2021年北京大学英语考试真题卷_1.docx

《2021年北京大学英语考试真题卷_1.docx》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《2021年北京大学英语考试真题卷_1.docx（54页珍藏版）》请在淘文阁 - 分享文档赚钱的网站上搜索。

1、2021年北京大学英语考试真题卷本卷共分为1大题50小题，作答时间为180分钟，总分100分，60分及格。一、单项选择题（共50题，每题2分。每题的备选项中，只有一个最符合题意） 1.Questions 11 to 18 are based on the conversation you have just heard.ABoth of the two speakers will have a relaxing weekend.BThe man will go for a picnic tomorrow.CThe woman will have a busy weekend.DThe woma

2、n will relax herself this weekend. 2.Questions 11 to 18 are based on the conversation you have just heard.AThey will have an exam.BThey will double-check the answers.CThey will correct the test score immediately.DThey will mark the wrong answer. 3.Questions 11 to 18 are based on the conversation you

3、 have just heard.AHe has taken photos of Kelly.BHe has taken photos of the campus.CHe has understood what the woman means.DHe will have a talk with Kelly. 4. Dont Destroy the Essential Catalyst of Risk Since the spring, and most acutely this autumn, a global contagion (传染)of fear and panic has choke

4、d off the arteries of finance, compounding a broader deterioration in the global economy. Financial institutions have an obligation to the broader financial system. We depend on a healthy, well-functioning system but we failed to raise enough questions about whether some of the trends and practices

5、that had become commonplace really served the publics long-term interests.Seven important lessons As policymakers and regulators begin to consider the regulatory actions to be taken to address the fallings, I believe it is useful to reflect on some of the lessons from tiffs crisis. The first is that

6、 risk management should not be entirely predicated on historical data. In the past several months, we have heard the phrase multiple standard deviation events more than a few times. If events that were calculated to occur once in 20 years in fact occurred much more regularly, it does not take a math

7、ematician to figure out that risk management assumptions did not reflect the distribution of the actual outcomes. Our industry must do more to enhance and improve scenario analysis and stress testing. Second, too many financial institutions and investors simply outsourced their risk management. Rath

8、er than undertake their own analysis, they relied on the rating agencies to do the essential work of risk analysis for them. This was true at the inception(初期)and over the period of the investment, during which time they did not consider other indicators of financial deterioration. This over-depende

9、nce on credit ratings coincided with the dilution of the desired triple A-rating. In January 2008, there were 12 triple A-rated companies in the world. At the same time, there were 64, 000 structured finance instruments, such as collateralized debt obligations, rated triple A. It is easy and appropr

10、iate to blame the rating agencies for lapses in their credit judgments. But the blame for the result is not theirs alone. Every financial institution that participated in the process has to accept its share of the responsibility. Third, size matters. For example, whether you owned $5 billion or $50

11、billion of (supposedly) low-risk super senior debt in a CDO, the likelihood of losses was, proportionally, the same. But the consequences of a miscalculation were obviously much bigger if you had a $50 billion exposure. Fourth, many risk models incorrectly assumed that positions could be fully hedge

12、d. After the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management mid the crisis in emerging markets in 1998, new products such as various basket indices and credit default swaps were created to help offset a number of risks. However, we did not, as an industry, consider carefully enough the possibility that li

13、quidity would dry up, making it difficult to apply effective hedges. Fifth, risk models failed to capture the risk inherent in off-balance sheet activities, such as structured investment vehicles. It seems clear now that managers of companies with large off-balance sheet exposure did not appreciate

14、the full magnitude of the economic risks they were exposed to; equally worrying, their counterparties were unaware of the full extent of these vehicles and, therefore, could not accurately assess the risk of doing business. Sixth, complexity got the better of us. The industry let the growth in new i

15、nstruments outstrip(超过)the operational capacity to manage them. As a result, operational risk increased dramatically and tiffs had a direct effect on the overall stability of the financial system. Last, and perhaps most important, financial institutions did not account for asset values accurately en

16、ough. I have heard some argue that fair value accounting - which assigns current values to financial assets and liabilities - is one of the main factors exacerbating(使恶化) the credit crisis. I see it differently. If more institutions had properly valued their positions and commitments at the outset,

17、they would have been in a much better position to reduce their exposures.Fair value: a discipline for financial institutions The daily marking of positions to current market prices was a key contributor to our decision to reduce risk relatively early in markets and in instruments that were deteriora

18、ting. This process can be difficult, and sometimes painful, but I believe it is a discipline that should define financial institutions. As a result of these lessons and others that will emerge from this financial crisis, we should consider important principles for our industry, for policymakers and

19、for regulators. For the industry, we cannot let our ability to innovate exceed our capacity to manage. Given the size and interconnected nature of markets, the growth in volumes, the globalACommercial banks.BFinancial institutions.CThe ministry of finance.DThe Wall Street. 5.Questions 19 to 21 are b

20、ased on the conversation you have just heard.AHe isnt interested in the movie.BHe slept through the whole movie.CHe didnt miss the best part of the movie.DHe brought pillow with him. 6. Dont Destroy the Essential Catalyst of Risk Since the spring, and most acutely this autumn, a global contagion (传染

21、)of fear and panic has choked off the arteries of finance, compounding a broader deterioration in the global economy. Financial institutions have an obligation to the broader financial system. We depend on a healthy, well-functioning system but we failed to raise enough questions about whether some

22、of the trends and practices that had become commonplace really served the publics long-term interests.Seven important lessons As policymakers and regulators begin to consider the regulatory actions to be taken to address the fallings, I believe it is useful to reflect on some of the lessons from tif

23、fs crisis. The first is that risk management should not be entirely predicated on historical data. In the past several months, we have heard the phrase multiple standard deviation events more than a few times. If events that were calculated to occur once in 20 years in fact occurred much more regula

24、rly, it does not take a mathematician to figure out that risk management assumptions did not reflect the distribution of the actual outcomes. Our industry must do more to enhance and improve scenario analysis and stress testing. Second, too many financial institutions and investors simply outsourced

25、 their risk management. Rather than undertake their own analysis, they relied on the rating agencies to do the essential work of risk analysis for them. This was true at the inception(初期)and over the period of the investment, during which time they did not consider other indicators of financial dete

26、rioration. This over-dependence on credit ratings coincided with the dilution of the desired triple A-rating. In January 2008, there were 12 triple A-rated companies in the world. At the same time, there were 64, 000 structured finance instruments, such as collateralized debt obligations, rated trip

27、le A. It is easy and appropriate to blame the rating agencies for lapses in their credit judgments. But the blame for the result is not theirs alone. Every financial institution that participated in the process has to accept its share of the responsibility. Third, size matters. For example, whether

28、you owned $5 billion or $50 billion of (supposedly) low-risk super senior debt in a CDO, the likelihood of losses was, proportionally, the same. But the consequences of a miscalculation were obviously much bigger if you had a $50 billion exposure. Fourth, many risk models incorrectly assumed that po

29、sitions could be fully hedged. After the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management mid the crisis in emerging markets in 1998, new products such as various basket indices and credit default swaps were created to help offset a number of risks. However, we did not, as an industry, consider carefully en

30、ough the possibility that liquidity would dry up, making it difficult to apply effective hedges. Fifth, risk models failed to capture the risk inherent in off-balance sheet activities, such as structured investment vehicles. It seems clear now that managers of companies with large off-balance sheet

31、exposure did not appreciate the full magnitude of the economic risks they were exposed to; equally worrying, their counterparties were unaware of the full extent of these vehicles and, therefore, could not accurately assess the risk of doing business. Sixth, complexity got the better of us. The indu

32、stry let the growth in new instruments outstrip(超过)the operational capacity to manage them. As a result, operational risk increased dramatically and tiffs had a direct effect on the overall stability of the financial system. Last, and perhaps most important, financial institutions did not account fo

33、r asset values accurately enough. I have heard some argue that fair value accounting - which assigns current values to financial assets and liabilities - is one of the main factors exacerbating(使恶化) the credit crisis. I see it differently. If more institutions had properly valued their positions and

34、 commitments at the outset, they would have been in a much better position to reduce their exposures.Fair value: a discipline for financial institutions The daily marking of positions to current market prices was a key contributor to our decision to reduce risk relatively early in markets and in ins

35、truments that were deteriorating. This process can be difficult, and sometimes painful, but I believe it is a discipline that should define financial institutions. As a result of these lessons and others that will emerge from this financial crisis, we should consider important principles for our ind

36、ustry, for policymakers and for regulators. For the industry, we cannot let our ability to innovate exceed our capacity to manage. Given the size and interconnected nature of markets, the growth in volumes, the globalAscenario analysis and stress testingBrisk management assumptionsCprediction on fin

37、ancial riskDmultiple standard deviation events 7.Questions 19 to 21 are based on the conversation you have just heard.AThe captain.BThe communication officer.CThe doctor.DThe frog person. 8.Questions 19 to 21 are based on the conversation you have just heard.AIn a neighbors house.BIn a movie theater

38、.CAt home.DOn the street. 9. Dont Destroy the Essential Catalyst of Risk Since the spring, and most acutely this autumn, a global contagion (传染)of fear and panic has choked off the arteries of finance, compounding a broader deterioration in the global economy. Financial institutions have an obligati

39、on to the broader financial system. We depend on a healthy, well-functioning system but we failed to raise enough questions about whether some of the trends and practices that had become commonplace really served the publics long-term interests.Seven important lessons As policymakers and regulators

40、begin to consider the regulatory actions to be taken to address the fallings, I believe it is useful to reflect on some of the lessons from tiffs crisis. The first is that risk management should not be entirely predicated on historical data. In the past several months, we have heard the phrase multi

41、ple standard deviation events more than a few times. If events that were calculated to occur once in 20 years in fact occurred much more regularly, it does not take a mathematician to figure out that risk management assumptions did not reflect the distribution of the actual outcomes. Our industry mu

42、st do more to enhance and improve scenario analysis and stress testing. Second, too many financial institutions and investors simply outsourced their risk management. Rather than undertake their own analysis, they relied on the rating agencies to do the essential work of risk analysis for them. This

43、 was true at the inception(初期)and over the period of the investment, during which time they did not consider other indicators of financial deterioration. This over-dependence on credit ratings coincided with the dilution of the desired triple A-rating. In January 2008, there were 12 triple A-rated c

44、ompanies in the world. At the same time, there were 64, 000 structured finance instruments, such as collateralized debt obligations, rated triple A. It is easy and appropriate to blame the rating agencies for lapses in their credit judgments. But the blame for the result is not theirs alone. Every f

45、inancial institution that participated in the process has to accept its share of the responsibility. Third, size matters. For example, whether you owned $5 billion or $50 billion of (supposedly) low-risk super senior debt in a CDO, the likelihood of losses was, proportionally, the same. But the cons

46、equences of a miscalculation were obviously much bigger if you had a $50 billion exposure. Fourth, many risk models incorrectly assumed that positions could be fully hedged. After the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management mid the crisis in emerging markets in 1998, new products such as various ba

47、sket indices and credit default swaps were created to help offset a number of risks. However, we did not, as an industry, consider carefully enough the possibility that liquidity would dry up, making it difficult to apply effective hedges. Fifth, risk models failed to capture the risk inherent in of

48、f-balance sheet activities, such as structured investment vehicles. It seems clear now that managers of companies with large off-balance sheet exposure did not appreciate the full magnitude of the economic risks they were exposed to; equally worrying, their counterparties were unaware of the full extent of these vehicles and, therefore, could not accurately assess the risk of doing business. Sixth, complexity got the better of us. The industry let the growth in new