太空如何支撑欧盟的战略指南针.docx

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1、SECURING THE HEAVENSHow can space support the EU!s Strategic Compass?INTRODUCTIONIt may be customary to begiTh aTh aThalysis oTh space by referencing famous sci-fi productions such as Star Trek. Yet terms such as zfinal frontier7 or zto boldly go where no man has gone before are outdated. Today, spa

2、ce is used for couThtless civil aThd military applica- tioThs aThd it is aTh iThcreasiThgly coThtested aThd coThgested political and technological arena. While it is true that space is not yet home to photon torpedoes or deflector shields, reality is starting to catch up with the sci-fi world. Consi

3、der that the United States took the decision in December 2019 to create a zSpace Force7 and in September 2020 France created an zAir and Space Force7, which followed on from the creation of a Space Command in 2019. Germany too took the decision in September 2020 to create an Air and Space Operations

4、 Centre7. A month later, NATO created its first-ever Space Centre in Germany and in 2021 it was decided that France would host the new NATO Centre for Excellence in military space. Additionally, other EU countries such as Italy have established space-defence capacities and on 8 March 2021 France sta

5、rted its first-ever military space exercise, Aster X 2021.Summary Despite political aThd iThdustrial divergeThc- es between EU member states, space will play an indispensable role in the Strategic Compass. Space is a strategic enabler that can enrich the EUs approach to crisis management, resilience

6、, capabilities and partnerships, and the Compass is an opportunity to upgrade the status of space and defence within the context of the EUs broader space policy. In line with the EUs Threat Analysis presented in November 2020*, any response to geopolitical rivalry, military threats, crisis managemen

7、t, climate change, failed states, globalisatioTh aThd critical supply aThd communications requires robust space imaging, surveillance, tracking, communication, po- sitioThiThg aThd ThavigatioTh capacities. The Strategic Compass could lead to initiatives such as the development of a dedicated EU Spac

8、e and Defence Strategy, investing in existing EU space bodies, financing counter anti-satellite weapon technologies, deploying space attaches in EU delegations, capitalising on the EU Government Satellite Communications programme (GovSatCom) and the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) and more. E

9、uropean Union Institute for Security Studies, 2021.The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.The StrategicCompass offers the EU an opportunity to rethink its approach to space and defence.Behind this drive

10、 is something rather more serious than sci-fi, of course. The combination of cheaper commercial launchers and the rise of private companies with an interest in space, earth-based technological shifts such as the introduction of 5G and 6G and the rise of new space powers such as China, India, the Uni

11、ted Arab Emirates and more, give EU member states reason to reflect on the political and not just economic importance of space. In fact, it is safe to say that without space much of the EUs economic power and vitality would no longer be sustainable. Therefore, aThy disruptioTh to space-based iThfras

12、tructure would directly imperil the EUs economic and political health.This is indeed the primary risk that emerges from the z weaponisation of space7 by the EUs rivals: a trend that is increasingly supported by new technologies such as Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASATs). Nevertheless, although the EU is

13、 not a latecomer to space aThd defeThce most member states still view space as a largely civil domain where maritime safety, environmental monitoring, agricultural sustainability and transportation can be supported. The EUs emphasis on the economic dimension of space under the 2016 EU Space Strategy

14、 is hardly surprising given that in 2017 the European space economy was valued between 53-62 billion and it employed more than 230 000 high-skilled professionals.Space is, therefore, a core part of the EUs high-skilled economy, but it is increasingly important for the EUs security and defence too. P

15、ermanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) are already being mobilised to fi- ThaThce aThd develop space capabilities for EU security and defence. Existing tools such as Copernicus and Galileo are also being used for a range of security-related tasks such as search a

16、nd rescue, border management, and even Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations. However, for all of these steps forward there remains a need to better link space and defence to meet the threats of the next 5-10 years. The EUs forthcoming Strategic Compass on security and de

17、fence is an opportunity to find ways of enhancing the linkages between space and defence and of evolving the EUs space strategy generally. The aim of this Brief is to outline the major space threats before making concrete suggestions on how space, as a cross-sectoral and multi-domain enabler, can su

18、pport each of the Strategic Compass baskets related to crisis management, resilience, capabilities and partnerships.OUT OF ORBIT?The EUs civilian and military deployments already rely on space-based assets to ensure their operational vitality. Without the vital link between space and earth, the Unio

19、ns freedom of military and civilian action would be greatly curtailed. Today, tools and bodies like Copernicus and the EU Satellite Centre (SatCen) support tasks such as crisis response, border management, disaster monitoring, counter-terrorism, cross-border state disputes, humanitarian aid delivery

20、, etc. The importance of space-based assets for EU security and defence is undeniable and the EU Capability Development Plan (CDP) has long identified space as a key capability domaiTh(3). However, the Strategic Compass offers the EU an opportunity to rethink its approach to space and defence at a t

21、ime when a number of partners and rivals are seekiThg to utilise space for broader geopolitical ends. Thus far, the EU Global Strategy has called for the need to maintain zthe autonomy and security of EU space-based services and permanent earth observa- tioTh(4). What is more, the Council Conclusion

22、s of 14 November 2016 also stressed that autonomous access to space is vital for EU security and defence(5). Clearly, a repeated call for autonomy in space does not, in itself, give civilian and military planners much to go by when integrating space into mission and operations concepts, exercises aT

23、hd sceThario plaThThiThg or capability development and research plans.Even though the 2016 EU Space Strategy points to threats such as the proliferation of space debris, volatile space weather, cyber threats and critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, the document is largely geared to the economic

24、dimension of space and the competitiveness of Europes space industry. It says relatively little about security and defence. This is concerning as growing geopolitical threats over the next 5-10 years will seriously challenge the EUs autonomy in space and earth. In particular, space is a geopolitical

25、 realm and three existing and growing interconnected trends should concern the EU: weaponi- sation, congestion and disruption.WeaponisationTrends towards miniature and swarm satellites, reusable and micro launchers, advanced propulsion, quantum encryption, artificial intelligence and robotics are gr

26、eatly enhancing accessibility to and use of space. However, the pace of technological and industrial innovation raises questions about whether certain dual-use technologies launched into space could pose a military threat. In particular, the possession of ASATs by the United States, China, Russia an

27、d India contributes to the idea of a weaponisation of space.Although at various stages of development, ASATs can include high-power microwaves, jammers, directed energy, robotics, chemical sprays and hit-to-kill ve- hicles(7). According to the 2019 French Space Defence Strategy, aggressive actions u

28、sing ASATs are becoming more frequent. For example, a Russian satellite loitered near a French-Italian zAthena-Fidusz military satellite iTh 2O18.(9) Furthermore, there is evidence that direct-ascent ASATs are responsible for creating thousands of pieces of space debris (e.g. one ASAT test in 2007 h

29、it a weather satellite to create 3 200 pieces of debris(10). The use of ASATs should concern the EU not just because satellites are relied upon for military communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance as well as missile defence, but because the EU cannot entirely trust the broader

30、geopolitical motivations of those states developing ASATs.CongestionSpace congestion has long been a concern. Consider that from 1990-1995 there were 711 objects launched into outer space by Russia, China, the United States, EU, Japan and the United Kingdom combined (the EU counted for 6% of these t

31、otal launches). From 2016-2020, however, 2 521 objects were launched by the same group of countries and actors (the EU counted for 6.7% of these total launches)0 n. Of course, with this growing congestion comes an increased risk of space collisions. However, increased space debris and assets caTh al

32、so provide cover for space-to-space aThd ground-to-space hybrid attacks on satellites by lowering the chances of attribution025. Although it may appear relatively simple to track space debris aThd objects, it is not. In fact, astrodynamics studies(13) coTh- tinue to show the limits of multi-target t

33、racking because of a large amount of data and the challenge of simultaneously predicting the trajectories of thousands of space objects (including small pieces of debris that may still significantly damage satellites). Without modern and e仔ective space surveillance and tracking (SST) capabilities, i

34、t will be harder for the EU to defend against unintentional accidents and/or malicious activities. Today, the EU does not have collective ASAT early warning capabilities. This is especially the case given that the EU does not have its own space-based SST capabilities, and it must presently rely on e

35、arth-based sensors.DisruptionBeyond ASATs, there will remain risks from cyber intrusions of space infrastructure and orbital/terrestrial jamming and spoofing technologies that can be used to disrupt space-to-earth communications and signals. Given that there is always a time lag in space-terrestrial

36、 data download and transfers, there already exists a risk that encryption and authentication protocols can be hacked, damaged or interfered with or that telecommand and telemetry functions can be damaged. Ensuring secure flows of data and infor- matioTh is of great importaThce for civiliaTh aThd mil

37、itary uses. For example, even a half second error in positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) can result in vehicles and weapons systems being kilometres off target and maladjusted timing sequences could imperil tasks such as air-to-air refuelling or maintenance, recalibration and repair. Furthermor

38、e, space and earth-based space infrastructure could become the target of malicious activities. On the one hand, commercial satellites could be hijacked and transformed into zsuicide satellites,(14). On the other, the EUs Space Surveillance and Tracking earth-based sensor network includes 12 radars,

39、34 telescopes and four lasers based in places as far as Argentina, Australia, Japan and South Africa05). These installations are potential targets for criminal aThd state-based malicious actors.Space assets therefore come with an inherent vulnerability, where any disruption to these assets could plu

40、nge civil and military actors into operational darkness and there could be economic and political costs too. Given the intense geopolitical competition underway on earth and in space, it cannot be discounted that some mixture of weapons, congestion and/or disruptions will not be used to inflict a st

41、rategic blow on the Union in the future. Even without the assumption of malicious attacks, greater space congestion, debris and space weather could lead to accidental collisions and/or communications blackouts06). Either way, the importance of space cannot be denied. Even beyond strictly military an

42、d strategic considerations, any disruption to the EUs space assets could greatly curtail its broader security iThterests aThd resilieThce. For example, increased extreme weather events and sea level rises aThd decreases are likely to place more frequent demands on earth observation capacities and mo

43、nitoring of CO2 levels. Moreover, the transition to the digital economy and the roll-out of 5G and 6G networks will also place greater strains on space through the introduction of new satellite constellations.A RE-ENTRY POINT?It should not be inferred from the challenges and threats outlined above t

44、hat the EU is a latecomer to space-defence initiatives. For example, the new EU Space Programme (EUSP) worth 13.2 billion will enable the Directorate General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) to modernise Galileo and Copernicus through the development and launching of the next-generation of

45、satellites each of these flagship programmes will be indispensable from a security and defence perspective. Additionally, through the EUSP the Commission will invest in secure digital connections and support the development of quantum eThcrypted commuThicatioThs aThd a broadbaThd satellite constella

46、tion. The Commission also intends to use the EUSP to support the European launcher industry in such a way as to promote new propulsion technologies and it will use the new CASSINI initiative to invest 1 billion in space start-ups and innovation. Moreover, the EUSP will be used to enhance the Space S

47、urveillance and Tracking framework and to ensure that international regulations are sufficiently geared to giving the EU autonomy over space tracking technology stand- ards(17). Finally, steps to transform the European Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) Agency into the EU Agency for the Spac

48、e Programme (EUSP Agency) will further enhance the Unions ability to protect and secure Galileo and European GNSS services(18). Overall, the EUSP will empower the Union to diminish the effects of coThgestioTh aThd disruptioTh iTh space.Aside from the planned investments under the EUSP, however, ther

49、e are also direct investments in space-defence capabilities being made under the European Defence Industrial Development Programme and the Preparatory Action on Defence Research. Under these preparatory programmes for the EDF, the European Commission has invested approximately 63 million from 2017-2020 in R&D projects for quantum secure communications (Quantaquesf), an autonomous positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) syste