全球投资策略-全球经济：冲突-2022.第二季度-122正式版.pdf

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1、Disclosures & Disclaimer: This report must be read with the disclosures and the analyst certifications inthe Disclosure appendix, and with the Disclaimer, which forms part of it.Asset / SubcategoryQ2 2022Economics | GlobalGlobal Economics Play video withJanet HenryQ2 2022By: Janet Henry and James Po

2、meroyGlobal Economics ConflictRussias invasion of Ukraine has dramatically altered the outlook for the global economy curbing growth, pushing inflation higher and with potentially far-reaching longer-term implicationsso the policy challenges and risks continue to heightenEconomicsGlobal 1 Economics

3、Global Q2 2022 Military and economic conflict mean another big supply shock Just when there were glimmers of hope that the worst of the supply chain disruptions were easing and that we might be moving into the final phases of the global pandemic, the global economy faces another potentially enormous

4、 broad-based supply shock. The Russia-Ukraine conflict, the steady roll-out of sanctions by the West, and some retaliatory measures by Moscow usher in a new era of economic conflict, the implications of which appear set to extend well beyond the short-term repercussions for commodity prices and infl

5、ation. Nor is the battle against COVID-19 consigned to history. Although there are some genuine reasons for optimism that the global pandemic is evolving into something more endemic, the resurgence of cases in parts of North Asia and the regional lockdowns in critically important manufacturing hubs

6、and international ports like Shenzhen and Shanghai in mainland China, pose a risk of renewed temporary supply chain disruptions. More broadly, the risk that dangerous new mutations could still emerge anywhere in the world cannot be dismissed, but for now Beijings response to the growing domestic and

7、 global growth risks is more policy stimulus. To say that the global economic outlook is exceptionally uncertain is undisputable. Global growth will clearly be weaker than it would have been and inflation will be higher, potentially significantly so. Already the swings in commodity prices and financ

8、ial markets have been dramatic and volatility appears set to be a feature of the outlook for the foreseeable future. Economic forecasts could be in a state of persistently playing catch-up as world leaders take decisions that affect the macroeconomic outlook. The challenges facing the major central

9、banks grow ever harder. Is a hard landing inevitable? This new broadly-based global supply shock hits at a time when in some parts of the world the consumer recovery has been proving to be more resilient in early 2022 than many anticipated. Retail sales in the likes of the US and the UK started the

10、year on a very high note but that may have just reflected a temporary unleashing of pent-up demand after the Omicron variant, which struck mostly in December. If so, it might fade imminently. Consumer confidence is certainly falling. However, robust consumer demand might also be a function of the un

11、derlying resilience of many households balance sheets bolstered by accumulated savings even as the cost-of-living squeeze intensifies. Given the abundance of employment opportunities, workers are calling for higher pay gains but so far the squeeze on real wages has not stopped them spending. So how

12、do we see the economic outlook? Flat or even inverted portions of sovereign yield curves suggest financial markets are pricing at least some likelihood of a hard landing. Recession certainly cant be ruled out, nor can outright stagflation. Neither is yet a certainty but the risks of both have risen.

13、 The growth risks are numerous: monetary policy normalisation could still follow various paths, but may have to be much quicker; the future course of the pandemic is still not clear; and there is huge uncertainty over the evolution of the armed conflict in Ukraine and the new era of economic conflic

14、t that has begun. It will impact our forecasts through various channels of influence, which we discuss in this report, but we cannot gauge the magnitude or the duration. Executive Summary COVID-19 is not over yet either Resilient Western consumers? Economics Global Q2 2022 2 The short and the long o

15、f it The scale of direct confidence effects will vary, according to each countrys proximity to the area of military conflict. That in itself can impact on investment but the biggest impact globally is already and will likely continue to be via commodity prices. We are acutely aware that the commodit

16、y price outlook would be different if a settlement is reached that brings an early halt to the conflict in Russia-Ukraine rather than if it continues indefinitely. We have, nonetheless, had to take a view on the assumptions to use for oil, gas, and a range of other commodities to make our forecasts

17、and what it means for each countrys terms of trade. The overall impact amounts to a redistribution of income from commodity consumers to commodity producers. Europe is a clear relative loser via higher energy prices and possible disruption to supplies. For many emerging economies the bigger headwind

18、s will come from the surge in the price of agricultural commodities, particularly wheat, and the pass-through will likely extend beyond 2022. Manufacturing-based economies are not only confronted by higher energy and metals prices but also face possible disruption to gas supplies, as well as an inab

19、ility to trade certain products with the worlds 11th largest economy, while semiconductor producers could potentially face supply chain disruptions given their reliance on rare gases from Russia. In terms of direct export exposures, Russia is not a major export market for many countries and not all

20、have imposed sanctions. But nor is it clear whether some might opt to bypass them and risk secondary sanctions from the US or EU. Other near-term questions include the impact of migrants from Ukraine, on both public spending and labour markets, possibly even easing worker shortages in some sectors i

21、n parts of Europe. We have also started to assess the likely longer-term implications of the current conflict. These will also vary depending on the degree of escalation and duration of the military operations but some areas have already been set on a new trajectory for the coming years irrespective

22、 of whether there is a near-term diplomatic resolution to the conflict. These include higher defence spending, which is already certain in Europe. Some further elements of de-globalisation, whether for financial reasons (e.g. FX reserves) or for supply chain resilience, will also be a feature. Energ

23、y transition towards renewables should have additional impetus even if governments near-term focus is to postpone ambitious goals to phase out oil and coal usage. The cost shock This all means that even with a degree of shielding by governments that may step in to cap household energy bills, already

24、-high inflation is set to go higher still around the world. Even Asia can be expected to see higher food and energy prices lift headline inflation. The squeeze on real incomes will intensify, hitting consumer spending. Many of the other commodity price rises and disruptions will be felt initially th

25、rough higher input costs for the corporate sector, particularly in manufacturing-based economies and more so in those advanced economies where labour costs are also rising. Already the surge in energy costs has led to partial closures of some factories in Europe. Companies may be forced to persisten

26、tly squeeze profit margins, halt production, shed labour or continue if able to raise prices, sowing the seeds of a wage-price spiral as inflation expectations jump higher. For central banks, the big concern is the latter. For central banks, only difficult decisions lie ahead The new global supply s

27、hock makes monetary policy decisions even harder. Inflation was, in most places, already too high. Demand is too strong for supply which is now even more constrained for the foreseeable future to meet. So central bankers need to slow demand as Surge in commodity prices poses the immediate big risk T

28、he landscape has changed Companies only have so many options to address the jump in input costs 3 Economics Global Q2 2022 they wait for the supply in goods and labour markets to grow enough for spare capacity to bear down on inflation. There was already a question of how much of a “sacrifice” in gr

29、owth they were willing to accept to bring it down. An energy price shock complicates the picture further. The major central banks know from the past that big rises in energy prices squeeze real incomes and can result in a sharp slowdown or even an outright contraction in consumer demand, soon result

30、ing in rate cuts. But with US inflation nudging 8% in February, and set to move higher in March at least, the Feds clear priority is to stabilise inflation and be confident that it will soon be heading on a downward path even as it faces external shocks to inflation that are beyond its control. The

31、Fed has now started to raise rates and signalled the shrinkage of the balance sheet will start soon. The FOMC now appears set on a course of 25bp moves at every meeting as long as inflation stays high, or until something starts to crack, whether that is in global markets or because an external or do

32、mestic shock poses a material deflationary risk to the US. The risk of course is that by treading too cautiously initially, the Fed falls further behind the curve and has to step up the pace. The Fed Chair has warned as much but if falls in asset prices follow then hopes of a soft landing would sure

33、ly fade, but a much sharper slowdown in growth and even some kind of recession to drive inflation out of the system might be the necessary price to pay for maintaining the central banks credibility. We are still less convinced that the ECB will have to tighten that aggressively, given the growth imp

34、lications from the Russia-Ukraine crisis are more severe, while inflation and wage growth are much lower than in the US. We forecast a 25bp deposit rate rise in October 2022 and a further 25bp in Q1 2023. Among the emerging economies, some have had little choice but to respond with more forceful pol

35、icy. In CEE severe downward pressure on currencies has been met with FX intervention and rate hikes: Poland raised rates by 75bp in March and Hungary by 125bp. We expect more will follow. In Asia, weaker consumer demand has kept a lid on inflation and central banks have been inactive, except Chinas

36、which we expect to continue easing both the quantity and the price of money as well as public spending. For much of the rest of the region we expect a slower pace of tightening than the Fed. Our forecasts: growth-inflation trade-off deteriorating markedly Our forecasts for global growth are lower. W

37、e revise down our global GDP growth forecast for 2022 to 3.5% from 4.1% with our forecasts for both the developed world and the emerging economies each falling by % even if in both cases it is, unsurprisingly, driven by Europe, both east and west. We revise down 2023 to 2.9% from 3.2%. The revisions

38、 to our inflation forecasts are upwards for both 2022 and 2023 and to pretty much every economy. We see global inflation averaging 6.5% this year, up substantially from 4.6% previously. Aside from Russia and Turkey, the biggest upward revisions have been in the US and across Europe. Key forecasts _

39、GDP _ _ Inflation _ % Year _ 2021f _ _ 2022f _ _ 2023f _ _ 2021f _ _ 2022f _ _ 2023f _ World 5.8 (5.7) 3.5 (4.1) 2.9 (3.2) 3.8 (3.8) 6.5 (4.6) 4.2 (3.3) Developed 5.1 (5.0) 3.1 (3.7) 1.9 (2.2) 3.2 (3.2) 6.0 (3.5) 2.8 (1.9) Emerging 6.7 (6.6) 4.2 (4.6) 4.3 (4.4) 4.1 (4.1) 6.8 (5.3) 5.1 (4.1) US 5.7 (

40、5.6) 3.4 (3.8) 2.1 (2.6) 4.7 (4.7) 6.9 (4.7) 3.1 (2.3) Mainland China 8.1 (8.0) 5.6 (5.6) 5.8 (5.8) 0.9 (0.9) 2.1 (2.0) 2.3 (2.3) Japan 1.6 (1.6) 1.9 (2.2) 0.9 (0.6) -0.2 (-0.2) 1.5 (0.4) 0.5 (0.3) India* 8.3 (8.2) 6.5 (7.2) 5.3 (5.5) 5.5 (5.5) 5.6 (5.0) 5.0 (4.5) Eurozone 5.3 (5.2) 2.6 (3.8) 1.8 (2

41、.2) 2.6 (2.6) 6.5 (2.9) 2.8 (1.8) UK 7.5 (7.1) 4.3 (4.5) 1.1 (1.8) 2.6 (2.6) 7.6 (4.6) 4.4 (2.1) Russia 4.7 (3.9) -6.0 (1.7) -0.6 (1.4) 6.7 (6.7) 14.7 (6.3) 12.4 (4.1) Brazil 4.6 (4.7) 0.5 (0.6) 1.1 (1.5) 8.3 (8.3) 9.4 (7.5) 4.7 (3.9) Source: HSBC Economics, Bloomberg. Note: *Note: *Indias GDP forec

42、ast is per calendar year and CPI forecast is per fiscal year. GDP aggregates use chain nominal GDP (USD) weights and inflation aggregates calculated using GDP PPP (USD) weights. Parenthesis show forecasts from the Global Economics Quarterly Q1 2022. Policy might have to become restrictive Lower grow

43、th, higher inflation Economics Global Q2 2022 4 Executive Summary 1 Key forecasts 5 Another big supply shock 6 The consequences of conflict 23 Global economic forecasts 33 GDP 34 Consumer prices 36 Policy Rates 38 Long rates 39 Exchange rates vs USD 40 Exchange rate vs EUR & GBP 41 Consumer spending

44、 42 Investment spending 43 Exports 44 Industrial production 45 Wage growth 46 Budget balance 47 Current account 48 North America 50 US 50 Canada 52 Asia Pacific 54 Mainland China 54 Japan 56 India 58 Australia 60 South Korea 62 Indonesia 64 Taiwan 66 Thailand 68 Malaysia 70 Singapore 72 Hong Kong 74

45、 Philippines 76 New Zealand 78 Eurozone 80 Eurozone 80 Germany 82 France 84 Italy 86 Spain 88 Other Western Europe 90 UK 90 Switzerland 92 Sweden 94 Norway 96 CEEMEA 98 Poland 98 Russia 100 Turkey 102 Saudi Arabia 104 South Africa 106 Latin America 108 Brazil 108 Mexico 110 Argentina 112 Colombia 11

46、4 Chile 116 Disclosure appendix 118 Disclaimer 120 Contents 5 Economics Global Q2 2022 Key forecasts _ GDP _ _ Inflation _ % Year 2021f 2022f 2023f 2021f 2022f 2023f World (nominal GDP weights) 5.8 3.5 2.9 3.8 6.5 4.2 Developed 5.1 3.1 1.9 3.2 6.0 2.8 Emerging 6.7 4.2 4.3 4.1 6.8 5.1 North America 5

47、.6 3.4 2.2 4.6 6.8 3.1 US 5.7 3.4 2.1 4.7 6.9 3.1 Canada 4.6 3.6 3.1 3.4 5.2 3.3 Asia-Pacific 6.2 4.6 4.4 2.0 3.1 2.8 Asia Big Three 6.7 4.9 4.7 2.0 2.9 2.8 Mainland China 8.1 5.6 5.8 0.9 2.1 2.3 Japan 1.6 1.9 0.9 -0.2 1.5 0.5 India* 8.3 6.5 5.3 5.5 5.6 5.0 Asia ex Big Three 4.5 3.7 3.2 2.2 3.6 2.7

48、Australia 4.7 3.5 2.8 2.9 4.2 2.7 South Korea 4.0 2.5 2.0 2.5 3.3 1.4 Indonesia 3.7 5.1 5.1 1.6 3.7 4.0 Taiwan 6.4 3.8 2.6 2.0 2.2 1.2 Thailand 1.6 3.8 3.1 1.2 3.6 2.3 Malaysia 3.1 5.5 4.3 2.5 3.2 2.5 Singapore 7.6 3.8 3.1 2.3 4.1 2.3 Hong Kong 6.4 2.0 3.3 1.6 2.5 2.1 Philippines 5.6 5.7 5.3 3.9 4.5

49、 3.8 New Zealand 5.6 3.2 1.8 3.9 6.5 3.0 Western Europe 5.5 3.0 1.7 2.5 6.5 3.1 Eurozone 5.3 2.6 1.8 2.6 6.5 2.8 Germany 2.9 2.2 2.3 3.2 6.1 3.0 France 7.0 3.3 1.5 2.1 5.0 3.0 Italy 6.6 2.7 2.0 1.9 6.7 3.0 Spain 5.0 4.8 3.5 3.0 6.9 2.5 Other Western Europe 6.2 3.9 1.2 2.4 6.4 4.0 UK 7.5 4.3 1.1 2.6

50、7.6 4.4 Norway* 4.2 4.1 1.5 3.5 4.2 3.7 Sweden 4.6 3.7 1.7 2.2 5.6 4.2 Switzerland 3.7 2.4 1.5 0.6 2.1 1.4 CEEMEA 5.6 0.0 1.8 8.4 21.1 13.1 Poland 5.6 4.1 2.8 5.1 9.2 11.2 Russia 4.7 -6.0 -0.6 6.7 14.7 12.4 Turkey 11.0 2.0 3.6 19.4 58.2 25.6 Saudi Arabia 2.5 6.4 4.0 3.1 3.0 3.4 South Africa 4.9 1.7