从批判参与到可信承诺：欧盟针对朝鲜扩散危 机的新战略.docx

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1、EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament ConsortiumNoN-ProliferatioN aNd disarmameNt PaPersPromoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanksNo. 67 February 2020FROM CRITICAL ENGAGEMENTTO CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS: A RENEWED EU STRATEGY FOR THE NORTH KOREAN PROLIFERAT

2、ION CRISISANTOINE BONDAZ1. INTRODUCTIONCrises linked to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) have persisted since the late 1940s as a legacy of the colonial period and the 1950-53 Korean War as well as the cold war. North Korea is currently involved in the most significant nu

3、clear and ballistic missile proliferation crisis of the 21st century. For decades, North Korea has remained uncompromising in its objective to develop nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction in the face of various international negotiation strategies based on sancti

4、ons and incentives, in bilateral or multilateral formats. Even if US President Donald J. Trump announced after the June 2018 Singapore Summit that there is no longer a nuclear threat from North Korea； the North Korea proliferation crisis remains unresolved. realDonaldTrump, 13 June 2018, .Crises lin

5、ked to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) have persisted since the late 1940s as a legacy of the colonial period and the 1950-53 Korean War as well as the cold war. North Korea is currently involved in the most significant nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation crisis

6、of the 21st century. For decades, North Korea has remained uncompromising in its objective to develop nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction in the face of various international negotiation strategies based on sanctions and incentives, in bilateral or multilateral

7、formats. Even if US President Donald J. Trump announced after the June 2018 Singapore Summit that there is no longer a nuclear threat from North Korea； the North Korea proliferation crisis remains unresolved. realDonaldTrump, 13 June 2018, . Not only are North Korean capabilities continuing to grow

8、in a highly concerning way, but the situation could get worse in the coming months amid the current deadlock in negotiations between the United States and North Korea, the upcoming 2020 US presidential election and the announcement of an end to the moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests

9、by North Korea. Carlin, R.,Distant thunder: The crisis coming in Korea7,38 North, 17 Oct. 2019; and KCNA Watch, Report on 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th CCWEK；! Jan., 2020.The European Union (EU) and the EU member states rightly affirm on a regular basis that their interests are at stake: the fight agai

10、nst nuclear weapon proliferation, and maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula and prosperity in Asia. As Federica Mogherini, the former Vice President and High Representative forSUMMARYThe North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile crisis is the most serious proliferation crisis the European U

11、nion (EU) and its member states currently face on the world stage. Despite the staging of diplomatic meetings, the threat caused by this crisis to European interests, in terms of proliferation, instability and to prosperity, persists. It is now essential that the EU and its member states move from a

12、 strategy of critical engagement to implementing a more proactive strategy of credible commitments in four areas: political engagement, non-proliferation, the implementation of restrictive measures and engagement with the North Korean people. Such a renewed strategy should be highly coordinated, bui

13、ld on the many initiatives already being taken and facilitated by the appointment of an EU Special Representative on North Korea.ABOUT THE AUTHORDr Antoine Bondaz (F rance) is the Director of the Korea Programme and a Research Fellow at Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique (FRS), and an Associate

14、 Professor at Sciences Po, Paris. His research focus is Chinas and the two Koreas foreign and security policies. He was previously a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and at Korea University. He can be reached via e-mail at or on Twitter at AntoineBondaz.Second, the

15、EU was the main and most consistent aid donor in order to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of the economic crisis of the late 1990s and of severe economic mismanagement by North Korea.68 Third, trade between North Korea and the EU, mostly in the form of North Korean exports to the EU, played a

16、n important role in preventing the total collapse of the North Korean economy in the 1990s.69 At the end of the 1990s, trade was worth $300 million and the EU was North Koreas third largest trading partner.70 Fourth, in September 1997 the EU joined the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) i

17、n order to implement the main provisions of the 1994 Framework Agreement by providing energy assistance to North Korea.71This active engagement was already being called into question by the time of the second nuclear crisis of the early 2000s, and especially following the first North Korean nuclear

18、test in 2006. The EU and its member states then adopted a strategy of critical engagement that combined pressure through sanctions in compliance with UN sanctions with additional EU autonomous restrictive measures while keeping open channels of communication. There were two key objectives: CVID in t

19、he fight against non-proliferation coupled with an improvement in the human rights situation in North Korea.The strategy then further evolved into one of active pressure, in close coordination with the US maximum pressure strategy. First, the EU and Japan co-sponsored a resolution in the UN Human Ri

20、ghts Council in March 2013 that led to the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry with a one-year mandate to investigate human rights abuses in North Korea.72Hungary (1948), Ireland (2003), Italy (2000), Latvia (1991), Lithuania (1991), Luxembourg (2001), Malta (1971), the Netherlands (2001), Pola

21、nd (1948), Portugal (1975), Romania (1948), Slovakia (1993), Slovenia (1992), Spain (2001), Sweden (1973) and the UK (2000).68 Park, M-K., Seliger, B. and Park, S-J. (eds), Europe-North Korea: Between Humanitarianism and Business? (Lit Verlag: Berlin, 2010); SongJ.,M首利曾PI号N色公科司匚利：1995亘-2005mAstudy o

22、f EU aid policy on North Korea, 1995-2005, Unpublished PhD thesis, Seoul National University, 2013, (in Korean).69 Berkofsky, A., EUs Policy Towards the DPRK: Engagement or Standstill? (European Institute for Asian Studies: Brussels, 2003).70 Kim, S., Current status and prospects of economic exchang

23、es between North Korea and the EU, Kotra, 10 Oct. 2002.71 Poland and Czechia joined in 1997 and 1999 respectively, see Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, About Us: Member Nations, n.d.72 Kratz, A., North Korea: a role for the EU on human rights, Commentary, European Council on Foreign

24、 Relations, 6 Jan. 2016.Second, the EU and individual EU member states actively supported the adoption of UN and EU autonomous restrictive measures targeting the sources of funding for North Koreas nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. As a package, these involved a ban on trade in goods, servic

25、es and technology, a ban on EU investment in North Korea, a ban on the sale of refined petroleum products and crude oil to North Korea, and freezing the assets of named people and entities.73 Third, political engagement was dramatically reduced. The EU-North Korea political dialogue was interrupted

26、after its 14th session in June 2015 and some EU member states, such as Spain in September 2017, expelled North Korean ambassadors.74Even though some EU member states, such as Sweden, had been actively trying to facilitate dialogue, this partial disengagement led to a further decrease in diplomatic i

27、nfluence over security affairs on the Korean Peninsula.75 The role of the EU and its member states is now much more limited than it was two decades ago, and diplomatic and economic levers have been considerably reduced. Unlike China or the USA, they are not key players that can provide sufficient se

28、curity guarantees to North Korea.76 The lever of establishing diplomatic relations can no longer be used, and the promise of strong involvement in the event of a multilateral agreement to make it more sustainable in the event of withdrawal by the USA is not considered credible, particularly in the l

29、ight of the EUs role vis-a- vis the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran following the US withdrawal from the agreement.It is also important to consider North Korean perceptions of the EUs potential role. First, unlike their portrayal in frequent analyses, the EU and most of the EU memb

30、er states are not perceived as neutral73 There are 80 individuals and 75 entities currently on the UN list; and 57 individuals and 9 entities are independently designated by the EU.74 Some other states, such as Mexico, Peru and Kuwait, had already done so. Heekyong Yang and Pearson, J.z Tactbox: Cou

31、ntries which have expelled North Korean ambassadors after nuclear test, Reuters, 19 Sep. 2017.75 Ballbach (note 62).76 It is useful to remember that the European Sending States that fought in the Korean War under UN supreme command are formally obliged to guarantee the Korean Armistice Agreement und

32、er UN Security Council Resolution 83 of 27 June 1950. Belgium, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK provided combat troops while Denmark, Italy, Norway and Sweden supplied humanitarian aid. France and the UK are still represented in the UN High Command-Rear at Yokota Air Base, Japa

33、n.actors. Pardo, R. P., North Koreas denuclearization: Is there a role for Europe?, 38 North, 26 Mar. 2019. North Korean officials repeatedly claim that by adopting autonomous sanctions and being a follower5 of the so-called US hostile policy, the EU has shown itself to be biased and aligned with th

34、e USA, or lacking impartiality5. Meetings with senior North Korean officials since 2016. Second, North Korean officials openly criticized the E3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) for being confrontational, while sending more conciliatory signals to other EU member states in northern and Easte

35、rn Europe. Third, it is important not to overestimate the potential role of EU and North Korean economic interests in increased cooperation. Panda, A., What can the EU contribute to peace on the Korean Peninsula? Tereza Novotna discusses the European Unions policies toward North Korea, The Diplomat,

36、 22 July 2019. The argument anticipating a sudden increase in European investment in North Korea in the event of a lifting of sanctions is fallacious. Pardo, R. P.,Europe has a lot to offer on the Korean Peninsula。 Global Asia, 26 June 2019. Before the adoption of international sanctions, European i

37、nvestment was extremely limited, partly because of the unstable business environment and the high corporate reputational costs of investing in the country. On EU-North Korea trade see Esteban, M./The EUs role in stabilising the Korean Peninsula, Elcano Working Paper 01/2019 (Jan. 2019). If South Kor

38、ea was one of North Koreas main trade partners in the late 2000s and until 2016, North Koreas trade is now almost fully dependent on China, for political, geographic and historical reasons. Bondaz, A./Kaesong: caught between two Koreas, Books andV. A RENEWED STRATEGY OF CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS BASED ON

39、 MULTI-LEVEL COORDINATIONThe North Korean crisis, most notably its nuclear and ballistic missile aspects, continues unabated, directly affecting the interests of Europe and its population. The strategy of critical engagement has demonstrated its limitations. It is now necessary to renew this strateg

40、y at a pivotal moment, as a new European Commission takes office, providing a new impetus to EU policy at a time when ambitions for a more proactive foreign policy are clear, and the risk of tensions in the peninsula in 2020 is increasing considerably. It is essential that the EU gives the challenge

41、s on theKorean peninsula the high priority they deserve. While coordination with regional partners is essential, coordination at the EU level must be a priority for implementing an independent, but not unilateral, European policy on the Korean Peninsula. The main problem the EU and the EU member sta

42、tes face today is not a lack of resources or a lack of initiatives, but a lack of coordination.Development of the EU Global Strategy relied on a process of strategic reflection based on considerable convergence among all players, followed by common action symbolized by the publication of the Global

43、Strategy in 2016.Ideas, 19 June 2017. According to Federica Mogherini, a strong Union is one that thinks strategically, shares a vision and acts together84 The new EU strategy for the Korean Peninsula should thus rely on deeper coordination between all actors, such as the European Council, the Europ

44、ean Commission and the European Parliament, as well as the EU member states and research institutes. The initial result would be the publication of a clear and comprehensive renewed strategy on the Korean Peninsula, using the model of the Country Strategy Paper, 2001-2004, and based on four credible

45、 commitments to political engagement, non-proliferation, restrictive measures implementation and the North Korean people.Last but not least, an EU Special Representative on North Korea should be appointed. The Special Representative would have a key role to play in increasing coordination within the

46、 EU among the different directorates, between EU member states, and with the EUs partners in the region. Its creation would send a strong diplomatic signal that the EU is credibly committed to protecting its interests in the Peninsula and to being more proactive, while raising awareness within the E

47、U of this ongoing proliferation crisis. In time, this would be an innovative way to address a specific proliferation crisis with a fully comprehensive and cross-sectoral strategy involving unprecedented coordination at all levels.83 Tocci, N./The making of the EU Global Strategy Contemporary Securit

48、y Policy, vol. 37, no. 3 (2016), pp. 461-72.84 See the Foreword to the EU Global Strategy by Federica Mogherini in Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Unions Foreign And Security Policy, (EEAS: Brussels, June 2016).Credible commitment to political enga

49、gementEU officials regularly state that: our goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula can only be achieved through diplomatic and political means. There is no military way out of this crisis. 85 An attempted pre-emptive strike against the North Korean chain of command could not eliminate with absolute certainty the risk of North Korean use of nuclear weapons.86 A military conflict in the Korean Peninsula would endanger hundreds of thousands of cit