基于收益分配和政府补贴的研发联盟创新激励研究.docx
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1、 基于收益分配和政府补贴的 研发联盟创新激励研究 重庆大学硕士学位论文 学生姓名:马国旺 指导教师:孟卫东 教 授 专 业:管理科学与工程 学科门类:管理学 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院 二 O 一 O 年四月 A Study On Innovation Incentive of R&D Alliance With Profit-sharing Arrangement and Financial Subsidies A Thesis Submitted to Chongqing University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for th
2、e Degree of Master of Management By Ma Guowang Supervised by Prof. Meng Weidong Major: Management Science and Engineering College of Economics and Business Administration of Chongqing University , Chongqing, China April, 2010 I 摘 要 随着技术变革的加快、产品生命周期的缩短以及市场竞争的加剧,仅仅依靠 企业内部有限的技术和资源进行研发变得日益困难,越来越多的企业倾向于采
3、用 联盟的方式进行研发活动。合作研发能给企业带来诸多好处,如:共享资源,分 担成本和风险,形成协同优势等。但是由于创新的外部性,研发活动的高成本、 高技术风险等因素,企业研发投入始终不足,结成研发联盟进行合作研发也不能 完全解决这一问题。 对于研发联盟创新激励问题,通常可以通过市场机制和政府调控两种途径来 实现。市场机制包括建立研发联盟收益分配机制、完善联盟契约、优选合作伙伴 等,以此来防范联盟成员道德风险,激励其进行技术创新,增大研发投入。政府 调控包括政府采用财政补贴、税收优惠、政府采购、公共投资等措施来激励研发 联盟进行技术创新,增大研发投入。 本文针对研发联盟技术创新研发投 入不足的问
4、题,主要从市场机制中的研发 联盟收益分配机制设计和政府调控中的财政补贴政策两个方面来研究。 在研发联盟收益分配研究中,运用 Shapley 值法,量化联盟成员之间的研发溢 出效应,分析此分配方法对联盟成员投资策略的影响及成员的最优投资策略的实 现。并对该方法进行改进,最终确定一个合理的分配机制,满足联盟成员参与约 束和激励相容两个条件,使联盟成员在自利行为的驱使下主动增大研发投入,从 而降低道德风险,发挥分配机制的激励作用使联盟获得成功。 在政府财政补贴政策研究中,针对研发溢出发生的不同阶段而存在 投资溢出 和成果溢出两种形式,分别建立投资溢出和技术风险的合作研发博弈模型及成果 溢出和技术风险
5、的合作研发博弈模型,分析政府不同的财政补贴方式对联盟成员 投资策略的影响,研究在不同政府研发补贴方式下联盟成员的研发和生产策略, 以及社会福利的大小。在此基础上以社会福利最大化为目标,找出不同外部环境 下的最优政府研发补贴政策,来激励企业增大研发投入,增加社会福利,为政府 制定相关政策提供决策支持。 关键词: 研发联盟,收益分配,财政补贴,创新激励 II ABSTRACT With the acceleration of technological change, shorter product life cycles, as well as intensifier market compet
6、ition, only relying on limited internal skills and resources to conduct R &D has become increasingly difficult, so more and more companies tend to use alliances to conduct R&D activities. Cooperative R&D can bring on many benefits, such as sharing resources, sharing costs and risks, and forming syne
7、rgies and so on. However, due to externalities of innovation, high-cost and high-tech risk factors of research and development activities, and inadequate corporate R&D, cooperative R&D alliances can not completely solve the problem. Considering of innovation incentives of R&D alliance issues, usuall
8、y it can be improved through market mechanisms and government regulation. Market mechanisms including the establishment of R&D alliance revenue allocation mechanism, the union contract improvement, preferred partners and alliance members, mean to prevent moral hazard, encourage technological innovat
9、ion, and increase R&D investment. Government regulation, including the adoption of fiscal subsidies, tax incentives, government procurement, public investment and other measures, mean to stimulate R&D alliance for technological innovation, increase R&D investment. This paper focuses on the investmen
10、t shortage of R&D alliance technological innovation, mainly from the two below aspects; one is profit-sharing arrangement mechanism design of market mechanism in the R&D alliance, the other is financial subsidy policy of government regulation. In the profit-sharing arrangement studies of R&D allianc
11、e, this paper used Shapley value method to quantify the R&D spillover effect between alliance members, analyze the effect of this distribution method on the investment strategy of union members and the realize of members of the optimal investment strategy. And the improvement of the method is to fin
12、ally decide the allocation of a reasonable mechanism, meet the union members to participate in the two conditions of constraints and incentive, so that union members driven by self-interested behavior will take the activities of enlarger R&D investment, which will reduce moral hazard, and make a all
13、iance success of the incentives of allocation mechanism. In the government financial subsidy policy research, due to the different stages of R&D spillover which contains investment overflow and achievement spillover the two 3 forms, the paper respectively establishes game models of cooperative R&D,
14、and one is based on investment overflow and technological risks spillover, while the other is based on technological risks and achievement spillover. Analysis of the effect of different financial subsidies on the investment strategy of the union members were given, besides, research of the R&D and p
15、roduction strategies of alliance members as well as the size of social welfare in the different government subsidies were also given. Based on this, to aim for maximize social welfare, the paper found out the optimal government R&D subsidy policy in the different external environment, to encourage c
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