俄罗斯论战中的神话与误解.docx

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1、Myths and misconceptions in the debate on RussiaHow they affect Western policy, and what can be doneDuncan Allan, Annette Bohr, Mathieu Boulegue, Keir Giles, Nigel Gould-Davies, Philip Hanson, John Lough, Orysia Lutsevych, Kate Mallinson, Anais Marin, James Nixey, Ben Noble, Nikolai Petrov, Ekaterin

2、a Schulmann, James Sherr, Kataryna Wolczuk and Andrew Wood CHATHAM 亭 HOUSEMyths and misconceptions in the debate on RussiaHow they affect Western policy, and what can be doneMyth 09: The Wesfs relations with Russia must be normalized in order to counter the rise of ChinaRapprochement with Russia as

3、a strategic means of countering China would likely take place on the Kremlin s terms, and would mean sacrificing the hard-won sovereignty of other post-Soviet states. Moreover, to subscribe to this myth is to assume that the Kremlin even wants normalized relations with the West, and to forget that a

4、 better relationship with Russia, whatever its price, would do little to prevent Chinas reach and capabilities from continuing to grow. Most importantly, while Chinas transgressions of international law and violations of human rights are no more to be excused than those of Russia, an alliance with t

5、he Kremlin implicitly removes the possibility of China and the West having sustainable relations in the longer term. Western nations do not have the luxury of focusing solely on the challenges posed by China while somehow glossing over Russias aggressive behaviour.Myth 10: The Eurasian Economic Unio

6、n is a genuine and meaningful counterpart to the EU5Russia presents the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as a partner for the EU in a proposed free-trade area stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok. In reality, the EAEU is a political project lacking the features of a true common market. Russia disrega

7、rds the rules of the very organization through which it seeks to reassert its power, and with which it wants the EU to cooperate. Trade policy does not constitute a separate, non-politicized track in Russias foreign policy； it is subordinated to it. Due to this instrumental use and deep politicizati

8、on of economic diplomacy, the EAEU is functionally unable to act as an integration body in Eurasia, not least because Russia has no economic interest in comprehensive trade liberalization either inside the EAEU or via a free-trade area with the EU.Myth 11: The peoples of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia

9、are one nationThe Kremlin misrepresents the regions history in order to legitimize the idea that Ukraine and Belarus are part of Russias natural sphere of influence. In fact, both countries have stronger European roots than the Kremlin cares to admit.It is historically inaccurate to claim that Russi

10、a, Ukraine and Belarus ever formed a single national entity (indeed, the latter two countries also have political and cultural roots in intrinsically European structures such as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania). The Kremlins narrative, which served to justify Russias claim to the status of primus inter

11、 PARes among post-Soviet republics, acknowledges Russias right to interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbours to this day. The idea of a triune Russian nation downgrades the uniqueness of historic indigenous cultures. Moreover, in questioning the authenticity of Ukrainian identity and the vi

12、ability of Belarusianness5 as national building-blocks, it seeks to entrench in international public opinion stereotypes that would make it harder for the two countries to pursue greater integration with Europe.Myths and misconceptions in the debate on RussiaHow they affect Western policy, and what

13、can be doneThe trouble with believing that what comes after Putin must be better than Putin is that it implicitly influences the majority of forecasts about Russia, thereby sustaining inertia in the West as politicians await an improvement that may never materialize.Second, any chances for a post-Pu

14、tin Russia to build a viable democratic political system are lower now than they were in the 1990s. Although nearly two generations of Russians have grown up since the collapse of the Soviet Union, they have done so largely under Putin and tend to be more pro-Soviet than anti-Soviet in their worldvi

15、ew. For many years, the countrys elections have been far from free and fair, and any remaining chances for meaningful democracy are rapidly evaporating. Long gone, too, is any semblance of legitimate and independent local government. Apart from a limited number of civil institutions either accepted

16、or tolerated by the Kremlin, Russia s civil society is non-existent and therefore has no experience or track record. This begs the question of how realistic it is to expect the emergence of advanced democratic institutions after Putin leaves office, when there are currently no foundations to speak o

17、f. In the early 1990s, a hunger for democracy compensated for the absence of institutions and expertise, and there was a clarity among the general public about which democratic models were to be adopted and a willingness to see the process through. Today, that hunger has been replaced by disappointm

18、ent with the results of the attempted democratization, and with the political models themselves.Third, in order for this beautiful Russia of the future, to emerge, the country will need a new professional cadre of elite bureaucrats and policymakers, along with the resources for their rapid mobilizat

19、ion. The conditions needed to achieve this are not present in todays Russia, and it will therefore take a long time to develop and establish new elites from scratch. This is a far cry from the Russia of the perestroikA era under Mikhail Gorbachev, when new elites clamouring for change were emerging

20、from within the old system. A recent policy brief on 4post-Putin diplomats, published by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), serves as a good illustration of this point. Liik, K.(2019), 4The last of the offended- Russias first post-Putin diplomats, ECFR, 19 November 2019, s-/ (accessed

21、 17 Feb. 2021).What is its impact on policy?The trouble with believing that what comes after Putin must be better than Putin is that it implicitly influences the majority of forecasts about Russia, thereby sustaining inertia in the West as politicians await an improvement that may never materialize.

22、 Most mass media outlets in the West follow their politicians5 line, rehashing this popular and palatable misconception instead of challenging it and shaping public opinion to ensure that views on Russias prospects are better informed and more realistic.The mistaken belief that Putin is an anomaly i

23、s also preventing the West from facing the uncomfortable truth that its problems with Russia will not disappear overnight once a new leadership ultimately takes power. This has potentially negative implications for both proactive and defensive Western policies towards Russia. For example, pushing fo

24、r a quick win in terms of political change could be counterproductive, not only because it would require reforming the whole system (rather just replacing the person heading it) but also because any precipitous orMyths and misconceptions in the debate on RussiaHow they affect Western policy, and wha

25、t can be donepremature changes could lead to instability. A fast-track approach would also likely struggle to engage with Russian civil society via educational initiatives and practical support. With electoral systems, for example, reform of technical structures needs to go hand in hand with the lab

26、orious task of changing the political culture of voters.Finally, adherence to the myth that Russia after Putin will inevitably be an improvement (by Western criteria) on the current regime carries the obvious risk of disappointment and consequent policy over reaction. When illusions collide with rea

27、lity, this can create a toxic media and political atmosphere in which policymakers and the general public are more susceptible to extreme proposals and unfounded assertions about Russias strategic intentions - thus removing the foundations needed for the development of credible policy.What would goo

28、d policy look like?The Western powers need to develop long-term strategies that serve their wider national interests, rather than focusing on Putin or any other individual. These strategies should be built on extensive research into the contemporary Russian political system and civil society, examin

29、ing the challenges in each area and the prospects for addressing them. Specific tactical steps must be joined up and built into a long-term strategy, as the Wesfs current positions arguably lack clarity, consistency or flexibility. To begin with, it would be useful to analyse the mistakes that have

30、lately been made by all sides, and to conduct an audit of existing approaches to building relations, retaining only those that can achieve positive results, while also developing more effective ones.In formulating policy towards Russia and engaging with Russian interlocutors, Western diplomats shoul

31、d distinguish between the regime, the state and the country.A clear strategy, based on general principles but also necessarily country-specific, would support more active and productive engagement both with public opinion in Western countries and with actors in Russia. Implementation of each step in

32、 the strategy should be constantly monitored for cost versus benefit. Current affairs in Russia must also be constantly monitored and analysed for their implications for the countrys future political development.The strategy should be multifaceted and multi-vectored. The usual containment, engagemen

33、t and isolation policies, in whichever combination, are not enough. Western powers should not close the door to possible cooperation with Russia (either during Putins rule or post-Putin) on urgent issues, such as the Arctic, the Middle East, COVID-19 and climate change. In consultations and discussi

34、on of problems, attention both to results and process is important, to allow effective responses to rapid changes in circumstances.In formulating policy towards Russia and engaging with Russian interlocutors, Western diplomats should also distinguish between the regime, the state and the country. Wh

35、en engaging with the Putin regime, the logical approach should be to minimize contacts with actors at the heart of the regime and to avoid particular political or dialogue formats that might contribute to its legitimation. In contrast, bilateral contacts at the expert level, and with civil activists

36、 and ordinary citizens, should be intensified. Western and Russian expert and political groups must strive to establish tighter connections.Myths and misconceptions in the debate on RussiaHow they affect Western policy, and what can be doneFinally, it is important to break the pattern in which, in a

37、ny dialogue with the West, Russias position is represented by Kremlin appointees, as for example in the St Petersburg Dialogue. A Russo-German civil society forum set up in 2001 under the patronage of Vladimir Putin and Gerhard Schroder, Germanys chancellor at the time. See TleTepGyprcKww wajior/Pet

38、ersburger dialog5 Petersburg Dialogue, s7/petersburgerdialog.ru. Russia has national interests that legitimately need to be formulated, articulated and taken into account, but these are not the same as the specific interests of the Putin regime. The more that Western powers proceed from this princip

39、le as they develop their policies, the more chances there are that Russia after Putin will be a more normal country on the world stage than it has been under Putin.ConclusionKeir Giles and James NixeySelecting the myths and misconceptions about Russia to include in this collection was challenging. T

40、here is no shortage of views on Russia that are commonly accepted but nonetheless confused, misguided or misinformed, sometimes dangerously so； and most analysts nurture their own personal lists of betes noires from among them. However, this paper is not about wanting to be right about isolated data

41、 points. It is about correcting those myths that lead to bad policy.All of the authors of this volume could have written on a number of different topics, and the resulting selection is only a sample of the wide range of firmly established but fundamentally incorrect ideas about Russia with which the

42、y have to grapple in the course of their professional lives. Other candidates for inclusion that in the end did not make the cut were that Russia engages in aggression abroad to divert attention from pressures at home9 (untrue - Russia has its own foreign policy objectives, regardless of domestic po

43、litics) or that there can be no security in Europe without Russia, and that there are no major world problems which can be solved without Russia5 (again no - where Russia is involved in a situation, it is almost invariably a substantial part of the problem, not the solution).This is in no way to sug

44、gest that people should not be allowed to say these things - it is a vital feature of a democracy that a wide range of genuine and honest opinion should be allowed to flourish in open debate. Our point is a different one* that fallacious propositions, especially but not only those devised and insemi

45、nated by our adversaries, should not be so widely embedded in the foundations of Western decision-making. The one aspect that all of the selected myths have in common is that our authors have observed them leading directly to policy errors by Western actors in dealing with Russia.And it is the actio

46、n that results from these mistaken views that matters. Collecting and dissecting this cross-section of errors has not been an exercise in intellectual vanity； instead, it is intended for a very specific purpose. The authors have repeatedly found that engaging in serious policy discussions on Russia

47、requires first challenging unhelpful but firmly entrenched preconceptions. These present obstacles that must be cleared so that Russia can be considered on the basis of reality, rather than on the basis of mental constructs that are comfortable for Western observers but entirely misleading. In a str

48、ange parallel, this process of breaking through barriers to a meaningful discussion resembles a common experience of European and US officials in interactions with their Russian counterparts, where a precondition for serious conversation is so often dealing with the disinformation, misdirection, blu

49、ster and bluff that precede it.Myths and misconceptions in the debate on RussiaHow they affect Western policy, and what can be doneConsidering all of these observations in the round allows us to extracta number of common themes. These can be distilled into a set of 10 foundational principles essential for achieving better results in managing the Wests relationship with Moscow.10 principles for the West for dealing more rationally and effectively with RussiaAdopt strat