《国防拨款法》：背景与国会议题选择.docx

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1、ContentsIntroduction 1Legislative Activity1Selected Actions 1Bill Overview 4Background 7Strategic Context7Budgetary Context8FY2021 Defense Budget Request 10Selected Policy Matters 12COVID-1912Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)14Border Wall and Related Matters 15Border Barrier Construction15Counte

2、r-Narcotics Support17Transfer Authorities 18Confederate Names 19Authorizations for the Use of Military Force (AUMFs)20Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) 21Iran 21Military Personnel 22End-Strength 22Pay Raise24Childcare Program 24Selected Acquisition Matters 25Software and Digital Technology Pil

3、ot Programs25Mid-Tier Acquisition and Rapid Prototyping Programs 26Strategic Nuclear Forces27Long-Range, Precision Strike Weapons 29Missile Defense Programs 31Military Space Programs 33Ground Combat Systems35Navy Shipbuilding37Military Aircraft Programs 40Outlook42FiguresDays between Start of Fiscal

4、 Year and Enactment of Annual Defense Appropriations Act, FY1977-FY2021 4Figure 1. Outlays by Budget Enforcement Category and Revenues, FY2001-FY2030 (Projected)9Portion of FY2021 Presidents National Defense Budget Request within the Scope of the Defense Appropriations Act11Figure 2. Department of D

5、efense Budget Authority, FY1948-FY2025 (Projected) 12 with DODs strategic approach, particularly its orientation towards strategic competition with other great powers. At the same time, the Commission asserted that successive Administrations and Congresses have underestimated the scale of this reori

6、entation, the urgency with which it must occur, and the resources required to make it happen. For example, the commission recommended that policymakers increase defense spending by 3% to 5% per year in real terms (i.e., adjusting for inflation)一or alter the expectations of the strategy and Americas

7、global strategic objectives. Eric Edelman and Gary Roughead (co-chairs), Providing for the Common Defense: The Report of the National Defense Strategy Commission, United States Institute for Peace, November 2018, p. 52, at 1/providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf. Some Members of Congress have recomme

8、nded increasing the defense budget by 3%-5% per year in real terms to prepare for long-term strategic competition with China and Russia. See, for example, Joe Gould, “HASCs new lead Republican on making Space Force permanent and budget fights to come, Defense News, February 4, 2021, at /02/04/hascs-

9、new-lead- republican-on-making-space-force-permanent-and-budget-fights-to-come/. Center for a New American Security, The National Defense Strategy Commission Report: Debating the Key Issues, January 15, 2019, at .Others have argued DOD could carry out the strategy with less funding. In 2019, Robert

10、O. Work, who served as deputy secretary of defense during the Obama Administration, said, “You can execute this National Defense Strategy at $700 billion a year, without question, if you make the right choices. You can completely screw up the strategy at $800 billion a year if you make the wrong cho

11、ices.,，2 Some Members of Congress have proposed reducing the defense budget by as much as 10% to fund non-defense priorities such as health care, housing, and educational opportunities. See, for example, Senator Bernie Sanders, Sanders: Cut the Pentagon by 10% to Hire More Teachers, Build More Homes

12、, and Create More Jobs J press release, June 25, 2020, at .Selected CRS ProductsFor background and analysis on the National Defense Strategy, see CRS Insight IN 10855, The 2018 National Defense Strategy, by Kathleen J. McInnis and CRS Report R45349, The 2018 National Defense Strategy: Fact Sheet, by

13、 Kathleen J. McInnis. For background and analysis on potential national-security implications of COVID-19, see CRS Report R46336, COVID-19: Potential Implications fbr International Security Environment-Overview of Issues and Further Reading fbr Congress, by Ronald ORourke, Kathleen J. McInnis, and M

14、ichael Moodie. For background and analysis on great power competition, see CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications fbr Defense Issues fbr Congress, by Ronald ORourke.Budgetary ContextCongressional action on the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2021, occurred as fede

15、ral spending continued to exceed revenues. The trend has raised questions about whether pressure to reduce the federal deficit may impact defense budget plans.In September 2020, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected a federal deficit of $3.3 trillion in 2020, or 16% of gross domestic produ

16、ct-the highest percentage since 1945. Congressional Budget Office, An Update to the Budget Outlook: 2020 to 2030, September 2020, at . This amount was $2.2 trillion more than CBO had estimated in March of 2020. CBO described the projected increase as mostly the result of the economic disruption caus

17、ed by the 2020coronavirus pandemic and the enactment of legislation in response., Over the next decade, mandatory spending and net interest payments on the national debt are projected to increase faster than discretionary spending. Ibid. For CRS products on COVID-19, see . Ibid. See Figure 2.Figure

18、2. Outlays by Budget Enforcement Category and Revenues, FY200I-FY2030 (Projected)(in trillions of dollars)FY19 FY?O FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24FY2sFY?6 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30Source: CRS analysis of Congressional Budget Office, lO-Year Budget Projections (Tables I-I, I-4) accompanying An Update to the Budget Ou

19、tlook: 2020 to 2030, September 2020.Notes: Area above dotted line reflects deficit. 2019 reflects actual figures; 2020-2030 reflect projections.In recent decades, during periods of widening gaps between revenues and outlays, Congress has sometimes enacted legislation intended to reduce the deficit i

20、n part by limiting defense spending. After the deficit had reached nearly 6% of GDP in 1983, Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Table 1.2, Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-) as Percentages of GDP: 1930-2025, accessed February 16, 2021, at .In recent decades,

21、 during periods of widening gaps between revenues and outlays, Congress has sometimes enacted legislation intended to reduce the deficit in part by limiting defense spending. After the deficit had reached nearly 6% of GDP in 1983, Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Table 1.2, Summar

22、y of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-) as Percentages of GDP: 1930-2025, accessed February 16, 2021, at . Congress enacted the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act; P.L. 99-177). For more information and analysis, see C

23、RS Report R41901, Statutory Budget Controls in Effect Between 1985 and 2002, by Megan S. Lynch. This legislation created annual deficit limits and stated that breaching them would trigger automatic funding reductions equally divided between defense and non-defense spending.In 1990, Congress passed t

24、he Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508), which included statutory limits on discretionary spending. These discretionary spending limits were in effect through 2002, and in certain years included a specific limit on defense spending. Ibid. Defense spending limits under P.L. 101-508 were in p

25、lace in FY1991, FYI992, FYI993, FY1998 and FYI999. After the deficit reached nearly 10% in 2009, Ibid. Congress enacted the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25), which reinstated statutory limits, or caps, on discretionary spending for fiscal years 2012-2021 and included separate annual lim

26、its for defense spending. Discretionary spendinglimits are enforced through a mechanism called sequestration. For more information, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions, by Grant A. Driessen and Megan S. Lynch. Sequestration automatically cancels previously enact

27、ed appropriations by an amount necessary to reach pre-specified levels. For more background and analysis, see CRS Report R42972, Sequestration as a Budget Enforcement Process: Frequently Asked Questions, by Megan S. Lynch. The defense spending cap under BCA as amended applies to discretionary base b

28、udget authority for the national defense budget function (O5O). The term base budget generally refers to funding for planned or regularly occurring costs to man, train, and equip the military force. Budget authority is authority provided by law to a federal agency to obligate money for goods and ser

29、vices. For more information on how BCA affects the defense budget, see CRS Report R44039, The Defense Budget and the Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions, by Brendan W. McGarry. The national defense budget function (identified by the numerical notation 050) comprises three subfunctions: De

30、partment of Defense (DOD)- Military (051); atomic energy defense activities primarily of the Department of Energy (053); and other defense-related activities (054), such as FBI counterintelligence activities. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10618, Defense Primer: The National Defense Budget

31、 Function (050), by Christopher T. Mann. The limit does not apply to certain other types of funding (eg, funding for Overseas Contingency Operations OCO or emergency requirements). Since 2009, the term Overseas Contingency Operations, or OCO, has been used to describe military operations in Iraq, Af

32、ghanistan, and other countries. For more information, see CRS Report R44519, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, by Brendan W. McGany and Emily M. Morgenstern. On March 1, 2013five months into the fiscal year-then-President Barack Obama ordered the sequestration of budget

33、ary resources across nonexempt federal government accounts. Government Accountability Office, SEQUESTRATION: Observations on the Department of Defenses Approach in Fiscal Year 2013, GAO-14-177R, November 7, 2013, p. 13, at . Some observers argue that such legislation disproportionately affects defen

34、se programs and inadequately addresses projected growth in mandatory programs. Others argue that it is necessary in light of recurring deficits and growing federal debt. For more information, see CRS Report R44039, The Defense Budget and the Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions, by Brendan

35、 W. McGarry, p. 3.In a 2020 report, the Congressional Budget Office identified 12 options for reducing the federal budget deficit through discretionary defense programs, such as reducing the DOD budget, capping increases in basic pay for military service members, and stopping construction of Fordcla

36、ss aircraft carriers.3、Congressional Budget Office, Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2021 to 2030, December 2020, at .Selected CRS ProductsFor background and analysis on the Budget Control Act (BCA) and sequestration, see CRS Video WVB00305, Budget Control Act: Overview, by Megan S. Lynch and Grant

37、 A. Driessen, CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions, by Grant A. Driessen and Megan S. Lynch, and CRS Report R44039, The Defense Budget and the Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions, by Brendan W. McGarry. For background and analysis on Overseas Contingency O

38、perations (OCO) funding, see CRS Report R445I9, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, by Brendan W. McGarry and Emily M. Morgenstern.FY2021 Defense Budget RequestPresident Trumps FY2021 budget request included $753.5 billion in budget authority for national defense-related

39、activities. Of that amount, $740.5 billion was for discretionary programs and $13.0 billion was for mandatory programs.56 Government Publishing Office, Budget of the United States Government, FY2021, Analytical Perspectives, Table 24-President Trumps FY2021 budget request included $753.5 billion in

40、budget authority for national defense-related activities. Of that amount, $740.5 billion was for discretionary programs and $13.0 billion was for mandatory programs.56 Government Publishing Office, Budget of the United States Government, FY2021, Analytical Perspectives, Table 24- The budget request

41、conformed to the FY2021discretionary defense limit established by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 (BBA 2019; P.L. 116-37). BBA 2019 had raised the defense spending cap initially set by the Budget Control Act of 2011 to $671,5 billion in FY2021. BBA 2019 also specified a nonbinding target of $69 bi

42、llion in FY2021 for defense OCO funding.Of the $753.5 billion requested for national defense-related activities in FY2021, the portion falling within the scope of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2021, totaled $690.17 billion, including $688.99 billion for DOD and $1.18 billion for othe

43、r agencies (i.e., certain activities of the intelligence community). See Figure 3.1: Budget Authority and Outlays by Function, Category, and Program, at.7 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, H.R. 133 / Public Law 116-260, Legislative Text and Expl

44、anatory Statement Book 1 of 2, Divisions AF, committee print, 117th Cong., 1st sess., March 2021, 43-750 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2021), p. 765, at 17HPRT43749.pdf. The portion of defense OCO funding falling within the scope of the legislation totaled $68.65 billion. The remaining $63.3 billion request

45、ed for national defense-related activities in FY2021, including $350 million in OCO funding, falls outside the scope of the legislation.Figure 3. Portion of FY2021 Presidents National Defense Budget Request within the Scope of the Defense Appropriations ActTotal: $753.5 billion OCO share: $69.0bTota

46、l: $753.5 billion OCO share: $69.0blncluded:$690.2bOCO：$68.65bNot Included: $63.3bOCO：$350mO&M $289.0bMILPERS$155.1bProcurement $136,9bDOE $26.0b$5.1b$58.6bRDT&E $106.6b$4.6b$331mConcurrentreceipt $10.6bH TRICARE forLife $8.4bMILCON/FH $8.2b $350mFBI $5.1b-Other $5.3bTotals may not sum due to roundi

47、ng.Totals may not sum due to rounding.Revolving funds $1.4b $20mRelated Agencies $1.2b Source: CRS analysis of funding table in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, H.R. 133 / Public Low / / 6-260, Legislative Text and Explanatory Statement Book I

48、of 2, Divisions A-Ft committee print, I 17th Cong., 1st sess., March 2021,43-750 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2021), p. 765, at 17HPRT43749/pdf/CPRT-1 17HPRT43749.pdf; and Government Publishing Office, Budget of the United States Government, FY20211 Analytical Perspectives, Table 24-1, Budget Authority and

49、 Outlays by Function, Category, and Program.Notes: OCO is funding designated for Overseas Contingency Operations; O&M is operation and maintenance; MILPERS is military personnel; RDT&E is research, development, test and evaluation; DOE is Department of Energy; MILCON/FH is military construction and family housing. Total and “not inc