金融市场与机构(第六版)测试银行 ch20.docx
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1、Financial Markets and Institutions, 6e (Mishkin/Eakins)Chapter 20 Banking Regulation20.1 Multiple Choice1) During the boom years of the 1920s, bank failures were quiteA) uncommon, averaging less than 30 per year.B) uncommon, averaging less than 100 per year.C) common, averaging about 600 per year.D)
2、 common, averaging about 2000 per year.Answer: CQuestion Status: Previous Edition2) When one party to a transaction has incentives to engage in activities detrimental to the other party, there exists a problem ofA) moral hazard.B) split incentives.C) ex ante shirking.D) pre-contractual opportunism.A
3、nswer: AQuestion Status: Previous Edition3) Moral hazard is an important consequence of insurance arrangements because the existence of insuranceA) provides increased incentives for risk taking.B) impedes efficient risk taking.C) causes the private cost of the insured activity to increase.D) both A
4、and B of the above.E) both B and C of the above.Answer: AQuestion Status: Previous Edition4) Since depositors, like any lender, only receive fixed payments while the bank keeps any surplus profits, they face the problem that banks may take on too risk.A) adverse selection; littleB) adverse selection
5、; muchC) moral hazard; littleD) moral hazard; muchAnswer: DQuestion Status: Previous Edition5) The existence of deposit insurance can increase the likelihood that depositors will need deposit protection, as banks with deposit insuranceA) are likely to take on greater risks than they otherwise would.
6、B) are likely to be too conservative, reducing the probability of turning a profit.C) are likely to regard deposits as an unattractive source of funds due to depositors1 demands for safety.D) are placed at a competitive disadvantage in acquiring funds.Answer: AQuestion Status: Previous Edition8) Acc
7、ording to some economists, Congress made a mistake when it passed the FDICIA of not requiring the FDIC to assess risk-based insurance premiums.Answer: FALSEQuestion Status: Previous Edition9) The utoo big to fail policy reduces the adverse selection problem in bank regulation. Answer: FALSEQuestion
8、Status: Previous Edition10) A better capitalized bank has more to lose when it fails and is less likely to take less risk. Answer: TRUEQuestion Status: Previous Edition11) When the payoff method is used to resolve a failed bank, both large and small depositors are protected from su仔ering losses.Answ
9、er: FALSEQuestion Status: Previous Edition20.3 Essay1) What do we learn about the causes of banking crises by comparing crises throughout the world to those that have occurred in the United States?Question Status: Previous Edition2) What is the asymmetric information problem and how does it contribu
10、te to our understanding of the structure of bank regulation in the United States and other countries? Question Status: Previous Edition3) Why did the United States experience a banking crisis in the 1980s?Question Status: Previous Edition4) How has bank regulation in the United States changed since
11、the late 1980s? What accounts for these changes?Question Status: Previous Edition5) How have bank capital requirements changed since the banking crisis of the 1980s? Explain. Question Status: Previous Edition6) Describe the CAMELS rating system used by bank examiners.Question Status: Previous Editio
12、n7) Why does the safety net created by deposit insurance increase the advere selection and moral hazard problems in banking? How do bank regulations attempt to overcome these problems?Question Status: Previous Edition6) Although the FDIC was created to prevent bank failures, its existence encourages
13、 banks to A) take too much risk.B) hold too much capital.C) open too many branches.D) buy too much stock.Answer: AQuestion Status: Previous Edition7) When bad drivers line up to purchase collision insurance, automobile insurers are subject to theA) moral hazard problem.B) adverse selection problem.C
14、) assigned risk problem.D) ill queue problem.Answer: BQuestion Status: Previous Edition8) Deposit insuranceA) attracts risk-prone entrepreneurs to the banking industry.B) encourages bank managers to take on greater risks than they otherwise would.C) reduces the incentives of depositors to monitor th
15、e riskiness of their banks asset portfolios.D) does all of the above.E) does only A and B of the above.Answer: DQuestion Status: Previous Edition9) The possibility that the failure of one bank can hasten the failure of other banks is called the A) bank run e仔ect.B) moral hazard effect.C) contagion e
16、ffect.D) adverse selection effect.Answer: CQuestion Status: Previous Edition10) If the FDIC decides that a bank is too big to fail, it will use the method, e仔ectivelyensuring that depositors will suffer losses.A) payoff; largeB) payoff; noC) purchase and assumption; largeD) purchase and assumption;
17、noAnswer: DQuestion Status: Previous Edition11) If the FDIC uses the purchase and assumption method to handle a failed bank,A) all deposits will su仔er losses.B) small deposits will be paid in full but deposits over the insurance limit will not.C) all deposits will be paid in full.D) none of the abov
18、e.Answer: CQuestion Status: Previous Edition12) One problem of the too-big-to-fail policy is that it the incentives for bybig banks.A) reduces; moral hazard by big banks.B) increases; moral hazard by big banks.C) reduces; adverse selection by big banks.D) increases; adverse selection by big banks.An
19、swer: BQuestion Status: Previous Edition13) The result of the too-big-to-fail policy is that banks will take on risks,making bank failures more likely.A) small; fewerB) small; greaterC) large; fewerD) large; greaterAnswer: DQuestion Status: Previous Edition14) The too-big-to-fail policyA) exacerbate
20、s moral hazard problems.B) puts large banks at a competitive disadvantage in attracting large deposits.C) treats large depositors of small banks inequitably when compared to depositors of large banks.D) does only A and C of the above.Answer: DQuestion Status: Previous Edition15) The primary differen
21、ce between the payoff* and the “purchase and assumption” methods of handling failed banks is that the FDICA) guarantees all deposits, not just those under the $100,000 limit, when it uses the payoff method.B) guarantees all deposits, not just those under the $100,000 limit, when it uses the purchase
22、 and assumption1 method.C) is more likely to use the payoff” method when the bank is large and it fears that depositor losses may spur business bankruptcies and other bank failures.D) both A and B of the above.E) both B and C of the above.Answer: BQuestion Status: Previous Edition16) The primary dif
23、ference between the payoff and the purchase and assumption11 methods of handling failed banks is that the FDICA) guarantees all deposits, not just those under the $100,000 limit, when it uses the payoff1 method.B) guarantees all deposits, not just those under the $100,000 limit, when it uses the pur
24、chase and assumption11 method.C) is less likely to use the payoff method when the bank is large and it fears thatdepositor losses may spur business bankruptcies and other bank failures.D) both A and B of the above.E) both B and C of the above.Answer: EQuestion Status: Previous Edition17) Regulators
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