【英文文学】German Influence on British Cavalry.docx

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1、【英文文学】German Influence on British CavalryPREFACEThis essay is meant to be read in connection with the facts and arguments adduced in my book of last year, War and the Arme Blanche, with its Introduction by Field-Marshal Lord Roberts. From the nature of the case I have not been able to avoid a small

2、measure of repetition, but I have done my best to confine myself to new ground.A word about my object in writing again. Contemporaneously with the publication of War and the Arme Blanche, General von Bernhardi published in Germany his Reiterdienst, and an English edition, translated by Major G.T.M.

3、Bridges, D.S.O., under the title Cavalry in War and Peace, appeared simultaneously in this country. Like its predecessor, Unsere Kavallerie im n?chsten Kriege (translated under the title Cavalry in Future Wars), this new book by General von Bernhardi was headed with a highly laudatory Preface from t

4、he pen of General Sir John French, who commended it to military students in this country as a brilliant and authoritative treatise on the employment of Cavalry in modern war. It was included in the valuable Pall Mall Series of military books, published by Hugh Rees and Co.; and, in short, unless the

5、 critical faculties and native common-sense of Englishmen can be aroused, it is likely to become a standard work. There exists, be it remembered, no similar work, modern and authoritative, by a British author.My object in this essay is to arouse those critical faculties and that common-sense. Withou

6、t any disrespect to General von Bernhardi, who writes, not for Englishmen, but, as a German reformer, for what he regards as an exceptionally backward Cavalry, I wish to show, not only that we have nothing to learn even from him in the matter of Cavalry combat, but that, if we only have the pluck an

7、d independence to break off the demoralizing habit of imitating foreign models, and to build on our own war experience and our own racial aptitudes, we have the power of creating a Cavalry incomparably superior in quality to any Continental Cavalry.The indispensable condition precedent to that reviv

8、al is to sweep away root and branch the tactical system founded on the lance and sword, and to create a new system founded on the rifle.I shall endeavour to show, using von Bernhardis Reiterdienst, with Sir John Frenchs Introduction, and our own official Manuals, as my text, that in the matter of mo

9、dern Cavalry warfare no principles worthy of the name exist among professional men. The whole subject is in a state of chaos, to which, I believe, there is no parallel in all the arts of war and peace. And the cause of that chaos is the retention in theory of a form of combat which is in flagrant co

10、ntradiction with the conditions exacted by modern firearms, and is utterly discredited by the facts of modern war.The excellence of the translation furnished by Major Bridges has made it unnecessary for me to introduce into this essay the various terms and phrases used in the original German text. A

11、fter a study of that text, I am satisfied, if Major Bridges will permit me to say so, that, obscure as the authors exposition often is, no part of the obscurity is due to the translator. I have not found a technical term of which he has not given the correct English equivalent, or a passage where he

12、 has not accurately interpreted the original sense.Let me add that I have been encouraged further to write this essay by the keen and instructive controversy which followed the publication of my book of last year. Incidentally I have taken the opportunity in this volume to reply to some of the criti

13、cisms against its predecessor, and to clear up some points which I think were not fully understood.E.C. March, 1911.CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORYI. The German Model.Impartial observers of the recent controversy upon the merits of the lance and sword as weapons for Cavalry must have been struck by one singu

14、lar circumstancenamely, that there exists in our language no standard modern work upon the tactics and training of Cavalry in modern war, written by a Cavalryman, accepted by Cavalrymen, and embodying and illustrating the lessons of the two great modern wars waged since the invention of the long-ran

15、ge, smokeless magazine rifle. Without such a work, controversy is seriously hampered. The need for it is beyond dispute.Whatever the extent of the revolution brought about by the magazine rifle, a revolution, byPg 2 universal admission, there is. Since 1901 a serious firearm has been substituted for

16、 the old carbine formerly carried by the Cavalry, and the Cavalry Manual has been rewritten, with increased stress on the importance of fire. It is also the fact that, from whatever causes, the lance and sword have proved, both in South Africa and Manchuria, almost innocuous weapons. These facts dem

17、and, to say the least, serious recognition from those who still hold that the lance and sword are the most important weapons of Cavalry. Angry letters to the daily press, desultory and superficial articles in the weekly and monthly press, are not enough. What is wanted is some comprehensive and auth

18、oritative exposition of what Cavalry functions are in modern war, how they have been modified by the firearm, and why, with chapter and verse, not by way of vague allegation, the only great wars in which that firearm has been tested are to be regarded as abnormal and uninstructive.For illumination a

19、nd confirmation on these matters, we are constantly referred, in defence of the lance and sword, by our own Cavalry authorities to foreign countries whose armies have had no experience at all of modern civilized war as revolutionized by the modern magazine rifle. We are referred, above all, to Germa

20、ny,Pg 3 and, in particular, to the works of a German officer, General von Bernhardi, who (1) writes exclusively for the German Cavalry, without the most distant reference to our own; (2) whose own war experience dates from 1870, when he fought as a Lieutenant, and who has not seen the modern rifle u

21、sed in civilized war; (3) who believes that no wars, ancient or modern, except the American Civil War of 1861-1865, afford an analogy to modern conditions, and that the modern Cavalryman must base his practice on speculative and theoretical reflection; (4) who states that the German Cavalry, owing t

22、o indifference to the revolution wrought by the modern firearm, and excessive adherence to old-fashioned knightly combats, is at this moment wholly unprepared for war and is trained on Regulations which, though quite recently revised, he makes the subject of stinging and sustained ridicule; (5) who

23、is so ignorant of the technique of fire-action by mounted troops that he renders it, unconsciously, more ridiculous even than shock-action; and (6) who firmly believes in the lance and sword, and in the shock-charge as practised in the times of Frederick the Great and Napoleon.In this strange list o

24、f qualifications the reader will see the makings of a pretty paradox. And a pretty paradox it is, a bewildering, incomprePg 4hensible paradox; not so much, indeed, that a German author, born and bred in a German atmosphere, should be so saturated with obsolete German traditions that even in the act

25、of denouncing them he can subscribe to them, but that British Cavalrymen, headed by Sir John French, our foremost Cavalry authority, men who have had three years experience of war with the modern magazine rifle, who have seen the arme blanche fail and the rifle dominate tactics, and who, eight years

26、 before the German Cavalry even stirred in its sleep, acquiesced in changes in Cavalry armament and training directly based on that experiencethat these men should acclaim the works of the aforesaid German author as the last word of wisdom on the tactics and training of modern Cavalry, and represent

27、 them as such to young British Cavalrymen, is a circumstance which almost passes belief.Still, it is a fortunate circumstance. We have a body of doctrine to grapple with and controvert. If we succeed in dissipating the myth of German superior intelligence on Cavalry matters, we go a long way towards

28、 dissipating the whole of the arme blanche myth, which in the opinion of our greatest living soldier, Lord Robertsan opinion founded on lifelong experience of waris as mischievous a superstition as ever fettered a mountedPg 5 military force. The whole of the material is hereand it is unexceptionable

29、 material for controversyfor Sir John French himself contributes his own views on the subject in the form of laudatory Introductions to both of General von Bernhardis works.I propose in the following pages (1) to criticize General Sir John Frenchs views, so expressed; (2) to analyze and criticize Ge

30、neral von Bernhardis recently published work, Cavalry in War and Peace, and to contrast his teaching with that of our own Service Manuals; (3) to try to show that each General refutes himself, that both refute one another, and that Sir John French is, by a strange irony, far more reactionary than th

31、e German officer to whom he directs us for progressive wisdom; (4) to expose the backwardness and confusion in every department of Cavalry thought, here and in Germany, as a direct consequence of the attempt to found a tactical system upon obsolete weapons; and (5) incidentally to put forward what I

32、 venture to suggest is true doctrine.This doctrine, briefly, is that the modern Cavalry soldier is, for practical purposes, represented by three factorsman, horse, and rifleand that it is only by regarding him strictly and constantly as a mounted, that is to say, anPg 6 especially mobile, rifleman,

33、as distinguished from the less mobile foot-rifleman, that we can establish his war functions on a simple, sound, and logical basis. I ask the reader to hold that clue firmly as a guide through the perplexities and obscurities of the topic and the obsolete terminology and phraseology which not only d

34、isturb reasoning but distort and enfeeble practice.At the outset let the reader grasp the following historical facts as to the efficacy of swords and lances in civilized war:1. Franco-German War of 1870-71: Six Germans killed and 218 wounded by the sabre and clubbed musket counted together. No separ

35、ate figures for the lance. Total German casualties from all weapons, 65,160.12. South African War, 1899-1902: No statistics as to death. About fifty Boer casualties through lance and sword together, and about fifty more prisoners taken. Total Boer and British deaths, and wounds from all weapons, abo

36、ut 40,000.3. Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05: No exact figures, but apparently not more than fifty casualties from lance and sword together. Total casualties in action, over 400,000.Pg 7II. Cavalry in Future Wars.Two works by General von Bernhardi have been translated into English, and widely circulated

37、 among our military men. I propose to say but little about the first, Cavalry in Future Wars, because I have already endeavoured to criticize it in detail in my own book, War and the Arme Blanche. It is the second work, Cavalry in War and Peace, published only in 1910, that I wish to make the basis

38、of discussion in this volume; but in order to explain the history of German influence on British Cavalry, it is necessary to recall briefly certain features of its predecessor.Cavalry in Future Wars was first published in German in 1899, before the Boer War broke out. There was a second edition in 1

39、902, when the Boer War was drawing to a close, and this second edition, headed by General Frenchs Introduction, was translated and published in England in 1906. It was a strange work, strangely sponsored. The keynote was fire-action for Cavalry, the moral drawn by the English sponsor shock-action fo

40、r Cavalry. The chapters on fire-action, urging the adoption of a firearm even better than the Infantry rifle in substitution for a mere pop-gun, formed in themselves a complete refutationPg 8 of shock; while the chapters on shock, so illogical and self-contradictory was the method of exposition, for

41、med an equally complete refutation of fire-action.It is true that the spirit of fire predominated, that fire was the Generals message to his lethargic brother-officers, but the message was so strangely expounded that it is no wonder that for ten years they turned a deaf ear to it. Instead of telling

42、 them at the outset that if they themselves adopted a good firearm, and learnt to use it properly, they would immensely enhance the value of Cavalry for all the purposes of war, he opened his argument with a melancholy dirge over the departed glories of the Cavalry owing to the adoption by other cla

43、sses of troops of the deadly modern firearm. They must recognize, he told them, that they had been driven out of their place of honour on the battlefields of the plains; that they could henceforward only attack Infantry who were already so shattered and demoralized by the fire of other Infantry as t

44、o have reached the point of throwing away their arms, and much more in the same sense. Never was such a tactless prophet! And the pity of it was that he did not really mean all he said. What he meant was that the ancient glories of the arme blanche, when pitted against the firePg 9arm, were gone pas

45、t recalla circumstance scarcely worth an elegy, one would imagine, from a scientific soldier. War is business, not romance, and if the same or better results can be produced by an intelligent and dashing use of the firearm, it is waste of breath to lament the decay of the lance and sword. It was the

46、 main purpose of the Generals work to prove that these results could be so obtained, and whenever he warmed to his subject, and fell into temporary oblivion of the romantic weapons, he proved his point well enough, in theory.But, unfortunately, his oblivion of the lance and sword lasted only as long

47、 as he was criticizing the action of Cavalry against troops not armed with those weapons. When he came to the action of Cavalry against Cavalry, both by hypothesis armed, not only with the lance and sword, but also with the best modern rifle obtainable, the principle he had just establishednamely, t

48、hat the rifle imposes tactics on the steeldisappeared, and the opposite principlethat the steel imposes tactics upon the rifletook its place. I say principle, but in this latter case no reasoned principle based on the facts of war was expounded, because it seemed never to occur to the General that C

49、avalry in combat with Cavalry would have the bad taste to use their rifles.Pg 10Needless to say, it was impossible to sustain this daring paradox with any semblance of logic and consistency throughout a book dealing with all the phases of war. War is not a matter of definitions, but of bullets and shells. And, in fact, the General threw logic and consistency to the winds. In his fir