欧洲的核威慑：趋同点奇异点和合作前景.docx

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1、ContentsIntroduction1Nuclear deterrence in Europe: a contrasting picture21.1. Different positions and singularities21.2. An accepted role for NATOs extended deterrence3A policy that is regularly formalised and debated 31.2.1. Capabilities inside and outside Europe4Growing reflection on the contribut

2、ion of independent nuclear arsenals to European defence52. Substantial investments to perpetuate capabilities in a remodelled strategic ENVIRONMENT 6Participation in NATOs nuclear mission: a significant investment for some allies72.1. Renewing the components of deterrence, critical choices for the U

3、K and France 10Prospects and questions relating to nuclear weapons in Europe112.2. Variable political acceptability112.3. Limited prospects for cooperation 112.4. Budgetary and industrial issues122.5. Nuclear deterrence and new technologies 13Conclusion14for NATOs nuclear mission. Eurofighter und F-

4、18-Jets sollen offenbar Bundeswehr-Tornados ersetzen, Handelsblatt, 26th March 2020. These aircraft were certified to carry American weapons in the 1990s and could be recertified at a lower cost than the Eurofighters and in a shorter period of time. Sebastian Sprenger, Boeings F-18 jet may have a le

5、g up in Germany over Eurofighter, Defense News, 4th October 2019. The Ministry of Defence has confirmed its intention to proceed with this dual acquisition in answers to parliamentary questions. Ant wort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Sevim Dagdelen, Heike Hansel, Christ

6、ine Buchholz, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE.- Drucksache 19/19057, Das Waffensystem “Tornado, die Nachfolge und die nukleare Teilhabe, Drucksache 19/19884, 5th August 2020. Sebastian Sprenger, German Government Cites US Ties in Choice of F-18 Planes for Nuclear, Jamming Missions,

7、Defense News, 22nd April 2020. Although the German government does not provide public information on NATOs nuclear policy, it pointed out that this acquisition was essential to cement the transatlantic partnership and to support Germanys credibility within NATO： The Bundestag has so far authorised t

8、he purchase of Eurofighter aircraft, with a decision on the F/A-18 expected next year. Laurent Lagneau, op. cit. In the longer term, Berlin wants to work on a new-generation aircraft as part of the large-scale, multinational FCAS programme. Deutschland peilt neuen Eurofighter fur Tornado-Nachfolge a

9、n,“ Reuters, 11th December 2017.Extracts from letter: Prirnar wird dabei das europaische Kampfflugzeug Eurofighter betrachtet, sekundar auch drei US-amerikanische Muster .Dieses Projekt ist ein wichtiger Meilenstein in der Kontinuitat der engen und rich tungs weisenden Zusammenarbeit dieser beiden N

10、ationen fur Europa. Die Bundesregierung ist fest entsch- lossen, die Entwicklung eines gemeinsamen Waffensystems voranzutreiben; erste gemeinsame Aktivitaten haben bereits begonnen.liApart from the very specific case of Turkey, the other four NATO countries participating in the Alliances nuclear mis

11、sion have thus recently confirmed capability choices that should give them the medium-term possibility of continuing to be able to carry the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on their territory.This aspect has sometimes taken on secondary importance in debates on future combat aircraft fleets. It is tru

12、e that the nuclear mission represents only a fraction of the activities carried out by these aircraft. However, in the Belgian and German cases, this mission appears to have played a significant role in the decisions ultimately taken.The decision of the Belgian authorities has been criticised in som

13、e quarters for not preferring a European aircraft manufacturer. AFP, Belgium to buy US F-35 fighters in blow to EUs defence policy, Euroactiv, 26th October 2018; Jean Quatremer, T-35 : la Belgique ne volera pas europeen, Coulisses de Bruxelles, Liberation, 30th October 2018. Moreover, there are majo

14、r questions concerning the reality of the offset agreements promised by Lockheed Martin during the contract negotiations Olivier Gosset, La Belgique a-t-elle fait preuve de naivete lors de Pachat du F-35 ?, LEcho, 4th March 2020. (partnerships and offset orders for Belgian industry). Some observers

15、think that the choice of the F-35 could lead to Belgium being excluded from participating in a European consortium working on a future system specifically the Franco-German-Spanish FCAS project for budgetary and technical reasons. Claude-France Arnould, nEr is geen druk, er is geen chantage, De Stan

16、daard, 1st June 2018. Brussels interprets the decision differently and Belgian industry has clearly expressed its intention to join the multilateral European programme. Lindustrie aeronautique beige veut monter a bord des futurs avions de combat, LEcho, 20th June 2019.On the German side, discussions

17、 between opponents and promoters of the F-35 also focused on Berlins ability to sign a contract with a U.S. contractor while supporting a European vision of defence industrial capabilities. In this context, the choice of the F/A -18 can be seen as a compromise: the purchase of a small number of Amer

18、ican aircraft makes it possible to ensure NATOs nuclear mission in the short term without undermining the preference for a European solution for the immediate requirement (with a fleet mainly composed of Eurofighters) and in the long term (FCAS). Race for Germanys Next Fighter Jet Ends in Compromise

19、, T-, 26th March 2020.2.2. Renewing the components of deterrence: critical choices for the UK andFranceThe programmes to modernise the British SSBNs and renew all the components of the French nuclear deterrent represent major investments of key importance to the defence efforts of these two countrie

20、s.Considered a major project across the Channel, the Dreadnought programme is leading to a major mobilisation of the British industrial base. Emmanuelle Maitre, Programme Dreadnought : progres et interrogations/ Bulletin n0 55, Observatoire de la dissuasion, June 2018. The programme, worth an estima

21、ted 31- 41 billion, aims to have the first vessel in service by the early 2030s, with the ultimate goal of renewing the entire fleet of four submarines. Claire Mills, Replacing the UKs Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: Progress of the Dreadnought Class,H Briefing Paper, Number 8010, House of Commons, upd

22、ated on 17th July 2020.On the French side, the SSBN modernisation programme provides for a renewal of the various components and support missions while retaining the current format. This programme aims to ensure that the deterrence mission is fulfilled until 2O7O. La necessaire modernisation de la d

23、issuasion nucleaire,H Information Report No. 560 (2016-2017) by Xavier Pintat, Jeanny Lorgeoux, Andre Trillard, Pascal Allizard and Claude Haut, submitted on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces, tabled on 23rd May 2017. It is progressing in relatively gradual phases

24、with a significant peak in investments around 2020-2021, leading to a twofold increase in the budget traditionally earmarked for deterrence. Corentin Brustlein, Torces nucleaires franaises : quel renouvellement ?, Politique etrangere, vol. 3, 2017. Thus, deterrence is also a critical choice for the

25、French defence industry for the naval sector (submarines and propulsion) Helene Masson, Bruno Tertrais, Impact economique de la filiere industrielle Composante oceanique de la Dissuasion - Volet 1.SNLE, Recherches & Documents, FRS, n0 2/2017. and for two other sectors: combat aircraft (design of dua

26、l-capability fighterbombers) and missiles (cruise missiles and ballistic missiles). The industry players concerned must be capable of meeting the operational requirements of the strategic forces in all circumstances. More generally, the capabilities and format of the French Air Force and Navy are la

27、rgely determined by the operational needs of the strategic forces, whose requirements are deemed to be a priority and which must be capable of carrying out their mission without interruption.3. Prospects and questions relating to nuclear weapons in EuropeVariable political acceptabilityNuclear deter

28、rence remains unpopular in a number of European countries. Three EU states now consider it illegal under international law.Even within certain NATO member countries, the subject of nuclear power remains particularly sensitive and provokes acute opposition within the political class. This is the case

29、 in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway. In the states that host American nuclear weapons, this opposition takes the form of demonstrations organised by anti-nuclear NGOs around air bases, parliamentary petitions for the withdrawal of these weapons or strong opposition to dual-capable aircr

30、aft modernisation programmes.Since the Ukrainian crisis, governments themselves seem less sensitive to calls for disarmament and are more inclined to speak publicly of their support for the Atlantic Alliances extended deterrence policy. As a result, anti-nuclear movements do not seem to have enough

31、weight to challenge NATOs extended deterrence in the short term, though they can influence the evolution of the Alliances doctrine and capabilities, making any debate on the subject difficult and politically risky in those countries. Outside NATO, the subject of nuclear weapons is raised very cautio

32、usly by France with its partners, particularly Germany. Thus, while Berlin seems to have an interest in discussing these issues bilaterally, the German government remains reluctant to take a completely open and public stance on the subject for political reasons.3.1. Limited prospects for cooperation

33、The desire for openness encouraged by France must not hide an essential principle of deterrence, namely independence and sovereignty at all levels of the system, whether in terms of doctrine, employment, or industrial capabilities, etc.Thus, unlike the UK, which is closely tied to the United States,

34、 notably for the design and manufacture of its ballistic missiles, Frances strategy is to avoid dependence on any foreign state, even a strategic partner. Consequently, proposals for cooperation with the UK or any other non-nuclear weapon state are subject to red lines. On the one hand, France does

35、not wish to engage in doctrinal discussions with its partners or become involved in shared planning, hence its constant refusal to join NATOs Nuclear Planning Group. On the other hand, it wants to retain the ability to conduct a dialogue on deterrence on its own. This de facto limits the partners sc

36、ope for action, for example during nuclear force exercises, insofar as the French military authorities would no doubt oppose any initiative likely to weaken the internal competences required for the strategic forces to fulfil their mission.A second avenue of openness, pursued by successive French go

37、vernments since the end of the Cold War, concerns cooperation with the United Kingdom. At the strategic level, this was expressed in the 1995 Checkers declaration, according to which the vital interests of one could not be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened.1 J

38、oint press conference by Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, and John Major, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, on Franco-British cooperation, on the nuclear test ban, on the European Union, EMU and Bosnia, London, 30th October 1995. Ibid. In practice, gradual cooperation was formalised in

39、 the Treaty of Lancaster House signed in 2010. The decision was taken to ubuild and operate jointly dedicated radiographic and hydrodynamic facilities.1 Since then, the cooperation centred on the EPURE project has led to the construction of the installations at Valduc and the acquisition of machines

40、 enabling hydrodynamic and detonation experiments to be carried out. The programme also provides for the construction of a joint technology development centre. Information report filed pursuant to Article 145 of the Regulations by the National Defence and Armed Forces Commission following a fact-fin

41、ding mission on the results of the Lancaster House Agreements of 2nd November 2010 and presented by Jacques Marilossian and Charles de la Verpilliere. However, there are few concrete proposals to go beyond these programmes while strictly respecting the sovereignty of both partners.Finally, the lack

42、of consensus on the role of nuclear deterrence within the European Union rules out any ambition for cooperation at the EU level. This is not an option that is currently on the table, but it was considered when some countries, such as Italy and Germany, joined the NPT in the 1970s as non-nuclear stat

43、es. This option was conceived in the event of the creation of a federal Europe that could inherit the nuclear weapons of its member countries. Three European states are currently parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. They are thus prohibited from assisting, aiding or encouragi

44、ng any state to threaten the use of nuclear weapons. There is therefore no prospect now of an integrated nuclear deterrence strategy at EU level.3.2. Budgetary and industrial issuesThe implementation of nuclear strategies in Europe has budgetary and industrial consequences. Investments in deterrence

45、, whether by France, the UK or the countries participating in nuclear sharing within NATO, can be significant, particularly when it comes to modernisation, e.g. the acquisition of new, specially equipped fighter-bombers.At a time when European states are under strong pressure to preserve or even inc

46、rease defence budgets in a very tight budgetary context, prioritising nuclear deterrence can have contradictory effects. In certain segments, it can lead to increased investment because mission implementation requires advanced capabilities and larger equipment orders (e.g. in numbers of fighters, ta

47、nker aircraft, nuclear attack submarines to support SSBNs, etc.). In other respects, it can lead to crowding-out effects or controversial choices. Thus, in terms of platform characteristics, aircraft selected for their ability to participate in a nuclear mission may prove less adapted to certain oth

48、ers conventional operations.Moreover, participation in a nuclear deterrence mission has consequences in industrial terms. Some European countries, such as Sweden (Saabs Gripen offer), Ian Anthony, NATO and Nuclear Weapons,* Politique etrangere, n 5, 2009. refuse to sell equipment that could be used

49、for a nuclear mission. In other cases, such as Eurofighter, there is no opposition in principle to nuclear certification, nor is there any proven material difficulty, but there are cost and time constraints which convinced Germany, for example, to prefer a U.S. aircraft. Andrea Shalal, Eurofighter Doubts U.S. will Use Nuclear Certification to Tilt German Jets Bid, Reut