全球-信贷策略-全球信贷2020年展望:弯曲而不是断裂.docx
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1、3 December 2019Global Macro StrategyGlobalAnna HoAnalyst +852-3712 2965Bhanu Ba we j aStrategist +44-20-7568 6833Mary Xia, CFAStrategist +86-105-832 8508Matthew Mish, CFAStrategist +1-203-719 1242Stephen Caprio, CFAStrategist +44-20-7567 5788Kamil AminStrategist +44-20-7568 2225Global ResearchMacro
2、Keys: Asia Credit Strategy2020 Outlook: Bend, Not BreakLook beyond 1H20This year is closing with stellar returns for Asian $ credits (IG: 10.8%, HY: 11.7%) on a dovish US Fed and Chinas easing policy stance. With a major move in spreads and rates, we expect lower returns in 2020 (IG: 3.5%, HY: 6.2%)
3、, Asian HY still offers better returns over its global credit peers where carry cushions spreads from widening, a slow default pick-up and policy support. We expect trade tensions and a likely trough in growth in 1H20 will carry spreads wider before tightening in 2H20. Policy responses in China, tho
4、ugh milder than the previous cycle, should anchor Asian $ credit spreads. Downside risks could emerge if Fed under delivers on market expectations and trade war-led CNY volatility rises. A comprehensive trade deal would raise upside potential.Asian default risk a burning question; we do not expect a
5、 big jump in 2020 Asian HY corporate default rates stood at 1-1.5% in 2019. Poor liquidity management and contraction of shadow channels are drivers of defaults. Our bottom-up analysis suggests Chinese HY industrials defaults will add 1 % to the current level. Chinese HY developers in the $ bond uni
6、verse (leading companies) should be able to fend off default risks on better rating quality and an ability to churn assets in managing refinancing stress. For CNY bonds, defaults are bound to rise on slower growth and private enterprises structurally high debt problems. The dominance of SOE/LGFV in
7、onshore bonds and less contraction in shadow credits should limit a system-wide default. Our top-down model predicts an onshore default rate at 1.3-1.6% in 2020 (0.5% currently) assuming trade tensions escalate.Asian HY credit offers room for some compressionWe look to position a bias on Asian HY ov
8、er IG with some compression opportunities. Benchmarking the US IG spreads widening call of 40bps to 145bps at end-2020 on rising credit cycle risks and slower US growth, we think the Asian IG spread could finish at 170bps (40bps widerfrom 130bps). Asian HY spreads already decompressed to 4.3x IG (3.
9、5x in the 2015 downcycle, 4.2x at end-2018) but we do not foresee a major deterioration in Chinese developers credit profiles and acceleration in default rates, coupled with more moderate bond supply. This should not put spreads back to the highs of end-2018 on easing monetary policy and lower rates
10、 outlook. We estimate HY spreads at 640bps at end-2020 (80bps wider from 560bps), or3.8x IG.This report has been prepared by UBS Securities Asia Limited. ANALYST CERTIFICATION AND REQUIRED DISCLOSURES BEGIN ON PAGE 80. UBS does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports.
11、 As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision.Figure 14: Financial profiles of Chinese university complexesSourc
12、e: Company financials, UBSTsinghua UnigroupTus- HoldingsTsinghua TongfangPeking UniversityFounderKeepwell & 曰PK providerTsinghua UnigroupN/AN/APUFGGuarantorN/ATus(TFN/ABond tickerTSINGHTHSCPATSIGTFFOUIHK, HKJHCCBond o/s (USD m)2,4501,3006003,1501) If Tsinghua Uni ceases to own COCputTsinghua Uni cea
13、ses to own 50% in TH50%inTH (whenTH owns 45% or moreinT us), 2) ifTH ceases to own 17%inTus(whenTHceasestoTsinghua Uniceasesto own 50% inTFPeking Uniceasesto own 50% inPUFGown 45% inTus)OwnershipTsinghua Hldgs (TH) 51%Tsinghua Hldgs (TH)45%Tsinghua Hldgs (TH)25%Peking Uni 70%BeijingJiankun lnv.49%Ch
14、ina Private Venture 30%BeijingZhaorun IM 30%Shanghai Xiexin Jinhan lnv.20%(Rmb m)1H199M199M199M19Revenue33,16113,59014,36191,769Gross profit7,2333,8153,04010,435Net profit(3,694)52743(2,469)EBITDA(718)761(312)1,504Short-term debt61,75723,02711,84196,130Long-term debt101,53939,87314,867103,034Gross d
15、ebt163,29662,90026,708199,164Total cash44,85717,1255,98545,459Net debt118,43945,77520,722153,705Assets274,088139,40562,750365,712Equity72,13536,42720,57962,760Gross profit margin22%28%21%11%EBITDA interest coverage(0.2)0.3(0.3)0.2Net debt/equity164%126%101%245%ST debt/gross debt38%37%44%48%Cash/ST d
16、ebt73%74%51%47%Effective interest costs2.7%3.7%3.7%3.6%ROE-5.1%0.1%3.6%-3.9%Figure 15: CH university complexes $ bond maturitiesFigure 16: CH university complexes CNY bond maturities Tsinghua Peking UniversitySource: Bloomberg, UBSTsinghua Peking UniversitySource: Bloomberg, UBSUsing a top-down appr
17、oach, we estimate that onshore defaults could: 1) rise to 1.3-1.6% at end- 2020 if the trade war escalates, or 2) muddle through 0.5-0.8% in a trade war de-escalation scenario.Figure 17: Chinas default and debt at riskNote: DAR ratio as of Jun19. Source: Wind, UBSCNY bond defaults could grind higher
18、 on much slower growth and POEs debt burdens.: turning to CNY bonds, privately-owned enterprises (POEs) leverage and high default rates remain a concern. Their debts at risk (DAR, defined as problematic debt where EBITDA interest coverage is less than 1 x, Figure 17) are rising, highlighting the abi
19、lity to service debt is deteriorating. POEs reliance on non-standard funding channels would be more negatively affected by governments tighter grip on leverage and subdued demand for lower-rated bond issuance (Figure 26).but this is likely to be met by a policy response. POEs default rate stood at c
20、5% in 2019, and markedly exceeded total credit bonds c0.5% on SOEs and LGFV dominance (Figure 19, Figure 20). We modelled the CNY bond default rate using assumptions on Chinas GDP, DAR and credit impulse. If growth slows much faster (in a trade war escalation scenario), we estimate the default rate
21、could test 1.3-1.6% in 2020. However, we believe the government will likely step in via some relaxations on shadow banking channels to limit a system-wide default (if that also results in a rise in unemployment). Moreover, from a bond maturity perspective, c80% due in 2020-21 are from SOEs and LGFV.
22、 They should have better flexibility to handle the maturity wall, especially since the latter fits into governments push for infrastructure spending.Figure 18: Scenarios on CNY bond default rateActual/Base case Trade de-escalationOil at $30/bblTrade escalation Oil$120/bblSupply becomes demand shockN
23、ote: Blue line denotes baseline scenario.Source: Wind, UBS estimatesFigure 19: CNY credit bond defaults.6 6 6 xP Q/ Q/ Q/mainly in 8.0% enterprises, shadow channelsRMB tn1.0%0.0%LH6ONCXJH85ZLH8SCSJZHNSCXJLHZ.5CXJCH9OCXILH9oeeHgoaLHlnseNH 寸5eNote: China credit bond o/s Rmb20tn. Source: Wind, UBSSourc
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