拉丁美洲和加勒比五个国家的竞争政策和大流行后恢复期分析.docx

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1、ContentsAbstract 5Introduction 71. ICTs and Competition9Digital economy in todays context91. The internet phenomenon9The digital economy112. The new antitrust environment16MSMEs in the context of a new competition environment 19A. CoviD-19 pandemiceffects 20Impact on the digital economy 201. Effecto

2、n MSMEs21What happens when the pandemic is over?22II. Competition policies in the region25A. Country selection 251. Competition policies26Cooperation agreements 26B. Argentina31Competition policy framework 311. Responsible authorities 33Present situation342. Adoption of measures due to the pandemic3

3、5Chile361. Competition policy framework 36Responsible authorities 382. Present situation38Adoption of measures due to the pandemic39C. Colombia41Competition policy framework 411. Responsible authorities 43Present situation432. Adoption of measures due to the pandemic44Table l.iPotential impacts on v

4、alue creation and capture from an expanding digital economy, by its components and actorsActorsDigital economy componentIndividuals (asMultinationalEconomy-wideusers / consumersMSMEsenterprises /Governmentsimplicationsand workers)digital platformsCore, digital sectorNew jobs forGreater inclusionInve

5、stmentAttractingIncreased growth,building andunder suitableopportunities forinvestment.productivity andinstalling ICTcircumstances orcompanies thatTax revenues fromvalue added.infrastructure.spillovers/domesticmeet high capital,the economicEmploymentNew jobs inlinkages.technological andactivity crea

6、tedcreation.telecom and ICTIncreasedskills requirementsInvestmentsector, especiallycompetition fromand diffusion ofICT servicescloud-servicetechnologies；providersR&D likely located in high-income countries.Mixed trade impactsDigital economyNew jobs inNew opportunitiesEnhancedMore tax revenueHigher g

7、rowth,digital ser- vices,in digitalproductivityresulting fromproductivity andespecially forecosystems.from data-drivenincreasedvalue added.highly skilledIncreasedbusiness models.economic activityEpetition fromGreater control ofand formalizationcreation/ losses.New forms offoreign digitalvalue chains

8、 usingof enterprises.Higher investment.digital work.firmsplatform- basedLost customsAggregation ofincluding for thebusiness models.revenue fromdigital firms inless skilledNew opportunitiesdigitalization ofsome locations.in the sharingproductsMixed tradeeconomyimpacts. Market concentrationDigitalized

9、New jobs in ICTPlatform-enabledEmergence ofIncreasedGrowth througheconomyoccupations acrossmarket access.platform firmsefficiency ofimprovedindustries.Reducedwith data-drivenservices throughefficiency inNeed for newtransaction costsmodels.e-government.sectors and valueskills as higher-Risk of race t

10、oGains fromIncreased revenuechains.value roles arethe bottom” inefficiency,from customsProductivityredesigned usingmarkets vs. abilityproductivity andautomation.improvements.digital tools.to find a niche.quality.Unclear impactInnovationGreater efficiencyLost opportunitiesOpportunities foron tax reve

11、nueimpacts.of servicesdue to automationthe monetizationincreases fromPotential crowdingreceived.(e.g. logistics；of data.higher economicout of local firms inJob losses orbusinessIncreasedactivity; lossesdigitally disruptedtransformation dueprocesses).competitivefrom taxsectors.to digitalization.New r

12、oles inadvantage ofoptimizationPotentialRisk of worsenedservice provision.digital platforms.practices by digitalautomation in lowworkingNew businessIncreased marketplatforms andand medium-skillconditions.opportunitiespower and controlMNEs.jobs.Improvedfor digitalizedof data value chain.Data-drivenWi

13、der inequality.connectivity.enterprisesLeadingopportunities toMixed tradeMore choice,digitalization inmeet various SDGsimpacts.convenience,different sectorsImpacts oncustomization of products for users and consumers. Lower consumer pricesstructural changeSource： (UNCTAD, 2019).(b) Competition in pla

14、tform marketsThe subject of competition in platform markets is not an easy one to tackle, due to the multiple dimensions in which digital platforms operate and their nature of multisided markets. A digital platform is characterized as being a facilitator or enabler for many-to-many (M2M) interaction

15、s； hence, transactions in this market become multisided. Multisided markets and multiple products are nothing new in the ICT industry, as broadcasters and internet service providers have been dealing with them for years (Shelanskiz 2013). Platforms act as intermediaries between different sets of con

16、sumers that would find it difficult to reach each other without them. These different groups relate with each other vertically as buyers and sellers, while being users of the platform services at the same time.The multisided nature of digital platforms creates several consequences for competition po

17、licy. A platform cannot set prices for one market facet without affecting supply and demand on other sides ofthe market (Shelanski, 2013). Market dominance on one side ofthe market doesnt necessarily imply that one platform is able to impose monopolistic prices on a specific market segment, as that

18、pricing would have negative effects on the prices that the platform would charge on customers on other market segments.Evans & Schmalensee (2007) make an interesting analysis on the driving forces that determine the process and level of concentration in two-sided markets, such as the digital platfor

19、ms. Table 1.2 shows the determinants of concentration on two-sided markets.Table 1.2Determinants of concentration on two-sided marketsDriving ForceEffect on concentrationStrength of indirect network effects+Degree of economies of scale+Capacity constraints-Scope of platform differentiation-Multihomi

20、ng opportunitiesSource： (Evans & Schmalensee, 2007).Indirect network effectsCompetition among two-sided platforms promote larger and fewer competitors； as platforms with more customers on one group are more valuable to the other group. For instance, more users of a social media platform make it more

21、 valuable to advertisers. This concentration effect tends to become a market-entry barrier for new platforms and yields consolidation of smaller platforms into larger ones. In addition, first movers have an inherent advantage, as new entrants have to build-up a large customer base on both sides in o

22、rder to effectively compete.Economies of scaleDigital platforms usually have relatively large fixed costs, such as the software development for managing the platform operations. Variable costs, on the other side, are quite small and the marginal cost of adding an additional customer on either side t

23、ends to become negligible. Large platforms such as eBay, Amazon and Airbnb incur in small additional costs with new customers, meaning that the larger they become, the easier it becomes to accommodate new customers. The notable exception to this rule would be the increasing needs for cybersecurity,

24、as the larger a digital platform becomes, the more interest it will generate to hackers and cyberattackers.Capacity constraintsOn the side of negative externalities, capacity constraints play an important role as deterrents for market concentration. As opposed to two-sided markets such as shopping m

25、alls, digital platforms do not have a constraint of physical space. But other forms of capacity constraints exist, such as limits on advertising space in digital markets, negative externalities caused by additional users, increased search cost due to user heterogeneity, and others (Haucap, 2019).Pro

26、duct differentiation between platformsDigital platforms can differentiate themselves through vertical differentiation (on the income and relative demand for quality) or horizontal differentiation (by choosing particular features and prices that appeal to particular groups of customers). The latter c

27、an also result in users choosing to join and use more than one platform, which is known as multi-homing (Evans & Schmalensee, 2007). For instance, many people choose to join more than one marketplace or social media platform. This would in turn yield to platform differentiation and act as an inhibit

28、or for consolidation. Multi-homing can occur on both sides of a digital platform.Switching costs and multi-homingUsers of digital platforms have to waive the pros and cons of switching costs involved in moving from one platform to another versus the costs of multi-homing. Switching costs might be co

29、nsiderable to users； particularly when migrating between social networks. Another factor is that items such as seniority and users reputation cannot be easily migrated to another platform and as time passes, it becomes increasingly costly to switch. Multi-homing costs might be negligible on one side

30、, as most platforms offer membership at no cost and the only expenses involved are those of keeping track of several accounts. On the other side, however, advertisers and similar users might find it expensive to use multi-homing and be naturally limited to just one or two platforms.(c) New concepts

31、in platform economyAs platforms evolve in todays digital economy, many new concepts arise due to the extensive use ofthe internet and the insertion of digital platforms in the economy. This is particularly challenging for governments, as they need to grasp the knowledge in record time in order to de

32、sign proper sector policies and develop the legal/regulatory framework applicable to them. Key concepts are market definition and market power.Market definitionMarket definition in digital platforms can be difficult to grasp, as different markets can be identified, and the literature is not always c

33、onsistent regarding them. A relatively straightforward conceptual model for digital platforms markets, as envisioned by Prof. Dr. Ron Meyer (Meyer, 2019), is shown in figure 1.4.It should be evident that market definition becomes a challenge once companies like Amazon start to become players in seve

34、ral markets and the reach ofthe platform becomes ubiquitous. Competition authorities need to be careful when assessing the markets covered by digital platforms, as some ofthe boundaries between them become blurred.Another matter regarding market definition is geographical reach. As digital platforms

35、 become global, their markets cover different geographies and some of them are able to reach entire continents and even most of the connected world. Google coverage, for instance, is almost global, except for a handful of countries that includes mainland China.Google restricts access to some of its

36、business services in certain countries or regions； such as China, Crimea, Cuba, Iran, Myanmar； North Korea, Sudan, and Syria, (see S：). This adds another dimension to the challenge of market definition, particularly when considering applicability of local laws and competition issues that go across b

37、orders.Figure 1.4Conceptual model for digital platformsFigure 1.4Conceptual model for digital platformsPayPalLinked 03tumblntujitKerioirbnbUber squg、 amazon nUyunWImbmAGitHubMarketplace thing supply &Gornmunicat，。* etwork for message。Source： (Meyer, 2019).In the case oftwo-sided platforms, market de

38、finition raises a numberof issues that do not arise on conventional markets. In market environments with two-sided platforms, the following questions arise： can the relationship between the platform and the respective market sides be considered separate markets orjust a single market? are there circ

39、umstances under which a market can be viewed in isolation of the other side? should the interplay between both sides always be taken into account? how should a side on the platform that does not need to make a monetary payment to consume the platforms service (zero price) be treated?As in standard c

40、ompetition analysis, substitutability ofthe different services offered by a two-sided platform needs to be investigated for market definition. The economic concept to do so is through cross-price elasticities of demand (Franck & Peitz, 2019). However, when no monetary prices are charged, modified co

41、ncepts need to be used.Market powerMarket power assessment in digital platforms is another key concept that needs close attention when dealing with competition in the new economy. (Franck & Peitz, 2019) develop an extensive analysis on market power in markets with platforms and conclude that when de

42、aling with two-sided platforms, particular care is needed, as the markets on the two sides are linked and an assessment ofthe overall market power of a platform has to take this link into account.,zTable 1.3 summarizes a set of indicators and the level to which the indicator applies, (i.e. whether t

43、here is such an indicator for the whole platform (platform) orwhetherthere is one on each side ofthe platform (market).Table 1.3Indicators of platform market powerIndicatorLevelRevenue shareplatformUser sharesmarketUser share relative to number of potential usersmarketShare of usage volumeplatform/m

44、arketMark-up/Lerner indexmarketProfitsplatformBarriers to entryplatformDirect evidenceplatform/marketSource： (Franck & Peitz, 2019). Revenue sharesTwo-sided markets platforms serve two user groups on two separate but interdependent markets. One possibility to assess the relative position of a platfo

45、rm is to calculate its revenue shares derived on each side ofthe platform. If the price structure is neutral,Neutral Pricing, or pricing similar to competition is the preferred option when the market is characterized by intense competition and low differentiation among competing offers. only overall

46、 shares are meaningful. If the price structure is non-neutral, the platform chooses its price structure to maximize the overall profitability of the platform and only overall shares are meaningful as well. Forthe case of uzero-price,/ markets, revenue shares are meaningless if all substitutes are pr

47、iced at zero. All things considered, the only reasonable option is to use revenue on all sides. User sharesRatherthan considering revenue shares, active users shares relative to the total number of active users might be considered. This means that market shares on both sides ofthe digital platform are to be considered separately. In case usage of a platform is heterogeneous, it is preferable to consider