IRENA-加速七国集团的氢部署：《氢行动公约》的建议（英）-2022.11-144正式版.docx

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1、加 IRENAInternational Renewable Energy AgencyACCELERATINGHYDROGEN DEPLOYMENTtiMTHE G7 上三二ABBREVIATIONSACESadvanced clean energy storageICAOInternational CivilAviation OrganizationBCAborder carbonIDAIndustrialadjustmentDecarbonisationBEISDepartment forAgendaBusiness, Energy andIECInternationalIndustri

2、al Strategy (UK)ElectrotechnicalBILBipartisanCommissionInfrastructure Law (US)IMOInternational MaritimeCADCanadian dollarOrganizationCAPEXcapital expenditureIPCEIImportant Projects of Common EuropeanCBAMcarbon borderInterestadjustmentsmechanismIPHEInternationalCCfDcarbon contracts forPartnership for

3、Hydrogen and FueldifferenceCells in the EconomyCCScarbon capture andISOInternational StandardstorageOrganisationCCUScarbon capture,IUCNInternational Union forutilisation and storageConservation of NatureCENEuropean Committee for StandardisationJPYJapanese yenLCOHlevelised cost ofCFPcalls for proposa

4、lhydrogenCO2carbon dioxideLNGliquefied fossil gasDRIdirect-iron-reducingMCHmethylcyclohexaneDoEDepartment of EnergyNDCnationally determined(US)contributionDPADefense Production ActNECPNational Energy and(US)Climate Plan (France)ECMWFEuropean CentreNH3ammoniafor Medium-RangeWeather ForecastsPEMpolyme

5、r electrolytemembraneERA5fifth-generationECMWF reanalysisPTXPower to XETSemissions tradingPVphotovoltaicschemeR&Dresearch andEUEuropean UniondevelopmentEUReuroSoTState of the TransitionFCEVfuel cell electric vehicleSPPsustainable publicGATTGeneral Agreement onprocurementTariffs and TradeTEStotal ene

6、rgy supplyGBPUnited Kingdom poundTFECtotal final energyconsumptionGDPgross domestic product1USDUnited States dollarGHGgreenhouse gasVREvariable renewableGWPglobal warming potential11WACCenergyweighted average costH2hydrogenof capitalHAPHydrogen Action PactWTOWorld TradeHINT.COHydrogen IntermediaryOr

7、ganizationNetwork CompanyZEVzero emission vehicleHRShydrogen refuellingstationsUNITS OFMEASUREbcmbillion cubic metresCCheqcarbon dioxide equivalentEJexajoulegco2gramme of carbon dioxideGJgigajouleGtgigatonneGWgigawattkgkilogrammekgCO2kilogramme of carbon dioxidekgH2kilogramme of hydrogenkmkilometrek

8、rwsquare kilometrektCO2eqkilotonne of carbon dioxide equivalentktH2kilotonne of hydrogenkWkilowattkWelelectric kilowattkWhkilowatt hourLlitrem3cubic metreMMBtumetric million British thermal unitMtmillion tonneMtCO2million tonne of carbon dioxideMtH2million tonne of hydrogenMWmegawattNrrWhnormal cubi

9、c metre per hourt/dtonne per daytco2tonne of carbon dioxideTWterawattTWhterawatt hourThe UK government is also working with industry, regulators and other stakeholders to deliver a range of research, development and testing projects on the use of hydrogen for residential heating. This includes a nei

10、ghbourhood trial of hydrogen for heating due to commence in 2023 to assess the feasibility, costs and benefits of using 100% hydrogen for heating.The country has committed to designing new business models to support the development of hydrogen transportation and storage by 2025, which will be essent

11、ial to grow the hydrogen economy and provide security for producers and consumers of hydrogen.In July 2022, alongside wider funding and policy announcements, the United Kingdom published a Hydrogen Strategy update, which summarised the UK hydrogen policy development and delivery since the publicatio

12、n of the UK Hydrogen Strategy, and also included further detail on the United Kingdoms hydrogen production strategy.Key policy developments since the publication of the UK Hydrogen Strategy include: The launch of the GBP 240 million (USD 280 million) Net Zero Hydrogen Fund and policy detail on the H

13、ydrogen Business Model. The conclusion of Phase 1 of the “CCUS Cluster Sequencing process，making public the clusters to be prioritised for deployment in the mid-2020s. The United Kingdom is in the process of shortlisting CO2 emitter projects - including CCUS-enabled hydrogen producers - to connect t

14、o these clusters. The Low Carbon Hydrogen Standard set a maximum threshold of 2.4 kgCOz/kgHz in the production process for hydrogen. Hydrogen producers seeking government funding must not exceed this threshold.Overall, the focus on all hydrogen production pathways could make the United Kingdom a lar

15、ge producer of low-carbon hydrogen in the short term, but this approach could put those same targets in jeopardy. Blue hydrogen may become quickly inconsistent with net-zero emissions targets worldwide, and current gas prices make it uncompetitive with green hydrogen in the short term. An earlier fo

16、cus on green hydrogen could accelerate the cost decrease of this pathway, avoiding the risk of stranded assets. Also, the full value chain approach risks diluting efforts and funding. In particular, developing domestic heating hydrogen solutions may prove tough due to the existence of cheaper and al

17、ready existing alternatives.UNITED Status for hydrogen and renewablesIn 2020, the United States consumed around 11 MtH2. About 80% of this was produced from fossil gas reforming, with the balance coming as a by-product from refineries, steam cracking and chlor-alkali. Refineries are the dominant hyd

18、rogen application, with almost two-thirds of the demand, followed by ammonia production (IEA, 2021). In 2021, the specific CO2 emissions from electricity production were 377 gCCh/kWh, with 61% of the electricity produced from fossil fuels, 19% from nuclear and 20% from renewables (EIA, 2022). Variab

19、le renewables are relatively limited with 132.7 GW of onshore wind and 93.7 GW of solar PV by the end of 2021 (IRENA, 2022d) contributing to about 12% of the generation mix. Out of 50 US states, 632 already have over 70% of the generation mix from renewables or nuclear, which opens the opportunity o

20、f connecting the electrolysers directly to the grid instead of off-grid plants. Outlook for hydrogen in 2050The United States is committed to achieving 50% to 52% GHG reduction by 2030 (vs. 2005) and reaching net-zero by 2050 (UNFCCC, 2021). By 2050, scenario analyses estimate that domestic hydrogen

21、 demand could grow to 36 MtHz/year to 56 Mthk/year. Although there is a range of estimates by sector, scenarios show transportation (trucks, biofuels, power-to-liquid) is expected to become the dominant application, with 45% (19 MtHz/year) of the total demand, industry (steel, ammonia, methanol) fol

22、lowed by 25% of the demand, complemented by energy storage (21%) and blending in the fossil gas network for heating (9%) (Satyapal, 2022). A fundamental requirement to reach these demand levels is to achieve a low hydrogen production cost at the point of end use. Hydrogen production would need to re

23、ach a levelised cost of USD 1.00/kgH2 to USD 2.00/kgH2 to become competitive in the applications that are the most technically challenging. The hydrogen supply mix depends on the assumptions for gas price and electrolyser cost. For low gas prices in 2050 (average of USD 6.60/metric million British t

24、hermal units MMbtu across the United States) and high electrolyser costs (USD 400/kWei), the mix is dominated by fossil-based hydrogen with CCS (85% to 100%). If gas00Vermont, South Dakota, Washington, Maine, Idaho and New Hampshire.prices are high (an average of USD 11.30/MMBtu across the United St

25、ates) and 1 the electrolyser costs are low (USD 100 kWei to USD 200/kWei), then the 一 “ electrolysis share increases to between 40% and 90% (Ruth et al., 2020). Low-carbon hydrogen production projectsAs of May 2022, there were 621 MW of PEM electrolysers under construction or already deployed. This

26、is a threefold increase from the value reported on the same date of the previous year (DoE, 2022). The bulk of the future electrolyser installations comes from four projects, each at 120 MW of electrolysis, from Plug Power (California, Georgia, New York, Texas), which will produce 135 t/d of liquid

27、hydrogen for road transport. Regarding projects using alkaline electrolysis, the Advanced Clean Energy Storage (ACES) project is the most prominent. ACES includes a 220 MW electrolyser and received a conditional loan commitment of USD 504 million from the Department of Energy (DoE) in April 2022 (Do

28、E, 2022). For this project, the hydrogen will be used for power generation with a 30/70 hydrogen/fossil gas mix by 2025, increasing to 100% H2 by 2045 and coupled with underground storage. Larger projects are planned, but are in earlier stages of planning. For instance, there is a sustainable aviati

29、on fuel plant expected to start operations by 2025 which aims to combine agricultural and timber waste feedstock with hydrogen from an 839 MW electrolyser (DG Fuels, 2021). Multiple initiatives and consortia have also received DoE funding aiming to improve the performance of the electrolyser, such a

30、s H2NEW, HydroGEN, ElectroCAT and the Hydrogen Shot Incubator Prize. The targets driving these initiatives are a hydrogen production cost of USD 1.00/kg in one decade (also known as the DoE Hydrogen Earthshot or Hydrogen Shot), a capital cost of USD 150/kW for the electrolyser (including balance of

31、plant), 73% efficiency (lower heating value) and 80 000 hours of lifetime by 2030 (Satyapal, 2022). Estimated renewable hydrogen cost in 2021The capital costs for solar PV and onshore wind were USD 1 166/kW and USD 1 400/kW, respectively, in 2021. The WACCs (real after tax) for utility-scale solar P

32、V and onshore wind were 4.3% and 3%, respectively (IRENA, 2022b). Assuming the same capital cost ratio (compared with the global average) for the electrolyser, the estimated levelised cost of hydrogen is USD 7.60/kgH2 to USD 11.7/kgH2 for solar PV and USD 5.20/kgH2 to USD 7.30/kgH2 for onshore wind.

33、 The DoE has reported a range of roughly USD 4.00/kgH2 to USD 6.00/kgH2 as the levelised cost using representative solar and wind costs and capacity factors (Vickers et al., 2020).Existing and planned infrastructureThe United States has the worlds most extensive hydrogen pipeline infrastructure at a

34、lmost 2 700 km (HyArc, 2016). Only 250 km is located outside Texas, where the concentrated operation of refineries and industrial facilities creates the economies of scale required to justify hydrogen pipelines and to have merchant suppliers. The United States has 15 ammonia terminals and 14 methano

35、l terminals (10 for both commodities in the Gulf Coast) (DNV, 2022). The United States has the largest hydrogen liquefaction capacity in the world with almost 310 t/d (Linde, 2019). Additionally, the United States has the largest salt cavern in the world used for hydrogen storage, based in the Gulf

36、Coast (Linde Hydrogen, n.d.). There are multiple liquefaction plants planned - including a 90 t/d plant from the H2OK project in Oklahoma that is planning to start operation by 2025 - and additional targets of 500 t/d by 2025 and 1 000 t/d by 2028 by Plug Power. Renewable hydrogen supply in 2030In t

37、erms of potential, 18% of the land is covered by forests and not considered in analyses for solar PV or wind installation. About 20% of the land has a slope unsuitable for solar PV and 1.6% has a slope unsuitable for wind. The population density criterion (130 people per km2)leads to the exclusion o

38、f 4% of the land. This still leaves roughly 41% and 68% of the land available for solar PV and onshore wind, respectively (see Figure 1.32). This would be enough to produce almost 2 625 MtH2/year (technical potential).FIGURE 1.32 Land types and exclusion criteria for renewable potential estimation i

39、n the United States75% 100% Forest ShrublandSavannaCropland (incl) Cropland (excl) Grassland WetlandUrban Snow/lce BarrenExclusionExclusion criteriacriteria forfor renewablerenewable Land types and potentialpotential estimationestimation USUS distribution - USExcluded.by slopeExcludedR for PVR for w

40、ind by slope25%50%25%50%Excluded by R population densitySource: IRENA (2022e).By 2030, some studies estimate that capital costs could come down by 60% for solar PV and by 30% for both onshore wind and electrolysis in a scenario aligned with a 1.5 trajectory (IRENA, 2022f). Considering these costs, t

41、he economic potential below USD 2.00/kgH2 could result in almost 2 000 MtHz/year in the most optimistic case for 2030 (see Figure 1.33).33 See Annex for more details on the assumptions and methodology for the technical potential.FIGURE 1.33 Supply cost curve for the United States in a low-cost scena

42、rio in 2030.TES 2020.Pessimistic OptimisticTechnical potential (EJ/yr)Source: IRENA (2022e).33Notes: TES in 2020 puts the hydrogen potential values into perspective. See Annex for more details on methodology and assumption for technical potential.Due to the higher CAPEX in the United States, there i

43、s no economic potential below USD 2.00/kgH2 for a scenario with pessimistic (higher) costs. Hydrogen and ammonia trade outlook for 2050Previous analyses have shown that demand in the United States may increase to between 36 MtH2/year and 56 MtFk/year by 2050 (Satyapal, 2022). Its vast renewable pote

44、ntial is more than enough to satisfy such demand. Thus, it is unlikely it will become an importer. Instead, its role as an exporter will depend on the extent to which capital costs come down to a level below other regions with rich resources. Soft costs (e.g. labour, transmission line, overhead, sal

45、es tax) can represent 20% to 25% of the total capital cost for solar PV (NREL, 2022), which increases the average hydrogen production cost compared to other regions.In a scenario with optimistically low production and transport costs, some estimates project that the United States could export close

46、to 5 MtW/year. This amount would be reduced by about 20% in a future where transport costs are higher and by 80% in a future where cost of capital differentials across countries have eroded. This would mean there are other regions closer to large importers (Asia and Europe) with a similar hydrogen p

47、roduction cost that can substitute for the United States. The import can almost triple to 15 MtHz/year in a scenario where all the costs are higher (IRENA, 2022f). While this increases the production cost in the United States and the transport to importers, it also makes domestic production much more expensive for importers that re