克鲁格曼国际经济学第八版上册课后答案.doc

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1、Overview of Section II:International Trade PolicySection II of the text is comprised of four chapters:Chapter 8The Instruments of Trade PolicyChapter 9The Political Economy of Trade PolicyChapter 10Trade Policy in Developing CountriesChapter 11Controversies in Trade PolicynSection II OverviewTrade p

2、olicy issues figure prominently in current political debates and public policy discussions. The first two chapters of this section of the text are concerned with the instruments of trade policy and the arguments for free trade and managed trade. The second two chapters consider these concepts in the

3、 context of specific sets of countries that face common problems. Throughout, the use of case studies provides the student with real world examples that clearly illustrate the theoretical arguments.Chapter 8 discusses various instruments of trade policy including tariffs, quotas, voluntary export re

4、straints, and local content requirements. The effects of these policies on prices and trade volumes are determined in the context of a partial equilibrium framework. The chapter reviews the analytical tools of consumer and producer surplus, and uses these tools to consider the welfare effects of var

5、ious protectionist measures. The specific incidents of trade restrictions presented as case studies include import quotas on sugar entering United States markets, voluntary export restraints on Japanese autos, and oil import quotas.Chapter 9 presents the set of ideas known as the political economy o

6、f trade theory. These ideas enable you to understand why certain trade restrictions exist, despite the force of general economic arguments which suggest that they reduce aggregate welfare. Possible motivations for trade restrictions are identified as those which increase national welfare, such as th

7、e optimum tariff, and those which foster either income redistribution or the preservation of status quo. While sometimes politically popular, these motivations for trade restrictions ignore the possibility of retaliation and usually fail tests based upon basic welfare analysis. Trade agreements of t

8、he 1990s are discussed, including the Uruguay Round, and distinctions are made between Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions as well as between trade creation and trade diversion.Chapter 10 considers the possible uses of trade policies to promote the growth of developing economies. The chapter reviews

9、 the relative successes of different development strategies. It examines arguments for and the results of import-substituting industrialization. It also discusses the decline of import-substituting industrialization and the increase in trade liberalization in developing countries since the mid-1980s

10、. The chapter concludes with a discussion of export led growth and the experience of the high performing Asian economies.Chapter 11 considers recent controversies in trade policy. The first part of the chapter considers the notion of strategic trade policy, which first arose in the 1990s. Strategic

11、trade policy refers to the use of trade (and other) tools for channeling resources to sectors targeted for growth by industrial country governments. The chapter presents some commonly voiced arguments for intervention in particular sectors of the economy, and then shows how these arguments are criti

12、cally flawed. The second part of the chapter introduces more sophisticated arguments for strategic trade policy. The most persuasive of these is the existence of some form of market failure. The third part of the chapter considers the impact of rising trade on workers in developing countries, and mo

13、re broadly, the debate over globalization. This debate has been argued in academia and policy circles, but also on the streets of Seattle, Genoa, and other cities hosting global economic summits. Finally, the chapter considers links between trade and the environment.Chapter 8The Instruments of Trade

14、 PolicynChapter OrganizationBasic Tariff AnalysisSupply, Demand, and Trade in a Single IndustryEffects of a TariffMeasuring the Amount of ProtectionCosts and Benefits of a TariffConsumer and Producer SurplusMeasuring the Costs and BenefitsOther Instruments of Trade PolicyExport Subsidies: Theory Cas

15、e Study: Europes Common Agricultural PolicyImport Quotas: TheoryCase Study: An Import Quota in Practice: U.S. SugarVoluntary Export RestraintsCase Study: A Voluntary Export Restraint in Practice: Japanese AutosLocal Content RequirementsBox: American Buses, Made in HungaryOther Trade Policy Instrumen

16、tsThe Effects of Trade Policy: A SummarySummaryAppendix I: Tariff Analysis in General EquilibriumA Tariff in a Small CountryA Tariff in a Large CountryAppendix II: Tariffs and Import Quotas in the Presence of MonopolyThe Model with Free TradeThe Model with a TariffThe Model with an Import QuotaCompa

17、ring a Tariff with a Quota nChapter OverviewThis chapter and the next three focus on international trade policy. Students will have heard various arguments for and against restrictive trade practices in the media. Some of these arguments are sound and some are clearly not grounded in fact. This chap

18、ter provides a framework for analyzing the economic effects of trade policies by describing the tools of trade policy and analyzing their effects on consumers and producers in domestic and foreign countries. Case studies discuss actual episodes of restrictive trade practices. An instructor might try

19、 to underscore the relevance of these issues by having students scan newspapers and magazines for other timely examples of protectionism at work.The analysis presented here takes a partial equilibrium view, focusing on demand and supply in one market, rather than the general equilibrium approach fol

20、lowed in previous chapters. Import demand and export supply curves are derived from domestic and foreign demand and supply curves. There are a number of trade policy instruments analyzed in this chapter using these tools. Some of the important instruments of trade policy include specific tariffs, de

21、fined as taxes levied as a fixed charge for each unit of a good imported; ad valorem tariffs, levied as a fraction of the value of the imported good; export subsidies, which are payments given to a firm or industry that ships a good abroad; import quotas, which are direct restrictions on the quantit

22、y of some good that may be imported; voluntary export restraints, which are quotas on trading that are imposed by the exporting country instead of the importing country; and local content requirements, which are regulations that require that some specified fraction of a good is produced domestically

23、.The import supply and export demand analysis demonstrates that the imposition of a tariff drives a wedge between prices in domestic and foreign markets, and increases prices in the country imposing the tariff and lowers the price in the other country by less than the amount of the tariff. This cont

24、rasts with most textbook presentations which make the small country assumption that the domestic internal price equals the world price times one plus the tariff rate. The actual protection provided by a tariff will not equal the tariff rate if imported intermediate goods are used in the production o

25、f the protected good. The proper measurement, the effective rate of protection, is described in the text and calculated for a sample problem.The analysis of the costs and benefits of trade restrictions require tools of welfare analysis. The text explains the essential tools of consumer and producer

26、surplus. Consumer surplus on each unit sold is defined as the difference between the actual price and the amount that consumers would have been willing to pay for the product. Geometrically, consumer surplus is equal to the area under the demand curve and above the price of the good. Producer surplu

27、s is the difference between the minimum amount for which a producer is willing to sell his product and the price which he actually receives. Geometrically, producer surplus is equal to the area above the supply curve and below the price line. These tools are fundamental to the students understanding

28、 of the implications of trade policies and should be developed carefully. The costs of a tariff include distortionary efficiency losses in both consumption and production. A tariff provides gains from terms of trade improvement when and if it lowers the foreign export price. Summing the areas in a d

29、iagram of internal demand and supply provides a method for analyzing the net loss or gain from a tariff. Other instruments of trade policy can be analyzed with this method. An export subsidy operates in exactly the reverse fashion of an import tariff. An import quota has similar effects as an import

30、 tariff upon prices and quantities, but revenues, in the form of quota rents, accrue to foreign producers of the protected good. Voluntary export restraints are a form of quotas in which import licenses are held by foreign governments. Local content requirements raise the price of imports and domest

31、ic goods and do not result in either government revenue or quota rents.Throughout the chapter the analysis of different trade restrictions are illustrated by drawing upon specific episodes. Europes common agricultural policy provides and example of export subsidies in action. The case study correspo

32、nding to quotas describes trade restrictions on U.S. sugar imports. Voluntary export restraints are discussed in the context of Japanese auto sales to the United States. The oil import quota in the United States in the 1960s provides an example of a local content scheme. There are two appendices to

33、this chapter. Appendix I uses a general equilibrium framework to analyze the impact of a tariff, departing from the partial equilibrium approach taken in the chapter. When a small country imposes a tariff, it shifts production away from its exported good and toward the imported good. Consumption shi

34、fts toward the domestically produced goods. Both the volume of trade and welfare of the country decline. A large country imposing a tariff can improve its terms of trade by an amount potentially large enough to offset the production and consumption distortions. For a large country, a tariff may be w

35、elfare improving.Appendix II discusses tariffs and import quotas in the presence of a domestic monopoly. Free trade eliminates the monopoly power of a domestic producer and the monopolist mimics the actions of a firm in a perfectly competitive market, setting output such that marginal cost equals wo

36、rld price. A tariff raises domestic price. The monopolist, still facing a perfectly elastic demand curve, sets output such that marginal cost equals internal price. A monopolist faces a downward sloping demand curve under a quota. A quota is not equivalent to a tariff in this case. Domestic producti

37、on is lower and internal price higher when a particular level of imports is obtained through the imposition of a quota rather than a tariff. nAnswers to Textbook Problems 1.The import demand equation, MD, is found by subtracting the home supply equation from the home demand equation. This results in

38、 MD = 80 - 40 P. Without trade, domestic prices and quantities adjust such that import demand is zero. Thus, the price in the absence of trade is 2. 2.a.Foreigns export supply curve, XS, is XS = -40 + 40 P. In the absence of trade, the price is 1.b.When trade occurs, export supply is equal to import

39、 demand, XS = MD. Thus, using the equations from Problems 1 and 2a, P = 1.50, and the volume of trade is 20. 3.a.The new MD curve is 80 - 40 (P + t) where t is the specific tariff rate, equal to 0.5. (Note: In solving these problems, you should be careful about whether a specific tariff or ad valore

40、m tariff is imposed. With an ad valorem tariff, the MD equation would be expressed as MD = 80 - 40 (1 + t)P.) The equation for the export supply curve by the foreign country is unchanged. Solving, we find that the world price is $1.25, and thus the internal price at home is $1.75. The volume of trad

41、e has been reduced to 10, and the total demand for wheat at home has fallen to 65 (from the free trade level of 70). The total demand for wheat in Foreign has gone up from 50 to 55.b.and c. The welfare of the home country is best studied using the combined numerical and graphical solutions presented

42、 below in Figure 8.1.Figure 8.1where the areas in the figure are:a.55(1.75 - 1.50) -0.5(55 - 50)(1.75 - 1.50) = 13.125b.0.5(55 - 50)(1.75 - 1.50) = 0.625c.(65 - 55)(1.75 - 1.50) = 2.50d.0.5(70 - 65)(1.75 - 1.50) = 0.625e.(65 - 55)(1.50 - 1.25) = 2.50Consumer surplus change: -(a + b + c + d) = -16.87

43、5. Producer surplus change: a = 13.125. Government revenue change: c + e = 5. Efficiency losses b + d are exceeded by terms of trade gain e. (Note: In the calculations for the a, b, and d areas, a figure of 0.5 shows up. This is because we are measuring the area of a triangle, which is one-half of t

44、he area of the rectangle defined by the product of the horizontal and vertical sides.) 4.Using the same solution methodology as in Problem 3, when the home country is very small relative to the foreign country, its effects on the terms of trade are expected to be much less. The small country is much

45、 more likely to be hurt by its imposition of a tariff. Indeed, this intuition is shown in this problem. The free trade equilibrium is now at the price $1.09 and the trade volume is now $36.40. With the imposition of a tariff of 0.5 by Home, the new world price is $1.045, the internal home price is $

46、1.545, home demand is 69.10 units, home supply is 50.90, and the volume of trade is 18.20. When Home is relatively small, the effect of a tariff on world price is smaller than when Home is relatively large. When Foreign and Home were closer in size, a tariff of 0.5 by home lowered world price by 25

47、percent, whereas in this case the same tariff lowers world price by about 5 percent. The internal Home price is now closer to the free trade price plus t than when Home was relatively large. In this case, the government revenues from the tariff equal 9.10, the consumer surplus loss is 33.51, and the

48、 producer surplus gain is 21.089. The distortionary losses associated with the tariff (areas b + d) sum to 4.14 and the terms of trade gain (e) is 0.819. Clearly, in this small country example, the distortionary losses from the tariff swamp the terms of trade gains. The general lesson is the smaller

49、 the economy, the larger the losses from a tariff since the terms of trade gains are smaller. 5.ERP = (200 1.50 - 200)/100 = 100% 6.The effective rate of protection takes into consideration the costs of imported intermediate goods. Here, 55% of the cost can be imported, suggesting with no distortion, home value added would be 45%. A 15% increase in the price of ethanol, thoug