格鲁吉亚：背景与美国政策.docx

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1、Georgia: Backcjound and US PolicyContentsIntroduction 1Politics and Go variance1October 2020 Election Controversy4Arrest of Opposition Leader5EU-Brokered Political Dialogue6Judicial Reform Challenges7Economy 8Relations with the European Union and NATO10Relations with Russia and Secessionist Regions1

2、2Abkhazia and South OssHia122008 Russia-Georgia War 13Conflict Resolution 13After the 2008 War and Recent Developments 14U.S.-Georgia Relations 15Congressional Action 16Foreign Aid17Trade20FiguresFigure 1. Gecrgia11TablesTable 1. October 2020 Parliamentary Elections3ContactsAuthor Information20Congr

3、essional Research ServiceIn 2017, the IMF approved a three-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement to provide Georgia with about $285 million in loans to support economic reforms focusing, among other things, on financial stability and infrastructure investment. The IMF noted the need for Geor

4、gia to increase its agricultural productivity, improve its business environment, and reform its education system.弗 IMF,ut IMF Executive Board Approves US$285.3 Million Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility for Georgia,press release, April 12,2017;andIMF, Country Report No. 17/97, Apr

5、il 2017. To help Georgia address the COVID-19 pandemic, the IMF expanded Georgias lending program and, by December 2020, had disbursed about $585 million to Georgia. IMF,44 IMF Executive Board Completes the Seventh Review under the Extended Fund Facility for Georgia,press release, December 16,2020.G

6、eorgia has improved its energy security in recent years. Almost all of Georgias natural gas supplies come from neighboring Azerbaijan. Georgia has rehabilitated hydropower plants and constructed new ones, although some hydropower development plans have engendered local and CSO opposition. Giorgi Lom

7、sadze, Troubled Dams on Georgias Waters/ Eurasianet, February 19, 2020; Andrew Barry and Evelina Gambino, 46 U n sust ai n abl e T ran sit io n ? Hydropower and the Post-Co vid Recovery in Georgia,“ openDemocracy, July 30, 2020; andJAM News, uNamakhvani HPP - 4 Dam of Death9 or Critical Energy Secur

8、ity?,March 5, 2021.In 2020, Georgias largest merchandise trading partner was the EU, which accounted for about 22% of total trade ($2.5 billion, down from $3 billion in 2019). Individually, Georgias four largest trading partners were Turkey ($1.6 billion, or 14% of Georgias trade), Russia ($1.3 bill

9、ion, 12%), China ($1.2 billion, 10%), and Azerbaijan ($934 million, 8%). Half of Georgias merchandise exports went to four countries: China, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Bulgaria. Georgias main exports were copper ores, beverages (wine, water, and spirits), motor vehicles, and iron and steel. Geo st at,

10、as reportedin T rade Data Monitor. Georgia has free trade agreements with the EU and China.From 2015 to 2019, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Georgia averaged $1.6 billion a year.About 60% of the total amount came from Azerbaijan, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Turkey. During this perio

11、d, most FDI was in transport (24%); other leading sectors were finance (15%), energy (12%), and construction (9%). Geo st at, at . geostat.ge/en. IMF, Country Report No. 17/97, April 2017, p. 45. In 2017, the IMF noted that attracting FDI to sectors with high export potential, including tourism and

12、agriculture, is crucial to ensure growth in foreign markets.,，53 In 2020, FDI declined to an estimated $617 million.Cancellation of Anaklia Port ProjectGeorgia has aspired to be a key transit hub for the growing East-West overland trade route between China and Europe. In January 2020, however, the G

13、eorgian government canceled a contract to develop a major new deepwater port and free industrial zone in Anaklia, located on Georgias Black Sea coast near the Russian- occupied region of Abkhazia. The port project was considered Georgias largest-ever infrastructure investment and was to be accompani

14、ed by major government investments in Georgias road and rail infrastructure. Officials said project consortium partners, who are contesting the cancellation in international arbitration court, failed to raise the necessary funds for the project. In March 2021, Georgian officials said a process to se

15、lect a new port developer would commence soon.Many observers have speculated about the government motives for canceling the contract and its level of commitment to the port project. In 201 9, Mamuka Khazaradze, the head of the project consortiums principal Georgian partner (TBC Holding, an affiliate

16、 of Georgias largest bank) and his deputy were charged with money laundering, in connection with what officials alleged were improper financial transactions from more than a decade before. Subsequently, a U.S. partner in the consortium withdrew from the project.Observers raised questions about the c

17、ase against Khazaradze. The U.S. government stated concerns “about the context and timing of the charges.0 In January 2020, the Georgian public defender (ombudsperson) filed an amicus curiae brief that stated, uthe case materials do not contain the elements necessary for assessing an action as a cri

18、me of money laundering/,Sources: Civil Georgia, *Key Points: TBC Bank Affair,M March 9, 20 I 9; Transparency International Georgia, Charges Against the Founders of TBC Bank Raise Many Questions about the Investigation,M July 25,201 9; U.S. Embassy Georgia, The U.S. Embassy Statement on Criminal Char

19、ges Against TBC Bank Co-founders Mamuka Khazaradzeand Badri Japaridze, July 25, 201 9; Giorgi Lomsadze, “Georgia Cancels Contract for Black Sea Megaport,Eurasia net, January 9, 2020; Public Defender of Georgia, “Amicus Curiae Brief Relating to Mamuka Khazaradzeand Badri Japaridzes Case,“ January I 5

20、, 2020; Agendage, “PM Garibashvili: We Will Start Selecting New Potential Investor for Anaklia Deep Sea Port Project in Near Future,“ March 4, 202 I.Relations with the European Union and NATOThe Georgian government has long made closer integration with the EU and NATO a priority. According to recent

21、 polls, more than 80% of the Georgian population supports membership in the EU and more than 70% supports membership in NATO. Center for Insights in Survey Research (International Republican Institute),44 Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Georgia,February 2021.The Georgian government has long made

22、 closer integration with the EU and NATO a priority. According to recent polls, more than 80% of the Georgian population supports membership in the EU and more than 70% supports membership in NATO. Center for Insights in Survey Research (International Republican Institute),44 Public Opinion Survey:

23、Residents of Georgia,February 2021.In 2014, Georgia concluded an association agreement with the EU that included a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area and encouraged harmonization with EU laws and regulations. The free-trade agreement was applied provisionally in 2014 and entered into force in 20

24、16. The textof theassociation agreement and the corresponding agenda for 2017-2020 are available at georgia/9740/eugeorgia-association-agreement_en. More information on the free-trade agreement is available from the Georgian government at . In 2017, the EU granted Georgian citizens vis a-free entry

25、to the EUs Schengen area of free movement, which allows individuals to travel without passport checks between most European countries. The EU also is a major provider of foreign aid to Georgia, providing more than 100 million (about $120 million) a year and additional pandemic-related aid. European

26、Commission and European External Action Service (EEAS), Joim Staff Working Do cum ent: Association Implementation Report on Georgia, February 5, 2021, p. 2. NATO,uRelations with Georgia,updated October 21,2020.NATO considers Georgia one of the Alliances closest partners.叼 a NAT O-Georgia Commission

27、was established in 2008. At the NATO 2014 Wales Summit, NATO leaders established a Substantial NATO-Georgia Package to help Georgia bolster its defense capabilities. Georgia is one of NATOs Enhanced Opportunity Partners, a cooperative status currently granted to six of NATOs close strategic partners

28、. NATO?s Enhanced Opportunity Partners are Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, Sweden, and Ukraine. NATO, Partnership Interoperability Initiative, updated June 12, 2020. In 2015, Georgia joined the NATO Response Force, a rapid reaction force.Georgia is one of the top troop contributors (and the top

29、 non-NATO contributor) to the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. As of February 2021, Georgia is the fourth-largest contributor to the Resolute Support Mission, with 860 troops. Georgia also contributed more than 2,250 troops to the NAT O-led Kosovo Force, or KFOR, between 1999 and200

30、8.NATO, Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures/ updated August 2020; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Security Cooperation with Georgia/5 June 16,2020. At its height, Georgias deployment to NATOs previous International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan reached over

31、 1,500 troops, who served with no operational caveats.In 2015, NATO opened a Joint Training and Evaluation Center in Georgia to enhance interoperability and operational readiness. The center has hosted two joint NATO-Georgia exercises. Some NATO member states participate in two sets of regular U.S.-

32、Georgia led military exercises: Agile Spirit and Noble Partner (see Military Aid” below).Closer integration with the EU and NATO does not appear to have enabled Georgia to improve its near-term prospects for membership in these organizations. The EU is unlikely to consider Georgia a candidate for me

33、mbership soon, given the EUs internal challenges and a lack of support for enlargement among many members. In 2008, NATO members agreed Georgia and Ukraine would become members of NATO, but neither state has been granted a clear path to or timeline for membership. In the Bucharest Summit Declaration

34、 of April 2008, heads of state and government of NATO member countries declared that uNATO welcomes Ukraines and Georgias Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NAT O. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. NAT0,44 Bucharest Summit Declaration,April 3, 2008.Many obser

35、vers attribute Georgias lack of a clear path to NATO membership to some members9 concerns that Georgias membership could lead to a heightened risk of war with Russia. Many believe NATO will not move forward with membership as long as Russia occupies Georgian territory and the conflict remains unreso

36、lved.Figure I. GeorgiaSources: Map created by CRS. Map information generated using data from the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, DeLorme, Department of State, and Esri.Relations with Russia and Secessionist RegionsSince the 1990s, Georgias relations with Russia have been tense. Georgian aut

37、horities accuse Moscow of obstructing Georgias Western integration. Many observers believe Russia supports the secession of Georgias breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to prevent Georgia from joining NATO.Abkhazia and South Ossetia originally sought to secede from Georgia in the early 1

38、990s, during and after Georgias pursuit of independence from the Soviet Union. The South Ossetia conflict occurred in 1991 -1992; the Abkhazia conflict occurred in 1992-1993. At the time, many observers believed Soviet and, later, Russian authorities instigated the conflicts, assisted local forces t

39、o halt Georgias efforts to distance itself from Russia, or both. After the conflicts ended, Russian forces remained in both regions to serve as peacekeepers.Abkhazia and South OssetiaAbkhazia and South Ossetia are small but strategically located regions of Georgia that make up almost 20% of Georgias

40、 territory (see Figure 1). Abkhazia accounts for more than half of Georgias Black Sea coastline. South Ossetia is located astride a major transportation route to Russia and close to Georgias main east-west highway.Most Georgians-who were previously the largest ethnic group in Abkhazia-were forced to

41、 flee Abkhazia during the 1992-1993 war and became internally displaced persons, or IDPs.Abkhazias population in the 1989 Soviet census was about 525,000, of which 46% were ethnic Georgians and 17% were ethnic Abkhaz. Authorities in Abkhazia allege the regions population in 2011 was about 240,000 (5

42、0% Abkhaz, 19% Georgian, 17% Armenian, and 9% Russian).The Georgian government has estimated that about 40,000 ethnic Georgians still live in Abkhazia, primarily in the southeastern district of Gali. Many observers note these Georgians from the Gali district face challenges regarding freedom of move

43、ment, political rights, and native-language education. Giorgi Menabde, uGeorgians in Abkhazia: A Choice Between Assimilation and Emigration,“ Eurasia Daily Monitor, August 6, 2019; Olesya Vartanyan,66 Easing Travel Between Cieorgia and Breakaway Abkhazia,“ International Crisis Group, September 5, 20

44、19. In 2020, a new local government came to power in Abkhazia and suggested it might be more attentive to the rights of the regions ethnic Georgian population. OC Media, 44 Abkhazian HR Commissioner Condemns Torture, Ethnic Discrimination, and Domestic Violence,v June 30, 2020; Civil Georgia, “Abkha

45、zias Ankvab:4Gali Georgians Are Our Citizens,August 14, 2020.Authorities in South Ossetia allege the regions population in 2015 was about 54,000 (90%Ossetian, 7% Georgian). In the 1989 Soviet census, the regions population was about 98,000 (66% Ossetian, 29% Georgian). Most ethnic Georgians who rema

46、ined in the region after the 2008 war are residents of the easternmost Akhalgori region, which was under Georgias direct control until the war (see “2008 Russia-Georgia War, below).As in occupied regions of Ukraine, Russia has provided citizenship to residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Observer

47、s note that Russia justified its 2008 invasion of Georgia in part by alleging the need to defend Russian citizens in South Ossetia. Yuri Zoria, tIs Russias Passport Scheme in Donbas a Harbinger of Full-Scale Invasion Like in 2008 Georgia? Euromaidan Press, May 14, 2019; and Toru Nagashima,44 Russia

48、Passportization Policy T oward Unrecognized2008 Russia-Georgia WarGeorgias relations with Russia worsened after Georgias 2003 Rose Revolution, which brought ex-President Saakashvili to power. Lincoln A. Mitchell, Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia s Rose Revolution (Philadelphia: U

49、niversity of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); and Cory Welt, “Georgias Rose Revolution: From Regime Weakness to Regime Collapse,in Valerie Bunce, Michael A. McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, eds., Democracy andA u th orita ri a n ism in the Post-Com m unist World (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 155-188. Under Saakashvili, the Georgian government sought to accelerate G