国际战略研究中心-战略竞争时代的综合军备控制（英）-2022.1.pdf

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1、Integrated Arms Control in an Era of Strategic CompetitionJANUARY 2022A Report of the CSIS Project on Nuclear IssuesAUTHORSRebecca K.C. HersmanHeather WilliamsSuzanne ClaeysIntegrated Arms Control in an Era of Strategic CompetitionJANUARY 2022AUTHORSRebecca K.C. HersmanHeather WilliamsSuzanne Claeys

2、A Report of the CSIS Project on Nuclear IssuesLanham Boulder New York LondonIII | Integrated Arms Control in an Era of Strategic CompetitionAbout CSIS The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to advancing practical id

3、eas to address the worlds greatest challenges.Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 2015, succeeding former U.S. senator Sam Nunn (D-GA). Founded in 1962, CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, who has served as president and chief executive officer since 2000.CSISs purpose i

4、s to define the future of national security. We are guided by a distinct set of valuesnonpartisanship, independent thought, innovative thinking, cross-disciplinary scholarship, integrity and professionalism, and talent development. CSISs values work in concert toward the goal of making real-world im

5、pact.CSIS scholars bring their policy expertise, judgment, and robust networks to their research, analysis, and recommendations. We organize conferences, publish, lecture, and make media appearances that aim to increase the knowledge, awareness, and salience of policy issues with relevant stakeholde

6、rs and the interested public.CSIS has impact when our research helps to inform the decisionmaking of key policymakers and the thinking of key influencers. We work toward a vision of a safer and more prosperous world.CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herei

7、n should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). 2022 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.ISBN: 978-1-5381-4051-2 (pb); 978-1-5381-4052-9 (eBook)Center for Strategic & International Studies1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NWWashington, DC 20036202-887-0200

8、| www.csis.orgRowman & Littlefield4501 Forbes Boulevard Lanham, MD 20706301-459-3366 | IV | Rebecca K.C. Hersman, Heather Williams, and Suzanne Claeys AcknowledgmentsThe authors would like to thank all of the workshop participants who offered valuable insights and sparked thoughtful discussions. The

9、 authors would also like to thank David C. Logan, Dr. Justin Anderson, and Elaine Bunn, who reviewed earlier drafts of the report and provided valuable feedback. The authors would also like to thank Eric Brewer for his close readings and recommendations for later versions of the report. Finally, the

10、 authors appreciate the support of CSISs iLab team in the editing, formatting, and publishing of the report.This research was made possible through the support of the United States Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Threat Reduction and Arms Control (ODASD(TRAC). The opinions, findi

11、ngs, views, conclusions, or recommendations contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of ODASD(TRAC) or the U.S. government. V | Integrated Arms Control in an Era of Strategi

12、c CompetitionContentsExecutive Summary 1Introduction 71 | The Evolving Security Environment: Integrated Deterrence and Strategic Competition 102 | The Evolving Technology Landscape: Challenges for Arms Control 183 | The Evolving Information Ecosystem: Arms Control in the Digital Information Age 224

13、| Evolving Concepts of Escalation and Stability: Integrated Arms Control and Risk Reduction 275 | Integrated Arms Control: The Way Forward 31Conclusions and Recommendations: Realizing an Integrated Arms Control Strategy 42Appendix A: Canary in the Coal Mine: The Chemical Weapons Case Study 48Appendi

14、x B: Disinformation and Covid-19 Case Study 52About the Authors 541 | Rebecca K.C. Hersman, Heather Williams, and Suzanne Claeys Executive SummaryCan contemporary arms control keep pace with the rapid rate of change in both geopolitics and technology? The increasingly competitive security environmen

15、t has made near-term prospects for further reductions in nuclear arms and delivery systems unlikely, yet fundamental interests in strategic stability, risk reduction, and the prevention of arms racing remain. Indeed, the challenges to future arms controlthe decline in trust between the United States

16、 and potential arms control partners; the rise in complex, highly interrelated, strategic technologies; the emergence of a highly digitized, privately controlled, and easily weaponized information environment; and the presence of increasingly assertive regional stakeholdersall point to a rocky road

17、ahead. Measures that build confidence, reduce miscalculation, enhance transparency, and restrain costly and dangerous military competition may be of increasing value, particularly as states develop and employ a wider range of strategic technologies and rely on broader strategic concepts such as inte

18、grated deterrence to reduce the risk of conflict between major nuclear-armed powers. Moreover, arms control institutions and mechanisms for dispute resolution and compliance enforcement can provide useful venues for addressing sources of conflict, reducing misperceptions, and restraining impulsive o

19、r risky actions.For arms controltools to succeed, however, they must be adapted to the current security environment, account for rapidly evolving technological and informational factors, and consider alternative structures, modalities, and participation models. As deterrence becomes more integrated

20、across an increasingly diverse range of technologies, domains, risks, and actors, so too must arms control. Indeed, now is the time for a recoupling of arms control with deterrencein a way that recognizes these new realities. Now is the time for integrated arms control.2 | Integrated Arms Control in

21、 an Era of Strategic CompetitionThe Evolving Technology LandscapeFor most emerging and potentially disruptive technologies, private actors, rather than governments, are the primary developers and drivers of innovation. Also, the rapid way in which these technologies are being developed, fielded, and

22、 updated is straining the ability of existing legal mechanisms and arms control institutionsoften more rigid and slower to adaptto keep up. Finally, many of these technologies are still under development, and both states and private companies might be unwilling to subject them to limits that could c

23、urtail future economic or military advantage. This evolving technological landscape has three broad implications for arms control: (1) emerging technologies complicate strategic stability and risks of crisis escalation and arms racing; (2) many of these advanced technologies are used in both the civ

24、ilian and military sectors, complicating the ways in which arms control agreements are negotiated and implemented, and (3) most of these technologies exist outside of existing arms control regulations, meaning legal mechanisms will likely struggle to incorporate them. The Evolving Information Ecosys

25、temTodays information ecosystem, specifically the potential benefits and challenges foraccessing, processing, analyzing, altering, and disseminating large volumes of information, is poised to change the nature of arms control.1 This complex and highly dynamic information environment will potentially

26、 transform how agreements are negotiated, monitored, verified, and enforced, not to mention altering roles and responsibilities along the way. First, the use of disinformation to undermine arms control structures, institutions, and mechanisms poses a large and growing challenge to future arms contro

27、l. Manipulated information could be used to raise questions about a countrys compliance with an arms control agreement, forge or fake a treaty violation, cover up or hide a violation, or cause confusion about a states weapon development. Second, state actors are not the only players of note in the n

28、ew information ecosystem. The explosion of international open-source investigation and analysis groups outside the government will potentially transform not only how verification is done but also who does it. In the future, open-source information may offer monitoring and verification alternatives w

29、hen intrusive, state-sponsored approaches might not be agreeable or desirable. Ultimately, this emerging information ecosystem, particularly in the form of highly competitive open-source analysis and investigation, will impact the role of national technical means (NTM)nationally controlled ground, s

30、pace, airborne, or even underwater sensorsin monitoring and verifying compliance with arms control agreements.2Evolving Concepts of Escalation and StabilityCold War stability concepts drew heavily on ladders and firebreaks to define nuclear crises and escalation, but contemporary deterrence failure

31、may more closely resemble “wormholes” or sudden, possibly temporary openings in the fabric of deterrence that allow for accelerated and unpredictable escalation risks. Future conflicts are unlikely to unfold in a clear linear or stepwise fashion with a distinction between pre-conflict and conflict t

32、ermination. Neither is a clear delineation between nuclear and non-nuclear crises sustainable when conventional and nuclear capabilities are highly co-mingled, capable of more diversified strategic effects, and increasingly vulnerable to detection, disruption, or disablement.3 3 | Rebecca K.C. Hersm

33、an, Heather Williams, and Suzanne Claeys Integrated deterrence strategies can only provide partial answers to this complex and multidimensional strategic challenge. In fact, in a deterrence framework that is much larger and more comprehensive than traditional nuclear deterrence, gaps and weaknesses

34、that create the potential for wormhole dynamics are more likely, not less. Moreover, the very nature of integrated deterrence erodes the utility of firebreaks in arresting stability risks as capabilities grow more entangled. In a security paradigm based on integrated deterrence, the imperative for a

35、rms control is more urgent than ever. By identifying and mitigating deterrence gaps and risks, future arms control may prove most useful by focusing on preventing conflict as well as costly arms races that might incentivize nuclear first use or crises that can rapidly escalate. Rather than seeking t

36、o impose numerical constraints on specific technologies, states might prioritize arms control efforts that target specific behaviors of concern, regardless of the technological capabilities involved, and explore a wide range of arms control modalities to reduce the risks of arms racing and improve c

37、risis stability. Conclusions and Recommendations: Realizing an Integrated Arms Control StrategyThis highly entangled, multidomain risk landscape suggests new approaches to strategic arms control will be needed to mitigate risks across both technical domains and levels of conflict. In addition, the s

38、tatus of China as a rising peer, accompanied by increasingly capable regional nuclear actors, suggests multi-actor and multifocal approaches will need to replace traditional bilateral ones. Going forward, while the broader goals of disarmament may be desirable, the most pressing objective for arms c

39、ontrol in the current security environment must be the prevention of major war, especially war that would occur under a dangerous nuclear shadow, which risks catastrophic escalation in the event of deterrence failure. It is in identifying and mitigating such deterrence gaps and risks, as well as the

40、 costly arms races that may well accompany them, that future arms controlintegrated arms controlmay prove most useful. Integrated arms control should be based on three broad principles: enhancing stability, embracing plurality, and reinforcing resiliency. First, arms control remains a tool for strat

41、egic stability and managing risks associated with crisis escalation and arms racing. This can, and should, work hand in hand with deterrence, and integrated arms control should be part of any integrated deterrence strategy. Second, arms control will need to be flexible and operate across a plurality

42、 of technologies and actors. Integrated arms control must be multidomain, multilateral, and agile. Amid geopolitical and technological changes, strategic stability is becoming increasingly complex and will require a more flexible approach to arms control than is typically provided by legally binding

43、 bilateral agreements that focus on single technologies or domains. Finally, an effective integrated arms control strategy will require that the United States organize and invest to create the structural, technical, and operational capabilities necessary to support such an approach in ways that are

44、durable and sustainable.ENHANCING STABILITY Recognize arms control as a constructive forum and outlet for strategic competition. Nuclear arsenals that are expanding both quantitatively and qualitatively, accompanied by a broader set of strategic delivery systems and high-impact technologies, which w

45、ill challenge existing U.S. defensive systems. Meanwhile gray zone activities will further complicate concepts of escalation. Arms control can offer the United States, China, and Russia 4 | Integrated Arms Control in an Era of Strategic Competitionan opportunity to compete openly and fairly in a dip

46、lomatic forum that reduces risk and encourages stability. Prioritize efforts that mitigate escalatory pressures that raise the risk of major war between nuclear-armed states. While broader goals of disarmament may be desirable, the most pressing objectives for arms control in the current security en

47、vironment must be preventing major war and reducing the risk of catastrophic escalation in the event of deterrence failure. Address a range of stability challenges across multiple domains and technology types. Nuclear arms control, such as a follow-on agreement to New START, remains critically impor

48、tant. However, it should not be prioritized to the exclusion of other arms control and risk reduction efforts in other arenas, such as biotechnology, advanced missile threats, space, cyber, and digital technologies, in which stability risks, both in terms of crisis management and arms racing, are of

49、 growing concern. Focus on particularly risky behaviors, especially the application of advanced technologies during crisis scenarios. Arms control arrangements that focus on banning or limiting specific numbers and types of weapons will continue to play a role in strategic stability, especially in t

50、erms of nuclear weapons and related delivery systems. But the intersection of nuclear and advanced technologies, especially during crises with compressed decisionmaking time, will also need to be a priority. Such agreements could address behaviors across the range of conflict that might erode or des