科索沃：背景与美国政策.docx

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1、Kosovo: Backqround and US PolicyContentsOverview 1Domestic Issues1Politics 22021 Snap Parliamentary Election and Outlook3Democracy and the Rule of Law 5Kosovo Serbs and Northo-n Kosovo5Economy6Relations with Serbia7War and Independence8EU-Led Dialogue to Normalize Relations8Dialogue Outlook9Transiti

2、onal Justice 10Relations with the EU and NATO11European Union 11NATO12U.S.-Kosovo Relations 13Support for Normalization of Kosovo-SerbiaRelations13Foreign Assistance 14Cooperation on Transnational Threats and SecurityIssues 15Congressional Engagement16FiguresFigure 1. Republic of Kosovo 2U.S. Foreig

3、n Assistance to Kosovo Since2008 15TablesTable 1. Early Parliamentary Election Results, October2019 and Fd)ruary 2021 4ContactsAuthor Information16Congressional Research ServiceKosovo Serb electoral participation and integrating law enforcement and the judiciary in the north into statewide instituti

4、ons. Other agreements, such as the ASM, have not been implemented. Donika Emini and Isidor a Stakic, Belgrade and Pristina: Lost in Nonnalisation?, EU Institute for Security St udies, April 2018; BIRN, Big Deal: Lost in Stagnation, April 2015; Marta Szpala, Serbia-Kosovo Negotiations: Playing for Ti

5、me Under Pressure from the West, Centre for Eastern Studies (Warsaw), August 21,2018.Kosovo Serb electoral participation and integrating law enforcement and the judiciary in the north into statewide institutions. Other agreements, such as the ASM, have not been implemented. Donika Emini and Isidor a

6、 Stakic, Belgrade and Pristina: Lost in Nonnalisation?, EU Institute for Security St udies, April 2018; BIRN, Big Deal: Lost in Stagnation, April 2015; Marta Szpala, Serbia-Kosovo Negotiations: Playing for Time Under Pressure from the West, Centre for Eastern Studies (Warsaw), August 21,2018.Althoug

7、h the dialogue format does not predetermine a specific outcome, the EUhas urged a comprehensive, legally binding agreement between the parties. Two particularly thorny issues in any such agreement are (1) what the outcome of normalization would entail (whether Serbia would fully recognize Kosovo or

8、accept Kosovos institutions and U.N. membership without formal recognition) and (2) how to address northern Kosovo in a final settlement. On the latter issue, U.S. and EU officials have mostly rejected local (primarily Serbian) leaders occasional hints at partition as a potential solution, fearing i

9、t would set a dangerous precedent in the Western Balkans. Analysts believe such a scenario might entail transferring Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo to Serbia, possibly in exchange for Albanian-majority areas of Serbia Presevo Valley. Alternatively, some consider expanded autonomy fo

10、r Kosovo Serbs, such as the ASM, to be a compromise that would preserve Kosovo territorial integrity. The ASM agreements implementation has faced legal hurdles in Kosovo, however, and some Kosovo officials fear that enhanced autonomy could give Serbia greater leverage in Kosovo. ICG, Relaunching the

11、 Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue; Balkans Policy Research Group, Scenarios for the Grand Finale Between Kosovo and Serbia, 2018; ICG, Kosovo and Serbia After the ICJ Opinion, 2010. As a third scenario, some have posited that an offer of accelerated EU membership and/or financial assistance could bring about

12、normalization of relations.而 Given signs of enlargement fatigue“ in some EU member states, as well as EU concern over Serbias compliance with core EU membership requirements, it is unclear whether the EU would be in a position to extend such an offer.Since late 2015, there has been little progress i

13、n reaching new agreements or implementing existing measures. Further, a shift in focus absorbed some of the dialogues energies. In 2018, then-President Thaqi and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic raised the prospect of partition as a settlement. To the surprise of some, Trump Administration officia

14、ls broke with long-standing U.S. opposition to redrawing borders by signaling willingness to consider such a proposal if Kosovo and Serbia were to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. RFE/RL, Bolton Says U.S. Won Oppose Kosovo-Serbia Land Swap Deal, August 24, 2018. Shortly thereafter, the dialo

15、gue came to a halt when Kosovo imposed tariffs on Serbian goods in retaliation for Serbias campaign to undermine Kosovos international legitimacy. Under U.S. and EU pressure, Kosovo lifted the measures in June 2020, and EU-led talks resumed in July. EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajcak has faci

16、litated recent talks on missing persons, property issues, financial claims, and implementation of the ASM; the latter in particular remains a fraught issue. European Western Balkans, 44The Fifth Round of Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue at the Expert Level Was Held Today in Brussels/9 October 29, 2020.Dia

17、logue OutlookThe EU-led dialogue has been operating for more than a decade. Many analysts view a final, comprehensive agreement as unlikely in the near term yet caution that the status quo cannot hold indefinitely. Politicians in Kosovo and Serbia appear to have done relatively little to prepare the

18、 public to accept compromise. The International Crisis Group describes a seeming impasse: ”Serbia has one big concession to makerecognitionwhich is also Kosovos main goal. Yet Kosovo has not explained what it is prepared to offer in exchange and Serbias aims are nebulous; Serbian President Vucic typ

19、ically says his country must get something in return .but offers no details. With the November 2020 resignation of then-President Thaqi, who largely had led Kosovos participation in the dialogue since 2011, Kosovo may lack a prominent proponent for a negotiated settlement.,，39 Many in Kosovo, includ

20、ing key politicians, contend the country should not have to concede anything to Serbia.9 ICG, Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue. Marko Subotic, Kurtis Comments Spark Pessimism in Belgrade over Kosovo -Serbia Talks, EuroNews, February 18,2021.Political divisions in Kosovo have made it difficult

21、for the country to bring a unified position to negotiations. Kosovos spring 2021 leadership changes could bring greater internal cohesion and coordination but also could bring a more hard-line approach to relations with Serbia. While in opposition, fctevendosje criticized the dialogue, protested aga

22、inst some of its agreements, and called for wartime reparations from Serbia. Ahead of spring 2021 elections, Xbtevendosje leader (now Prime Minister) Kurti stated that the dialogue would be a relatively low priority and proposed revisiting some of the agreements that have already been reached. Valon

23、 Fan a,t Kurti Urges for Discussion on Reparations in Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue,Prishtinalnsight, October 28, 2019; Marko Savkovic,How Does Kurti See the Dialogue?,European Western Balkans, February 1 1,2021. Quoted in Reuters, Kosovo Parliament Elects Vjosa Osmani as New National President,April 4, 20

24、21. President Osmani has voiced support for the dialogue but calls for “remorse and an apology from Serbia and . justice for those who have suffered from Serbian crimes.42 Both leaders are likely to face considerable EU and U.S. pressure to participate in the dialogue and work toward a comprehensive

25、 final settlement.Separately, some observers caution that growing uncertainty over the Western Balkan countries EU membership prospects could alter the incentive structure weaving together the dialogue and the accession process, making normalization more challenging.Transitional JusticeTransitional

26、justice relating to the 1998-1999 war is a sensitive, emotionally charged issue in Kosovo and Serbia and a source of friction in efforts to normalize relations. Serbian police, soldiers, and paramilitary forces were accused of systematic, intentional human rights violations during the conflict. Abou

27、t 13,000 people were killed, and nearly half of the population was forcibly driven out of Kosovo. An estimated 20,000 people were victims of conflict-related sexual violence. The vast majority of all victims were ethnic Albanians. On a smaller scale, some KLA fighters-particularly at the local level

28、-carried out retributive acts of violence against Serb civilians, other minority civilians, and Albanian civilians whom they viewed as collaborators.4 For further information, see HRW, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, 2001 (hereinafter, HRW, Under Orders); Amnesty International, Wounds That Bum O

29、ur Souls”: Compensation for Kosovos Wartime Rape Survivors, But Still No Justice, 2017; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told: The Human Rights Findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, 1999.Transitional justice relating to the 1998-1999 w

30、ar is a sensitive, emotionally charged issue in Kosovo and Serbia and a source of friction in efforts to normalize relations. Serbian police, soldiers, and paramilitary forces were accused of systematic, intentional human rights violations during the conflict. About 13,000 people were killed, and ne

31、arly half of the population was forcibly driven out of Kosovo. An estimated 20,000 people were victims of conflict-related sexual violence. The vast majority of all victims were ethnic Albanians. On a smaller scale, some KLA fighters-particularly at the local level-carried out retributive acts of vi

32、olence against Serb civilians, other minority civilians, and Albanian civilians whom they viewed as collaborators.4 For further information, see HRW, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, 2001 (hereinafter, HRW, Under Orders); Amnesty International, Wounds That Bum Our Souls”: Compensation for Kosovos

33、 Wartime Rape Survivors, But Still No Justice, 2017; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told: The Human Rights Findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, 1999.Before closing in 2017, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslav

34、ia (ICTY) tried several high-profile cases relating to the Kosovo conflict, including those of deposed Serbian leader Milosevic, who died before his trial finished, and former Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj, who was twice acquitted of charges relating to his role as a KLA commander. Courts i

35、n Kosovo and Serbia now handle most war crimes cases. Weak law enforcement and judicial cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia is an impediment in the many cases in which evidence, witnesses, victims, and alleged perpetrators are no longer in Kosovo. On current challenges in transitional justice, see

36、 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2020; Humanitarian Law Centre (Belgrade), Regional Judicial Cooperation in the Prosecution of War Crimes: Analysis and Improvement Critics assertthat low political will in Serbia in particular hampers transitional justice. Officials from successive post-Milosevic Se

37、rbian governments have been criticized for downplaying or failing to acknowledge Serbias role in the wars in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo in the 1990s and for fostering a climate that is hostile to transitional justice and societal reconciliation with the past.Recommendations, December 2018.that low

38、political will in Serbia in particular hampers transitional justice. Officials from successive post-Milosevic Serbian governments have been criticized for downplaying or failing to acknowledge Serbias role in the wars in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo in the 1990s and for fostering a climate that is ho

39、stile to transitional justice and societal reconciliation with the past.Recommendations, December 2018. On Serbia, see Milica Stojanovic, Serbia: A Year of Denying War Crimes,“ Balkanlnsight, December 26,2019; HRW, Under Orders, Humanitarian Law Centre (Belgrade), Report on War Crimes Trials in Serb

40、ia, 2019; and relevant sections in European Commission, Serbia Progress Report 2020. U.S. Embassy in Kosovo, Quint Member States Statement,January 4,2018.Transitional justice processes concerning the KLA are controversial in Kosovo. Under U.S. and EU pressure, in 2015 the National Assembly adopted a

41、 constitutional amendment and legislation to create the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor Office. These institutions are part of Kosovos judicial system but are primarily staffed by international jurists and located in The Hague, Netherlands, to allay concerns over witness intimid

42、ation and political pressure. They are to investigate the findings of a 2011 Council of Europe report concerning allegations of war crimes committed by some KLA units. The Specialist Chambers is controversial in Kosovo, because it is to try only alleged KLA crimes. In 2017, lawmakers from the then-g

43、overning coalition moved to abrogate the Specialist Chambers but backed down after the United States and allies warned that doing so would have severe negative consequences.,，46Over the past two years, the Special Chambers has begun issuing summons for questioning to former KLA combatants and filing

44、 indictments against prominent former officials who were KLA commanders. Serbeze Haxhiaj, Kosovo: War Commanders Questioned as Prosecutors Step Up Probes,Balkanlnsiht, DecemberOver the past two years, the Special Chambers has begun issuing summons for questioning to former KLA combatants and filing

45、indictments against prominent former officials who were KLA commanders. Serbeze Haxhiaj, Kosovo: War Commanders Questioned as Prosecutors Step Up Probes,Balkanlnsiht, December The highest-profile case is that of former President and Prime Minister Hashim Thaqi, a towering figure in Kosovos push for

46、independence and its politics for more than two decades. Along with three high-profile codefendants, Thagis charges include six counts of crimes against humanity and four counts of war crimes.27,2019; Dean Pineles,44 American Dilemma: What if Kosovos Thaci Is Indicted? Balkanlnsight, January 24, 201

47、9. 48 Kosovo Specialist Chambers, Hashim Thaqiet al. (Case number KSC-BC-2020-06). While many in Kosovo criticized the actions of the Specialist Chambers and the Specialist Prosecutor Office, EU and U.S. officials reiterated support for the courts and lauded Kosovo officials5 cooperation with the bo

48、dies. U.S. Embassy Pristina, Statement from the Heads of Mission,v September 18,2020; European External Action Service,Kosovo: Statement by the Spokesperson on the Latest Developments,November 5, 2020.Relations with the EU and NATOThe EU and NATO have played key roles in Kosovo; these relationships

49、continue to evolve alongside Kosovos state-building processes.European UnionThe EU has played a significant role in Kosovos postwar development. As discussed above, the EU has facilitated a dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia since 2011. The EU provides the largest amount of foreign assistance to Kosovo; it allocated 602 million (about $717 million) in assistance from 2014 to 2020.5 European Commission