通过跨大西洋合作加强东北欧的能源安全.docx

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1、Bolstering energy security in Northeastern Europe through transatlantic cooperationNortheastern Europe has already made efforts to end its reliance on Russian energy supplies, through investment in gas infrastructure and clean energy technology. This pivot not only insulates the region from Russian

2、energy leverage but primes its transformation into an energy hub for all of Europe. Ongoing diversification in Northeastern Europe would ensure regional energy security and contribute to the climate and security objectives of the entire continent.The United States can play a meaningful role in this

3、endeavor. Transatlantic coordination could bolster the liquefied natural gas trade, drive investment into critical infrastructure, bring clean technologies to market quicker, and foster completion of the Baltic states desynchronization from the Russian power grid. Doing so would create a bulwark of

4、low-carbon energy security on Russias border, impeding its campaign to wield energy as a weapon while advancing the objectives of the European Green Deal. Northeastern Europe is the perfect region for to store gas supplies and deploy them across Europe-will be of utmost importance. The European Unio

5、n has already exceeded its 2022 requirements that available storage be filled to at least 80 percent capacity. The target increases to 90 percent in 2023 and subsequent years. Increased interconnection will create liquidity for the combined 5.9-bcm existing gas storage capacity in Poland and Latvia.

6、 A more extensive pipeline network could also connect to natural geologic formations in Latvia and add a prospective storage capacity of 50 bcma, which would double the European Unions storage capacity. Another critical tool for European gas supply security is the coordination of demand aggregation

7、across Europe for securing sufficient supply at lower prices, especially for nations with annual natural gas demand below 5 bcm. The current sellers5 market makes it challenging for these countries to compete for and negotiate favorable longterm contracts; combined volumes are more likely to attract

8、 suppliers, and coordinated purchasing power will lead to greater leverage in negotiations. The European Union has already recognized the need for such efforts through its new EU Energy Platform, which aims to coordinate joint purchases of natural gas and hydrogen as a bloc. The natural gas industry

9、, the United States, the European Union, and national leaders must work together to implement this mechanism for pooling purchasing power. In addition to helping facilitate these matches, governments can also play a critical role in managing risks for buyers with concerns about twenty-year commitmen

10、ts-the average length of long-term contracts today. As buyers seek guaranteed carbon emissions reductions for the supplies, and options to divert supplies in the long term, the industry has offered creative solutions within the contracts to meet these demands. In cases where sufficient flexibility c

11、annot be guaranteed, however, governments have an opportunity to take on some of these risks.2.2 The US role in diversifying natural gas supplies Northeastern Europe has advanced toward its gas diversification and reliability goals, but Russias war demands that progress accelerate rapidly, providing

12、 the United States a crucial and immediate role to play. Washington should enhance ongoing regional and European efforts by increasing natural gas exports, coordinating outreach with other alternative gas suppliers, and leveraging finance and private sector partnerships to deploy new infrastructure

13、for receiving alternative gas supply in Northeastern Europe.Amid a highly competitive global marketplace for LNG, the United States is a pivotal player as the worlds top exporter. In March, the Joe Biden administration promised that at least 15 bcm of US LNG would reach the European Union this year,

14、 and even more would be pledged in the following years. The United States must further exports by boosting its liquefaction capacity including on the East Coast near its highly productive Appalachian fields-to help displace the 155 bcm that Russia supplies to Europe. Moreover, safely resuming Texass

15、 Freeport LNG operations at full capacity, which were shut down due to an explosion last June, could restore 17 percent of US LNG export capacity.The United States now supplies more gas to Europe than Russia, but US LNG alone cannot compensate for decreased Russian supply. To increase global supply,

16、 Washington should continue to engage other top LNG exporters, such as Qatar and Australia, as it has attempted through diplomacy with major oil producers. Outreach to other major importers is also critical. The United States recently persuaded Japan-the worlds number-two LNG importer after Chinato

17、divert some of its long-term contracts to supply Europe. Finding ways to ensure fungibility in destination for LNG cargoes and managing competition in a tight marketplace is crucial to global energy security.Washington and partner capitals have many bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to advance t

18、he infrastructure necessary to allow Northeastern European to diversify its gas supply. Elevating the profile of the NATO Energy Security Center of Excellence in Vilnius can contribute to multilateral coordination and the dissemination of best practices across the region. Other existing partnerships

19、, such as the Three Seas Initiative and the Partnership for Transatlantic Energy and Climate Cooperation (P-TECC), can be employed to facilitate public-private partnerships to raise financing and leverage the power of the US energy and infrastructure industries to enable large projects at speed.The

20、European Commission has delivered most of the financing for important gas interconnections in Northeastern Europe as cross-border Projects of Common Interest (PCIs), which are eligible for EU funds. For projects such as LNG terminals, whose cross-border import is not as apparent, EU funding is not a

21、ssured. Klaipeda was solely a national endeavor, although Polands Gdansk terminal is listed as a PCI. EU support will continue to play a critical role in the development of the next wave of infrastructure necessary to delink the European energy system from Russias, but there will be funding gaps whe

22、re the United States can step in.For energy-infrastructure needs in Europes northeast, the United States can play a pivotal financial role through the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). Under the 2019 European Energy Security and Diversification Act, DFC is empowered to finance

23、energy infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe, despite their higher income classifications, and funds have already been pledged for this purpose. Last July in Latvia, CEO Scott Nathan announced the DFC would provide up to $300 million for critical infrastructure in the Three Seas region, the f

24、irst of $1 billion promised by the White House under the previous administration. This funding could be released with President Bidens June 2022 delegation of authority to the US secretary of state under the 2019 Energy Act. This authority gives the US Department of State a timely opportunity to dep

25、loy DFC funding for European projects that can promote energy security. To ease geopolitical sensitivities that could arise from DFC funding infrastructure in relatively high-income countries, the institutions funding allocation from the US government should be raised.2.3 Reconciling diversified gas

26、 imports with the energy transitionDiversifying gas imports in the shorter term and scaling up renewable-energy capacity for the longer-term need not be an either-or proposition. New infrastructure investments must be made compatible with the European Unions commitment to achieve carbon neutrality b

27、y 2050. This is critical for ensuring these measures political viability in Europe and for complying with the legally binding European Climate Law, as well as preserving European leadership on climate. Moreover, the UnitedStates must square the circle between its strategic interest in safeguarding t

28、he energy security of important allies amid renewed war in Europe and maintaining momentum on its own drive to assert international climate leadership-one of this centurys defining geopolitical goals, as the world contends with the increasingly devastating impacts of climate change.Replacing Russian

29、 gas with LNG from other suppliers is compatible with transatlantic climate ambitions. Assuming that Europes near-term gas demand remains equal, the implications fbr Europes overall emissions picture would be relatively benign-if the replacement gas supply is less emissions intensive than Russian ga

30、s, the climate impact could be a net positive. In fact, across the supply chain, US LNG exports produce about half the greenhouse-gas emissions, or fewer, compared to Russian pipeline exports, resulting in potential climate benefits from import reorientatione Moreover, LNG can also accelerate an ene

31、rgy-secure coal-to-gas transition in Central and Eastern Europe more broadly.US-EU efforts to mitigate the climate intensity of natural gas, however, must go further. The transatlantic LNG trade should incorporate rigorous standards on lifecycle emissions transparency, which can create a competitive

32、 advantage for environmentally responsible gas producers under existing and future emissions trading regimes. Moreover, the United States and Europe must seize the opportunity to align standards for sustainable gas investment under the EU green taxonomy and promote technological solutions for reduci

33、ng per-unit emissions through carbon capture, preventing methane leakage, and transitioning to lower-carbon gases such as hydrogen and biomethane. Strengthened transatlantic energy collaboration can, therefore, displace Russian production with gas from lower-emitting sources, ensuring that Northeast

34、ern Europes drive to secure new gas supplies does not negate its other energy priorities under the European Green Deal.Natural gas inclusion in the EU green taxonomy unlocks money from the sustainable-investment community, but these projects will need to be paired with carbon-reduction technologies

35、to meet the taxonomys standard of 270 grams of carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent per kilowatt hour. This requirement provides a business case for decarbonizing the natural gas sector.The United States interventions under the DFC can take this even further. The DFC is obliged to make one-third of its i

36、nvestments climate-focused in fiscal year 2023, and to attain a net-zero portfolio by 2040. By combining its support for natural gas infrastructure with investments in renewable projects, the DFC can support an all-of-the- above approach for energy diversification in the region. Moreover, by collabo

37、rating with local partners to ensure new gas infrastructure is built with hydrogen compatibility in mind, the United States and Europe can reduce the risks of investing in future stranded assets” and see to it that projects enable the energy transition rather than “lock in natural gas use.In additio

38、n, under the EU Energy Platform, US and EU partners must explore ways to mitigate the risks associated with long-term gas contracts as Europe attempts to taper off its gas consumption beyond 2030 by replacing gas with renewables. This could include flexible destination provisions, which would allow

39、future cargoes to be redirected to developing nations so they can use gas to transition away from dirtier fossil fuels. Another mechanism for lessening future carbon lock in could be through the joint leasing of FSRUs, as modeled by the Finnish-Estonian deal with Excelerate Energy. This approach wou

40、ld make gas import infrastructure less permanent. Through public-private partnerships like these, Northeastern Europes short- and medium-term gas diversification needs can be reconciled with its longer- term need to build a secure, net-zero energy system.2.4 Decarbonization to advance energy securit

41、y in the regionIn addition to securing alternative gas sources and building new infrastructure to fill supply gaps across Europe, the region can bolster its energy security through large-scale investments in energy-efficiency renovations, renewable generation, and energy storage. Transitioning to a

42、lower-carbon energy system with these mechanisms is necessary to reduce overall demand for fossil fuel imports, particularly those from Russia, and can strengthen regional energy independence. Given the monumental challenges posed by replacing 155 bcma of the United States and its allies to prove th

43、at deRussification and decarbonization of the energy sector can occur in tandem.I. IntroductionMoscows war in Ukraine is pushing European energy systems toward a future without Russian energy imports. The Kremlin is wielding natural gas shut-offs and curtailment to exert pressure on European countri

44、es, intertwining Russias energy exports with its military priorities. Europes continued purchases of Russian gas contribute to a record windfall of $20 billion per month that funds Russias war.1 Drastically reducing these profits through European energy diversification is one of the most effective w

45、ays to deprive Russia of revenue for the war and its other malign activities.Northeastern Europe-the Baltic States and their immediate neighbors Finland and Poland-has already taken important steps toward breaking its reliance on Russian energy through investments in natural gas infrastructure and c

46、lean energy technologies. Even prior to the war in Ukraine, Northeastern Europe anticipated the risk of overreliance on Russian energy, and advanced Russian gas, reducing reliance on this energy resource will be a necessary component of decarbonization.Investments to improve the energy efficiency of

47、 the regions aging stock of buildings can reduce demand fbr gas during the winter heating season, while offering savings to consumers. This tactic represents the lowest- hanging fruit for emissions-reduction efforts to bolster Northeastern European energy security.Additionally, renewable energy inve

48、stments in Northeastern Europe could transform the region into a clean energy export hub within Europe. Clean electrification of transport, heating, and industry can greatly reduce consumption of Russian hydrocarbons, while amplifying demand for clean power across Europe and laying the foundation fo

49、r wind-powered green hydrogen production.As the global energy crisis worsens, Baltic states have raised their renewable generation targets to gain relief from politically induced price volatility in the future. Estonia increased its 2030 renewable generation target from 40 percent to 100 percent, and Lithuania accelerated its timeline for achieving 100 percent renewable power consumption from 2050 to 2035. The new objectives are highly ambitious: in 2019, onshore wind, solar, and hydropower met only 2.6 per