新美国安全中心-数字盟友-深化美韩科技创新合作（英）-2022.3-21正式版.pdf

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1、MARCH 2022Digital Allies Deepening U.S.South Korea Cooperation on Technology and InnovationJacob Stokes, Alexander Sullivan, and Joshua FittAbout the AuthorsJacob Stokes is a Fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Program at CNAS, where his work focuses on U.S.-China relations, Chinese foreign policy,

2、and East Asian security affairs. He previously served in the White House on the national security staff of thenVice President Joe Biden. He has also worked as a professional staff member for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, an advisor for U.S. Senator Amy Klobuchar, and a seni

3、or analyst in the China program at the United States Institute of Peace. He is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations.Alexander Sullivan is an Adjunct Fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Program at CNAS, where he focuses on U.S.-China relations, U.S. alliances, and the role of energy in g

4、eopolitics. He also is a doctoral student in political science at Georgetown University, focusing on international negotiation, power politics, and U.S.-China relations.Joshua Fitt is an Associate Fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Program at CNAS. He focuses on U.S. East Asian security strategy

5、and specializes in Japanese and Korean Peninsular affairs. Before joining CNAS, Fitt was a campaign field organizer during the 2018 midterm elections in the Upper Midwest, an earthquake and tsunami disaster relief volunteer with IsraAID in Japan, and an intern with the Council on Foreign Relations J

6、apan Program. He earned his BA in East Asian Studies from Yale University.About the Indo-Pacific Security ProgramThe CNAS Indo-Pacific Security Program addresses opportunities and challenges for the United States in the region, with a growing focus on issues that originate in the Indo-Pacific but ha

7、ve global implications. It draws on a team with deep government and nongovernment expertise in regional studies, U.S. foreign policy, international security and economic statecraft. The Indo-Pacific Security Program analyzes trends and generates practical and creative policy solutions around five ma

8、in research priorities: U.S.-China strategic competition, Indias growing role in the Indo-Pacific, the North Korea threat, American alliances and partnerships, and challenges in South and Central Asia.AcknowledgmentsThe authors are grateful to the many officials and expertsboth in the United States

9、and elsewherewho shared their perspectives over the course of this project. We are particularly indebted to Troy Stangarone, Martijn Rasser, and Lisa Curtis for their expert reviews of this paper, and to Zachary Durkee for his excellent research and program support. Finally, this paper would not hav

10、e been possible without assistance from a host of CNAS colleagues, including Melody Cook, Rin Rothback, Allison Francis, Maura McCarthy, Jake Penders, and Emma Swislow. The views presented here do not represent those of CNAS or any other organization, and the authors are solely responsible for any e

11、rrors in fact, analysis, or omission. This report was made possible with the generous support of the Korea Foundation.As a research and policy institution committed to the highest standards of organizational, intellectual, and personal integrity, CNAS maintains strict intellectual independence and s

12、ole editorial direction and control over its ideas, projects, publications, events, and other research activities. CNAS does not take institutional positions on policy issues and the content of CNAS publications reflects the views of their authors alone. In keeping with its mission and values, CNAS

13、does not engage in lobbying activity and complies fully with all applicable federal, state, and local laws. CNAS will not engage in any representational activities or advocacy on behalf of any entities or interests and, to the extent that the Center accepts funding from non-U.S. sources, its activit

14、ies will be limited to bona fide scholastic, academic, and research-related activities, consistent with applicable federal law. The Center publicly acknowledges on its website annually all donors who contribute.TABLE OF CONTENTS01 Executive Summary02 Introduction02 The Role of Technology Cooperation

15、 in the U.S.-ROK Alliance03 Status of Alliance Interactions Across Key Technology Areas08 Technology at the Intersection of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and ROK New Southern Policy09 Recommendations for Policymakers11 ConclusionINDO-PACIFIC SECURITY | MARCH 2022Digital Allies: Deepening U.S.South

16、Korea Cooperation on Technology and Innovation1RExecutive Summaryapid advances in digital and other emerging technologies have become a defining feature of international geopolitics and geoeconomics in the 21st century. This report explores how the United States and South Korea can broaden and deepe

17、n their alliance through expanded cooperation on issues related to technology and innovation.Despite the continued centrality of traditional security threatsespecially those emanating from North Koreaboth the United States and South Korea are seeking to deepen and broaden alliance cooperation to add

18、ress a larger set of shared challenges and opportunities. To that end, both capitals have noted the increasing impor-tance of key technologies for economic growth as well as for security and governance. The two countries are at the very beginning of defining how an augmented alliance will approach t

19、echnology coordination, but they have decades of economic and trade ties on which to build. Technology issues are central to the policy platforms of both U.S. President Joe Bidens and South Korean President Moon Jae-ins administrations and will continue to be important under future administrations i

20、n both countries.In addition to examining general consultative frameworks, enhancing U.S.-South Korea technology cooperation requires assessing the state of bilateral interactions sector by sector and issue by issue. The two countries occupy leading roles in many founda-tional technology ecosystems

21、within the evolving global economy, such as semiconductors, telecommunications, and advanced batteries. In emerging fields such as artifi-cial intelligence and quantum computing, U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) collaboration harbors the potential not only to raise living standards through technological

22、 breakthroughs but also to promote governance norms in accordance with liberal democratic principles.Potential opportunities for Washington and Seoul to deepen cooperation extend beyond the bilateral context to regional and global affairs, through coordination of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and S

23、outh Koreas New Southern Policy or its successor under the new President-Elect Yoon Suk-yeol. Rapid technological growth and digitization in Indo-Pacific countries, particularly those of Southeast Asia, present both immense economic oppor-tunity and a range of governance challenges. The United State

24、s and South Korea have an important opportunity to ensure that technological development promotes a free, open, secure, and prosperous region.Taken together, the strategic rationales for enhancing U.S.-South Korea cooperation on technology issues are strong. Meaningful efforts to that end are alread

25、y underway, but more can and should be done to deepen alliance coordination. Policymakers in Washington and Seoul should consider recommendations spanning the areas of foreign policy and international organizations, coordination on key technologies, trade and investment, and digital governance and d

26、omestic policy. Doing so will enable the alliance to meet the challenges and seize the opportunities presented by the current regional and global landscape.CNASDC2RPIntroductionapid advances in digital and other emerging technologies have become a defining feature of international geopolitics in the

27、 21st century. The United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) both possess key advantages as leading technological powers and robust democracies. The U.S.-ROK alliance serves as the linchpin for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, which sits at the heart of Northeast Asia.

28、 In this context, digital and other emerging technologiesmost of which come from the commercial rather than the defense sectorare becoming more important to foreign and security policy. Indeed, just as nearly every modern business must be a technology company to some degree, no conception of nationa

29、l security would be complete without con-sidering the crucial role technology plays in driving security outcomes.This report explores how the United States and South Korea can broaden and deepen their alliance relation-ship through expanded cooperation on issues related to civilian technology and in

30、novation. (CNAS will cover cooperation on military and defense-related technolo-gies in a subsequent report.) It proceeds in four parts. The first section explores the role of technology coop-eration in the broader context of the U.S.-ROK alliance. The second section takes a sector-by-sector look at

31、 the state of play between Washington and Seoul in key technology areas. The third section explores the overlap between the technology pillars of U.S. and South Korean policies toward the broader Indo-Pacific. The fourth section offers recommendations for policymakers for advancing U.S.-ROK technolo

32、gy cooperation, especially in the Indo-Pacific region.The Role of Technology Cooperation in the U.S.-ROK Allianceroperly assessing the role of technology coop-eration in the U.S.-South Korea relationship first requires understanding where the issue fits into overall relations between Washington and

33、Seoul. The U.S.-South Korea alliance has sustained peace and security on the Korean Peninsula since the signing of the bilateral Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953 following the conclusion of the Korean War (19501953).1 The alliances main role has always been, and remains, ensuring peace and stability on

34、 the Korean Peninsula and deterring aggression from the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). The con-tinued progress of North Koreas nuclear and missile programsoften in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutionsmeans that purpose will remain at the center of the

35、 alliance. In addition, the rapid growth of Chinas military and Beijings pattern of aggres-sive actions pose an additional challenge to regional security, with implications for both Washington and Seoul.Despite the continued centrality of traditional security threats to the alliance, though, both th

36、e United States and South Korea are seeking to deepen and broaden alliance cooperation to address a larger set of shared challenges and opportunities. To that end, both capitals have noted the increasing importance of key technologies for economic growth as well as for security and governance. This

37、focus was evident in the joint statement and other outcomes from the May 2021 summit between U.S. President Joe Biden and South Korean President Moon Jae-in.2An Alliance of High-Technology InnovatorsThe United States and South Korea both have highly dynamic economies and have each played a role in d

38、riving innovation for decades.3 The history of tech-nological innovation in the United States, especially the role of state-funded research and Silicon Valley entrepreneurs in birthing the information age, is well documented and widely known. South Koreas rise as a technological power has garnered r

39、elatively less atten-tion outside of expert communities. In the aftermath of the Korean War, the South Korean economy sat in shambles, still primarily agricultural and decimated by conflict. The intervening decades of skyrocketing growth enabled South Korea to become the 10th-largest economy in the

40、world by 2020, according to World Bank data.4 Many factors explain South Koreas phe-nomenal economic success. A few key elements that helped Seoul become a technological leader include its massive levels of spending on research and develop-ment (R&D), its major conglomerate companies known as chaebo

41、ls, and a highly educated population.5Both capitals have noted the increasing importance of key technologies for economic growth as well as for security and governance. INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY | MARCH 2022Digital Allies: Deepening U.S.South Korea Cooperation on Technology and Innovation3TSouth Koreas

42、rise as a leading economy and technology manufacturer generated some friction on trade issues with the United States along the way. Washington expressed concerns about weak protections for intellectual property, state subsidies, and dumping by Korean firms throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.6 Thos

43、e concerns eased as South Korea instituted a series of reforms mandated by the International Monetary Fund following the 1997 Asian financial crisis. In return, Seoul received a bailout package worth $58 billion, which it later repaid. Many remaining disagreements were resolved as South Koreas econo

44、my transitioned to producing more higher value-added goods and in the process of negotiating the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), which was agreed to in 2007 and came into force in 2012.7 Moreover, prior to KORUS, trade in some types of information technology equipment had already been liber

45、alized through the Information Technology Agreement concluded under the auspices of the World Trade Organization in December 1996.8Today, the full U.S.-ROK economic relationship is extensive, with total bilateral trade in goods and services reaching $170.1 billion in 2019 (the last pre-COVID year) a

46、nd $155.8 billion in 2020.9 As of 2020, U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in South Korea was $33.9 billion, and South Korean FDI in the United States was $63.7 billion.10 In addition, one outcome from the Biden-Moon summit was commitments from South Korean compa-nies including Samsung Elect

47、ronics, Hyundai Motors, SK Innovation, and LG Energy Solution to invest an addi-tional $25 billion in the United States.11 To be sure, in the technology arena, there will always be a balance between healthy commercial competition between firms based in each country and bilateral efforts between the

48、two gov-ernments to advance common goals. Different viewpoints could be further compounded by divergent approaches to strategic questions, especially whether, how, and to what extent to decouple with the Chinese economy. But complementarity and integration between the U.S. and South Korean economies

49、 can help facilitate cooperation on technology issues.Shaping Regional and Global Order Through TechnologyFor both Washington and Seoul, the importance of tech-nology goes beyond their bilateral relationship or driving domestic economic growth. Both countries recognize that new technologies shape po

50、liticsand not always for the better. Technology can have decidedly mixed effects on gov-ernance. In this context, both countries share an interest in, as the Biden-Moon summit fact sheet put it, “safeguarding a trusted, values-driven digital and technological ecosystem, in line with our shared democ