柠檬市场：质量的不确定性和市场机制(中英对照).doc

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1、【精品文档】如有侵权，请联系网站删除，仅供学习与交流柠檬市场：质量的不确定性和市场机制(中英对照).精品文档.The Markets for “Lemons”: Quality uncertainty and The Market Mechanism柠檬市场：质量的不确定性和市场机制Geogre A. Akerlof 阿克洛夫一、引言This paper relates quality and uncertainty. The existence of goods of many grades poses interesting and important problems for the t

2、heory of markets.（本文论述的是质量和不确定性问题。现实中存在大量多种档次的物品给市场理论提出了饶有趣味而十分重大的难题）On the one hand, the interaction of quality differences and uncertainty may explain important institutions of the labor market.（一方面，质量差异和不确定性的相互作用可以解释劳动力的重要机制）On the other hand, this paper presents a struggling attempt to give stru

3、cture to the statement: Business in under-developed countries is difficult; in particular, a structure is given for determining the economic costs of dishonesty.（另一方面，本文试图通过讨论获得这样的结论：在不发达国家，商业交易是困难的，其中，特别论及了欺骗性交易的经济成本）Additional applications of the theory include comments on the structure of money m

4、arkets, on the notion of insurability, on the liquidity of durables, and on brand-name goods.（本文的理论还可以用来研究货币市场、保险可行性、耐用品的流动性和名牌商品等问题）There are many markets in which buyers use some market statistic to judge the quality of prospective purchases.（在许多市场中，买者利用市场的统计数据来判断他们将要购买的商品的质量）In this case there is

5、 incentive for sellers to market poor quality merchandise, since the returns for good quality accrue mainly to the entire group whose statistic is affected rather than to the individual seller. As a result there tends to be a reduction in the average quality of goods and also in the size of the mark

6、et.（在这种情况下，卖者有动力提供低质量商品，因为某种商品的价格主要取决于所有同类商品质量的统计数据而非该商品的实际质量。结果，商品的平均质量将趋于下降，市场规模将不断缩小）It should also be perceived that in these markets social and private returns differ, and therefore, in some cases, governmental intervention may increase the welfare of all parties. Or private institutions may ar

7、ise to take advantage of the potential increases in welfare which can accrue to all parties.（我们还可以观察到在这种市场上，对个人和社会有不同的回报，因此，某种情况下，政府的干预可以增进社会的总体福利水平。或者说，私人组织利用了整个社会福利水平潜在的增长机会而使自己获利）By nature, however, these institutions are nonatomistic, and therefore concentrations of power- with ill consequences

8、of their own-can develop.（实际上，这些私人组织的行动所产生的影响并非可以忽略不计，因此，尽管集权本身有许多负面影响，但是，一定程度上的集权可以保证经济的健康发展）The automobile market is used as a finger exercise to illustrate and develop these thoughts. It should be emphasized that this market is chosen for its concreteness and ease in understanding rather than for

9、 its importance or realism.（下面，我们用汽车市场作为例子来阐释和进一步发展以上的思想。需要指出的是，之所以选择旧车市场来讨论，是因为这个例子很具体，并且容易理解，而不是因为它的重要性和有何现实意义）二、以汽车市场模型为例（一）汽车市场The example of used cars captures the essence of the problem. From time to time one hears either mention of or surprise at the large price difference between new cars an

10、d those which have just left the showroom. The usual lunch table justification for this phenomenon is the pure joy of owning a new car.（旧车市场的例子可以抓住问题的本质。人们不止一次的听说或惊讶于新车与刚刚开出样品陈列室的汽车之间的价格存在巨大差别。对于这种情况最普遍的解释是人们有一种对“新”车的特别偏好）We offer a different explanation. Suppose (for the sake of clarity rather than

11、 reality) that there are just four kinds of cars. There are new cars and used cars. There are good cars and bad cars (which in America are known as lemons). A new car may be a good car or a lemon, and of course the same is true of used cars.（假设（作出这种假设只是为了简化分析，而非从实际出发）用四种汽车：新车和旧车；高质量的车和低质量的车（低质量的车在美国

12、被称为“柠檬”）。一辆新车可能是高质量的，也可能是“柠檬”，当然一辆旧车也同样有两种情况）The individuals in this market buy a new automobile without knowing whether the car they buy will be good or a lemon. But they do know that with probability q it is a good car and with probability (1-q) it is a lemon; by assumption, q is the proportion of

13、 good cars produced and (1 - q) is the proportion of lemons.（在这样的市场上，消费者买新车时并不知道车辆到底是高质量的还是“柠檬”，但是他知道这辆车是高质量的概率是q，是“柠檬”的概率是“1-q”。这里假设q是高质量车占所有汽车的比率，1-q是“柠檬”的比率）After owning a specific car, however, for a length of time, the car owner can form a good idea of the quality of this machine; i.e., the own

14、er assigns a new probability to the event that his car is a lemon. This estimate is more accurate than the original estimate.（车主在拥有汽车后一段时间内就会了解到该车的质量，也就是说，此时车主可以赋予该车可能是“柠檬”的一个概率值，这个估计比初始的估计更加准确）An asymmetry in available information has developed: for the sellers now have more knowledge about the qua

15、lity of a car than the buyers. But good cars and bad cars must still sell at the same price- since it is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference between a good car and a bad car.（于是，信息不对称发生了：卖主掌握了比买主更多的关于汽车质量的信息。对于买主来说，由于他不能在买车时区分汽车的质量，所以，高质量车和低质量车只能以同一个价格水平出售）It is apparent that a used car ca

16、n-not have the same valuation as a new car - if it did have the same valuation, it would clearly be advantageous to trade a lemon at the price of new car, and buy another new car, at a higher prob-ability q of being good and a lower probability of being bad.（显然，一辆新车和一辆旧车不应该有相同的评价。如果他们拥有相同的评价，车主通过以高质

17、量车的价格出售“柠檬”后再买一辆新车，该新车是高质量的概率q大于原先购买新车的概率）Thus the owner of a good machine must be locked in. Not only is it true that he cannot receive the true value of his car, but he cannot even obtain the expected value of a new car.（这样，高质量车的拥有者将不会卖出汽车，因为如果卖出汽车他不仅无法得到汽车的真实价值，也无法获得一辆新车的期望价值）Greshams law has mad

18、e a modified reappearance. For most cars traded will be the lemons, and good cars may not be traded at all. The bad cars tend to drive out the good (in much the same way that bad money drives out the good).（这里出现了一个修正后的格莱欣定律。当“柠檬”充斥汽车市场时，高质量车根本不会成交，于是，如同劣币驱逐良币一样，低质量车将高质量车逐出市场）But the analogy with Gre

19、shams law is not quite complete: bad cars drive out the good because they sell at the same price as good cars; similarly, bad money drives out good because the exchange rate is even.（然而，该结果与格莱欣定律并不完全一样：低质量车驱逐高质量车是因为低质量车和高质量车在相同的价格水平上出售。相似地，劣币驱逐良币是因为两者的交换利率相同）But the bad cars sell at the same price a

20、s good cars since it is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference between a good and a bad car; only the seller knows. In Greshams law, however, presumably both buyer and seller can tell the difference between good and bad money. So the analogy is instructive, but not complete.（但是低质量车之所以与高质量以同一个

21、价格出售是因为买主无法区分一辆车到底是低质量的还是高质量的，这只有卖主才知道的信息。在格莱欣定律中，买主和卖主大概否可以区分劣币和良币。所以说，这个类比具有启发性，但非完全相同）（二）非对称信息It has been seen that the good cars may be driven out of the market by the lemons. But in a more continuous case with different grades of goods, even worse pathologies can exist.（我们已经看到质量好的汽车会被“柠檬”逐出市场。但

22、是，在不同质量等级的产品连续分布的情形下，更糟糕的情况也会发生）For it is quite possible to have the bad driving out the not-so-bad driving out the medium driving out the not-so-good driving out the good in such a sequence of events that no market exists at all.（质量最差的汽车在将质量最好的汽车逐出市场后，会继续将质量较好、质量中等和质量稍差的汽车依次逐出市场，从而导致二手车交易市场根本无法存在）O

23、ne can assume that the demand for used automobiles depends most strongly upon two variables - the price of the automobile p and the average quality of used cars traded, , or Qd = D（p, ）.（假设对二手车的需求主要取决于两个变量二手车的价格p和进入交易的二手车的平均质量，即Qd = D（p, ）Both the supply of used cars and also the average quality wil

24、l depend upon the price, or =(p) and S=S(p).（而二手车的供给和平均质量都取决于二手车的价格，即=(p) 和S=S(p)）And in equilibrium the supply must equal the demand for the given average quality, or S(p) = D (p, (p). As the price falls, normally the quality will also fall. And it is quite possible that no goods will be traded at

25、any price level.（在均衡状态下对于给定的平均质量，二手车的需求等于供给，即S(p) = D (p, (p)。随着二手车交易价格下降，进入交易的二手车的平均质量当然也随之降低，最终导致在任何价格水平下都不存在二手车交易）Such an example can be derived from utility theory. Assume that there are just two groups of traders: groups one and two. Give group one a utility function：（效用理论可以用开帮助我们解释二手车市场的例子。假定市

26、场上有两类交易者，交易者1和交易者2，交易者1的效用函数为）Where M is the consumption of goods other than automobiles, is the quality of the th automobile, and n is the number of automobiles.（其中，M代表交易者1对二手车之外其他商品的消费，的质量，n为汽车的数量）Similarly, let（同理，交易者2的效用函数是）Three comments should be made about these utility functions:（对于这些效用函数有三点

27、需要说明）(1) without linear utility (say with logarithmic utility) one gets needlessly mired in algebraic complication（第一，这里采用线性效用函数（如对数效用函数）来讨论问题，这样我们就无需处理复杂的代数运算）(2) The use of linear utility allows a focus on the effects of asymmetry of information; with a concave utility function we would have to de

28、al jointly with the usual risk-variance effects of uncertainty and the special effects we wish to discuss here.（第二，现行效用函数还能让我们专注于对非对称信息的效果。如果在凹形效用函数下进行研究，我们将不得不在考察我们最希望关注的事实的同时，考虑不确定性所带来的风险变动的影响）(3) U1 and U2 have the odd characteristic that the addition of a second car, or indeed a kth car, adds th

29、e same amount of utility as the first. Again realism is sacrificed to avoid a diversion from the proper focus.（第三，U1和U2具有边际效用不变的特征，即增加第二辆车的消费所带来的效用的增加都与增加第一辆车消费所带来的效用增加相等。在此，我们再一次为了研究的需要牺牲了边际效用变动的现实）To continue, it is assumed (1) that both type one traders and type two traders are Von Neumann-Morgen

30、stern maximizers of expected utility; （接下来假设：（1）两类消费者都是冯.诺依曼摩根斯坦效用函数中的追求期望效用最大化者）(2) that group one has N cars with uniformly distributed quality , , and groupt wo has no cars;（2）交易者1拥有N辆质量为并且服从均匀分布的汽车，其中，交易者2没有汽车）(3) that the price of other goods M is unity.（3）把其他商品M的价格看成为一个单位）Denote the income (in

31、cluding that derived from the sale of automobiles) of all type one traders as Y1 and the income of all type two traders as Y2.（把各种类型的交易者1的收入（包括销售二手汽车所带来的收入）记作Y1，将交易者2的收入记为Y2）The demand for used cars will be the sum of the demands by both groups. When one ignores indivisibilities, the demand for auto

32、mobiles by type one traders will be（对二手车的需求即是两类交易者对二手车需求的总和。当我们忽略不可整除的可能时，交易者1对二手车需求的数量可以表示为）And the supply of cars offered by type one traders is（交易者1对二手车的供给是）With average quality（二手车的平均质量为）(To derive (1) and (2), the uniform distribution of automobile quality is used.)（在（1）和（2）两个表达式中，我们使用了二手车质量服从均

33、匀分布这一假设）Similarly the demand of type two traders is （同样，交易者2的需求为）And（供给是）Thus total demand D (p, u) is （因此，总需求D (p, u)是）However, with price p, average quality is p/2 and therefore at no price will any trade take place at all: in spite of the fact that at any given price between 0 and 3 there are tra

34、ders of type one who are willing to sell their automobiles at a price which traders of type two are willing to pay.（尽管有这样的事实，即在0到3之间的某个价格下有的交易者1愿意卖掉他们的车，而有的交易者2愿意在这一价格下购买。但无论如何，在价格为p，平均质量为p/2这种质量均匀分布的情形中，在任何价格水平下都根本不会发生二手车交易）（三）对称信息The foregoing is contrasted with the case of symmetric information.

35、Suppose that the quality of all cars is uniformly distributed,. Then the demand curves and supply curves can be written as follows:（上面的分析将与对称信息下的情形形成对照。假设所有汽车的质量是均匀分布的，。那么，供给曲线和需求曲线就可以写成如下形式：）Supply（供给曲线是）S(p)=N p1S(p)=0 p1And the demand curves are（需求曲线是）D(p)=(Y1+Y2)/p p1D(p)=(Y2/p) 1p3/2In equilibr

36、ium（均衡时）P=1 如果Y2N （3）P=Y2/N 如果2Y2/3NY2 （4）p=3/2 如果N2Y2/3 （5）If N Y2, in which case the income of type two traders is insufficient to buy all N automobiles, there is a gain in utility of Y2/2 units.)（如果N Y2，此时交易者2的收入不足以购买到N辆汽车，那么，将有Y2/2单位的效用收益）Finally, it should be mentioned that in this example, if

37、traders of groups one and two have the same probabilistic estimates about the quality of individual automobiles- though these estimates may vary from automobile to automobile- (3), (4), and (5) will still describe equilibrium with one slight change: p will then represent the expected price of one qu

38、ality unit.（最后，对于该例子应该提到的是，如果两类交易者对每辆汽车的质量具有相同的概率估计尽管这种估计因汽车的不同而不同（3）、（4）和（5）仍将能描述均衡，只不过此时p将代表每单位质量的期望价格）三、例证和应用（一）保险It is a well-known fact that people over 65 have great difficulty in buying medical insurance. The natural question arises: why doesnt the price rise to match the risk? （总所周知，年龄超过65岁的

39、人很难买到医疗保险。这就产生了一个问题：为什么保险费不能一直上升到风险相当的水平？）Our answer is that as the price level rises the people who insure themselves will be those who are increasingly certain that they will need the insurance; for error in medical check-ups, doctors sympathy with older patients, and so on make it much easier for

40、 the applicant to assess the risks involved than the insurance company.（我们的回答是，当保险费提高时，只有那些越来越确信自己有必要投保的人才会买保险。医疗体检中的弊端、医生对病人的同情等因素，使得保险申请人比保险公司更加了解自己的风险状况）The result is that the average medical condition of insurance applicants deteriorates as the price level rises -with the result that no insuranc

41、e sales may take place at any price.（结果，当保险费上升时，投保申请人的平均健康状况不断恶化，导致最终将不会在任何保险费水平上签订保险合同）This is strictly analogous to our automobiles case, where the average quality of used cars supplied fell with a corresponding fall in the price level. This agrees with the explanation in insurance textbooks:（这与我们

42、汽车市场的例子十分相似，在那里，待售旧车的平均质量随着市场价格的下降而下降。关于这一点，保险学教科书的解释是这样：）Generally speaking policies are not available at ages materially greater than sixty-five. The term premiums are too high for any but the most pessimistic (which is to say the least healthy) insureds to find attractive. Thus there is a severe

43、problem of adverse selection at these ages.（通常，65岁以上人的保单是无效的。此时，保险费太高以至于除了那些最悲观的（即健康状况最差的）投保人而没有其他人会对投保感兴趣，因而在这一年龄存在着严重的逆向选择问题）The statistics do not contradict this conclusion. While demands for health insurance rise with age, a 1956 national sample survey of 2,809 families with 8,898 persons shows

44、that hospital insurance coverage drops from 63 per cent of those aged 45 to 54, to 31 per cent for those over 65.（以上结论与统计数据是一致的。1956年对2809个家庭8898个人进行的全国性调查问卷显示，当人们随着年龄的增长越来越需要保险时，医疗保险的覆盖率从4565岁人群的63%下降到65岁以上人群的31%）And surprisingly, this survey also finds average medical expenses for males aged 55 to

45、 64 of $88, while males over 65 pay an average of $77.（令人吃惊的是，调查显示，5564岁之间男性的平均医疗支出是88美元，超过65岁男性的该项支出是77美元）While noninsured expenditure rises from $66 to $80 in these age groups, insured expenditure declines from $105 to $70.（然而，在该年龄段的人的非保险支出从66美元上升到80美元，保险支出则从105美元下降到70美元）The conclusion is tempting

46、 that insurance companies are particularly wary of giving medical insurance to older people.（结论是饶有趣味的：保险公司对向老人提供保险尤为谨慎）The principle of adverse selection is potentially present in all lines of insurance. The following statement appears in an insurance textbook written at the Wharton School:（逆向选择问题是所

47、有类型的保险都存在的普遍问题。下面的观点摘自沃顿商学院的一本教科书：）There is potential adverse selection in the fact that healthy term insurance policy holders may decide to terminate their coverage when they become older and premiums mount.（当逐渐变老的那些健康保险的投保人面对保费上升时，他们就有可能决定退出保险，这种情况中便存在潜在的逆向选择）This action could leave an insurer wit

48、h an undue proportion of below average risks and claims might be higher than anticipated.（这一行动能使保险公司的客户中高风险客户所占比例过高，而使保险公司可能支付比预期要高的赔偿金额）Adverse selection appears (or at least is possible) whenever the individual or group insured has freedom to buy or not to buy, to choose the amount or plan of insurance, and to persist or to discontinue as a policy holder.（当保险个人或团体能自由选择购买或不买保险，能都自由选择保险金和保险计划，自由选择维持保险或中断保险时，逆向选择便会出现，或至少可能存在逆向选择）Group ins