美国北约威慑和恢复力的下一步行动.docx

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1、June 2021Next Steps in NATO Deterrence and ResilienceC II tz German Marshall FundG I| of the United StatesSTRENGTHENING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATIONSteven Keil, Heinrich BraufS, and Elisabeth BrawWashington, DC Ankara Belgrade Berlin Brussels Bucharest Paris Warsawtions for cross-border movements of mi

2、litary forces and equipment, as well as improving transport infrastructure and ensuring effective command and control, resilience, and military support. The implementation of the EU Action Plan on Military Mobility and of NATOs Enablement Plan is ongoing, supported by the Structured Dialogue on Mili

3、tary Mobility established between the relevant NATO and EU staffs. The EUs commitment, including through co-funding of infrastructure projects, facilitates the deployment of NATO forces across Europe and is therefore an important factor in transatlantic burden sharing. But given the political and mi

4、litary importance of military mobility, progress must be speeded up. Leadership awareness and engagement at the highest levels is required in NATO, the EU, and European capitals at the political and military levels. Heinrich Brauss, Ben Hodges, and Julian Lindley-French, Moving Mountains for Europes

5、 Defense: The CEPA Military Mobility Project, Center for European Policy Analysis, March 3, 2021. Countries that are members of both NATO and the EU should engage to accelerate implementation. The Dutch-led EU Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) Project on Military Mobility has recently been op

6、ened to participation of the United States, Canada, and Norway. This offers the opportunity to enhance transparency, mutual understanding, coordination, and alignment between non-EU allies-particularly the North American allies-and EU member states in an area of eminent common interest and responsib

7、ility. The Netherlands and Germany, as the central hub for military mobility in Europe, should make every effort to advance the work within the two organizations and cooperation of the relevant staffs.Enhancing Air and Missile DefenseIn 2019, NATO decided not to respond to the deployment of Russian

8、land-based, nuclear-capable, intermediate-range missiles by deploying new nuclear missiles in Europe. Instead, it is primarily looking at advanced conventional capabilities. See NATO, Press Conference by NATO Secrelary General Jens Sten-berg following the meetings of NATO DOence Ministers, June 26,

9、2019.In 2019, NATO decided not to respond to the deployment of Russian land-based, nuclear-capable, intermediate-range missiles by deploying new nuclear missiles in Europe. Instead, it is primarily looking at advanced conventional capabilities. See NATO, Press Conference by NATO Secrelary General Je

10、ns Sten-berg following the meetings of NATO DOence Ministers, June 26, 2019. The provision of effective air and missile defense capabilities by European allies to protect critical infrastructure and forces for reinforcement is of utmost importance. During the 20 years of focusing on crisis-response

11、missions beyond NATOs borders in regions where there was no air threat, while European allies continuously reduced their defense budgets, this capability was almost abandoned in Europe. It now needs to be reconstituted expeditiously to protect critical infrastructure and reinforcement forces. This s

12、hould include capabilities able to strike Russian cruise missiles during early flight phases as well as defense against drones. The acquisition of these capabilities should be a top procurements priority for European allies. It offers the potential for multinational cooperation among them, including

13、 within the framework of PESCO.Enabling Joint Air Power and Joint FiresGiven the geography and space-forces-time relationship in Europe, NATOs airpower would likely be the first-choice reinforcement force in a crisis or conflict. Joint fires, particularly with long-range precision strike weapons, dr

14、ones, and electronic warfare capabilities are required to be able to defeat Russian A2/ AD capabilities and strike relevant command-and- control centers and massed forces, thus impeding Russias ability to wage a regional war. All relevant arrangements related to alert, decision-making, and command a

15、nd control must be in place to ensure the rapid availability of allied air forces, which should be visibly exercised in peacetime.Enhancing European EffortsEuropean countries must play a full part in ensuring security for their continent and provide some 50 percent This figure is essentially based o

16、n the comparable size of the GDPs: U.S. vs. European Allies collectively.European countries must play a full part in ensuring security for their continent and provide some 50 percent This figure is essentially based on the comparable size of the GDPs: U.S. vs. European Allies collectively. of the co

17、nventional forces and capabilities, including strategic enablers, required for collectivedefense in Europe and military crisis management. The European allies should set themselves a “European Level of Ambition“ for their fair share of the forces and capabilities NATO needs. On that basis, they shou

18、ld aim to develop a coherent set of forces capable of covering the whole mission spectrum一 from high-end maneuver warfare operations to crisis management and peacekeeping missions. Such a European force within NATO should be capable of acting as a first responder alongside the U.S. forces in Europe.

19、 It would strengthen the “European pillar” of NATO and at the same time constitute the EUs core military capacity to act on its own in crisis management, since the 21 European allies that would contribute to it are also EU members.Upholding Nuclear Sharing Arrangements NATOs response to the new Russ

20、ian SSC-8 includes enhanced readiness of its sub-strategic nuclear capabilities, which are provided by the United States, are stored in several European countries, and would be carried by dual-capable aircraft (DCA) in a military conflict. It is the only nuclear capability in Europe establishing the

21、 link to the United States, strategic nuclear potential. DCA and U.S. sub-strategic nuclear weapons also embody transatlantic nuclear risk sharing and the participation of European allies in NATOs nuclear planning. DCA exercises should at times be conducted concurrently with, or in the context of, c

22、onventional exercises to demonstrate the relation between conventional defense and nuclear deterrence. Russia must be made to realize that its territory is not a sanctuary if it were to threaten European allies with “euro-strategic“ nuclear missiles. NATO must therefore uphold its nuclear-sharing ar

23、rangements, which remain central to the United States extended nuclear deterrence.Russia must also be induced to embark on arms control as a means to reduce risks and enhance strategic stability in Europe. Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin have extended the New START Treaty by five years. The

24、United States and Russia will presumably commence negotiations on a new agreement, hopefully leading to further reductions of their strategic nuclear arsenals. Sub-strategic weapons threatening Europe should be included in these negotiations and NATO should be the forum for consultations among allie

25、s on any future arrangements.ConclusionNATO has entered an age of global competition and strategic simultaneity. The spillover effects bear on Europes security, which has a regional and global dimension. Chinas geo-economic strategy has the potential of shaking NATOs cohesion. Resilience has acquire

26、d an additional dimension and must include protection against vulnerabilities in alliance critical infrastructure including stemming from Russian or Chinese ownership or investment.NATO must broaden its approach to security. It should help build a community of democracies, including in the Indo-Paci

27、fic. It must maintain its technological edge and allied interoperability. It must also address the manifold security implications of climate change as a crisis multiplier and its geopolitical implications.While addressing global developments, NATO must remain a regional alliance. It must ensure Euro

28、-Atlantic stability. Ensuring credible deterrence and defense against Russia remains its priority task. Therefore, its agreed posture must be implemented expeditiously and fully. In light of the evolving strategic environment further actions are required to ensure that NATO s posture is fully credib

29、le.Boosting Transatlantic Resilience throughSecure SupplyElisabeth BrawWhen the superfreighter Ever Given accidentally blocked the Suez Canal for nearly a week in March, a global public discovered the vulnerability of global shipping. It was a much-needed realization. Ships transport 80 percent of t

30、he worlds trade,1 but most consumers have minimal understanding of the complexities and vulnerabilities involved in transporting their goods around the clock. Todays advanced economies depend on globe-spanning supply chains operated by private companies around the world. The supply chains involve no

31、t just shipping companies and other transportation providers, but companies all the way from end manufacturer to third-tier supplier as well. Today virtually every Western company is in some way connected to global supply chains. So are defense ministries, which rely on private companies for a range

32、 of goods and services. This makes supplychain vulnerability a matter for NATO too.The Ever Given incident caused bemused postings by Twitter users, most of whom were unaware of the extreme precision involved in guiding through the narrow Suez Canal such ships, which carry up to 20,000 containers fi

33、lled with every conceivable type of product. But delays in key global shipping arteries are no laughing matter. The incident was resolved within a week, after specialist crews managed to unmoor the Ever Given. By then, hundreds of other cargo ships were either waiting to go through the canal or had

34、embarked on the longer route via the Cape of Good Hope. Three days after the Ever Given became lodged sideways, 248 cargo ships originally bound for the Suez Canal were already underway toUnited Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of maritime ransport, undated.their destinations by t

35、he longer route around the Cape of Good Hope. James Baker, Container lines avoiding Suez turn to long route to Asia for backhaul： Lloyds List, March 26, 2021. The delays resulting from the accidental blockade continued for weeks after it had been resolved. By April 6, 66,480 containers carrying ever

36、ything from furniture to auto parts had still not reached their destinations. Jennifer Smith, “From Beer to Flat-Pack Fumiture, Suez Blockage Offers a Global Trade Snapshot： Wall Street Journal, April 6, 2021. The journeys of up to 200,000 live animals being transported on cargo ships were also dela

37、yed by the blockade; Cristian Gherasim, uSome 200,000 animals trapped in Suez canal likely to die： EU Observer, March 30, 2021. it is unclear how many of them survived.A Wicked ProblemThe Ever Given incident demonstrated why global supply chains are an attractive target for hostile states and their

38、proxies: they span the globe and are extremely complex, and advanced economies in particular depend on them to function without disruption. Supply chains are, of course, nothing new. In ancient Rome, wealthy citizens arranged for fine goods such as marble and amber to be transported long distances s

39、o that they could use them for anything from construction to jewelry. In the past three decades or so, however, globalization has accelerated. The end of the Cold War led to market economies being introduced in more European countries and elsewhere, and the advent of World Trade Organization and Chi

40、nas accession to it sped up the process even more. As late as the 1990s, for example, Western automakers sourced most of their components from their home countries or nearby countries. Today their supply chains span the globe and do not just involve the direct suppliers.While relatively simple produ

41、cts such as shoes often involve suppliers in other countries, complex products can involve not just first-tier but second-tier and third-tier suppliers as well. A car, for example, consists of around 30,000 components. According to one estimate, an auto manufacturer has around 5,000 direct (first-ti

42、er) suppliers and each of them in turn has around 250 subcontractors (second-tier suppliers). Elisabeth Braw, “The Manufacturers Dilemma： Foreign Policy, April 27,2019. This means that the end manufacturer has a supply chain of 1.25 million suppliers and has to manage not just its complexity but als

43、o the fact that it is impossible to know-let alone scrutinize-every part of the supply chain. The end manufacturer cannot know how vulnerable each part of the chain is.End manufacturers may not discover a vulnerability until a problem occurs. That was the case in 2011 when a tsunami hit Japan and ca

44、used a devastating nuclear-reactor accident in Fukushima prefecture. This forced a large number of companies there to temporarily close, including ones that are not particularly big but supply customers with crucial components. At the time of the accident, 22 percent of the global supply of 300 mm s

45、ilicon wafers came from one plant in the area, and 60 percent of key car components also came from the prefecture. Dennis Fisher, 4tJapan Disaster Shakes Up Supply-Chain Strategiesr Harvard Business School Working Knowledge, May 31, 2011. One company making the pigment that gives cars their shimmery

46、 finish was several brands, sole supplier. The just-in-time model that most major companies around the world have been introducing since the 1970s meant that all these customers lacked pigment supplies to see them through a temporary disruption. Ford and Chrysler, among others, found themselves havi

47、ng to suspend sales of cars in certain colors. Naomi Tajitsu, “Five yeans aftei Japan quake, rewiring of auto supply chain hits limits： Reuters, March 30, 2016. The Fukushima accident taught companies an invaluable lesson regardingthe use of single-source suppliers, and they have also tried to at le

48、ast partly move away from just-in-time deliveries. Just-in-time is, however, highly cost-effective, and shareholders prefer executives who run a tight ship and maximize profits over those who plan for Ujust-in-case scenarios.Democracies9 DilemmaThe fundamental dilemma facing liberal democracies toda

49、y is that their way of life rests on the smooth functioning of the private sector, which is in turn dependent on the smooth functioning of their supply chains and provision of vital services. Businesses make strenuous and successful efforts to perfect the efficiency of their operations and supply chains to minimize or eliminate the risk of disruption. They have done so with such success that the public now takes constant convenience fo