中央银行和分布式分类帐技术：中央银行今天如何探索区块链.docx

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1、WORLDCQNOMQRUM,SWhite PaperCOMMITTED TOIMPROVING THE STATEOF THE WORLDCentral Banks and DistributedLedger Technology: How are Central Banks Exploring Blockchain Today?March 2019Retail CBDC: key benefits and downsidesThe table below summarizes some of the noteworthy benefits and downsides to retail C

2、BDC that are discussed in research today. It is imperative for policy-makers and researchers to deeply consider all risks and downsides to implementation within the specific country context and to weigh benefits with risks and downsides. For instance, rarely discussed in CBDC research is the potenti

3、al for financial exclusion ratherthan inclusion. Policy-makers must seek to encourage the unbanked to participate in any new digital currency regime. They must be aware of hurdles to adoption such as usability challenges, access, or insufficient government identity documentation.A second notable ris

4、k relates to stability in commercial bank deposits, as citizens may see CBDC held in accounts with the central bank as a safer or more attractive substitute for holding money in deposits at a commercial bank. If citizens switch to holding money in CBDC, commercial bank deposits could become more vol

5、atile and volumes could decrease, which would cause instability in commercial bank balance sheets and a potential reduction in lending activity. These risks can be addressed through implementation decisions described in the next section, namely decisions around interest payments on CBDC and account

6、and transaction size limits.Moreover, CBDC can potentially play an important role in a future where cash usage dramatically declines. If the use and availability of cash within a country becomes extremely low or non-existent, whether by policy or consumer preferences, then CBDC could potentially aid

7、 citizens.In this environment, in countries where commercial banks are unstable and deposit insurance is not offered, CBDC accounts with the central bank could provide a potentially safe place for citizens to save money (account size limits notwithstanding). Second, they could helpcitizens maintain

8、direct access to central bank money (cash, today). Third, CBDC, and any central bank-issued mobile phone applications that could accompany it, could serve as an important alternative and counterweight to private sector digital payments applications that could dominate in a country.Ultimately, as sta

9、ted by economist Ousmene Mandeng in a recent speech entitled, uDo central banks need to issue currency?”： “The case for CBDC should naturally rest on whether it supports central banks, and the publics objectivesyRelative to physical cash, introduces noteworthy consumer privacy and protection risksRe

10、lative to physical cash, increases exposure and vulnerability to cyber-security risk and power outagesBlockchain technology challenges: transaction scalability, user experience, key management, confidentiality and transaction speedsProsProsConsPotential for faster and cheaper domestic and cross-bord

11、er payments Notable risks to financial stability from bank (both retail and wholesale)disintermediation or other forcesPotential to offer retai I depositors safer savings venue (i.e., accounts with the central bank) with lower risk of default or loss of funds than storing savings in domestic commerc

12、ial bank accounts (varies by country)Potential to improve payment system resilience to cyberattacks, operational failures and hardware faults relative to centralized data storage and processing, which has less data redundancy and, therefore, may be less robustPotential to provide alternative to priv

13、ate sector digital payments technologies, to counter operational risk or monopolistic control by those providers if they become dominant, and to serve as a government-issued alternative for cash if it becomes scarce in the futurePotential to incentivize participation in banking sector for the under-

14、 Potential forfinancial exclusion if populations bankedwho do not adopt CBDC are not integratedand are further marginalized from digital payment systemsPotential to improve AML/KYC functionalities and to reduce tax Potential for sovereign to have greater access evasion, corruption and illicit activi

15、ties (often not a primary area of to appropriate citizen funds (for any form of focus for a central bank)money custodied with the central bank)Potential to reduce frictions and costs associated with physical cash Introduces unknown risks storage, transport and management within the banking systemPot

16、ential to challenge commercial bank monopoly power of retail deposits; can pressure commercial banks to increase interest rates to depositors and provide more financial services; may also be a risk to financial system stabilityCBDC design and implementation trade-offsCentral banks also consider key

17、design and implementation choices when evaluating the prospect of retail or wholesale CBDC. The following is a cursory list of some of the major trade-offs and choices they evaluate.- Availability: Should the CBDC be available for public use (retail CBDC), or restricted for commercial banks and clea

18、ring houses (wholesale)? Who is the primary audience of the CBDC, retail consumers and citizens, or commercial banks?- Distribution and storage: If CBDC is for retail use, what is the distribution mechanism that is most effective, achieves the programs goals, and is the most inclusive to capture all

19、 eligibleparticipants? Further, where will the CBDC be held? CBDC can either be held in accounts directly at the central bank, in accounts at participating commercial banks if they act as intermediaries for distribution, or on government-issued debit cards, among other options.the amount of CBDC a c

20、itizen can hold and transfer to reduce negative consequences. These include the potential for bank runs or lower demand for bank deposits if citizens see CBDC as a safer substitute for holding money thank commercial bank deposits. In the wholesale context, the central bank may limit whether commerci

21、al banks can employ CBDC for large-value payments.Foradditional information on central bank experiments with CBDC and key issues, design choices and findings, see the International Monetary Fund 2018 report, Casting Lighton Central Bank Digital Currencies, the IBM and OMFIF2018 paper, Central bank d

22、igital currencies”,and the BIS 2019 report, Proceeding with caution - a survey on central bank digital currency”.Further, the BIS reports Central bank digital currencies (2018) and Cryptocurrencies: Looking beyond the hype” (2018), and the US Federal Reserve Boards Distributed ledger technology in p

23、ayments, clearing, and settlemenf (2016) provide detailed descriptions of CBDC and key issues, opportunities and risks.-Interest payments: Should the central bank pay CBDC holders, whether retail or wholesale, interest? This decision has implications for the relative attractiveness for holding CBDC.

24、 In the retail context, it affects whether depositors prefer to hold savings in CBDC with the central bank or in traditional commercial bank deposits. This, in turn, affects the volume and stability of commercial bank deposits, their balance sheets and their lending activity. CBDC interest payments

25、will compete with those from commercial banks, potentially pressuring commercial banks to raise their interest payments to depositors. For both retail and wholesale CBDC, implications for affecting monetary policy, whether deliberate or inadvertent, must be carefully studied and are the subject of m

26、uch existing research.- Transaction anonymity: Should CBDC transactions preserve customer privacy? Anonymity would encourage more consumers to use CBDC as a private and peer-to-peer alternative to cash. However, it increases the difficulty of reversing fraudulent transactions, catching illicit activ

27、ity and recovering lost funds. Of note, if a central bank has strong motivations to employ CBDC for anti-money laundering, anticorruption or tax evasion, or capital control and monitoring purposes, it will be less inclined to enable anonymity (at the cost of discouraging adoption). However, unless t

28、he central bank or state compels CBDC usage, those who wish to engage in illegal or illicit activity will continue to use cash and other alternatives (as well as new privacy-enabling cryptocurrencies) for these purposes.- Account and transaction volume limits: Should central banks limit the amount o

29、f CBDC that can be held or transferred at one time? Such limitations can mitigate implementation and money-laundering risks. In the retail CBDC context, the central bank may limitWhere is wholesale CBDC research focused today?The leading cases forwholesale CBDC consist of increasing efficiency in cr

30、oss-border interbank payments and in interbank securities trading and settlement.While wholesale CBDC also addresses domestic interbank payments, most developed countries already possess efficient domestic payment systems. The central bank of Denmark, for instance, says in a 2017 report: uln a Danis

31、h context, it is unclear what central bank digital currency would be able to contribute what is not already covered by the current payment solutions (page 1). For some emerging economies, domestic interbank payment systems are not yet highly efficient and CBDC could potentially improve these systems

32、.Most early-stage pilots have focused on wholesale CBDC for domestic use. As tests have often occurred in countries whose domestic interbank payment systems are already efficient, early research conclusions do not generally pointto strong value from CBDC forthis application alone. This is the case f

33、or the phase one trials of the Bank of Canadas Project Jasper, the South African Reserve Banks Project Khokha, and the European Central Bank and Bank of Japan5s joint Project Stella.In later phases ofthese pilots, the central banks test the value of DLT when applied to expanded contexts and connecte

34、d with other DLT-enabled processes. This includes cross- border interbank payments, interbank securities trading and settlement, oreventradefinancewherethere is high potential to increase efficiency. In these contexts, CBDC may prove more beneficial.In one of the most exciting areas of research, who

35、lesale CBDC is tested for rapid and complete cross-border interbank securities transactions not possible today. In this scenario, otherwise known as a delivery versus paymenf transaction, the full and final payment and settlement for a trade occurs at the same time the asset is fully (or “atomically

36、)delivered to the buyer. Both the asset and currency are located on the distributed ledger and they aretraded simultaneously. The result is greater operational efficiency and reduced settlement and counter-party risk.The ECB and Bank of Japan Project Stella (phase 2), the MAS Project Ubin (phase 2),

37、 the Deutsche Bundesbank BLOCKBASTER prototype (2016-2018), and the 2018 joint paper Cross-border interbank payments and settlements” cited above by the Bank of Canada, Bank of England and MAS all investigate this specific application.CBDC in macroeconomic modelsTo date, a reliable and thorough quan

38、titative analysis of the effects of CBDC or other DLT-enabled applications has not been conducted and may constitute a barrier to adoption by policy-makers. In limited cases, macroeconomists have applied existing models to evaluate how a CBDC could impact GDP or welfare in a country. The results of

39、these papers indicate mixed benefits and the authors recognize the limited ability of the models to estimate outcomes given the complexity of conditions.A 2018 Bank of Canada staff working paper, entitled u Central bank digital currency and monetary policy, evaluates how a non-anonymous CBDC affects

40、 welfare and monetary policy when it is issued in environments where cash persists and where it does not. Where cash continues to be used, the analysis shows CBDC to have no notable effect or to decrease welfare (in GDP terms) depending on conditions. If cash is removed from the economy (an unlikely

41、 scenario in the short and medium term), the authors find that, within the modePs conditions, CBDC could increase GDP permanently in Canada by up to 0.64% and in the United States by up to 1.6%, owing largely to an expanded monetary policy toolkit.The most commonly stated rationale for an expanded m

42、onetary policy toolkit in a no-cash environment is that central banks would be able to effect a negative nominal interest rate policy. In this context, they could charge citizens on deposits. This policy would stimulate spending in recessionary and deflationary environments by discouraging household

43、 savings. This option is unavailable today in the presence of cash, as citizens would prefer to save in cash and other assets rather than have deposits “taxed by a negative interest rate.A strongly optimistic 2016 Bank of England staff working paper, entitled u The macroeconomics of central bank iss

44、ued digital currencies, suggests that an interest-paying retail CBDC could permanently raise GDP by up to 3% in an economy depending on implementation. It also notes salient risks to financial and monetary stability associated with CBDC implementation.Finally, a 2018 Federal Reserve of St. Louis wor

45、king paper, Assessing the impact of central bank digital currency on private banks combines multiple existing economic models to evaluate the impact of CBDC issuance on a countrys banking sector in an environment where banks have monopolistic power. Theauthor finds that an interest-bearing CBDC incr

46、eases financial inclusion and diminishes demand for cash, while decreasing bank profits. He finds that CBDC does not necessarily lure depositors away from commercial banks if the banks compensate for the heightened competition from the central bank by paying higher interest rates.Alternative payment

47、 systemsIn the future, some experts believe we may see forms of central bank digital currency facilitate alternative or bilateral international payments systems that operate outside current dominant systems. For instance, a blockchain-based state currency could operate outside the SWIFT messaging sy

48、stem that facilitates global payments. The result could potentially include a greater diversification in international payment processes and monetary systems away from the US dollar and other major currencies and away from a limited set of institutions. States and financial actors may, as a result,

49、have greater independence and autonomy over payments they conduct in the international sphere.potential implications, alongside other measures. It further quotes the Civil Defense Organization of Iran as having stated that cryptocurrencies can help bypass certain sanctions through untraceable banking operations.nSovereign-state financingAs another example, Venezuela has allegedly issued the “petro digital currency on the NEM blockchain platform in February 2018, in part