某咨询报告：中国路边的零售业.docx

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1、编号：时间：2021 年 x 月 x 日书山有路勤为径，学海无涯苦作舟书山有路勤为径，学海无涯苦作舟页码：第1页 共7页第 1 页 共 7 页To make money from the expansion of the Chinese market,most oil companies will have to sell much more than gasoline.JONATHAN R.WOETZELThe McKinsey Quarterly,2002 Number 3CChina 抯 automotive market is predicted to be the third lar

2、gest in the world by 2008.1The accompanying growth in demand forgasoline and related car fuel products 梒 ombined with government plans to deregulate the sector and the need to address the chronicinefficiency of current distribution 梥 hould create a juicy opportunity for multinational oil companies a

3、s well as for China 抯 twodomestic giants,PetroChina and Sinopec.Gasoline reaches the huge Chinese market through a fragmented retail and distribution network of about 90,000 stations,almost allstate owned.Many are run more as sinecures than as businesses,often with a staff four to five times larger

4、than the international normbut with less than a quarter of the average gasoline throughput of US stations.The Chinese government,which is well aware of theproblem,has resolved not to allow the country 抯 energy infrastructure to burden the whole economy:it is fast deregulating the sector,which will b

5、e fully opened up to foreign companies in 2004 under the commitments attending the country 抯 membership in the WorldTrade Organization(WTO).Foreign oil companies have hitherto been restricted to one-off local deals in special economic zones or tiedto investments in toll-road construction.Although th

6、e stage should thus be set for canny corporations to move into the market,it remains unclear how they will make money.Competition is already driving down retail margins on gasoline,while prices for the best station sites have soared as China 抯 largedomestic oil companies have rushed to buy them.Oil

7、companies in the West facing similar margin pressures know that most gasolinestations are viable only if they offer general-retail facilities at least as large as a convenience store,in addition to gasoline.This is true inChina as well.The highest-volume sites might be made profitable on their fuel

8、revenues alone,but the rest need substantial nonfuelrevenues to make a profit.The strategic implications are clear.In China as elsewhere,the first decision for an oil company is whether to own and operate sites ormerely to supply them with gasoline.If the company opts for ownership,it has a choice:t

9、o adopt a retail strategy and pursue nonfuelrevenues from a portfolio of retail sites or to target only the highest-volume sites,using them to build a high-quality gasoline brand thatcan also be offered through independent retailers.At present,the Chinese oil majors are pursuing neither strategy;the

10、y have simplyrushed to grab any available site,where they sell as much petroleum-based product as possible while ignoring the retail potential.Themultinationals have been more judicious in selecting sites for their initial joint ventures,but they too have neglected the strategic choice.Unless all of

11、 these companies,domestic and international alike,change tack,their investments in expensive Chinese real estate mayunravel.THE MARKET AND SITE ECONOMICSChina 抯 dominant oil companies are Sinopec,in the south and east,and PetroChina,which has the more comprehensive refinery anddistribution network o

12、f the two,in the north and west(Exhibit 1).The two companies aim to capture,between them,70 percent of China抯 gasoline sales volume by 2005.Since their IPOs,in 2000,they have invested heavily in petroleum-related infrastructure and in编号：时间：2021 年 x 月 x 日书山有路勤为径，学海无涯苦作舟书山有路勤为径，学海无涯苦作舟页码：第2页 共7页第 2 页

13、共 7 页brand building.Having already raised their share of sales to more than 40 percent and secured most of the prime sites in the biggestcities,they are on track to meet this target.Until 2004,multinational companies will be allowed to own outright only the 300 or so sites they now possess through l

14、ocal deals struckbefore government deregulation of foreign investment in the sector,in the mid-1990s,but they can build up their holdings through jointventures with Chinese companies.BP,ExxonMobil,and Royal Dutch/Shell are establishing joint ventures with PetroChina and Sinopecby contributing capita

15、l for the purchase of sites and by supplying higher-margin premium fuels;BP and PetroChina,for example,aim toboost their holdings to 950 stations by acquiring 670 stations from local companies in Fujian and Guangdong.Such joint ventures bindthe partners only in specific provinces and have so far bee

16、n formed in just 4 out of 27 of them.For the remainder,the options of bothparties are still open.The 60 percent of sales not controlled by the two Chinese leaders is currently held by various quasi-governmental entities,includinglocal and provincial authorities and state-owned enterprises.City gover

17、nments,for example,have started their own retailing groups,often built around local highway-construction projects.Some private operators are also emerging:for example,China ResourcesEnterprise,a holding company based in Hong Kong,has 23 stations and is thinking about opening more.But in general,smal

18、lercompanies,daunted by the bidding power of PetroChina and Sinopec,are holding back.编号：时间：2021 年 x 月 x 日书山有路勤为径，学海无涯苦作舟书山有路勤为径，学海无涯苦作舟页码：第3页 共7页第 3 页 共 7 页Both of the majors hope that their spending will create a profitable structure for China 抯 gasoline-retailing industry after the marketopens up

19、in 2004.International experience shows that gasoline retailing tends to be relatively profitable wherever the top threeparticipants control 80 percent of the market,growth is strong,and the supply of gasoline is short.China should meet these conditions.PetroChina and Sinopec are consolidating the ma

20、rket by buying out their independent rivals and,given their head start over themultinationals,should succeed in gaining a leading position in the market.Growth in demand is forecast to remain high,especially forhigh-quality gasoline.And although supply is currently in balance with demand at the nati

21、onal level,it runs short in the coastal regions,where both demand and growth are greatest.Retail margins are tightening fast,however.As in almost every deregulated Chinese industry,domestic price competition will probablybe severe as the market opens up.PetroChina and Sinopec fought several damaging

22、 price wars from 1997 until they were restrained in1999 by state-imposed price controls that are now being removed in tandem with China 抯 entry into the WTO.The resumed pricecompetition will intensify when new foreign and domestic companies are permitted to purchase sites in 2004.Moreover,all compan

23、iesin the market will gain greater access to gasoline as import tariffs for refined products fall to 5 percent,from 9.Where comparablereforms have taken place 梚 n Australia,France,Israel,Japan,and New Zealand 梤 etail margins have dropped by up to half.In anticipation of this fiercely competitive fut

24、ure environment,PetroChina,Sinopec,and new entrants willing to take them on areratcheting up spending on locations,brands,and marketing.Good locations 梩 he 20 percent of urban gasoline stations that generate60 percent of the revenues 梐 re scarce,and zoning regulations and the high cost of land limit

25、 new entrants.These prime sites,whichmove more than 1,500 tons in volume and generate over 900,000 renminbi($108,700)in fuel-related gross margins a year,currentlysell for up to 20,000,000 renminbi,three to six times the price of a station with equivalent turnover in the United States or Europe.Thei

26、nflated costs at the high end of the market are also dragging up the price of smaller stations,to 5,000,000 to 10,000,000 renminbi.Thecost of promotional campaigns,including television advertising,is about as steep as it is in developed markets.MAKING SITES PAYSelling gasoline and diesel fuel throug

27、h retail outlets is a costly(and therefore risky)business.Unless PetroChina,Sinopec,and theforeign joint venture partners of both companies reconsider their indiscriminate buying of sites,they could find that their stationportfolios hold more balance sheet liabilities than assets.It is vital to make

28、 the sites pay,but how?There is little scope to cut operating costs,which are already low by global standards;labor,for example,is relatively cheap if inefficient.Capital costs are largely fixed once a station has been bought.Wholesale margins,onwhich the Chinese majors have usually relied to subsid

29、ize their retail outlets,will probably dwindle to the cost of transport and storageas WTO commitments and other reforms take effect.The truth is that the economics of most sites won 抰 work unless there aresignificant nonfuel sales,for they improve site margins by lifting revenues without raising cos

30、ts in a comparable way(Exhibit 2).Petroleum companies thus have three possibilities:they can focus on the retail opportunity of their sites,concentrate on a high-qualityfuel service through the highest-volume sites,or ignore retail altogether and be wholesalers of commodity fuels.编号：时间：2021 年 x 月 x

31、日书山有路勤为径，学海无涯苦作舟书山有路勤为径，学海无涯苦作舟页码：第4页 共7页第 4 页 共 7 页THE RETAIL STRATEGYElsewhere in the world,multinational oil companies have compensated for tight margins on gasoline by investing in additional revenuestreams.This kind of strategic behavior takes place in the context of a global retail sector movi

32、ng from ownership of product categoriesto ownership of retail occasions梩 he way-to-work or weekend stop for gasoline and incidentals,routine Saturday shopping,the lessfrequent household stock-up.Gasoline stations are designed to attract customers who want more than just fuel for their cars,and inEur

33、ope and the United States these formats now generate as much revenue from extras as from gasoline.In developed economies,this model has been adopted slowly because it takes time to convert or dismantle the legacy assets of along-established gasoline-only strategy.Chinese players have an opportunity

34、to go straight from the basic gasoline model to integratedretailing.Yet so far,PetroChina,Sinopec,and even the multinationals have been reluctant to pursue nonfuel retail strategies on theircurrent sites,for they have been persuaded that,in China,the ubiquity of local mom-and-pop stores means that c

35、onvenience stores atgasoline stations are redundant and that margins on nonfuel items are too thin.The marketing efforts of these companies have thusbeen confined to gasoline,and their sites offer no more than a limited selection of low-cost additional goods and services such ascigarettes,snacks,and

36、 auto lubricants.Nonetheless,the integrated retail model for gasoline stations can succeed in China.As working hours and prosperity increase,theChinese are more and more willing to pay for convenience and brands.Car drivers,who are generally among the most affluent peoplein the country,are beginning

37、 to demand offerings not available at mom-and-pop stores,such as foreign brands and technology-basedservices.And the economics should work,since even small nonfuel items often have profit margins of more than 50 percent.Owning anetwork of sites further improves margins for individual locations by de

38、livering scale benefits for overhead costs such as marketing andadministration as well as purchasing scale for both fuel and nonfuel items.编号：时间：2021 年 x 月 x 日书山有路勤为径，学海无涯苦作舟书山有路勤为径，学海无涯苦作舟页码：第5页 共7页第 5 页 共 7 页The key is to start with an attractive retail site梡erhaps incorporated into an entertainme

39、nt or commercialdevelopment that could also draw pedestrians 梐 s opposed to a pure gasoline stop.Chinese consumersare already familiar with retailing concepts such as hypermarket chains,specialty stores,and greatlyimproved supermarkets and department stores,which have all emerged over the past 10 to

40、 15 years.Most of these formats have beensuccessful,though convenience stores have fallen prey to oversupply and margin pressures.2Given this rather mixed experience,profitability will depend on three factors.The first is early entry into the market.Only companies that have been quick to introduce i

41、nnovative formats and to gain national scalehave made their retail ventures pay.Carrefour led the pack with hypermarkets,thereby securing a leading market share and leavinglocal and foreign competitors with less attractive locations.Yet the need to build scale quickly shouldn 抰 persuade companies to

42、overpay;instead they should look for opportunities in midsize cities,which represent up to 40 percent of national demand for gasolineand where retail demand is now growing fastest.Here there is still a chance to enter the market early and to establish a strong brandpresence without overpaying for si

43、tes.Developing the right retail proposition is the second factor.China 抯 newly affluent consumers are driving change throughout thecountry 抯 retail sector by seeking convenience and branded quality.For a retail gambit to work,gasoline stations must appeal toprosperous consumers,such as people who dr

44、ive their own private cars(accounting for upward of 40 percent of new-car purchases in2000),as well as the young motorcycle riders,who still dominate station forecourts and are more likely to try out new and foreignbrands.To appeal to these categories of consumers,gasoline retailers will need to off

45、er not only high-quality goods 梥 uch as preparedand packaged foods,including a substantial number of foreign brands 梑 ut also services such as DVD rentals,photographicprocessing,a pick-up location for Internet orders,laundry,mail,and pharmacy counters.The precise mix and the design of the site willd

46、epend on the market segment the retailer aims to serve:affluent but more traditional car drivers or younger motorbike riders.Butretailers must also bear in mind the needs of taxi drivers,who still account for most gasoline consumption in China and look mainly forhigh-quality gasoline and good servic

47、e.The third ingredient is the development of retail skills beyond the usual level of basic expertise.Managing a network of retail sitesinvolves the continual development of a portfolio of options from which each site can draw 梐 n undertaking that requires skills inconcept design,partnering,and ventu

48、re capital.The state-owned Chinese oil companies will need to develop these skills bothorganically and through joint ventures.THE GASOLINE SPECIALIST STRATEGYGiven the high cost of owning a large network of retail sites,and the accompanying pitfalls,oil companies might decide instead tobecome gasoli

49、ne specialists.Pursuing this strategy would involve buying only those high-volume sites that have sufficient sales ofgasoline and auto-related services to make a profit.Elsewhere,the company 抯 branded gasoline products would be sold through anetwork of retail partners.The rationale of the gasoline s

50、pecialist route is that auto fuel is a technically differentiated product and that branded,quality productscan command a premium.China,with its shortages in domestic supply and its increasingly discerning consumers,is thus promisingground for the gasoline specialist.In the case of auto lubricants,fo