政变的代价：缅甸濒临国家崩溃.docx

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1、INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUPThe Cost of the Coup: Myanmar Edges Toward State CollapseCrisis Group Asia Briefing N0167Yangon/Brussels, 1 April 2021Whats new? The 1 February coup has plunged Myanmar into political, social and economic turmoil. Mass protests, public- and private-sector worker strikes, an

2、d the security forcesThe 1 February coup d5etat has triggered a mass uprising across Myanmar. The security forces have responded with brutal violence, first against demonstrators and now against the broader population, with the apparent aim of terrorising people into submission, particularly in citi

3、es. The worst so far came on 27 March, when the military killed at least 158 people. Far from quelling dissent, this approach has hardened many peoples resolve to resist, including through strikes that paralyse governance and the economy, nudging Myanmar closer to state collapse. Outside actors have

4、 few good options, but the stakes are too high not to try to pull the country back from the brink. Foreign governments should pressure the regime and deny it tools of repression. They should not recognise the junta and should engage the elected governments representatives. They should impose or stre

5、ngthen arms embargoes and targeted sanctions on the military and its business interests. Western and Asian powers should pursue a unified approach in urging the regime to change course so as to avert a deeper crisis that would reverberate across the region.Since the first anti-coup demonstrations er

6、upted in early February, the military regime has attempted to crush peaceful protests and strikes. The situation has escalated dramatically, with large numbers of battle-hardened troops deployed into brutal violence against the population, including the killing of at least 158 unarmed civilians on 2

7、7 March, are pushing the country toward collapse.Why does it matter? Neither the military regime nor the popular uprising is likely to prevail soon. Nor is either likely to back down. The crisis is set to deepen, with the prospects of greater bloodshed, economic damage, humanitarian emergency and re

8、fugee flight to neighbouring countries growing in coming months.What should be done? Getting the regime to change course will be an uphill struggle. Still, foreign actors should not recognise the junta; they should impose arms embargoes and targeted sanctions on the military and its interests. Asian

9、 and Western powers should continue working together. Donors should plan for significant humanitarian and development needs.I. Overviewa Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement that provides a framework for a political solution to the conflicts. Since 2014, however, the peace process has been moribund, mired

10、 in procedural wrangles and bogged down by an apparent lack of political will - on either the militarys part or the elected NLD governments - to make any significant concession that minorities demand，1The coup has upended the strategic calculations of ethnic armed groups. Some are seeking to steer c

11、lear of the crisis, or even trying to engage the regime to further their own goals. Many armed groups and ethnic political leaders were deeply disappointed by the NLD government, which in their view offered few concessions at the peace table and did little to address their grievances in parliament o

12、ver the last five years.42 Many ethnic leaders also feel that the Burman majority failed to support them when the military was carrying out abusive campaigns in ethnic areas over the years. At the same time, however, ethnic minorities have long experience of the armys brutality and are alarmed at th

13、e prospect of a return to authoritarian military rule; there have been large anti-coup protests in several ethnic areas, and the sense that greater minority-majority solidarity may now be possible seems to be growing.43Against this backdrop, different ethnic armed groups are approaching the unfoldin

14、g crisis in different ways: The United Wa State Army, a 20-30,000 strong, well-equipped armed group (My- anmars largest) with de facto autonomous control of its territories on the Chinese and Thai borders, has remained aloof from the post-coup crisis but maintained informal contacts with the Myanmar

15、 military.44 It would likely seek a confrontation with regime forces only if its direct interests were threatened. It might be open to an agreement with the regime that would solidify its autonomous status. The Arakan Army, which had been fighting a brutal two-year conflict with the Tatmadaw in Rakh

16、ine State until an informal ceasefire in November 2020, is the armed group most closely engaging the military.45 Its aim is an autonomous status for Rakhine State like the Was. It sees an opportunity to further this goal at a time when the military cannot afford to be fighting on multiple fronts.441

17、 Ibid.42 Ibid.43 On protests in ethnic areas, see, for example, uNun kneels in front of police to stop Myanmar violenceJ, Reuters, 9 March 2021； and “KNU vows protection for Karen protesting Myanmar coup”, Bangkok Post, 17 February 2021. On the possibility of minority-majority solidarity, see Naw Hs

18、a Moo and Dominique Dillabough-Lefebvre, uWhile Myanmafs Cities Become Military Occupations, Conflict Persists in the Ethnic Borderlands”, Transnational Institute, 12 March 2021.44 Crisis Group interview, individual with knowledge of the discussions, Thailand, March 2021.45 For background to the con

19、flict, see Crisis Group Asia Report N03O7, An Avoidable War: Politics and Armed Conflict in Myanmars Rakhine State, 9 June 2020； and Asia Briefing N0164, From Elections to Ceasefire in Myanmars Rakhine State, 23 December 2020.46 Ibid. There has been little unrest in Rakhine State since the coup, apa

20、rt from in the NLD stronghold in its far south. Rakhine political and civil society figures have accepted positions in the juntas national and state administrative councils, and the regime revoked the Arakan Armys terrorist designation on 11 March. This willingness to work with the regime has divide

21、d Rakhine public opinion and the communitys main political party has stated that its cooperation with the regime is contingent on added benefits for the Rakhine people.47 On 29 March, the Arakan Army and two allied groups threatened to resume fighting the military if it continued violence against pr

22、otesters.48The Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) has had a de facto ceasefire with the military in Kachin State since mid-2018, though sporadic clashes between its units in northern Shan State and regime soldiers have continued over this period. Following the coup, the group informed the milita

23、ry that it “would not tolerate” violence against protesters in Kachin State and that it would “stand with the people in any such confrontation.49 Since then, the military has shot protesters in the region, and the KIO has launched attacks on Myanmar military bases; it remains unclear whether these a

24、ttacks were a direct response to the violence against protesters, although some in the KIO have made the link.5。Like other armed groups, the KIO has to strike a difficult balance between a desire to maintain its ceasefire and an imperative to stand with the Kachin population. The ten armed groups th

25、at have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement were quick to condemn the coup (these do not include the United Wa State Army, the Arakan Army or the KIO). They also collectively expressed their support for the CRPH and the demonstrators, and they suspended their formal engagement with the peace p

26、rocess as of 20 February. There have only been informal contacts with the militarys peace negotiators since then .51The largest of these groups, the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) and the Karen National Union (KNU) have also met separately with CRPH leaders.52 More than a thousand people -

27、 protest organisers, NLD MPs and civil society figures - have also sought refuge in areas under KNU and RCSS control See “ANP describes cooperation with junta as contingent on benefits for Arakans people”, Development Media Group, 12 March 2021. Myanmars Arakan Army, allies set to resume fight again

28、st Tatmadaw over civilian killings”, The Irrawaddy, 30 March 2021. KIO vows to stand with the people if military govt resorts to violence”，Kachin News Group, 11 February 2021; statement, KIO Central Committee, 17 February 2021 (in Burmese); UKIO General Secretary La Nan: The main problem is the 2008

29、 constitution，Kachin News Group, 19 February 2021. See Military clashes with KIA after ambush in Kachin state，Myanmar Now, 12 March 2021; and uKachin Independence Army says latest fighting is to show coup military that the KIA will not tolerate people being harmed”, Myitki/ina News Journal, 21 March

30、 2021 (Burmese). Crisis Group interviews, individuals involved in the peace process, Yangon, February-March 2021. See also uNCA-signatory EAOs discuss how to prevent further bloodshed by regime”, Myanmar Now, 12 March 2021. See tweet by Dr. Sasa, CRPH envoy, DrSasa22222,9:01PM, 6 March 2021; and twe

31、et by Nimrod Andrew, KNU representative, NimrodAndrew, 2:24AM, 6 March 2021. Crisis Group interviews, individuals with direct knowledge of the situation, March 2021. See also “Nearly 100 people seek refuge from military regime in RCSS territory”, Shan Herald Agency for News, 15 March 2021; and Thail

32、and braces as refugees from Myanmar coup flee to border regions”, Reuters, 19 March 2021.In the long term, it is possible that the post-coup crisis could bring a new level of empathy to relations between the Burman majority and ethnic minorities, and a corresponding political realignment that could

33、improve the prospects of a lasting settlement to Myanmars decades-old conflicts - assuming civilian rule is restored.必The CRPH has made important moves in this direction. Apart from consultations with the RCSS and KNU mentioned above, on 9 March it appointed a prominent ethnic Karen politician, the

34、ousted NLD speaker of the Upper House Mahn Win Khaing Than, as acting vice president and de facto civilian leader while President Win Myint is detained by the regime.55 It has also announced the removal of all ethnic armed groups from the lists of terrorist organisations and unlawful associations th

35、at were in existence before the coup, and has spoken of future plans to replace the Burman- dominated military with a more diverse “federal army”.56In the short term, at least some ethnic armed groups could become entangled in the crisis, and violence in ethnic areas could increase as a result. The

36、KNU is providing armed protection of demonstrations in areas where it operates, with its fighters escorting columns of protesters. Their presence has engendered tensions - though, so far, no clashes - with the Myanmar military and police. Local conflict in Kachin State could also escalate if the KIO

37、 follows through on its threat to intervene if the regime kills demonstrators in the state. Finally, with the Tatmadaw focusing its attention and resources on operations to quell urban dissent, some armed groups may take advantage of the circumstances to seek to expand their territory or to press te

38、rritorial claims against rival groups - dynamics that have been visible in northern Shan State since the coup.57The coup could also give birth to a new type of conflict in Myanmar. The security forces deadly crackdown on demonstrations has led more determined protesters to use weapons such as Moloto

39、v cocktails, fireworks and swords.s8 At least several hundred of these have now travelled to the territory of five different ethnic armed groups to obtain military training. Some hope to form an armed group to conduct urban warfare against the regime; others are planning to return to the cities and

40、engage in more informal resistance and asymmetric attacks.59 Although guns are easily available in Myanmars conflict areas, the extent of peoples capability and resources to pursue such a plan are difficult to assess with confidence at this time. Still, high levels of anger and despair may drive som

41、e down this path, raising the prospect of violent escalation in the cities.54 For discussion, see Ashley South, uRe-imagining Myanmar - The mother of all critical junctures, The Irrawaddy, 24 February 2021; Naw Hsa Moo and Dillabough-Lefebvre, uWhile Myanmars Cities Become Military Occupations, Conf

42、lict Persists in the Ethnic Borderlands，op. cit.55 CRPH Notification 12/2021, 9 March 2021.56 CRPH Notification 14/2021,17 March 2021. See the interview with CRPH envoy Sasa in the Facebook post by VOA Burmese News, 17 March 2021.57 Crisis Group interview, analyst, Chiang Mai, Thailand, March 2021.

43、See also Statement on the Situations Following the Seizure of Power by the Tatmadaw”, Restoration Council of Shan State, 22 February 2021； and “Clashes persist between RCSS and combined forces ofTNLA, SSPP in Namtu”, Shan Herald Agency for News, 16 March 2021.58 Crisis Group interviews, demonstrator

44、s and journalists, Yangon and Mandalay, March 2021.59 Crisis Group interviews, individuals involved in these activities, March 2021.Conflict erupting on so many different fronts would send the country even further into a downward spiral, but there is no reason to believe the regime would feel it had

45、 to back down or that it was at risk of defeat. Such violence would undoubtedly stretch the Tatmadaws capacity, but its size and firepower are vastly superior to those of its potential opponents. Most well-informed analysts put the militarys strength at 300-350,000 personnel. See Andrew Selth, uStro

46、ng, Fully Efficient and Modern,: Myanmafs New Look Armed Forces，Griffith University Asia Institute, 2016. Ethnic armed groups are well versed in guerrilla warfare and defending their upland areas, but most do not have the capability to conduct offensive operations in the lowlands. Crisis Group inter

47、views, analysts, Yangon and Bangkok, March 2021. Given that these groups are not a united front, the regime can also cut deals with individual groups to relieve the pressure. Arms embargoes, while important, are unlikely to degrade the militarys ability to fight. It manufactures most of its own ligh

48、t weapons and ammunition, and it retains close relations with key arms suppliers. See Selth, 4Strong, Fully Efficient and Modern，op. cit. Crisis Group interviews, analysts and Chinese diplomats, January-February 2021. See Crisis Group Asia Report N023i, Myanmar: The Politics of Economic Reform, 27 J

49、uly 2012. Ibid. In particular, Russias embrace of the Myanmar military, with Deputy Defence Minister Alexander Fomin attending Armed Forces Day as a guest of honour, will have given the regime confidence that it still has the backing of important allies.C. A Post-coup Economy: Natural Resource RentSeeking and Illicit EconomyWhile the military is still struggling to consolidate its control over the country f