毕业论文外文翻译-激励机制和奖励办法：竞争性招标在采购与谈判.doc

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1、宁波工程学院毕业设计（论文）外文翻译 外文原文1： Incentives and Award Procedures: Competitive Tendering vs. Negotiations in ProcurementSteven Tadelis Patrick BajariUniversity of California Berkeley University of MichiganHaas School of Business Department of Economics January, 2006 Abstract Should the buyer of a customized

2、 good use competitive bidding or negotiation to select a contractor? To shed light on this question, we a framework that rst describes the buyers choice of contracts, and then links this choice to the selection of competitive tendering or negotiations. The analysis suggests a number of possible limi

3、tations to the use of competitive tendering. These may perform poorly when projects are complex, contractual design is incomplete and there are few available bidders. Furthermore, competitive tendering may stie communication between buyers and sellers, preventing the buyer from utilizing the contrac

4、tors expertise when designing the project. Implications of these results for procurement in the private and public sector are discussed.1 IntroductionManufactured goods, such as computers, TVs and automobiles are mass produced, have standardized characteristics and are typically purchased at list pr

5、ice. Other goods, such as new buildings, fighter jets, custom software or consulting services are tailored tot a procurers specific and often unique needs. To procure these customized goods,the procurer hires a contractor who supplies the good according to a set of desired specifications. We call th

6、is the procurement problem. The procurement problem has attracted much attention both in policy and in academic circles. The main focus of academic economists has been on procurement by the public sector, in part because of its sheer importance to the economy.For example,procurement by federal, stat

7、e and local government accounts for more than 10 percent of Gross Domestic Product in the United States. Many private sector transactions are also governed by procurement contracts. Prominent examples include electronics components, custom software, automobile production, and building construction.

8、When considering the procurement of goods and services, the procurer is faced with many challenges. First, she has to choose what exactly should be procured, and how to transmit her needs to the potential suppliers. Second, a contract must be laid out that includes contractual obligations and method

9、s of compensation. Third, the procurer needs to decide how to award the procurement contract between the potential suppliers.Finally, the award mechanism should result in the selection of a qualied and desirable supplier and in the implementation of a cost-eective nal product Following up on these l

10、ast two points, competitive tendering is widely recognized asan attractive procurement mechanism and is commonly advocated for several reasons.Most notably it is viewed as a procedure that stimulates and promotes competition.By its nature, open competitive tendering invites potential suppliers from

11、many venues.Furthermore, in the face of competition from many potential suppliers each one has strong incentives not to inate his price. Indeed, fair market price discovery is often touted as a benecial result of such tendering. Open competitive mechanisms are also known for their transparency, maki

12、ng it easier to prevent corruption both in the public and private sectors where procurement managers may have incentives to rig the system Interestingly, there is widespread use of both competitive tendering and negotiations in the private sector. For example, from 1995 to 2000, forty-four percent o

13、f private sector non-residential building construction projects in Northern California were procured using negotiations, while only eighteen percent were procured using open competitive tendering. The use of negotiations with single source suppliers is also common in high tech and software, and used

14、 for defence procurement as well. This Chapter ers a framework to compare competitive tendering with negotiations and relate these award mechanisms to the payment procedures chosen in the contract. In particular, it tries to shed light on when competitive tendering with xed price contracts will be p

15、referred to negotiating cost plus contracts, and when not. To put this Chapter in perspective it is worth observing that most of the economic analysis describes the procurement problem as follows. The supplier has information about production costs that the procurer does not have. The procurer then

16、has to consider clever ways to infer the suppliers costs, such as ering the supplier many potential projects to choose from, and having the supplier select the one that will be produced. In contrast, scholars and practitioners of engineering and construction management argue that the central problem

17、 in procurement is not that suppliers know so much more than procurers at the onset of the project, but that instead both procurers and suppliers share uncertainty about many important design changes that occur after the contract is signed and production begins. These changes are usually a consequen

18、ce of design failures, unanticipated conditions, and changes in regulatory requirements. An illustrative example of the signicance of ex post adaptation is the building of the Getty Center Art Museum in Los An geles, which is a 24 acre, $1 billion dollar facility that took over 8 years to construct

19、(see Engineering New-Record 1994, 1997). The project design had to be changed due to site conditions that were hard to anticipate. The geology of the project included canyons, slide planes and earthquake fault lines, which posed numerous challenges for the team of architects and contractors. For ins

20、tance,contractors “hit a slide” and unexpectedly moved 75,000 cubic yards of earth. More severely, in 1994 an earthquake struck. Cracks in the steel welds of the buildings frame caused the contractors to reassess the adequacy of the seismic design standards that were used. The project design had to

21、be altered also due to the regulatory environment 107 items had to be added to the buildings conditional use permit. These problems were very hard to predict, both for the procurer and the contractor. However, it seems reasonable that once problems arose, the contractor had superior information rega

22、rding the costs and methods to implement changes. A more recent and much more contentious example is the “big dig” in Boston, where 12,000 changes to more than 150 design and construction contracts have led to $1.6 billion in cost overruns, much of which can be traced back to unsatisfactory design a

23、nd site conditions that diered from expectations. These observations suggest that the procurement problem may indeed be primarily one of smoothing out or circumventing adaptations after the project begins rather than information revelation by the supplier before the project is selected. In this Chap

24、ter we argue that the form of contracts and award mechanisms can be tailored in a way to help mitigate this procurement problem. In particular, a trade between incentives to reduce cost and incentives to facilitate changes and share information will be the key force in our arguments of contractual c

25、hoice. We argue that simple projects, which we dene as easy to design with little uncertainty about what needs to be produced, ought to be procured using xed-price contracts,should be accompanied by high levels of design completeness (to prevent the need for adaptations), and are best awarded throug

26、h competitive tendering. In contrast, complex projects, which we dene as hard to design with large scope for surprises in the final configuration ought to be procured using cost-plus contracts, should be accompanied by low levels of design completeness (implying a high chance that adaptations to the

27、 contract will be needed), and should be awarded through a negotiation with a reputable and qualified supplier. The intuition for our prescriptions stems from a tension between providing incentives to lower costs and avoiding costly and wasteful renegotiation that follows requests for changes. The s

28、trong incentives to reduce costs that are oered by xed-price tendered contracts will lead the parties to the transaction to dissipate valuable surplus when changes need to be renegotiated. This eciency loss will often be due to haggling over prices when there is true lock-in of the current supplier

29、who wishes to use the need for changes to his advantage. Cost-plus contracts, in contrast, discourage cost-saving eorts but ease the process of renegotiating changes and adaptation to the contracts original requirements. We continue to argue that the choice of payment procedures, such as xed price a

30、nd cost plus contracts, is tied in with the follow-up decision that a procurer faces: whether to award a procurement contract by competitive tendering or by negotiating with a potential supplier While our research has been motivated by practices in the private sector, it oers implications for the pu

31、blic sector as well. In the U.S. the public sector statutes that govern procurement, typically based on FARs, strongly favor the use of competitive bidding. For example, from 1995 to 2000, ninety-seven percent of public sector building construction projects in Northern California were procured using

32、 competitive bidding.While competitive bidding does have the advantage of unbiased awarding of projects, it fails to respond optimally to ex post adaptation. This suggests that public procurement of complex projects are suering from eciency losses. We begin our analysis in the next section with a si

33、mple framework to describe the procurers choice of devising a contract that will govern the procurement relationship with a selected supplier. We then continue to describe how the contracts chosen will dictate the use of award mechanisms. We conclude with a discussion of implications for business st

34、rategy and public procurement. 中文翻译1： 激励机制和奖励办法：竞争性招标在采购与谈判 史蒂芬Tadelis 帕特里克Bajari 密歇根大学 加州大学伯克利分校 经济学系 哈斯商学院 2006年1月 摘要 买方会使用一个定制好的竞争性招标或谈判选择承包商吗？为了关注这个问题，我们提供了一个框架，首先介绍合同买方的选择，然后将这个选择与竞争性招标或谈判相联系。分析表明对于使用竞争性招标有大量可能性的限制。当项目是复杂的时候，这些可能会执行不佳，合同的设计也不完整，很少有可用的竞投者。此外，竞争性招标，可能会扼杀买家和卖家的交流，防止利用承包商的专业买家当设计项目

35、。这些结果在采购的启示私营和公共部门进行了讨论。 1 引言制成品，如电脑，电视和汽车的大规模生产，他们有标准化的特点，通常按价格表购买。其他商品，比如新的建筑，战斗机，定制软件或咨询服务定制是针对采购人的具体要求购买，他们通常有特殊的需要。获取这些定制产品，采购人雇用了一个能根据一套理想的规格提供物品的承包商。我们称这种为采购问题 采购问题已经引起了政治界和学术界的广泛关注。专业经济学家的主要焦点已经在公共部门的采购，部分是由于它对于经济有纯粹的重要性。1例如，在美国，联邦，州和当地政府的采购占国内生产总值的百分之十几。许多私营部门交易也是需要用采购合同。突出的例子包括电子元器件，定制软件，汽

36、车生产和建筑施工。 当考虑采购的货物和服务时,采购者面临许多挑战。首先,她必须选择究竟什么应该被采购，怎样传递需要到潜在的新供应商。第二,一个合同必须设置合同义务和补偿方法。第三,采购者需要决定如何奖励潜在供应商之间的采购合同。最后,这个奖项机制会导致一个合格的选择和理想供应商和在实施一个有效的最终产品。 随后这两场分,竞争投标是被广泛认可一个有吸引力的采购机制和普遍提倡这有几个原因。最明显的是被看作是一个过程,激发和促进竞争。由其自身的性质决定,开放的竞争投标邀请来自许多潜在的供应商场所。此外,面对竞争的每个人都有许多潜在的供应商他不充气的强烈冲动的价格。事实上,公平市场价格发现是经常吹捧为

37、一种有益的由于这样的招标。开放的竞争机制以他们的透明度,使它更容易防止腐败公众。无论是在在采购经理和私营部门可能鼓励钻机系统以换取贿赂和其它好处。这些特点,以及赞成平等机会,提供正当的律例如联邦的习得条例(美国联邦航空局法规),强烈支持使用在美国的竞争投标公共部门. 有趣的是,有普遍使用的两个竞争投标和谈判在私营部门。举例来说,从1995年到2000年,百分之四十四的私人建筑施工项目的棚舍在加利福尼亚州北部被发现利用谈判,而只有百分之十八的人收购利用开放的竞争招标。使用单一的供应商的谈判中也常见高技术和软件,并用于国防采购。本章提供了一个框架比较竞争投标的谈判并将这些奖付款程序机制的选择,在合

38、同。特别是,它试图当竞争投标揭示与固定造价合同将被优先考虑谈判成本加成合同,什么时候不该吃。 把这一章,是值得观察角度,大部分的经济分析采购问题描述如下。供应商已经信息对生产成本并不存在。这然后不得不聪明的方法来推导出考虑供应商费用,如提供供应商很多潜在项目的选择,并且在选择一个供应商产生. 相反,学者和教育工作者的工程施工管理认为的中心问题,供货商采购是不知道的比较多在分娩比项目,但这两不是和供应商分享的不确定性对变化,许多重要的设计后的合同签署、生产开始。这些改变通常是由于设计失败、不可预见的条件,和改变监管要求。 一个数值例子的意义是事后适应的建筑盖蒂中心在洛杉矶艺术博物馆,这是一个24

39、亩,设施,10亿美元接管了8年的构装体(请参阅工程技术New-Record 1994、1997、)。这个项目设计必须改变由于现场条件使人难以预料。这地质的项目包括峡谷、飞机和地震的断层滑动,哪一个为球队带来诸多挑战建筑师与承包商。例如，承包商“刺痛了一个滑”,竟然搬到75000立方公尺的地球。更多的严重的,在1994年一场地震。钢焊缝裂纹的这个建筑物的框架承包商重新引起的充分性和耐震设计标准的内容被使用。工程设计必须改变也由于法规环境- 107项目被放置于建筑物使用执照的条件。这些问题很难预测,都procurer和承包商。然而,似乎合理的,一旦问题的出现,承包商具有优良的相关信息成本和实施办法

40、的变化。最近的一种和更多的争议例子就是“大挖在波士顿,在那里12000改变超过150设计和建造合同已经导致16亿美元的成本超支,其中大部分即可追溯到设计和现场条件不与期望。 这些观察建议,问题可能确实是采购为主理顺或伪装的适应,而不是项目后开始信息披露前由供应商提供项目选择。在这一章我们认为合同的形式和奖励机制可以剪裁的帮助缓解这个采购问题。特别是,一个激励之间的协调为了降低成本和鼓励促进变化和分享信息将钥匙部队在争论合同的选择。我们认为,简单的职业活动,我们定义为易于设计和小的不确定性对生产所需要的,应当获得使用固定价格合同,应伴有高水平的设计完整性(防止需要吗适应),所以最好是通过竞争获得

41、招标。相反,复杂项目,我们定义为大范围很难设计惊喜的决赛配置,应当获得成本加成合同使用,必须有人陪同低含量的完整性(意味着设计高机会,适应了合同将需要),应当获得通过谈判和水平的和合格供应商。 为我们的直觉处方源于紧张关系提供奖励降低成本,避免昂贵和浪费,暨南请求之后变化。强烈的刺激,以降低成本提供固定转化合同将导致双方交易的时候再剩余价值要改审议。这种效率损失,常常会由于磋商价格有真的锁定现有供应商的希望使用需要改变自己的优势。成本加成合同,相反,阻止节约的努力但谈判过程中变化减缓和适应合同正本要求。 我们继续认为付款程序的选择,如固定价格成本加成合同,是与后续的决定绑在一个procurer

42、面:不管授予竞争性招标采购合同或通过谈判的潜在的供应商。而我们的研究实践的对话已经激发了私营机构,它提供了公共部门的意义。在美国公共部门的律例管理采购,通常是基于美国联邦航空局法规,大力支持使用具有竞争力招标。举例来说,从1995年到2000年,百分之九十七的公共部门的建筑在加利福尼亚北部,是建设项目使用竞价收购。在招标的优点是无偏见的奖励的计划,它没有反映优化,事后的适应。这表明公共采购复杂的项目是遭受效率损失我们开始我们的分析在下一节里与一个简单的框架来描述采购者选择设计,采购合同管理的关系用选定的供应商。然后我们继续描述如何选择合同决定使用奖励机制。我们的结论的影响进行了讨论经营策略及公

43、共采购.外文原文2： Subcontracting and Competitive Bidding on Incomplete Procurement Contracts Daniel P. Miller University of Minnesota Job Market Paper November 12, 2008 Abstract This paper investigates the cost implications of contractual incompleteness and itse ect on subcontracting decisions in the bridg

44、e construction industry. Construction contracts are incomplete because the original blueprints and specications may require modications during construction. According to the transactions cost theory of the rm|Coase (1937), Williamson (1985)|such contract revisions can lead to signicant bargaining an

45、d renegotiation costs. Furthermore, theory predicts these costs are larger if a subcontractor performs the work. Forward looking contractors anticipate these costs and incorporate them in their bids. I develop an empirical framework to quantify the impact of incompleteness on cost for both integrate

46、d and non-integrated transactions and apply it to 32 bridge contracts procured by the California Depart-ment of Transportation. Contracts contain many work items (e.g. casting concrete,drilling, trac striping). For each item, contractors decide whether to perform work themselves or hire a subcontractor and submit a bid. The di erence between the work item quantity in the original contract and the quantity actually installed after revi-sions proxies for incompleteness. In estimation, I account for the strategic aspects of bidding to recover cost from bids