【PPT精品课件】货币金融学7版英文课件--14-大学课件2.pptx

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1、Chapter 14StructureofCentralBanksandtheBankofCanada 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.The Bank of Canada(The Bank)TheBankwascreatedbytheBankofCanadaActin1934andstartedoperationsonMarch11,1935Initially the Bank was a private institution but wasnationalizedin1938,soisnowanationalinstitutionwithheadqua

2、rtersinOttawaTheBankalsohasregionalofficesinToronto,Vancouver,Calgary,Montreal,andHalifaxUnlikeaprivatebankthatoperatesinpursuitofprofit,theBankofCanadaisresponsibleforthecountrysmonetarypolicyandfortheregulationofCanadasdeposit-basedfinancialinstitutions.2 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.Establis

3、hment of Selected Central BanksCountryYearcentralbankwasestablishedSweden1656UnitedKingdom1694France1800Belgium1850Germany1875Japan1882Italy1893Switzerland1905UnitedStates1913Canada19353 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.The Political Environment and the Bank of CanadaSincetheinceptionoftheBankofCan

4、adatherehavebeensevengovernors:1935-1954,GrahamTowers1955-1961,JamesCoyne1961-1973,LouisRasminski1973-1987,GeraldBouey1987-1994,JohnCrow1994-2000,GordonThiessen2001-,DavidDodge4 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.Formal Structure of the Bank of CanadaResponsibilityfortheoperationoftheBankrestswithaBo

5、ard of Directors,whichconsistsoffifteenmembersthegovernor(currentlyDavidDodge,whoisthechiefexecutiveofficerandchairmanoftheBoardofDirectors)theseniordeputygovernor,thedeputyministeroffinance,andtwelveoutsidedirectorsTheBoardappointsthegovernorandseniordeputygovernorwiththegovernmentsapproval,foraren

6、ewabletermof7years.Theoutsidedirectorsareappointedbytheministeroffinance,withcabinetapproval,fora3-yearterm.5 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.The Functions of the BankThefunctionsoftheBankofCanadaarebanknoteissuegovernmentdebtandassetmanagementservicescentralbankingservices,andmonetarypolicymanage

7、ment.6 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.Bank Note IssueBeforethecreationoftheBank,thefederalgovernmentandthe early banks issued notes designed to circulate ascurrency.By1945,however,thebankhadamonopolyovernoteissueinthecountry.TheBankalsoconductsongoingresearch,workingcloselywithprivatesectorpartne

8、rshipsandnote-issuingauthorities in other countries,in order to improve cost-effectiveness,increase the durability of bank notes,andreducecounterfeiting.7 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.Government Debt and Asset Management ServicesAsthefederalgovernmentsfiscalagent,theBankprovides debt-management

9、 services for the federalgovernment such as advising on borrowings,managingnewdebtofferings,andservicingoutstandingdebtmanagesthegovernmentsforeignexchangereservesheldby the Exchange Fund Account of the Department ofFinanceengagesininternationalfinancialtransactions,onbehalfofthegovernment,inorderto

10、influenceexchangerates8 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.Central Banking ServicesAsCanadascentralbank,theBankofCanadaserves as the lender of last resort if a bank faces aliquiditycrisis,therebypreventingbankrunsandpanics.Thislendingiscloselycoordinatedwiththetwofederalregulatoryagenciesthataresetup

11、specificallytoregulatefinancialinstitutions-OSFIandCDIChasexplicitresponsibilityfortheregulatoryoversightofthenationalpaymentssystem,operatedbytheCPAacts as the holder of deposit accounts of the federalgovernment,the directly clearing members of the CPA,international organizations such as the IMF,an

12、d othercentralbanks.9 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.Monetary PolicyAlthoughinCanadatheultimateresponsibilityformonetarypolicyrestswiththegovernment,theBankemployssuchtoolsasopen market operationsand,toalesserextent,theshifting of government balances between it and thedirectly clearing members of

13、 the CPA to implementchangesintheM.TheBanksultimateobjectiveistokeeplow.Low is closely related to the goal of steady economicgrowth,because businesses are more likely to invest toincreaseproductivityandeconomicgrowthwhenislow.Lowisalsodesirablebecauseitprotectsthepurchasingpowerofpensionersandthoseo

14、nfixedincomes.10 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.Bank of Canada IndependenceFactors making Bank of Canada independent1.Bankhasoperational(orinstrument)independence2.Bankhasmovedtowardsgreatertransparencyinitsoperations.TheBanksGoverningCouncilpublishestheMonetary Policy Report(everyMayandNovember)

15、,since1999theUpdatetotheMonetary Policy Report(everyJanuaryandJuly),theBank of Canada Review,andtheBank of Canada Banking and Financial Statistics.3.Bankincreasedthenumberofpressconferences,pressreleases,andspeeches,andalsoreorganizeditsregionaloffices,withtheobjectiveofimprovingcommunicationanditsa

16、ssessmentofeconomicconditionsacrossCanada.11 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.Bank of Canada IndependenceFactors making Bank of Canada dependent1.Jointresponsibilitysystem(since1967whentheBankofCanadaActwasamended)2.MinisterofFinancecanissueadirectivetotheBankindicatingthespecificpolicychangesthatt

17、heBankmustfollow.Thedirective,however,mustbepublishedindicatingnotonlythenewpolicythattheBankissupposedtoundertakebutalsotheperiodduringwhichitistoapply.Overall:Bank of Canada is quite independent but not on paper12 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.Formal Structure of the Fed13 2005 Pearson Educati

18、on Canada Inc.Federal Reserve Districts14 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.Informal Structure of the Fed15 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.Fed IndependenceFactors making Fed independent1.MembersofBoardhavelongterms2.Fedisfinanciallyindependent:ThisismostimportantFactors making Fed dependent1.Cong

19、resscanamendFedlegislation2.PresidentappointsChairmenandBoardmembersandcaninfluencelegislationOverall:Fed is quite independentOther Central Banks1.BankofEnglandleastindependent:Govt.makespolicydecisions2.EuropeanCentralBank:mostindependentpricestabilityprimarygoal3.BankofCanadaandJapan:fairdegreeofi

20、ndependence,butnotallonpaper4.Trendtogreaterindependence:NewZealand,Europeannations16 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.Explaining Central Bank BehaviorTheory of bureaucratic behavior1.Isanexampleofprincipal-agentproblem2.BureaucracyoftenactsinowninterestImplications for Central Banks:1.Acttopreserv

21、eindependence2.Trytoavoidcontroversy:oftenplaysgames3.SeekadditionalpoweroverbanksShould the Bank of Canada be Independent?Case For:1.IndependentBanklikelyhaslonger-runobjectives,politiciansdont:evidenceisindependenceproducesbetterpolicyoutcomesthroughoutthewhole2.Avoidspoliticalbusinesscycle3.LesslikelydeficitswillbeinflationaryCase Against:1.Bankmaynotbeaccountable2.Hinderscoordinationofmonetaryandfiscalpolicy3.Bankhasoftenperformedbadly 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.17