(精品)Varian_Chapter01_TheMarket.ppt

《(精品)Varian_Chapter01_TheMarket.ppt》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《(精品)Varian_Chapter01_TheMarket.ppt（60页珍藏版）》请在淘文阁 - 分享文档赚钱的网站上搜索。

1、 2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.1The Market 2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.2TextbookIntermediate Microeconomics:A Modern Approach(8th Edition)by Hal R.VarianW.W.Norton，2010 2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.3Reference Booksu 微微观经济学：学：现代代观点点 练习册（第八版）册（第八版）by Bergstrom and Varian费方域、李双金方域、李双金译，格致出版社，格致出版社 u 中中级微微

2、观经济学学学学习指南指南（第三版）（第三版）钟根元、根元、陈志洪志洪编著著上海交通大学出版社上海交通大学出版社 2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.4Something About MeuName:巢宏巢宏Email:Office:法法华校区校区4号楼号楼101室室Phone#:52301562Research areas:Experimental Economics,Labor Economics,Contract Economics.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.5About Final Gradeu10 problem sets(40%).u

3、1st midterm exam(20%,in week 7).u2nd midterm exam(20%,in week 12).uFinal exam(20%).2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.6Website to download PSuftp:/User name：chaohongPassword：public 2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.7The Theory of Economics does notfurnish a body of settled conclusionsimmediately applicable to po

4、licy.It isa method rather than a doctrine,anapparatus of the mind,a technique ofthinking which helps its possessor todraw correct conclusions-John Maynard Keynes 2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.8 2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.9Economic ModelinguWhat causes what in economic systems?uAt what level of detail

5、 shall we model an economic phenomenon?uWhich variables are determined outside the model(exogenous)and which are to be determined by the model(endogenous)?2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.10Modeling the Apartment MarketuHow are apartment rents determined?uSuppose apartments are close or distant,but other

6、wise identicaldistant apartments rents are exogenous and knownmany potential renters and landlords 2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.11Modeling the Apartment MarketuWho will rent close apartments?uAt what price?uWill the allocation of apartments be desirable in any sense?uHow can we construct an insightfu

7、l model to answer these questions?2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.12Economic Modeling AssumptionsuTwo basic postulates:Rational Choice:Each person tries to choose the best alternative available to him or her.Equilibrium:Market price adjusts until quantity demanded equals quantity supplied.2010 W.W.Norto

8、n&Company,Inc.13Modeling Apartment DemanduDemand:Suppose the most any one person is willing to pay to rent a close apartment is$500/month.Thenp=$500 QD=1.uSuppose the price has to drop to$490 before a 2nd person would rent.Thenp=$490 QD=2.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.14Modeling Apartment DemanduThe l

9、ower is the rental rate p,the larger is the quantity of close apartments demandedp QD .uThe quantity demanded vs.price graph is the market demand curve for close apartments.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.15Market Demand Curve for ApartmentspQD 2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.16Modeling Apartment SupplyuSup

10、ply:It takes time to build more close apartments so in this short-run the quantity available is fixed(at say 100).2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.17Market Supply Curve for ApartmentspQS100 2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.18Competitive Market Equilibriumu“low”rental price quantity demanded of close apartment

11、s exceeds quantity available price will rise.u“high”rental price quantity demanded less than quantity available price will fall.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.19Competitive Market EquilibriumuQuantity demanded=quantity available price will neither rise nor falluso the market is at a competitive equilib

12、rium.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.20Competitive Market EquilibriumpQD,QSpe100People willing to pay pe for close apartments get closeapartments.People not willing to pay pe for close apartments get distant apartments.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.21Competitive Market EquilibriumuQ:Who rents the close ap

13、artments?uA:Those most willing to pay.uQ:Who rents the distant apartments?uA:Those least willing to pay.uSo the competitive market allocation is by“willingness-to-pay”.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.22Comparative StaticsuWhat is exogenous in the model?price of distant apartmentsquantity of close apartm

14、entsincomes of potential renters.uWhat happens if these exogenous variables change?2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.23Comparative StaticsuSuppose the price of distant apartment rises.uDemand for close apartments increases(rightward shift),causing a higher price for close apartments.2010 W.W.Norton&Compan

15、y,Inc.24Market EquilibriumpQD,QSpe100 2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.25Market EquilibriumpQD,QSpe100Higher demand 2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.26Market EquilibriumpQD,QSpe100Higher demand causes highermarket price;same quantitytraded.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.27Comparative StaticsuSuppose there were m

16、ore close apartments.uSupply is greater,so the price for close apartments falls.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.28Market EquilibriumpQD,QSpe100 2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.29Market EquilibriumpQD,QS100Higher supplype 2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.30Market EquilibriumpQD,QSpe100Higher supply causes alower

17、market price and alarger quantity traded.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.31Comparative StaticsuSuppose potential renters incomes rise,increasing their willingness-to-pay for close apartments.uDemand rises(upward shift),causing higher price for close apartments.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.32Market Equili

18、briumpQD,QSpe100 2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.33Market EquilibriumpQD,QSpe100Higher incomes causehigher willingness-to-pay 2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.34Market EquilibriumpQD,QSpe100Higher incomes causehigher willingness-to-pay,higher market price,andthe same quantity traded.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,I

19、nc.35Taxation Policy AnalysisuLocal government taxes apartment owners.uWhat happens topricequantity of close apartments rented?uIs any of the tax“passed”to renters?2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.36Taxation Policy AnalysisuMarket supply is unaffected.uMarket demand is unaffected.uSo the competitive mark

20、et equilibrium is unaffected by the tax.uPrice and the quantity of close apartments rented are not changed.uLandlords pay all of the tax.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.37Imperfectly Competitive MarketsuAmongst many possibilities are:a monopolistic landlorda perfectly discriminatory monopolistic landlor

21、da competitive market subject to rent control.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.38A Monopolistic LandlorduWhen the landlord sets a rental price p he rents D(p)apartments.uRevenue=pD(p).uRevenue is low if p 0uRevenue is low if p is so high that D(p)0.uAn intermediate value for p maximizes revenue.2010 W.W.

22、Norton&Company,Inc.39Monopolistic Market EquilibriumpQDLowpriceLow price,high quantitydemanded,low revenue.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.40Monopolistic Market EquilibriumpQDHighpriceHigh price,low quantitydemanded,low revenue.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.41Monopolistic Market EquilibriumpQDMiddlepriceM

23、iddle price,medium quantitydemanded,larger revenue.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.42Monopolistic Market EquilibriumpQD,QSMiddlepriceMiddle price,medium quantitydemanded,larger revenue.Monopolist does not rent all theclose apartments.100Vacant close apartments.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.43Perfectly Dis

24、criminatory Monopolistic LandlorduImagine the monopolist knew everyones willingness-to-pay.uCharge$500 to the most willing-to-pay,ucharge$490 to the 2nd most willing-to-pay,etc.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.44Discriminatory Monopolistic Market EquilibriumpQD,QS100p1=$5001 2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.4

25、5Discriminatory Monopolistic Market EquilibriumpQD,QS100p1=$500p2=$49012 2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.46Discriminatory Monopolistic Market EquilibriumpQD,QS100p1=$500p2=$49012p3=$4753 2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.47Discriminatory Monopolistic Market EquilibriumpQD,QS100p1=$500p2=$49012p3=$4753 2010 W.

26、W.Norton&Company,Inc.48Discriminatory Monopolistic Market EquilibriumpQD,QS100p1=$500p2=$49012p3=$4753peDiscriminatory monopolistcharges the competitive marketprice to the last renter,andrents the competitive quantityof close apartments.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.49Rent ControluLocal government imp

27、oses a maximum legal price,pmax pe,the competitive price.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.50Market EquilibriumpQD,QSpe100pmax 2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.51Market EquilibriumpQD,QSpe100pmaxExcess demandThe 100 close apartments areno longer allocated bywillingness-to-pay(lottery,lines,large families first

28、?).2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.52Which Market Outcomes Are Desirable?uWhich is better?Rent controlPerfect competitionMonopolyDiscriminatory monopoly 2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.53Pareto EfficiencyuVilfredo Pareto;1848-1923.uA Pareto outcome allows no“wasted welfare”;ui.e.the only way one persons wel

29、fare can be improved is to lower another persons welfare.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.54Pareto EfficiencyuJill has a close apartment;Jack does not.uJill values the close apartment at$200;Jack would pay$400 for it.uJill could sublet the apartment to Jack for$300.uBoth gain,so it was Pareto inefficient

30、 for Jill to have the close apartment.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.55Pareto EfficiencyuA Pareto inefficient outcome means there remain unrealized mutual gains-to-trade.uAny market outcome that achieves all possible gains-to-trade must be Pareto efficient.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.56Pareto Efficienc

31、yuCompetitive equilibrium:all close apartment renters value them at the market price pe or moreall others value close apartments at less than peso no mutually beneficial trades remainso the outcome is Pareto efficient.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.57Pareto EfficiencyuDiscriminatory Monopoly:assignment

32、 of apartments is the same as with the perfectly competitive marketso the discriminatory monopoly outcome is also Pareto efficient.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.58Pareto EfficiencyuMonopoly:not all apartments are occupiedso a distant apartment renter could be assigned a close apartment and have higher

33、 welfare without lowering anybody elses welfare.so the monopoly outcome is Pareto inefficient.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.59Pareto EfficiencyuRent Control:some close apartments are assigned to renters valuing them at below the competitive price pesome renters valuing a close apartment above pe dont get close apartmentsPareto inefficient outcome.2010 W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.60Harder QuestionsuOver time,willthe supply of close apartments increase?rent control decrease the supply of apartments?a monopolist supply more apartments than a competitive rental market?