2023年国有商业银行产权探究.docx

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1、2023年国有商业银行产权探究 一、国有商业银行公司治理的产权基础 公司治理的实质就是要解决委托代理的效率问题，产权制度是企业内部组织制度形成和发挥作用的基础，公司治理就是在既定的产权制度基础之上对企业的激励约束机制进行构建。研究产权的目的是为了评判各种不同产权制度安排之下经济组织的效率，寻求在产权约束之下最优化的委托代理关系。不同的产权制度会产生不同的产权激励机制，进而决定了公司治理机制及其运行效率的差异。现代产权理论认为公有产权形式下，控制权和收益权处于分离状态，公有产权下的个体都想分得公有产权的收益而不愿意多付出努力，因此在激励方面存在很大的外部性。我国有学者从西方国家国有商业银行产权改

2、革的实践发展中总结了其四个特点：“（1）西方发达国家的银行体系中仍然存在占有相当比重的国有股权，并在经济运行中发挥着重要的作用；（2）这些发达国家在银行中的国有资本投资基本上都采取股权管理的方式，而不是直接的政府行政管理；（3）从动态发展的角度来看，国有股份在逐步趋于下降，银行的股权结构趋向分散化和多元化；（4）国有银行股权多元化过程中对外资介入持审慎态度”。 二、我国国有商业银行治理中由国家产权带来的问题 对于国有商业银行而言，我国银行法第四条中有明确规定“商业银行以效益性、安全性、流动性为经营原则，实现自主经营、自担风险、自负盈亏、自我约束”，该规定揭示了国有商业银行应该实现利润最大化，然

3、而，国有商业银行的国有属性，使国家集所有权和行政权于一身。当国家处于所有者身份时，要求银行的经营者们群策群力以实现低风险下的利润最大化；当国家处于行政当局地位时，便更加关注经济增长、充分就业、物价稳定、国际收支平衡等宏观社会指标。当两重目标一致时，“利润最大化”掩盖了“实现社会目标”，国有银行真正“商业化”了；而当两者不一致时，“实现社会目标”就会凌驾于“利润最大化”目标之上，行政权损坏了所有权。在企业目标多元化的情况下，企业经理人必然会在其边际收益更大的目标上付出更多的努力。当国有银行两个目标趋于一致时，与利润目标兼容的激励约束机制最有效；但是，当国有银行的两个目标不完全一致时，经营者往往会

4、在实现社会目标上多做努力，以实现工作职务的升迁。而对于利润的努力会因为政策性目标所引起的负担而变的微不足道，争取利润得不到应有的激励。从另一个方面说，经营者们也可以以社会目标对利润目标的负外部性为理由，推诿自己无法提高利润的无能。由此可见，经理人在实现社会目标时可以获得激励，而在实现利润目标时，不仅没有激励而且更无约束。最后，在两权分立下，委托人和代理人之间的信息不对称，使委托人只能通过利润目标和股票市场来简单判断代理人行为。而由于国有商业银行目标的多元化，利润就无法避免的含有很多非经营因素。如果政府因为此原因，相对弱化了所有权约束，则会加重了代理人的机会主义行为和逆向选择动机；另一方面，如果

5、政府为强化所有权约束而借助直接行为监督，则无异于向计划经济时代回归，违背政府寄希望于成立董事会而形成良好公司治理的初衷。 三、实行产权改革完善国有商业银行资本结构 目前，股权过于集中，不利于实现股权结构多元化和分散化，容易形成控股股东与中小股东之间不平等关系。德国的商业银行股权分散，机构投资者在股份中占有绝大多数，从而比较好地在股权方面解决银行内部的激励和约束问题。国有商业银行产权制度改革，其核心在于实行产权主体多元化通过产权制度创新引进战略投资者逐步完善国有商业银行股权结构，在确保国家控股的前提下，通过公开招募法人股，有条件吸收个人和引导国际先进的外资银行参股，建立国有商业银行多元化和社会化

6、的股权结构，较好地实现企业财产所有权和经营权分离，妥善解决企业所有者、经营者与其他利益关联者之间的责权利关系，使所有出资者收益共享。风险共担，从而形成有一定刚性约束的资本经营机制，加快完善国有商业银行法人治理结构，从产权制度上按照现代企业制度的要求对国有商业银行进行综合改革。杨军，姜彦福认为，“一股独大并非一无所取”公司治理解决的核心问题是出资人的权益如何保障的问题，大股东有能力、也有动力加强对管理层的监督管理，甚至更换管理层，大股东机制是有效解决代理问题的途径之一。大股东机制的积极因素不能简单否定。且单纯股权分散并不能解决大股东侵占小股东利益的问题。日本和韩国的所有权比较分散，但是公司内部侵

7、占小股东利益的现象仍然比较严重。笔者也是这么认为的，取股权分散模式需要有完备的保护小股东利益的法律基础，而这不仅仅是发展中国家不具备的，也是很多发达国家也不具备的条件。因此，我国应当在继续保持国家的大股东的地位的同时，应当适当地分散其股权。 Property rights basis for the governance of state owned commercial Banking Company The eence of corporate governance is to solve the principal agent efficiency problems, the prope

8、rty rights system is foundation of enterprise internal organization system formation and play a role, corporate governance is based on established the foundation of property rights system of incentive and restraint mechanism of enterprise were constructed.The purpose of studying the property right i

9、s to judge the efficiency of the economic organization under the arrangement of different property right system, and to seek the optimization of the principal agent relationship under the ownership restriction.Different property right system will produce different property right incentive mechanism,

10、 and then determine the difference of the corporate governance mechanism and its operating efficiency.The modern theory of property rights that the form of the public owned property rights, control rights and income rights are in a state of separation, under public ownership of individuals to share

11、the proceeds of public property and do not want to pay more efforts to, so in incentive exists great externality.Some scholars in our country from the practice and development of property rights reform of State-owned Commercial Bank of western countries summarizes the four characteristics: banking s

12、ystem (1) of the western developed countries there are still occupy a considerable proportion of state-owned shares, and plays an important role in the economic operation; (2) the developed countries in the Bank of state-owned capital investment have taken equity management way, and not direct gover

13、nment administration; (3) from a dynamic perspective, state-owned shares gradually tends to decline, the bank ownership structure trend diversification and pluralism; and in achieving profit targets, not only have no incentive and no more constraints.Finally, in the separation of the two powers unde

14、r the information asymmetry between the principal and the agent, the principal can only through the profit and the stock market to simply determine the agent behavior.But because of the diversity of the state-owned commercial bank profit target, it is impoible to avoid containing a lot of non operat

15、ing factors.If the government because of this reason, the relative weakening of the ownership constraints, it will aggravate the motives of the agents opportunism behavior and adverse selection; on the other hand, if the government to strengthen the restriction of ownership and with direct supervisi

16、on, is tantamount to return to the era of the planned economy, against the government hopes to set up a board of directors and the formation of the original intention of good corporate governance.Three, the implementation of property rights reform and improve the capital structure of state owned Com

17、mercial Banks At present, equity is too centralized, not conducive to the realization of the diversification of ownership structure and diversification, easy to form the relationship of inequality between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.German commercial banks dispersed ownership,

18、 institutional investors in shares in the majority, so as to better solve the problem of incentive and constraint within the bank in terms of equity.The property rights reform of state-owned commercial banks, the core is to implement the diversification of property rights through the property right

19、system innovation introduction of strategic investors to gradually improve the equity structure of state-owned commercial banks, in the premise of ensuring the state-controlled, through open recruitment of corporate shares, condition is applied to absorb a person and guide the advanced foreign banks

20、 participation, the establishment of state-owned commercial banks the diversification and socialization of ownership structure, better implementation of enterprise property ownership and management separation, to properly resolve the busine owners, operators and other interests of the aociation betw

21、een rights and responsibilities., so that all investment revenue sharing.Risk sharing, thus forming a rigid constraint mechanism of capital management, accelerate the improvement of the corporate governance structure of state-owned commercial banks, from the system of property rights in accordance w

22、ith the requirements of modern enterprise system of the state-owned commercial banks for comprehensive reform.Yang Jun, Jiang Yanfu believes that one big share is not empty-handed to solve the core iue of corporate governance is funded. 国有商业银行产权探究 论国有商业银行改革 国有商业银行改革论文 国有商业银行风险 国有商业银行警示教育心得 国有商业银行的财务风险 五大国有商业银行 浅析国有商业银行的人才管理 国有商业银行内部审计探讨 国有商业银行待遇对比分析