解析美国国防部2022财年预算.docx

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1、Table of ContentsEXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4INTRODUCTION 6OVERVIEW OF THE FY 2022 TOPLINE AND TRENDS 7AREAS OF INVESTMENT: CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR COMPETITION WITH CHINA8Pacific Deterrence Initiative8Long-Range Fires 8Naval Shipbuilding 11Research & Development and Readiness12Nuclear Modernization 14TRANSN

2、ATIONAL THREATS 15BALANCING THE BOOKS: DIVESTMENTS AND LOOKING BEYOND 2021 1620Figure 2: FY 2021 and Battle Force 2045 Shipbuilding Plan Comparisons35FY22FY23FY24FY25Fiscal Yoar SUBMARINES SEALIFT AUXILIARY WARSHIPS1510oThe December 2020 shipbuilding plan not only increased the total number of ships

3、 built, but it also significantly increased the planned buy of surface warships.To build Battle Force 2045, shipbuilding would need to accelerate with the procurement of 15 ships in FY23, 16 in FY24, 19 in FY25, and 20 in FY26. This growth would require a significant boost in the annual shipbuilding

4、 budget to nearly $34 billion by FY25a nearly $14 billion increase from the FY21 request.36 The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the December plan would require on average $28.8 billion per year for new ship construction, which is more than double the historical average and nearly 25 perce

5、nt higher than the Navys estimate.37 Trump planned to fund this naval buildup by cutting legacy systems, Army end strength, and withdrawing from Iraq and Afghanistan, although it remains unclear whether these savings would offset the costs of the ambitious shipbuilding plan.38The Biden administratio

6、ns budgetary request language indicates that the department is focused on developing an affordable shipbuilding plan and is heavily weighted toward undersea and unmanned vessels, which likely means fewer surface combatants. This does imply that the general contours of Battle Force 2045,s force desig

7、n have been embraced by the new administration, if not the specific fleet size. Battle Force 2045 aimed to improve the lethality, survivability, and sustainability of the fleet by reducing the number of large warships in favor of more small ships, unmanned surface vessels, and unmanned underwater ve

8、hicles, although as evidenced in Figure 2, it did not adhere to this particular fleet architecture in practice.Nevertheless, many questions remain. Will the Biden administration continue the past practice of identifying a desired fleet size (e.g., 355-ship goal), which foolishly focuses on capacity

9、instead of capability?39 Will the Pentagon accept more near-term risk by reducing the size of the surface fleet so that it can invest more in future unmanned and autonomous systems? There have been rumors that the Pentagon is revisiting a 2019 proposal to retire the aircraft carrier USS Harry S.Trum

10、an (CVN-75) early rather than undertake a costly mid-life refit and refueling.40 Finally, it is worth keeping in mind that the administration does not always get what it requests. Between 2012 and 2021, Congress appropriated $1.9 billion per year more on average for shipbuilding than the president r

11、equested.41RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT AND READINESSTwo areas identified as Biden administration prioritiesresearch and development and readiness-are often in tension with each other, as the former focuses on long-term investments for the future force and the latter on availability of units for current d

12、eployments and operations.As a part of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), the Trump administration emphasized both restoring readiness for warfighting and maintaining the departments technological advantage.Over the last four years, the Department of Defense has consistently resourced researc

13、h, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) in an effort to ensure the U.S. technological advantage over China. Oddly, however, over the same period, science and technology funding, a subset of RDT&E that funds longer-term revolutionary research, has declined.42Since the Biden administration has em

14、phasized funding research in “breakthrough technologies” versus incremental improvements to existing technologies, one would expect more science and technology investments in FY22.43Figure 3: Total Department of Defense Research, Development, Test & Evaluation Request with Science & Technology Broke

15、n Out (Adjusted for Inflation)44At the same time, the Biden budget request also aims to fund the “best trained and equipped force in the world,n one that is “always ready to fulfill its obligation to protect the security of the American people.,，45 Joint doctrine defines readiness as “the ability of

16、 military forces to fight and meet the demands of assigned missions.,，46 Readiness is a difficult concept to measure and it is even more challenging to identify what parts of the budget have the greatest effect on readiness.47 As Todd Harrison has argued, nearly every part of the defense budget is r

17、elated to readiness in one form or another.,，48 This ambiguity about which defense accounts fund readiness is reflected in the services1 budget requests as their submissions related to key readiness investments report their end strengths in addition to investments in different domains.49Key Service

18、Investments in Readiness ($ billions)U.S.ArmyU.S.NavyU.S. Marine CorpsU.S. Air ForceFYI 922.2279.832.6FY2O23.731.511.835.9FY2123.829.79.630.9Total69.788.231.299.4U.S.ArmyU.S.NavyU.S. Marine CorpsU.S. Air ForceFYI 922.2279.832.6FY2O23.731.511.835.9FY2123.829.79.630.9Total69.788.231.299.4U.S. Space Fo

19、rce2.32.3Key readiness investments vary by service: The Army includes ground readiness, aviation readiness, depot maintenance, and infrastructure; the Navy includes ship readiness, aviation readiness, and infrastructure; the Marine Corps includes ground readiness, aviation readiness, and infrastruct

20、ure; the Air Force includes maintenance, flying hours and operations, and infrastructure; and the Space Force was only reported in FY21 and included space operations and space system sustainment.50Between FY19 and FY21, the Air Force and the Navy reported the largest key investments in readiness spe

21、nding, $99.4 billion and $88.2 billion respectively, while the Army came in a distant third having invested only $69.7 billion over the same period of time. The much smaller Marine Corps invested $31.2 billion in readiness, while the Space Force, which was established in December 2019, reported spen

22、ding $2.3 billion on readiness. Despite these allocations, a recent Government Accountability Office report concluded that efforts to improve readiness have only been partially effective. Between fiscal years 2017 and 2019, readiness improved for ground forces, but declined for maritime forces and f

23、luctuated for air, space, and cyber forces.51 Of the three large services, the Army, which invested the least in readiness, reaped the largest gains, while larger investments by the Navy and Air Force did not yield commensurate benefits. This suggests that readiness challenges are due to the mismatc

24、h between the available supply of forces and the insatiable demand of combatant commanders.52U.S. forces have been some of the busiest in the world since the end of the Cold War.53 The Biden administrations decision to withdraw all U.S. forces from Afghanistan by September 2021 should reduce the tem

25、po of current operations and save at least $14 billion, which was the sum requested through OCO in FY21 for the war in Afghanistan.54 Nevertheless, Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Charles Q. Brown and the Commandant of the Marine Corps General David H. Berger have argued that the department

26、needs to redefine readiness, which currently is equated with availability for current deployments. In their view, readiness should mean a joint force capable of conducting all-domain combat operations against a peer adversary.55 If budgets remain flat, the Biden administration may need to adopt the

27、readiness framework proposed by Generals Brown and Berger to simultaneously fund all of its conventional and nuclear modernization priorities while also enhancing readiness. In large part, however, readiness depends on the policies chosen by civilian leaders and whether they are judicious in when th

28、ey deploy and employ the military.NUCLEAR MODERNIZATIONThe interim national security guidance makes it clear that the Biden administration seeks to reduce the role of nuclear weapons while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent.56 It also highlights the importance of maintaini

29、ng strategic stability amid competition with China, which is expanding the size of its nuclear arsenal and fielding new nuclear delivery systems.57 U.S. nuclear forces and their supporting infrastructure are old and a comprehensive upgrade is overdue. The main decision w川 be whether to maintain the

30、triad of nuclear delivery systems given that the entire nuclear enterprise, including delivery systems, the command-and- control system, weapons, and warheads, needs to be replaced or undergo a life extension. While senior DoD leaders expressed support for the triad in their confirmation hearings, c

31、onstrained resources, a deemphasis of nuclear weapons, and the need for extensive conventional modernization suggest that the Biden administration will have difficult decisions to make about nuclear modernization efforts.58Since 1961, the United States has maintained three systems that can launch nu

32、clear weapons, known as the triadstrategic bombers, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. All three legs of the triad are scheduled to be modernized in the upcoming years. This dramatic spike in spending will absorb a growing percentage of

33、 the Pentagons investment budget.59 In 2019, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that modernizing strategic nuclear delivery systems and weapons would cost approximately $234 billion, which would require a 60 percent increase in spending between 2019 and 2028.60 In FY21, the recapitalization o

34、f nuclear forces cost $10 billion, and these costs are projected to increase to $13.3 billion by FY25.61The lions share of these expenditures is earmarked to fund the next generations of the sea- and ground-based legs of the triad. The department plans to spend $24 billion over FY21-FY25 on the Colu

35、mbia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), which will relieve the retiring Ohio-class SSBNs, and $13 billion on the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)一the replacement for the aging Minuteman III ICBM. The overall bill for nuclear modernization and the cost of GBSD, in particular, have fuele

36、d debates over whether the Minuteman III ICBMs life can be extended, the number of missiles can be decreased, or the ICBM leg can be eliminated altogether.62Congressional Democrats have called for cuts to the planned nuclear modernization due to its cost and, in some instances, concerns that program

37、s are unneeded or undermine strategic stability. In particular, Democrats in Congress have proposed cutting the GBSD and the submarine-launched, low-yield nuclear cruise missile developed by the Trump administration.63 Yet, the presidenfs budget request “supports ongoing nuclear modernization progra

38、ms while ensuring that these efforts are sustainable/1 which suggests that all legs of the triad are likely safe for now.64 The administration may be planning to maintain the triad, as both Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks have indicated they favor, or may be buying time to conduct a more

39、 thorough analysis of alternatives to GBSD before the FY23 budget.Transnational ThreatsMost of the areas identified in President Bidens defense budget request were also Trump administration priorities and are linked to competition with China. The FY22 defense budget elevates one major mission that i

40、s a departure from the Trump administrations policies countering transnational threats and, in particular, the dangers posed by climate change andbiothreats. President Biden appears to be following through on his campaign pledge to make the U.S. military more resilient against natural disasters caus

41、ed by climate change and to make the department more energy efficient.65 This could involve boosting the military construction budget to enhance the resiliency of U.S. military installations and operations, as well as incentivizing the procurement of greener products.66 Some believe that focusing on

42、 the climate could entail less new spending than incorporating climate considerations into existing procurement and budgetary decisions.67Not surprisingly given the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the FY22 budgetary request also identifies countering emerging biological threats as an area of emphasis. Th

43、e Chemical and Biological Defense Program is primarily responsible for protecting against biological threats, and in the FY21 budget request, it asked for $1.29 billion to fund basic research on biological threats; improvements to warning, surveillance, and detection; modeling and simulations to aid

44、 decision makers; medical countermeasures; and protective equipment for military personnel.68 In light of the devastation caused by COVID-19, there have been some calls to invest dramatically more resources in biological defenses, as much as $6 to $7 billion annually.69 It remains to be seen how man

45、y resources are tunneled into countering these two transnational threats and whether these investments take from other areas.Balancing the Books: Divestments and Looking Beyond 2021Because the defense budget is not going to grow in real terms, the department needs to realign resources to support all

46、 of the priorities identified hereand to support its broader effort of competing with China. Toward that end, the FY22 request announces its plan to divest of legacy systems and programs because many of these forces are costly to maintain and not capable enough for great-power competition. But quest

47、ions remain over what constitutes a legacy platform. More importantly, members of Congress have previously thwarted DoD and the services attempts to retire aging weapons systems or ones that are not effective against great-power competitors to protect jobs in their districts. The Air Force, in parti

48、cular, has been unable to retire A-10 attack aircraft, older KC-135 and KC-10 tankers, MQ-9 Reapers, and RQ-4 Global Hawks. Marines struggled to follow through on the Commandanfs force design as Congress cut funding for long- range fires and reinstituted heavy transport helicopters. It remains to be

49、 seen whether the Army will be successful if it decides to retire Bradley vehicles.It is abundantly clear that the Biden administration will need to make difficult tradeoffs in the defense space that may upset the services and Congress to fund all of its priorities. Moreover, it has the opportunity to make hard choices, especially in its first few years in office, an