全球货币宽松不济仍需财政刺激和区域贸易协定.docx

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1、Contents4646485052545658606264666870Key forecasts5Putting the air back in6Still on the way down6Cracks emerging?8Gauging vulnerabilities10The monetary gas is being pumped back in11Will it work?12Time to get fiscal15Better together16Goldilocks, recession and populism 19 De-globalisation continues but

2、 so does trade liberalisation21Global economic forecasts25North America42US42Canada44Asia PacificMainland China Japan India Australia South Korea Indonesia Taiwan Thailand Malaysia Singapore Hong Kong Philippines New ZealandEurozone72Eurozone72Germany74France76Italy78Spain80Other Western Europe82UK8

3、2Switzerland84Sweden86Norway88CEEMEA90Poland90Russia92Turkey94Saudi Arabia96South Africa98Latin America100Brazil100Mexico102Argentina104Colombia106Chile108Disclosure appendix110Disclaimer11220. Equity markets keep swinging around on tariff announcementsIndexMSCI AC World IndexIndex11010510095908580T

4、rump says talks with China still plannedUS-China truce until March, but if no agreement is reached by then US 10% tariffs will be raised to 25%US announces revised $50bn list for 25% tariffs, China retaliatesTrump tweets plans for tariff rate hike on previous list, China retaliates withTrumpannounce

5、s $200bn tariff list, China responds with tariffs on $60bn of US importsTrump approves tariffs on solar panels and washing machinesUS announces tariffs on almost all remaining Chinese imports11010510095908580Jan-18 Mar-18 May-18 Jul-18 Sep-18 Nov-18 Jan-19 Mar-19 May-19 Jul-19 Sep-19Source: MSCI, Re

6、finitiv Datastream, HSBC, PIIE21. Recent developments and key dates in US trade negotiationsDate Developments in US trade negotiations1 August US announced 10% tariffs on USD300bn of Chinese products starting on 1 Sep 20196 August Chinese Ministry of Commerce said Chinese companies have stopped purc

7、hasing American agricultural products; US labelled China a currency manipulator13 AugustUS announces delay of 10% tariffs on some Chinese goods until 15 Dec 201923 AugustChina announced additional 5% and 10% tariffs on American products worth USD75bn starting on 1 Sep and 15 Dec 201924 AugustUS Pres

8、ident Trump said he will raise existing tariffs on USD250bn of Chinese products from 25% to 30% starting on 1 Oct2019, and the 10% tariffs which will be imposed on USD300bn of Chinese products will be raised to 15%1 September As announced in August, US tariffs on more than USD111 bn of Chinese produ

9、cts become effective, spanning a range of items including clothing, shoes, dishwashers, smart watches and diapers. China, in turn, began imposing additional tariffs (of 5% and 10%) on some of the goods on a USD75bn list induding a 5% tariff on US crude oil.5 September Chinese Ministry of Commerce an

10、nounced that the US and China have agreed to hold high-level trade talks in Washington in early October, with both trade teams to begin consultations in mid-September ahead of these talksSeptember The US administration issued a statement that an initial agreement between the US and Japan had been re

11、ached, and would be signed in the coming weeks*. The mood music at the UN Climate Actiona Summit in New York on 21-23 September was also encouraging.19 September Japanese Foreign Minister Motegi states that he wants to receive direct assurances from President Trump that any US- Japan agreement would

12、 include no additional tariffs on autosOctober As announced on 11 September, the tariff hike (from 25% to 30%) on a now estimated USD228bn of Chinese products was delayed from 1 Oct to 15 Oct 2019, as a gesture of good will to respect the 70th Anniversary of the Peoples Republic of China20 November

13、Following US President Trumps 180-day delay in May, a new deadline is set for talks to be concluded on US auto tariffs to avoid US actionDecember Tariffs come into effect on an estimated USD156bn of US imports from China, at a tariff rate of 15%. China will also impose additional 5% and 10% tariffs

14、on American products within the USD75bn list and will also impose 25% tariffs on US automobiles and 5% tariffs on auto parts and componentsSource: HSBC, USTR, FTWeak investment means weak productivity growthWeak investment means weak productivity growthConsequently, rather than investment reviving i

15、n response to monetary easing, corporate sector savings might just continue to rise and find their way into financial assets rather than productive fixed assets. The implication from any continued shortfall in investment spending is of course that productivity growth is likely to stay weak. US inves

16、tment had been relatively solid until 2019 and productivity has revived a little (charts 22-23). But now, with investment wobbling, productivity could slow too. In Germany, and particularly the UK, the post-crisis productivity performance has been much weaker and, in German/s case, there has been a

17、worrying drop over the past year.Policy issuesThe FOMCs decision to cut the target range for the federal funds rate to 2.00-2.25% in July, and the echo it had across several emerging economies, was a game-changer for Mexicos monetary policy (see Mexico Monetary Policy: Cuts expected, but on/v to kee

18、p pace with the US, 12 August 2019). In our view, this factor, combined with weaker growth prospects and more benign inflation dynamics, prompted Banxico to cut the policy rate by 25bp to 8.00% in August.Going forward, we see Banxico replicating further Feds moves, which would imply a recoupling wit

19、h the monetary conditions with the US. Given that our US economic team estimates another 25bp cut in the US federal funds rate in October (see US Economic Outlook, Trade risks in focus, 25 August 2019), we would expect a similar reaction from Mexicos central bank. Overall, we expect the policy rate

20、to end 2019 at 7.50%.Fiscal policy is being scrutinized by markets, especially since the presentation of the 2020 Economic Program proposal. In our view, the 2020 Economic Program proposal was well received by markets as it displayed an ambitious, but realistic and credible landscape. The fiscal foc

21、us looking into 2020 will be on four main themes, in our view: (1) economic activity backdrop, (2) revenues and spending dynamics behind the fiscal targets, (3) governmenfs priority programs and projects, and (4) Pemexs business plan implications on public finances. Overall, the governments approach

22、 to these four themes is key for Mexicos economic outlook next year from the fiscal perspective.RisksOne upside risk for growth stems from a potential increase of exports to the US, as Mexico could continue gaining market share in the US if current global trade dynamics persist. Also, a steeper pick

23、-up in private consumption due to lower inflation and higher real wage gains may represent a positive surprise. Finally, a recovery in business confidence could prove supportive for overall activity.In contrast, a deterioration in the US manufacturing industry and external demand could have a negati

24、ve impact on Mexican exports and production. Also, if policy uncertainty extends and business confidence weakens, investment could decline further, thus affecting GDP growth negatively.Key forecastsNote: *Period end% Year2019f2020f2021fQ319fQ419fQ1 20fQ2 20fQ3 20fQ4 20fGDP0.51.42.10.51.01.11.81.41.4

25、GDP (% quarter)-0.40.20.80.20.10.3Consumer spending1.52.02.71.71.91.82.02.12.2Government consumption0.51.02.01.72.01.11.21.00.8Investment-3.00.00.5-2.5-1.4-1.31.00.30.3Stockbuilding (% GDP)-2.5-2.3-2.3-Domestic demand0.51.52.20.91.31.11.71.61.7Exports6.86.18.58.48.06.96.25.75.4Imports5.85.48.06.56.6

26、5.65.15.65.3Industrial production-1.80.00.7-2.0-1.6-1.50.30.50.8Unemployment (%)4.44.23.94.24.44.04.14.24.2Wage growth6.15.55.26.06.15.95.45.55.5Consumer prices4.13.83.63.43.43.63.63.83.5Current account (USDbn)-20.5-9.4-16.5-3.0-3.2-5.0-4.24.0-3.3Current account (% GDP)-1.6-0.7-1.1-0.2-0.3-0.4-0.3-0

27、.3-0.2Budget balance (% GDP)-2.7-2.7-2.9-0.7-0.8-0.8-0.7-0.6-0.6Gross external debt (% GDP)43.043.644.2-Gross government debt (% GDP)46.547.847.9-MXN/USD*21.0021.50-19.4021.0021.0021.0021.2521.50Policy rate (%)*7.507.507.507.757.507.507.507.507.5010-year bond (%)*6.77.57.56.96.77.07.37.57.5Source: H

28、SBC estimatesArgentinaJorge MorgensternSenior Economist, LatAmHSBC Bank Argentina S.A.jorge.morgensternhsbc .ar +54 11 4130 9229DissonanceSince the 11 August primaries showed that the opposition candidate Alberto Fernandez had already enough votes to secure a victory in 27 October first round of ele

29、ctions, markets rapidly focused on the policies he would pursue. In our view, the market reaction did not correspond to his proposals or statements were but, rather, the belief that they did not reflect what he would ultimately do.This is not fully irrational. Alberto Fernandez was designated as a c

30、andidate by Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK), who is his running mate. During her two presidential terms, CFK pursued several policies (eg pervasive regulations in markets, including in the currency, nationalizations, extended disputes with holdouts and disregard for the IMF and use of Central B

31、ank funding). Policy direction from an eventual Fernandez administration is difficult to read in advance. After leaving the CFK government in 2008, Fernandez criticized many of the above- mentioned policies. He does not have past relevant experience as an elected official, while CFK is arguably the

32、most popular political figure at the polls. He is receiving the support of key members of their political movement, Peronism, who have their political base in provinces that rely on exports of their natural resources and would benefit from foreign investment and access to debt markets. CFK is backed

33、 by social movements and the youth movement of Peronism, who frequently call for drastic anti-market reforms.The dissonance between what is being said and is being expected would only be resolved once a new administration is elected and has the stature to take decisions. The point at which the marke

34、ts view will meet actions by new authorities will determine the outlook for the Argentine economy. Incentives are aligned for a relatively constructive approach towards debt and fiscal issues and a good starting point with no external or fiscal deficit will be a plus. However, lack of market access

35、(external since 2018 and, more recently, domestic) would be a pressure point. The damage for economic activity from recent weeks of stress is still difficult to assess and has likely changed the plans any candidate could have upon taking office. We forecast a contraction in GDP of 3.0% in 2019 follo

36、wed by a 2.0% decline in 2020, which incorporates an improvement in the second half of the year. We also see inflation dropping to 35% in 2020 after reaching 55% in 2019.Key macro imbalances are being correctedCurrent account (RHS)Source: INDECThis has been a decade of stagnationArgentina (RHS)Argen

37、tinaS. America ex Arg, VenSource: INDEC, IMFPolicy issuesThe government estimates that it will finish 2019 with a 0.5% primary deficit, which would be in line with the targets of the IMF program. We think that worse-than-expected GDP growth and the impact of measures announced since the 11 August pr

38、imaries could lead to a worse result. Moreover, we dont expect an improvement of the primary balance in 2020 as GDP growth should take time to recover. How much the Treasury would pay in terms of interest is difficult to estimate as it would be function of the outcome of debt negotiations. Beyond th

39、at, the scope for fiscal consolidation will not be easy. Export taxes introduced in late-2018 as an emergency measure, and set to expire at the end of 2020, are expected to bring 1.7% of GDP in revenues. It is difficult to see how they could be removed without a significant damage to fiscal results

40、and IMF and bondholders5 support.Regulations within the FX market allow the central bank to set the exchange rate level without a major sacrifice of FX reserves. It may also allow authorities to lower the policy interest rate once the spike of inflation, resulting from the recent depreciation, subsi

41、des. We think that positive real interest rates are likely to remain, but the magnitude will also be determined by exchange rate expectations: a function of spreads to non-official FX rates and the scope of FX controls.RisksRisks are significant and mostly tilted to the downside in terms of growth a

42、nd a weaker outlook for companies and investors. Our base scenario assumes a new administration follows the incentives to rapidly seek support from the IMF for a fiscal path and a debt restructuring. Once completed, this would likely alleviate the pressures on FX reserves, restore market confidence

43、and allow a relaxation of FX controls. There are many ways this may not be the outcome. For example, the acceptable fiscal path for a new administration may be less austere and only consistent with a deep debt haircut, which bondholders may take time to accept. In that scenario, the government may t

44、urn to the Central Bank for funding.Moreover, Argentina remains vulnerable to deteriorations of the external environment which could tilt the political balance within a new administration towards its less market-friendly components.Key forecastsNote: * Under monetary base targeting framework, the 7-

45、day rate for open market instrument (LELIQ) -the policy tool until September 2018- become endogenous starting on October 2018.% Year2019f2020f2021fQ319fQ419fQ1 20fQ2 20fQ3 20fQ4 20fGDP-3.0-2.01.5-4.1-3.1-2.5-2.5-1.5-1.5GDP (% quarter)-2.4-1.5-1.00.00.50.8Consumer spending-8.9-5.13.8-8.0-10.0-8.0-5.0

46、-4.0-3.0Government consumption0.00.81.00.02.00.01.01.01.0Investment-17.6-4.63.5-12.0-15.0-9.0-6.0-3.00.0Stockbuilding (% GDP)-0.40.20.0-0.5-0.4-0.20.30.30.2Domestic demand-9.6-3.32.6-8.1-8.5-6.4-1.6-2.9-2.6Exports0.93.03.0-2.71.81.42.85.22.6Imports-17.83.88.015.216.314.417.016.016.7Industrial production-8.0-2.93.6-5.4-4.1-3.5-3.4-2.2-2.3Unemployment (%)9.710.28.09.79.710.60.510.110.2Wage growth41.535.838.468.541.562.645.638.335.8Consumer prices52.945.529.854.050.151.748.545.238.8Current account (USDbn)-7.74.2-1.8-3.81.