模拟试题2及答案(共6页).doc

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1、精选优质文档-倾情为你奉上模拟试题 二一、 名词解释：（共16分）1边际技术替代率递减规律2纳什均衡3IS曲线4平衡预算乘数二、单项选择题（共10分）1垄断市场中的厂商和行业的短期供给曲线（）A. 没有规律性 B.向右上方倾斜 C.向左上方倾斜 D.为一水平线2下列说法中正确的是（）A. 纳什均衡一定是占优策略均衡，而占优策略均衡不一定就是纳什均衡B. 占优策略均衡一定是纳什均衡，而纳什均衡不一定就是占优策略均衡C. 占优策略均衡不一定是纳什均衡，纳什均衡也不一定是占优策略均衡D. 占优策略均衡一定是纳什均衡，纳什均衡也一定就是占优策略均衡3可以使两个罪犯永久合作下去的方式是（）A.合作一次

2、B.合作有限次 C.合作无限次 D.没有方法4如果所有的个人和企业都是以自我利益为中心的价格接受者，则竞争均衡（）A.不会有帕累托最优效率 B.不可能具有帕累托最优效率 C.可能具有帕累托最优效率 D.肯定具有帕累托最优效率5下列关于生命周期假说和永久收入假说的说法中正确的是（）A. 生命周期假说偏重于对储蓄动机的分析，而永久收入假说则偏重于个人如何预测自己未来收入的问题B. 永久收入假说偏重于对储蓄动机的分析，而生命周期假说则偏重于个人如何预测自己未来收入的问题C. 生命周期假说和永久收入假说都是对对储蓄动机的分析D. 生命周期假说和永久收入假说都关心个人如何预测自己未来收入的问题6投资的边

3、际效率随着投资支出的增加而（）A. 逐渐增加 B. 逐渐递减 C.保持不变 D.不确定7下列选项中不属于货币政策工具的是（）A.公开市场业务 B.贴现率 C.政府转移支付 D.法定准备率以及道义上的劝告8总需求曲线向右下方倾斜不取决于（）A. 实际余额效应 B.时际替代效应 C.开放替代效应 D.货币余额效用9关于充分就业的说法中正确的是（）A. 充分就业并不代表所有人都就业 B. 充分就业代表所有劳动力都就业C. 充分就业代表所有人都就业 D. 充分就业率就是自然率10下列关于通货膨胀的说法正确的是（）A.通货膨胀使债权人受益 B. 通货膨胀使债务人受益C. 通货膨胀使债权人债务人都受益 D

4、. 通货膨胀对债务无影响三判断题（共10分）1我总愿意用6单位的x替代1单位的y，我的偏好违背了单调性假设。（）2微观经济学的基本假设：（1）合乎理性人的假设条件；（2）完全信息的假设条件。（）3GDP=工资+利息+租金+利润+间接税和转移支付+折旧。（）4规模报酬变动的主要原因是内在经济和内在不经济、外在经济和外在不经济。（）5货币幻觉可能会引起实际消费支出的下降，但不可能引起实际消费支出的上升。（）6对完全竞争厂商来说，其短期均衡的条件为P=MC。（）7可排他的公共物品常有供给不足的现象，无法排他的公共物品常有利用不足的现象。（）8CPI会夸大通货膨胀的程度。（）9固定汇率和资本完全流动的

5、条件下，单独一个国家的货币政策有效。（）10成本推动型通货膨胀是一种货币现象。（）四计算题（共20分，每题10分）1某垄断竞争市场中一厂商的长期总成本函数为：LTC=0.001Q*Q*Q-0.425Q*Q+85Q。 设该市场中不存在进入障碍，产量由该市场的整个产品集团调整。如果产品集团中所有厂商按同样比例调整他们的价格，出售产品的实际需求曲线为Q=300-2.5P。 （1）计算厂商长期均衡产量和价格； （2）计算厂商主观需求曲线上长期均衡点的弹性。2假设有一经济社会是由三部门构成的。其消费函数为C=20+0.8（Y-T），投资函数为I=600-4000r，政府支出G=420，税收函数T=100

6、+0.25Y，名义货币供给Ms=345，货币需求函数为Md=25+0.4Y-4000r。试求：（1）IS曲线方程式；（2）当价格水平P=1时，LM曲线的方程式；（3）当价格水平P=1时，产品市场和货币市场同时均衡时的利率和收入；（4）总需求曲线方程式。五简答题（共16分，每题8分）1完全竞争市场的有效性体现在哪几个方面？2货币政策的含义及其局限性。六论述题（共28分，每题14分）1帕累托最优。2评述新古典增长理论。七英语翻译（50分）Great barrier griefONE consequence of the worst economic crisis in 80 years is th

7、at dismal scientists everywhere have had to gen up on the Depression in order to contribute to the policy debate. Most have by now picked up the stylised fact that a rigid adherence to the gold standard made a bad slump worse. Countries that cut the link to gold quickly and allowed their currencies

8、to fluctuate endured shallower recessions and recovered more quickly than those that stuck with it. Freed from the need to uphold a gold-price parity, these countries could lower interest rates and so stimulate spending. By devaluing against gold, their money also became cheaper against currencies t

9、hat kept their gold parity, giving domestic producers a cost advantage over many foreign firms.A new paper* by Barry Eichengreen of the University of California, Berkeley, and Douglas Irwin of Dartmouth College adds a fresh dimension to this analysis. It examines how the decision to quit gold or to

10、cleave to it affected trade policies. The picture painted by most accounts is of a rush to erect new barriers to trade, as each country tried to shield its businesses and workers from the deepening slump and responded in kind to the protectionism of others. In fact, say the authors, trade barriers w

11、ere not imposed uniformly. Countries that stuck with gold were more protectionist than those that abandoned it. Tariffs were a poor substitute for policy stimulus, but in an era of balanced budgets they were all that gold-standard countries had.In order to stand up that claim, the authors first show

12、 how the global monetary system broke down. In the decades leading up to the first world war, paper currencies were backed by gold at a fixed parity, in effect linking countries through a system of pegged exchange rates. Once war broke out, the system went into abeyance. When the gold standard was r

13、evived in the 1920s, it was a more fragile entity. Despite high inflation in the meantime, many countries restored their pre-war gold parities. With more money in circulation that led to a shortage of bullion. So the two main paper currencies, sterling and the dollar, were used as gold substitutes.

14、Such a ruse relied on credible monetary policy in both Britain and America.Of the two America is often seen as the main culprit for the spread of protectionism. The infamous Smoot-Hawley act, which was passed in June 1930 and increased nearly 900 American import duties, is usually viewed as central

15、to the collapse in world trade that followed. But Messrs Eichengreen and Irwin argue that it was Britains ditching of gold in September 1931 that really started the “avalanche” of protectionism.The ensuing rush to protect home markets served only to depress commerce further. By 1933 the volume of wo

16、rld trade was down by one-quarter from its 1929 level. Many of Britains trading partners responded quickly to sterlings devaluation by coming off gold too. Two groups of countries held out for longer. The first, including Germany and Austria, was haunted by memories of hyperinflation and fearful of

17、the consequences for financial stability of de-linking from gold. A second group, which included France and Switzerland and is labelled the “gold bloc” by the authors, held fast to gold to preserve their status as financial centres. Establishing that these countries were more prone to protectionism

18、is tricky. Comprehensive data on 1930s trade barriers are hard to find. One source, a League of Nations estimate of the share of imports covered by import quotas, supports the authors thesis: in a small sample of eight countries the gold bloc used more quotas than the others. To test whether that fi

19、nding holds up in a bigger sample, the authors compared exchange-rate fluctuations of 40 countries between 1928 and 1935 with the increase in import barriers over the same period, using the share of customs revenue in the value of imports as a measure of tariffs. They found barriers rose least where

20、 countries had devalued.Though the results look solid, they contain an awkward outlier: Britain. Its devaluation blew a hole in the global monetary system, causing America to raise interest rates in the midst of a slump and forcing others to scrabble for bullion to replace their sterling reserves. T

21、he Eichengreen-Irwin theory says Britain, with its cheaper currency, should have been among the freer traders. Yet it raised its import barriers almost immediately. The authors put this down to local politics: the financial crisis brought an avowedly protectionist party, the Conservatives, to power.

22、 Mr Eichengreen says the paper has provoked two contrasting responses from colleagues. “Half say we spend far too much time explaining why Britain is a special case. The other half complain that we dont fully explain why Britain is different.”The tale underlines the importance of policy co-ordinatio

23、n. It would have been better if all countries had devalued against gold at the same time, allowing a looser global monetary policy much earlier. By 1936 even the gold-bloc countries had abandoned the link, but by then the damage to world trade had been done. There is a similar need today for co-ordi

24、nation, this time in fiscal policies. If countries feel that others are gaining from their own stimulus packages, they may be tempted to resort to trade barriers. The broader message is a happier one. The risk of a 1930s-style outbreak of protectionism is much lower because countries are able to use

25、 fiscal and monetary policy more flexibly. However, within that big lesson is a smaller one, that devaluations cause trade tensions. In an echo of the 1930s crisis Britain has again benefited from a weaker currency, upsetting its trading partners (notably Ireland). But Mr Eichengreen notes that the

26、euro, by militating against more widespread beggar-thy-neighbour policies, may have helped preserve the European single market. 参考答案：一、 名词解释：略二、选择题 ABCD ABCD AB三、判断F T F T F T F T F T 四、计算题1解：（1）由LTC=0.001Q*Q*Q-0.425Q*Q+85Q得： LAC=0.001Q*Q-0.425Q+85 同时，由Q=300-2.5P得：P=120-0.4Q， 长期均衡时实际需求曲线必然和LAC曲线在均衡点

27、上相交。 令LAC=P，得Q=200，P=40 （2）长期均衡时，主观需求曲线必然和LAC曲线相切，且MC=MR。 由于LTC=0.001Q*Q*Q-0.425Q*Q+85Q得LMC=0.003Q*Q-0.85Q+85 当Q=200时，LMC=35，MR=35。 运用公式MR=P（1-1/e），得e=82解：（1）IS曲线方程： Y=C+I+G Y=20+0.8（Y-T）+600-4000r+420=960+0.6Y-4000r 整理得IS曲线方程：Y=2400-10000r （2）LM曲线的方程：345/P=25+0.4Y-4000r 当价格水平为1时，LM曲线的方程：345=25+0.4Y

28、-4000r 整理得Y=800+10000r （3）P=1时，得Y=1600，r=0.08 （4）联立（1），（2）得总需求方程为Y=1725/4P-4675/4五、简答1边际成本等于市场价格；平均成本等于市场价格；长期均衡通过价格的自由波动实现（逐条进行展开论述，但由于是简答题，所以篇幅不宜过长） 本题属于开放式题目 以上三条只是列举了一部分，另外合适的也可以列举并论述。2定义，有哪些工具，逐个工具分析含义以及局限性。六、论述1详见高鸿业教材中帕累托最优的实现一节，该题是论述题，要对帕累托最优进行详细的描述，包括定义，交换帕累托实现，生产帕累托实现，以及在完全竞争市场中帕累托最优的实现过程。

29、2内容，四个关键结论，稳定增长的条件及其政策含义，缺陷及其发展（详见高鸿业教材）七翻译“触礁“之痛作为这场80年来最严重的经济危机造成的后果之一，各国经济学家为了进行政策辩论不得不重温经济大萧条的教训。目前为止，其中大多数人得出的结论是一个程式化的事实，即拘泥于金本位只能导致使经济衰退更加严重。在那些迅速与黄金切断关系，允许汇率上下浮动的国家，衰退比起坚持金本位制度的国家来得更温和些。由于汇率不必由黄金平价决定，前者可以通过降低利率来刺激消费。当这些国家的货币相对黄金贬值时，相对于其它仍然由黄金平价决定的货币而言也贬值了，因此这些国家的国内制造商相对外国公司具有了成本优势。加州大学伯克利分校的

30、巴里艾臣格林和(新罕布什尔州)达特茅斯学院的道格拉斯埃尔文在一篇新论文*中为这一分析带来全新视角。论文分析了放弃或坚持金本位是如何影响贸易政策的。受经济衰退的影响，各国纷纷采取措施保护本国公司及员工，并对其他国家的同类做法以牙还牙，多数人认为这样的做法造成了贸易壁垒。论文作者的看法是，实际上各国的贸易保护程度并不一致。保持金本位的国家比起放弃金本位的国家贸易保护程度更严重。关税并不能代替政策上的刺激，但在预算平衡期，金本位国家只有这条路可走。为证明此断言，作者首先解释了国际货币体系是如何瓦解的。第一次世界大战前数十年间，各国纸币汇率由金本位制下的折合对等价值固定，因此各国由固定汇率联系在一起。

31、一战爆发后，金本位体系告终。二十年代金本位制复苏，但已经十分脆弱。尽管通胀十分严重，许多国家恢复了战前的金平价。由于流通中的纸币增加，金砖数量不足，因此英镑和美元这两种主要纸币被用来替代金砖。这一策略主要依赖英国与美国可靠的货币政策。英美两国中，美国往往被视为贸易保护主义传播的罪魁。1930年六月通过的臭名昭著的斯姆特-霍利法案提高了900多项进口商品关税，因而该法案被认为是导致其后世界贸易崩盘的重要原因。但论文作者艾臣格林与埃尔文提出，是英国在1931年九月放弃金本位造成了贸易保护主义开始泛滥。英国放弃金本位后，各国纷纷采取措施保护本国市场，导致贸易衰退加深。到1933年，世界贸易总额比19

32、29年减少了四分之一。作为对英镑贬值的回应，英国的贸易伙伴国迅速切断与黄金的联系。两派坚持金本位制的时间相对较长。一派包括德国与奥地利，由于惧怕过去恶性通货膨胀的旧事重演，担心脱离金本位制之后金融得不到稳定。另一派包括法国和瑞士，这一派被作者称为“金本位国家集团”，他们紧紧抓住金本位制，以图保住金融中心的地位。要证明这些国家更倾向于贸易保护主义相当复杂。有关二十世纪三十年代贸易壁垒的数据踪迹难寻。其中一处数据来源于国际联盟根据进口配额估测得出的进口额配比，证明了作者的论点：在作为样本的八个国家中，金本位国家占有更多进口配额。为了测试这一结论是否适用于更大的样本，作者通过计算海关税收占进口额比率

33、来衡量关税，对比了40个国家在1928到1935年间的汇率浮动情况与进口壁垒的增加情况。他们发现，在货币贬值的国家，贸易壁垒增加最少。尽管结论看似可靠，但其中包括一个难以解释的例外：英国。英镑贬值给全球货币体系带来沉重的一击，致使处于经济衰落中的美国提高利率，迫使其它国家纷纷抢购金砖以取代英镑储备。艾臣格林-埃尔文理论认为，英国由于货币价格降低，理应采取自由贸易。然而英国几乎同时又提高了进口壁垒。作者把原因归结于英国国内政策：经济危机使得公然支持贸易保护主义的保守党取得政权。艾臣格林说他们的论文在同行间引起两种截然不同的反应，“一半认为我们在解释为什么英国是一个特例上花了太多时间，另一半抱怨我

34、们没有完全解释英国为什么特别。”这个例子强调了政策协调的重要性。如果各国货币同时贬值，趁早实现宽松的货币政策，事情发展就会好得多。到1936年，连金本位国家集团成员也放弃了金本位政策，但那时国际贸易已经受到了重创。在今天的形势下，协调同样也是必须的，这次需要的是财政政策的协调。如果一些国家感到其它国家正从自己的经济刺激方案中获利，他们也许会采取贸易壁垒措施。普遍的讯息还算乐观。因为各国能够灵活运用财政与货币政策，1930年式贸易保护主义风潮再次爆发的风险很低。然而，这个大教训中还包含一个小教训，即货币贬值可能导致贸易紧张。像二十世纪三十年代的危机一样，英国再次由于货币相对便宜而获利，令贸易伙伴大为恼火（尤其是爱尔兰）。但是艾臣格林指出，欧元抵挡住了普遍性的损人利己政策，也许已经起到了保护欧洲单一市场的作用。专心-专注-专业