美国的财政刺激是否会导致经济过热为什 么日本没有.docx

《美国的财政刺激是否会导致经济过热为什 么日本没有.docx》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《美国的财政刺激是否会导致经济过热为什 么日本没有.docx（11页珍藏版）》请在淘文阁 - 分享文档赚钱的网站上搜索。

1、21-12 Overheating DebateWhy Not in Japan?Egor Gornostay and Madi SarsenbayevJune 2021Note： The authors thank Adam S. Posen for his guidance and Jeremie Cohen-Setton, Simeon Djankov, Joseph E. Gagnonz and Takeshi Tashiro for their helpful comments. All errors are the authors The base effect is the ef

2、fect the reference point has on a comparison between two points. Because inflation was low in the initial months of the pandemic, increases the following year appear higher than they would had inflation the previous year been higher.1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW | Washington, DC 20036-1903 USA | +1.

3、202.328.9000 | own.INTRODUCTIONEgor Gornostay and Madi Sarsenbayev are research fellows at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.Egor Gornostay and Madi Sarsenbayev are research fellows at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.An intense debate has erupted over whether the

4、unprecedented size of the US fiscal stimulus will cause the US economy to overheat and generate high inflation. Lawrence H. Summers and Olivier J. Blanchard, in particular have warned of the adverse inflationary implications of the recently enacted American Rescue Plan. However, some economists, not

5、ably Paul Krugman, argue that overheating due to fiscal expansion is far from certain, while others, including Joseph E. Gagnon, believe that even if the stimulus did overheat the economy, the resultant surge in inflation would be temporary. Policymakers, too, are unconvinced that persistently high

6、inflation is a risk. Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen has repeatedly dismissed inflationary concerns; she recently stated that she expects any price increases in the near term to be transitory. This view is shared by Federal Reserve Chair Jerome H. PowelL who sees one-time price increasesstemming

7、largely from ubase effects, energy price increases, and supply-chain bottlenecks-as having no lasting effects on inflation.To date, the debate about overheating has focused primarily on the United States, even though many other developed countries responded to the COVID-19 crisis with economic stimu

8、lus packages of unprecedented scale. By some measures, Japan stands out: The International Monetary Funds (IMF) COVID-19 Policy Tracker and some media reports hove indicated that the estimated total amount of its three consecutive stimulus packages exceeds 50 percent of GDP, aTable A2Additional fisc

9、al measures related to COVID-19 announced in Canada, Germany, Italy, and the United StatesCountryAmount SourcesCanada (in billions of Canadian dollars):Recovery Plan for Jobs, Growth, and Resilience0 50Department of Finance, Canadaas percent of GDP 2.26%Germany (in billions of euros):Corporate aid a

10、nd extra investments to help counter COVID-19Federal Ministry of Finance, GermanyItaly (in billions of euros)as percent of GDP 1.48%Urgent measures related to the emergency from COVID-19Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Italyas percent of GDP 1.88%United States (in billions of US dollars):Amer

11、ican Jobs Plan: Measures to protect Americans from future pandemics30White House, USas percent of GDP 0.14%a. This item includes amounts expected to be incurred over the next three fiscal years.Note: This table lists additional fiscal packages announced by national governments before the end of Marc

12、h 2021 (our cutoff date) and not included in the Fiscal Monitor database. We do not include them in table Al and figure 1 because these packages had not been approved by national parliaments as of the end of March and were therefore subject to amendments by legislators. Moreover, some of them still

13、lack specifics and thus (1) some parts of these packages may be below the line, and (2) others may not be directly linked to COVID-19. Only amounts judged to be directly linked to COVID-19 are included in this table.Sources: For GDP (accessed via Macrobond): Statistics Canada, German Federal Statist

14、ical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt), Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat), and US Bureau of Economic Analysis.豫:PIIEPETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 2021 Peterson Institute for International Economics. All rights reserved.This publication has been subjected to a prepublic

15、ation peer review intended to ensure analytical quality. The views expressed are those of the authors. This publication is part of the overall program of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, as endorsed by its Board of Directors, but it does not necessarily reflect the views of indivi

16、dual members of the Board or of the Institutes staff or management.The Peterson Institute for International Economics is a private nonpartisanz nonprofit inst什ution for rigorous, intellectually open, and indepth study and discussion of international economic policy. Its purpose is to identify and an

17、alyze important issues to make globalization beneficial and sustainable for the people of the United States and the world, and then to develop and communicate practical new approaches for dealing w什h them. Its work is funded by a highly diverse group of philanthropic foundations, private corporation

18、s, and interested individuals, as well as income on its capital fund. About 35 percent of the Institutes resources in its latest fiscal year were provided by contributors from outside the United States.A list of all financial supporters is posted ath 甘 ps: piie /sites/defoult/files/supporters.pdf.nu

19、mber about twice as high as the US fiscal packages, which together represent approximately 26 percent of GDP (see figure I). Numbers expressed as percentages of GDP are based on estimates of 2020 nominal GDP from national sources. No one, however, seems to be actively raising overheating concerns fo

20、r Japan.Figure 1 Total COVID-19-related fiscal stimulus as percent of 2020 GDP inG7 countries, end-March 2021American Rescue Plan16.7%8.9%United StatesUnited KingdomJapanCanadaGermanyItalyFrancefiscal stimulus as percent of GDPNotes: Total stimulus includes additional spending and forgone revenue an

21、nounced or taken as of March 17, 2021, as reported in the IMFs Fiscol Monitor dotobose, as well as further fiscal stimulus implemented as of the end of March 2021, which is our cutoff date, and some emergency and recovery measures missing from the database. International support measures of about 2.

22、4 billion are excluded from the UK stimulus numbers (see table Al in the appendix for detailed calculations). Some other fiscal packages announced by national governments before the end of March 2021 and missing from the Fiscal Monitor database are not added, because they had not been approved by na

23、tional parliaments as of the end of March and were therefore subject to amendments by legislators. Moreover, some of them still lack specifics and thus (1) some parts of these packages may be below the line, and (2) others may not be directly linked to COVID-19 (see table A2 in the appendix for deta

24、ils).Sources: IMFs Fiscal Monitor Dotobose of Country Fiscal Measures in Resoonse to the COVID-19 Pandemic, Office for Budget ResQonsibility (UK), Ministry of Finance of jQQQn, and Committee for o ResQonsible Federal Budget; GDP data via Macrobond from Cabinet Office of Japan, French National Instit

25、ute of Statistics & Economic Studies (INSEE), German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt), Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat), Statistics Canada, UK Office for National Statistics (ONS), and US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).This Policy Brief uses IMF data (with a fe

26、w adjustments) to show that the US fiscal stimulus is the largest among the Group of Seven (G7) countries relative to GDPZ justifying the attention economists have given it. Although Japans headline number cited above looks astonishingly high, the actual size of its discretionary fiscal measures is

27、about 16 percent of GDP (see figure 1), a number substantially smaller than the total size of the US fiscal stimulus. In fact, the United Kingdom is estimated to spend more than Japan as a proportion of GDP, but even the UK stimulus program markedly lags behind that of the United States. If addition

28、al stimulus measures currently making their way through the legislative process in Canada are counted (see table A2 in the appendix), Jopons fiscal stimuluswould rank even lower and would amount to only being average in size among G7 countries. Given this and the lackluster performance of its econom

29、y in the first quarter of 202b it is unlikely that Japan will find itself in overheating terr什ory any time soon.COMPONENTS OF JAPANS FISCAL STIMULUSHistorically, fiscal programs announced by the Japanese government tend to stretch their stimulative content (Posen 1998). This time is no different.The

30、 total project scale of the three stimulus packages announced in 2020 is estimated to exceed 300 trillion yen (over 50 percent of GDP). However some parts of these stimulus packages are borne by the private sector while some others are unlikely to have direct impacts on the Japanese economy. Spendin

31、g that increases aggregate demand and thus has a stimulative effect is referred to as Mamizu (clear water) It is widely acknowledged in Japan that the effects of a fiscal stimulus package should be measured by Mamizu, a concept that has evolved over time. In the past, Mamizu was calculated as the to

32、tal stimulus package minus spending the following year, purchase of land for future public works, and other asset transfers; it represented the amount that potentially increased GDP. In recent years, fiscal expenses by the national government or the national government and local governments have oft

33、en been referred to as Mamizu. In this Policy Brief, Mamizu is defined as the fiscal expenses of the national and local governments. in Japan, but not every measure included in fiscal support can be classified as such.Figure 2 shows the components of Japans COVID-19 fiscal packages. Two points stand

34、 out. First, the headline size of Jopons stimulus includes expend什ures by the private sector, which the government encourages through the provision of various incentives. These contributions from private industries magnify the project scale of stimulus packages.Second, the headline number also inclu

35、des an off-budget Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP), which offers fiscal loans, industrial investment, and government guarantees, and is funded by government-affiliated financial institutions. It is used mainly for liquidity support to affected industries and small and medium-sized enterpris

36、es (SMEs). Such liquidity support is essential, but it has only indirect effects on GDP. It should also be noted that Japans first stimulus package included 10 trillion yen of fiscal expenditures already planned before the COVID-19 pandemic (Comprehensive Economic Measures planned in 2019).Excluding

37、 both of these components from Japans stimulus packages leads to our practical measure of Mamizu, consisting of fiscal expenses by the national and local governments. One could also make other adjustments. For example, contingency funds could be treated differently, depending on the methodology used

38、. This definition of Mamizu roughly corresponds to the additional spending and forgone revenue included in the IMFs Fiscal Monitor Database of Country Fiscal Measures in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic. The total amount of Mamizu, 101 trillion yen, is thus similar to the IMFs total after adjustmen

39、ts for Japans COVID-19 Contingency Fund. The IMFs Fiscal Monitor database includes only actual use of the COVID-19 Contingency Fund; the numbers in figure 2 include total amounts allocated to the fund. We therefore use the IMF data in the rest of our analysis.Figure 2 Japans COVID-19-related stimulu

40、s packagesApril 2020Economic MeasuresMay 2020December 2020 Economic MeasuresDecember 2020 Economic MeasuresSupplementary BudgetHeadline size of the stimulus.一 Includes financial measures and private sector expenses.Project scale 117.1 trillion yen (21.7% of GDP)Project scale117.1 trillion yen (21.7%

41、 of GDP)Project scale73.6 trillion yen (13.7% of GDP)Fiscal expenses 48.4 trillion yenFiscal expenses 72.7 trillion yenFiscal expenses 40 trillion yenFILP12.5 trillion yenFILP39.3 trillion yenFILP7.7 trillion yenFILP = public corporation (o-budget)-MamizuNational/local government expenses 35.8 trill

42、ion yenNational government expenses33.2 trillion yenNational/local government expenses 32.3 trillion yen2020 third supplementary budget and FILP funds2021 budgetPart of December 2019 stimulusFebruary and March 2020 emergency packages2020 second supplementary budget and FILP funds2020 supplementary b

43、udget and FILP fundsFILP = Fiscal Investment and Loan ProgramNote: All percentage numbers are relative to 2020 GDP.Sources: Cabinet Office of Jqqqfi and the Ministry of Finance.CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON OF COVID-19-RELATED STIMULUS PACKAGESTo compare the magnitudes of fiscal support across G7 countri

44、es, we use the IMFs Fiscal Monitor database, which provides the size along with the breakdown of COVID-19-related fiscal measures announced or token by governments in selected economies as of March 17, 2021. The database organizes fiscal support measures into various types, depending on their implic

45、ations for a countrys budget balance and government debt. We focus on additional spending and forgone revenue (uabove the line” measures, excluding accelerated spending and deferred revenue), because (a) these measures better capture a countrys current fiscal stance by immediately affecting budget d

46、eficits and (b) they allow for a better comparison of G7 packages to the Japanese fiscal stimulus.Other support measures, such as tax deferrals, equity injections and provision of nonforgivable loans and guarantees, also affect economic activity, but their impact may be more muted. Tax deferrals, fo

47、r example, eventually come due and thus offer only temporary relief. Programs providing guarantees, loans, and equity injections may be taken up by businesses only partially, which is why counting them can greatly overstate actual fiscal support (see Anderson et al. 2021). For instance, out of 100 b

48、illion reserved in Germanys Economic Stabilization Fund, which was set up in March 2020, for recapitalization of firms, only 8 billion had been taken up by the end of March 2021. Moreover guarantees typically do not have immediate implications for public finances (they only create contingent liabili

49、ties), while loans and equity injections may have little or no upfront effect on fiscal deficits (they are “below the line” measures). We therefore do not include these items in our analysis.To the additional spending and forgone revenue we add further fiscal stimulus implemented from March 17 to March 3b 2021 and some eme