转变经济增长方式和发展的再思考-毕业论文外文翻译.docx

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1、西安邮电大学 毕 业 设 计（论 文）外文文献翻译学 院： 经济与管理学院 专 业： 国际经济与贸易 班 级： 国贸XX班 学生姓名： XXX 导师姓名： XXX 职称： XX 起止时间：2016年03 月 07 日 至 2016 年 03月 10日 英文原文Shifting patterns of economic growth and rethinking developmentAbstractThis paper provides an historical overview of both the evolution of the economic performance of the

2、 developing world and the evolution of economic thought on development policy. The twentieth century was broadly characterized by divergence between high-income countries and the developing world, with only a limited number (less than 10% of the economies in the world) managing to progress out of lo

3、wer or middle-income status to high-income status. The last decade witnessed a sharp reversal from a pattern of divergence to convergence particularly for a set of large middle-income countries. The latter phenomenon was also driven by increasing economic ties among developing countries and, on the

4、intellectual scale, increased knowledge generation and sharing among the developing countries. Re-thinking development policy implies confronting these realities: twentieth century economic divergence, the experience of the handful of success stories, and the recent rise of the multi-polar growth wo

5、rld. This paper provides descriptive data and a literature survey to document these trends.KeywordsEconomic growth ,development,convergence,structural transformation1. IntroductionThe industrial revolution marked a dramatic turning point in the economic progress of nations. Technological innovation

6、created new tools that created the potential for a dramatic increase in productivity and living standards. During the nineteenth century, a number of technological leaders and early adapters leapt ahead of the rest of the world, while others lagged behind.One might have expected that the twentieth c

7、entury would have been a period in which technology spread across the world allowing countries to catch up with advanced economies. This might have been achieved through trade and capital flows based upon continued progress in transportation and communication technology. In fact, the predominant neo

8、-classical paradigm in economic thinking suggested that this would be the case.Instead, the twentieth century was an unfortunate period of continued and accelerated divergence in living standards. In part, this may have been due to an interruption in trade and capital flows during the World Wars and

9、 the inter-war Great Depression that marked the first half of the twentieth century. Protectionism also persisted in many countries following the Second World War. It was only with the Uruguay Round of negotiations in the 1980s, leading to the eventual establishment of the WTO in 1995, that a clear

10、institutionalized path towards trade opening was established. Meanwhile, technological progress in communications and transport but especially communications facilitated the acceleration of global trade and capital flows in the last quarter of the twentieth century.On the other hand, there was a sma

11、ll group of exceptional cases of catch-up. In addition, since the turn of the century, there has been reinvigorated growth in the developing world, especially in a number of large developing countries, such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and the Russian Federation. There are numerous other coun

12、tries that are taking advantage of growing trade and financial links both with developed and developing countries to accelerate economic growth. In brief, the global economy has entered a period of multi-polar growth with large developing countries leading the way as the new and most dynamic growth

13、poles.The next section provides a history of twentieth century divergence. We then provide an anatomy of the rise of the multi-polar growth world. This is followed by a critique of the history of development thinking and the need for a democratic approach to economic enquiry for development.2. The c

14、hallenge of economic development: historical antecedents and twentieth century divergenceBefore the industrial revolution, there was little growth in the world economy and the income gap between countries was extremely small. For example, even in 1820, the between-country income differences represen

15、ted less than 15% of income equality across people in the world, whereas the between-country share rose to well over half of global inequality by 1950,and the richest countrys per capita income was only just less than four times higher than the poorest, and the richest countries per capita income is

16、 an astonishing 127 times higher than the poorest now . The industrial revolution led to the Great Divergence: world growth was driven by a few Western industrialized countries before the Second World War, and similarly after the Second World War with the exception of Japan, which joined the group o

17、f advanced industrialized nations.Maddison (1982) divides the last 1500 years into four economic epochs: agrarianism, advancing agrarianism, merchant capitalism, and capitalism. The capitalism period started at the time of the industrial revolution. The new technology created the potential for new t

18、echniques of production that required organizational structures based on capitalist economic relations. It also represented the start of a period of unprecedented growth for the world economy .2.1 The industrial revolution and the great divergenceAll of this changed with the industrial revolution. S

19、cientific progress began to be applied to the means of production as machines were developed that both increased productivity in firms, but also dramatically reduced transportation costs. This created the possibility for the countries that developed those technologies, or those that adapted the tech

20、nologies first, to grow much faster than less technologically advanced countries.The result of this process was that (at least prior to the year 2000) the global economy was dominated by the few industrialized economies that existed in the world, and most of these few economies had become industrial

21、ized either as leaders or earlier followers of the nineteenth century industrial revolution. Lin (1995) argues that the transition from innovation based on the experiences of artisan/farmers in the pre-industrial revolution period to innovation based on controlled experiments guided by science after

22、 the industrial revolution was the key factor.Societal incentives in pre-modern China did not favor the move toward the human capital accumulation needed for the new system of innovation. Historical data dramatically reveal the divergent pattern of growth across country groupings. In the late ninete

23、enth century, the Western European countries and their colonial offshoots began to experience an historic take-off in incomes per capita. This was later matched by Japan in the middle of the twentieth century.The world economy was driven by several large Western European countries (Germany, France,

24、Italy, the United Kingdom) and Anglophone offshoots (Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and Canada), plus Japan. Many other countries, including the former Soviet Union, were able to rise to middle-income status and experience levels of average economic welfare that far surpassed prior centu

25、ries; however, these standards of living still lagged badly behind the leading countries. In brief, the global economy was dominated by the so-called G7.One can see the significance of these few large economies both in terms of their shares of global economic output and in terms of their contributio

26、n to economic growth. During the twentieth century, the G7 maintained a large and fairly stable share of world gross domestic product that started and ended the century at about 45%. There was a slight rise to 51% during the first half the century that was reversed during the second half of the cent

27、ury.2.2 Low and middle income country growth trapsIn principle, one would expect, and certainly hope, that the poorer countries in the world can catch up with the richer countries in the world. Unfortunately, few countries have experienced convergence on a sustained basis. In fact, one famous paper

28、that discusses the performance during the twentieth century is entitled: Divergence, big time .One approach to measuring relative progress is to look at per capita GDP relative to the United States, which has been the symbol of advanced industrialized countries after the Second World War. Figure 4 s

29、hows that the shares of countries in each ratio range have been fairly stable, with some growth in the percentage of countries in the upper MIC range (say, roughly 0.30.7), but really not much expansion of the share of countries that are at 0.7 of the US level of per capita GDP. At the bottom end, t

30、he share at 0.1 or less of US levels remains stuck near 40%. Persistently, over 80% of the countries in the world have GDP per capita levels that are half or less than half of the level in the United States.There is also some churning where countries not only converge up the ladder, but also diverge

31、 down the ladder. This is the case of some former colonies in Africa: many have gone from being lower MICs at independence to LICs in 1980. Since then, some have climbed back up to MIC status. There are also countries at the HIC end of the distribution that have fallen back to MIC status, by this me

32、asure.The net result is that, during the twentieth century, very few countries managed to progress from low income status to middle income status and then to high income status. Part of this history was explained in the previous sections, and hopefully, the recent rise of a number of large MICs mark

33、s the beginning of a better century for developing country convergence. That said, Table 2 summarizes how only a handful of developing countries have succeeded in reaching high levels of prosperity, and many of them are in Western Europe. The few developing economy success stories with the exception

34、 of a few small oil rich countries are generally located in East Asia and achieved rapid industrialization by following comparative advantage export dynamism, helped by the facilitating role of the state. 3. The rapid growth of a few large economies and the rise of the new growth poles While there w

35、as progress in development during the twentieth century, the G7 countries still dominated the global economy in terms of size, contribution to economic growth and living standards. This dominance began to decline dramatically during the first decade of the twenty-first century in particular, due to

36、the fast growth of large dynamic emerging economies the so-called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China). As a result, the G7 share of global GDP declined rapidly from 45 to 37% in just 8 years. This is an unprecedented and historic shift. After a remarkable degree of G7 dominance for an entire cen

37、tury, one decade of extraordinary growth has caused a dramatic shift in the balance of economic power.The BRICs and other emerging economies also have increased their share of trade, capital flows and innovation. A growing trend within these dimensions is south-south globalization as economic intera

38、ctions between emerging markets have increased at an even faster pace than they have between high-income countries and developing countries. As growth poles emerge in the developing world, one way that the more rapid growth could be sustained is through increased south-south globalization.To underst

39、and the patterns of south-south globalization, one can start by examining the evolution of the large fast-growing BRICs. In the trade dimension, after decades of stagnation in the developing country share of world exports, this share began to increase sharply at the turn of the century, and it now s

40、tands at about 30%. We see, however, that much of this recent evolution was driven by the increasing share from BRIC countries. The BRIC share more than doubled from 2000 to 2009. A large part of the story has to do with increasing trade between developing countries a trend that actually dates back

41、a couple of decades as south-south bilateral and regional trade agreements proliferated and as supply chains integrated across the developing world. The share of developing country imports that originate in other developing countries is now nearly double the share of the 1960s. The old global divisi

42、on of labor characterized by developing countries (the south) exporting primary products to the high income countries (the north) to produce manufacturing goods has become much more complex, with increasing south-south trade in primary products. Some key developing economies are now specializing in

43、the export of manufacture (Abraham and Van Hove, 2011). All these phenomena are related: the same Chinese manufactures embody a combination of primary imports from developing countries, as well as intermediate inputs from emerging Asia, in addition to Japan, Taiwan, China, and Korea. This is a natur

44、al consequence of trade integration both within the developing world and between developing and high-income countries.Capital flows have been an important factor in the changing multi-polar landscape. Developing countries were receiving record levels of FDI and other capital flows prior to the globa

45、l financial crisis. Naturally, there was a decline in these flows following the boom; however, flows have continued to be in line with the average of the 3 to 4 years preceding the crisis. In addition, starting since the mid-1990s there has been a general shift up in annual FDI flows as a share of d

46、eveloping countries GDPs . There is also a rise in south-south investment flows, even though the largest flows remain among the high-income countries. Recently published data from the IMF are difficult to analyze systematically due to many missing data points; however, there are specific cases where

47、 the data reveal the surprisingly large influence of south-south flows. For example, Hong Kong SAR, China is the tenth largest source of outward direct investment positions globally, and South Africas direct investment position in China (mainland) is slightly larger than that of traditional economic

48、 power France. While large emerging markets grab the headlines of multi-polar growth, smaller and poorer economies have also experienced important changes in their position in the global economy. For example, in terms of accelerating growth and expanding trade and capital flows, the Sub-Saharan Africa region has also participated in the recent multi-polar growth decade. GDP growth in the region as a whole has accelerated sharply. There were 11 countries in the region among 29 countries in the world that averaged economic growth of 6.5% or more prior to