and Roberto WhiteJuly 2021First publishedJuly 2021 Civitas 202155 Tufton StreetLondon SW1P 3QLemail:bookscivitas.org.ukAll rights reservedIndependence:Civitas:Institute for the Study of Civil Society is a registered educational charity(No.1085494)and a company limited by guarantee(No.04023541).Civitas is financed from a variety ofprivate sources to avoid over-reliance on any single or small group of donors.All the Institutes publications seek to further its objective of promoting the advancement oflearning.The views expressed are those of the authors,not of the Institute.2SummaryOur previous Civitas paper Inadvertently Arming China?revealed the widespreadsponsorship of scientific research centres in UK universities by Chinese military-linkedconglomerates and universities.Research at some of these centres is being sponsored by theBritish taxpayer.Some of these conglomerates produce Weapons of Mass Destruction(WMDs)includingintercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBMs)and nuclear warheads.Others manufacture strikefighter engines,stealth aircraft,military drones and navy ships.The risk of the Chinese military sponsorship of UK academia is not just that outputs may beput to use by the Chinese military,but that they create other strategic risks.TheGovernments Integrated Review of March 2021(Global Britain in a Competitive Age:theIntegrated Review of Security,Defence,Development and Foreign Policy)discussed howrival states might use economic tools to target and undermine the economic and securityinterests of rivals,highlighting how we should expect increased competition for scarcenatural resources such as critical minerals,including rare earth elements which may beused as leverage on other issues.This paper proposes detailed solutions to what we havecalled strategic incoherence.SanctionsThe UK Government has not yet prevented Chinese military companies from investing in theUK and benefitting from UK-based research,despite their products being put to use by theChinese state in what is credibly called a genocide in Xinjiang,and supplying regimesincluding Burma and Syria.A sanctions regime would prevent investment in the UK,including its research facilities.Academic Technology Approval Scheme(ATAS)The Academic Technology Approval Scheme(ATAS)has been strengthened.But it should befurther reviewed.The central ATAS requirement is to ensure that people who are applyingto study certain subjects in the UK do not have existing links to WMD programmes.ATASshould be amended to prevent the entry into the UK of the staff and students of certainmilitary-linked universities,laboratories and conglomerates in China(and equivalents insome other autocracies).UK equivalent of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States(CFIUS)CFIUS is an inter-agency body,whereas the UKs new Investment Security Unit(ISU)is to bebased under the Department for Business,Energy and Industrial Strategy(BEIS),whosepriority is liable to be inward investment.3Defence research funding for universitiesIn the US,Defense Department funding comprises 40 per cent of all engineering researchand development(R&D)in universities:the UK may need an equivalent of its DefenseUniversity Research Instrumentation Program(DURIP).The UK should better distinguish between Basic and Applied Research in universities;university departments should also need to outline all the uses research could be put to,instead of what they think it will be used for.Five Eyes cooperationThe UK should push to expand university collaboration under the Five Eyes TechnicalCooperation Program.A formal research collaboration programme funded by Five Eyesgovernments could closely involve leading universities.Export rulesSome of the Export Control Order(ECO)is unclear.For example,the requirement to havegrounds for suspecting allows considerable leeway.Article 34(3)(a)states that an offencewill be committed if the person has been informed that goods(and so forth)may beintended for military use,but this allows activities to be treated differently depending onthe claims of researchers.The systems complexity is a concern in itself:leading lawyers saythey do not fully grasp its implications.University guidanceA number of requirements,such as to check whether your potential collaboration partnerhas been involved in activities of potential concern using e.g.internet searches areunreliable.The public domain exclusion for published research also creates risks:other spin-offs fromresearch that has also produced published papers may help military advancement.Thisneeds clarification that restrictions on other transfers may still apply.4AuthorsDr Radomir Tylecote is Director of the Defence and Security for Democracy(DSD)Unit atCivitas.He is also a Fellow of the Institute of Economic Affairs.He has a PhD from ImperialCollege London and an MPhil in Chinese Studies from the University of Cambridge.Roberto White recently finished studying for his BA in Politics and International Studies atthe University of Warwick and will be pursuing a Masters in International Relations later thisyear.His research interests include Chinese policy in Asia and East Asian security studies.Hehas previously completed internships at the Institute of Economic Affairs and Bright Blue.NB:None of the academics,researchers,or other staff whose research at UKuniversities or centres is discussed in this report or previous reports are accused ofknowingly assisting the development of the Chinese military,of knowinglytransferring information to that end,or of committing any breach of theiruniversity regulations.Nor are they accused of any other wrongdoing,or breach ofnational security,or any criminal offence.In some cases,research may be usedsolely for non-military ends;the purpose of the examples mentioned in this reportis not necessarily to demonstrate that they risk being used for military purposes,but in some cases that the research may simply help improve the business oracademic position of a PRC military-linked conglomerate or institution;whereresearch may be put to use by the military of the PRC or organisations which arelinked to it,we assume that researchers in the UK will have carried out thisresearch without intending this to happen.Furthermore,none of the UKuniversities,institutes or funding bodies mentioned in this report are accused ofknowingly contributing to the development of Chinas military or its militaryindustries,as we believe that these universities have developed the sponsorshipand research relationships we describe in good faith and in the belief that theirscientific outputs will have purely civil ends.Where we discuss possible reforms tolaws,regulations,guidelines or university practice,this should not be taken asreferring to any of the researchers or research discussed in previous papers.The purpose of this report is simply to draw attention to the risk that UK researchmay be exploited by the Chinese military in a way the researchers could neverhave envisaged.It is our belief that shedding light on this risk is unquestionably amatter of pressing and vital public interest.5GlossaryAA:Aluminium alloyACMT:Advanced Conventional Military TechnologyAECC:Aero Engine Corporation of ChinaAI:Artificial IntelligenceAHV:Air-breathing hypersonic vehiclesASRI:Aircraft Strength Research Institute(subsidiary of AVIC)ARIA:Advanced Research and Invention Agency(UK)ATAS:Academic Technology Approval SchemeATD:Advanced Technology DevelopmentAVIC:Aviation Industry Corporation of ChinaBAMTRI:Beijing Aeronautical Manufacturing Technology Research Institute(former name of MTI,below)BATRI:Beijing Aircraft Technology Research Institute(subsidiary of COMAC)BIAM:Beijing Institute for Aeronautical Materials(subsidiary of AECC)BIS:Bureau of Industry and Security,Department of Commerce(US)BIT:Beijing Institute of TechnologyBUAA/Beihang:Beijing University of Aeronautics and AstronauticsBWC:Biological and Toxin Weapons ConventionCALT:China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology(subsidiary of CASC)CASC:China Aerospace Science and Technology CorporationCCP:Chinese Communist PartyCETC:China Electronics Technology Group CorporationCGM:Control Momentum GyroscopesCGWIC:China Great Wall Industry CorporationCNT:Carbon nanotubeCOMAC:Commercial Aircraft Corporation of ChinaCQU:Chongqing UniversityCQUT:Chongqing University of TechnologyCSSC:China State Shipbuilding CorporationCSU:Central South UniversityDARPA:Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency(US)DIT:Department for International Trade(UK)DMU:Dalian Maritime UniversityDNN:Deep neural networksDOD:Department of Defense(US)ECJU:Export Control Joint UnitECO:Export Control Order(2008)EPSRC:Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council(UK)FAI:First Aircraft Institute(subsidiary of AVIC)FAST:Fast light alloys stamping technologyFDI:Foreign direct investmentFML:Fibre-metal laminate7FSS:Frequency selective surfaceGNSS:Global Navigation Satellite System/sGPS:Global Positioning SystemHDPE:High-density polyethyleneHEFCE:Higher Education Funding Council for EnglandHEU:Harbin Engineering UniversityHfC:Hafnium CarbideHIT:Harbin Institute of TechnologyHUST:Huazhong University of Science and TechnologyICBM:Intercontinental Ballistic MissileLPD:Low probability of detectionMIMO:Multiple Input Multiple OutputMSS:Ministry of State SecurityMTCR:Missile Technology Control RegimeMTI:Manufacturing Technology Institute(subsidiary of AVIC)NELA:Northeast Light Alloy CompanyNCHU:Nanchang HangKong UniversityNJU:Nanjing UniversityNorinco:China North Industries CorporationNPU/NWPU:Northwestern Polytechnic UniversityNUAA:Nanjing University of Aeronautics and AstronauticsNUDT:National University of Defence Technology(China)PLA:Peoples Liberation ArmyPRC:Peoples Republic of ChinaPZT:Lead zirconate titanateQMUL/QMES:Queen Mary University of London/Queen Mary Engineering SchoolSASAC:State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration CommissionSASTIND:State Administration for Science,Technology and Industry for National DefenceSIPRA:China-Scotland Signal Image Processing Research AcademySOE:State-owned enterpriseTPUN:Thermoplastic polyurethane elastomer nanocompositesUAV:Unmanned aerial vehicleUESTC:University of Electronic Science and Technology of ChinaUHF:Ultra-high frequencyUHSS:Ultra-high strength steelUHTC:Ultra-high temperature ceramicsUWB:Ultra-wide bandUSV:Unmanned submersible vehicleUUV:Unmanned underwater vehicleVLFS:Very large floating structuresWA:Wassenaar ArrangementWMD:Weapons of Mass DestructionWHUT/WUT:Wuhan University of TechnologyWMG:Warwick Manufacturing Group8IntroductionStrategic incoherenceThis paper draws on the analysis and conclusions of the lead authors previous Civitaspublication,Inadvertently Arming China?The Chinese military complex and its potentialexploitation of scientific research at UK universities1(Radomir Tylecote and Robert Clark,February 2021),and develops the broad recommendations in that paper for the nationalsecurity reforms the authors believe are necessary(some of these are already underway,albeit in relatively early forms).The paper Inadvertently Arming China?revealed the widespread sponsorship of high-technology research centres in many leading UK universities by Chinese military-linkedconglomerates and universities,as well as research collaboration between these centresand their sponsors.Many of these centres staff in the UK are former employees or researchers,or graduates,ofthese Chinese companies and universities;some of their research has been carried out incollaboration with these Chinese military-linked universities and military-sponsoredlaboratories.Some research is carried out at UK universities;in other cases,research hasbeen carried out at the Chinese universities or companies sponsoring the UK researchcentre.Most of the cases we analysed were extant;in some cases,the relationships werehistoric,but these relationships ended only recently.The report demonstrated that over half of the 24 Russell Group universities and other UKinstitutions,have or have had scientific research relationships with Chinese military-linkedmanufacturers and universities.2 Research at these UK centres is being sponsored by the UKtaxpayer through research councils and Innovate UK.The UK universities studied(a non-exhaustive list)have established relationships with 22Chinese military-linked universities,as well as companies.Many of these universities havebeen deemed Very High Risk in analysis by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute(ASPI).3 41 Tylecote,R.and Clark,R.(2021).Inadvertently Arming China?The Chinese military complex and its potentialexploitation of scientific research at UK universities.Civitas.February 2021.https:/www.civitas.org.uk/publications/inadvertently-arming-china/2 This includes,in very limited cases,researcher/s and/or teaching fellow/s at one or more of the constituentcolleges of these universities,who are not employed by the university,but merely by a constituent college ofthat university,and where their research is carried out independently of either the college or university.3 Joske,A.(2019).The Chinese Defence Universities Tracker.Australian Strategic Policy Institute,2019.https:/unitracker.aspi.org.au/;Joske,A.(2018).Picking Flowers,Making Honey:The Chinese MilitarysCollaboration with Foreign Universities.Australian Strategic Policy Institute,2018.https:/www.aspi.org.au/report/picking-flowers-making-honey4 This report included statements from the UK institutions analysed:provided they responded to our enquiries,the position of each was represented to the fullest extent possible.We have also told those institutions we didnot hear from that we will update the online version of this report to the fullest extent possible,if and when9The companies sponsoring UK-based research centres include Chinas largest weaponsmanufacturers,including producers of strike fighter engines,ICBMs,nuclear warheads,stealth aircraft,military drones,tanks,military-use metals and materials,and navy ships.Many of the research projects will naturally have a civilian use,and UK-based researcherswill be unaware of a possible dual use that might lead to a contribution to Chinas militaryindustries.Examples of research collaborationsSome examples of research cooperation are as follows.At Heriot-Watt University,one researcher from the PRC cooperated with a researcheraffiliated with Harbin Engineering University on research entitled Snoopy:Sniffing yoursmartwatch passwords via deep sequence learning,5 where UK taxpayers funded researchinto a password-breaking tool with a leading Chinese military-linked university which isunder US sanctions,known to specialise in information security,and whose staff ha