顺风与逆风因素影响下的总供给与宏观经济稳定.docx

《顺风与逆风因素影响下的总供给与宏观经济稳定.docx》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《顺风与逆风因素影响下的总供给与宏观经济稳定.docx（23页珍藏版）》请在淘文阁 - 分享文档赚钱的网站上搜索。

1、顺风与逆风因素影响下的总供给与宏观经济稳定导读2020年之前的三十年里，四个“顺风”因素使得全球总供给能够高度顺应总需求的变化：相对稳定的地缘政治环境、科技进步、全球化和合理的人口结构。这些因素以多种方式维持低通胀，同时促进经济发展。但事实上，在宏观经济保持良好的表象下，供给侧的隐患正在持续累积。自金融危机开始，全球各国的生产率增长普遍放缓。尽管改革开放能够暂时刺激生产力发展，但考虑到既得利益者的抵制以及改革成效缓慢，政府的结构性改革热情大幅衰减。鉴于此，各经济体不得不依靠金融系统扩张来获取发展动力。但这种由债务支撑与需求推动的增长在金融危机后便失去效力。随着私营部门债务与主权债务升至历史最高

2、点，加之全球不平等问题加剧，各国经济变得十分脆弱。疫情等事件最终暴露了供给侧支持的局限性。我们可以从中吸取三点教训：一、调节供给并不像调节需求那样容易；二、全球供应网络并非坚不可摧，少数关键生产投入的中断即可导致供应链崩溃；三、通货膨胀极易受到供给状况影响。一旦供不应求，通货膨胀的后果就会令人措手不及。展望未来，即使疫情和地缘政治冲突逐步缓解，供给侧因素对通胀的影响将依然显著，而这恰恰是因为先前提到的“顺风”因素地缘政治、全球化、人口结构即将变为“逆风”，阻碍全球经济发展。在俄乌冲突之前，国际政治局势已然紧张，进而导致全球化失去动力，影响全球贸易一体化。同时，人口结构逐渐失衡，劳动力比重下降，

3、国际劳动力流动受阻。加上气候变化、能源危机等新“逆风”因素的出现，通胀水平居高不下。那我们应当如何应对通胀危机呢？首先，要重新制定宏观经济政策，尽快阻止通胀形势进一步恶化。其次，货币政策与财政政策密切配合，聚力结构性改革，正面解决气候变化、人口老龄化和基础设施等因素造成的制约。再次，要营造良好的法律监管环境促进技术创新。最后，要维护国际合作，反对保护主义和民粹主义。总之，在未来的政策讨论中，重振生产力增长和强化供给灵活性必须占据更重要的地位。作者丨阿古斯汀卡斯滕斯，国际清算银行总裁A story of tailwinds and headwinds: aggregate supply and

4、macroeconomic stabilisationSpeech by Agustn Carstens, General Manager, Bank for International SettlementsJackson Hole Economic Symposium, 26 August 202201IntroductionThank you for the opportunity to speak at this event, particularly as it is the last one Esther George will preside over.In recent dec

5、ades, and especially under Esthers leadership, this forum has laid the groundwork for many key global monetary policy debates. This years event certainly is not the exception.My remarks today will reflect on aggregate supplys importance for macroeconomic stabilisation. We are used to viewing the eco

6、nomy mainly through the lens of aggregate demand, with supply assumed to adjust smoothly in the background. But we need a more balanced approach. Signs of fragility in supply have been ignored for too long. Recent events have shown the dangers of doing this. Reinvigorating productivity growth and en

7、hancing the flexibility and resilience of supply will have to play a larger role in policy debates going forward.Let me elaborate on these thoughts.02An era of supply tailwindsIn the three decades leading up to the pandemic, four criss-crossing tailwinds made aggregate supply highly responsive to sh

8、ifts in aggregate demand: a relatively stable geopolitical environment, technological advances, globalisation and favourable demographics.A relatively stable global political landscape arose around the broad consensus that free markets and cooperation would support economic growth. At an internation

9、al level, this helped forge trade agreements that drew more countries into global production networks. At a domestic level, it helped strengthen market forces through privatising state enterprises, deregulating labour, product and financial markets, and legal improvements, including more secure prop

10、erty rights.Liberalised and globalised markets, in turn, disciplined policymaking, as they made it harder to deviate from prudent approaches and helped spread best practices, such as inflation targeting.At the same time, technological advances pushed down costs, made time and physical distance less

11、of a constraint on economic activity and thus provided the basis for a lift in global productivity.Intertwined with these political and technological developments, globalisation expanded the world production frontier. Globalisation in goods and factor markets gave firms access to a larger consumer b

12、ase, a wider pool of resources, access to international know-how and chances for specialisation. Financial globalisation alleviated constraints. As a result, more productive capacity was brought online and opportunities for efficiency gains and cost reductions were exploited on a global scale.Meanwh

13、ile, demographic trends were favourable. The working age share of the global population grew rapidly from 1970 onwards. In advanced economies, baby boomers injected a large cohort of workers into the job market from the 1980s. And trade brought the previously untapped young workforces of emerging ma

14、rket economies into the global labour pool.These tailwinds fostered growth alongside low inflation in several ways (Graph 1). A key one was by loosening the link between domestic economic activity and inflation (Forbes (2019). Access to cheaper production locations drove inflation down. More contest

15、able domestic markets and sharper international competition weakened the pricing power of firms and bargaining power of workers. And because countries especially advanced economies could more easily tap global resources, domestic supply constraints became less binding. As a result, Phillips curves f

16、lattened (Borio (2017)and global rather than domestic slack increasingly became the key driver of inflation (Borio and Filardo (2007), Boissay et al (2021).At the same time, the tailwinds also made supply more responsive to changes in demand. Producers could easily access a network of worldwide supp

17、liers. This allowed them to take advantage of the best available prices. After disruptions, supply would generally adjust quickly to new demand patterns.03A build-up of fragilitiesThe supply tailwinds produced a business cycle distinct from that seen in the post-war period. With inflation low and st

18、able, monetary policy had less need to tighten during expansions than in the past. And in recessions, central banks were usually in a position where they could provide forceful stimulus, confident that inflation would remain under control. Fiscal policy also had more leeway, as nominal and real inte

19、rest rates fell to their lowest levels since records began.But, even though macroeconomic conditions remained benign, fault lines emerged.Low productivity growth was a key warning sign. In advanced economies, it plunged during the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) and never fully recovered, part of a lon

20、ger decline going back at least to the late 1990s (Graph 2). In emerging market economies, the productivity boost from integration into global networks and structural reforms proved to be fleeting. The post-GFC slowdown has been the steepest and most prolonged of the past three decades.In retrospect

21、, some slowdown in productivity growth was probably inevitable. Liberalising reforms that improve the quality of institutionscan deliver rapid productivity gains. But these naturallyslow as countries exploit them and approach the productivity frontier. Incremental improvements in institutional quali

22、ty become harder to achieve.That said, there is no hiding the fact that the growth-enhancing structural reform drive prevalent during the 1990s and early 2000s slowed significantly in many countries (Graph 3). There are many possible explanations for this. Vested interests resist changes. And, as th

23、e benefits of structural reforms accrue only in the longer term, they usually rank low in governments priority lists.Paradoxically, the supply side tailwinds may also have played a role. Plentiful global supply and low inflation concealed the costs of low productivity. In consequence, governments lo

24、st the appetite for technically difficult and often politically unpopular structural reforms. The can was kicked down the road.Missing the lift that robust productivity growth could have provided, economies had to rely on other sources of growth. Expanding financial systems provided an impetus, at l

25、east until the GFC when the engine of growth fuelled by debt and driven by demand sputtered. Crucially, this was not neutral for potential growth, as indicated by the break in productivity patterns I mentioned earlier. And fiscal and monetary policies were increasingly called upon to sustain output.

26、 Although obscured by acceptable growth, the constraints were increasingly visible, even before the pandemic. Economies were becoming fragile as private and sovereign debt levels reached historical highs (Graph 4) and inequality rose. The room for policy manoeuvre was eroding, with policymakers forc

27、ed to do ever more to bring economies back to trend after each downturn.Nonetheless, with supply side tailwinds still lending support, increased reliance on demand management did not lead to higher inflation. Indeed, in many parts of the world, the key challenge for central banks on the eve of the p

28、andemic was to bring inflation back up to target. The winds were about to change, however.04A rude awakeningThe pandemic and the war in Ukraine have been a rude awakening both in an economic and humanitarian sense. To be sure, both were exceptional shocks that arose from exogenous causes.But they pa

29、infully revealed that the supply side could only be stretched so far. This made demand side policy responses far harder to calibrate. I draw several lessons from this experience.First, to fight the pandemic it was decided to bring the global economy intentionally to an immediate standstill in mid-ai

30、r. But turning on and off supply is not like turning on and off demand. With the benefit of hindsight, it was perhaps nave to expect that it would be possible to easily reignite the growth engine, quickly recover speed and again fly smoothly. We now know better.The second lesson is that we cannot ta

31、ke the availability of aggregate supply for granted. The global supply networks that adjusted smoothly to changes in aggregate demand turned out to be far less resilient than we thought. Seemingly robust supply chains broke down in the face of disruptions to a few key production inputs.The final les

32、son is the sensitivity of inflation to supply constraints. Policymakers had grown accustomed to decades of ample supply, and, with no experience in calibrating stimulus to restart an engine that had been intentionally switched off, reached for their familiar demand side tools. These had boosted grow

33、th in the past, without stoking inflation. The consequences for inflation when supply could no longer keep up caught many of us off guard.05As tailwinds turn into headwindsLooking further out, a key challenge I see is that even if the specific supply disruptions caused by the pandemic and the war fa

34、de, the importance of supply side factors for inflation is likely to remain high. This is because the global economy seems to be on the cusp of a historic change as many of the aggregate supply tailwinds that have kept a lid on inflation look set to turn into headwinds. If so, the recent pickup in i

35、nflationary pressures may prove to be more persistent. Let me consider three of the forces I noted earlier: geopolitics, globalisation and demographics.Even before the war in Ukraine, the political environment had been growing tense and less friendly to the principle of international cooperation. Th

36、is backlash reflects, in part, the course globalisation has taken: the perceived uneven distribution of benefits within and across countries and discontent with local and global governance mechanisms. Greater inequality has given rise to populism, which has threatened the rules-based international t

37、rade and finance system, and more broadly democratic norms and institutions, including independent central banks (Goodhart and Lastra (2018), Borio (2019).Thus, it is not surprising that globalisation has been losing steam.Other, more structural, factors have also weighed on global trade integration

38、. As emerging market economies converge to their richer trade counterparts, comparative advantage on the basis of wages narrows. Advances in robotics and information and communications technology (ICT) that decrease the relative importance of labour in production processes could also favour local pr

39、oduction and discourage global goods trade.Recent developments could accelerate this trend further. The pandemic revealed the fragility of global supply chains that prioritised cost reduction above all else. The war in Ukraine has rattled commodity markets and threatened energy and food security. It

40、 has also accelerated the realignment of geopolitical alliances. As a result, access to global production networks and international financial markets can no longer be taken for granted. A reconfiguration of global value chains could well follow. Some of these developments may be warranted. But we s

41、hould not imagine that they will be costless.Meanwhile, demographic tailwinds are set to reverse, and labour may not be as abundant as it used to be. The baby boomers are retiring. The pandemic may leave a persistent imprint on both the quantity and quality of workers. Labour force participation rat

42、es remain below pre-pandemic levels in many countries, signalling a potential shift in attitudes towards work. Lost schooling and disruptions to regular healthcare services during the pandemic could scar human capital.International labour mobility also faces increasing obstacles.Moreover, even as th

43、ese tailwinds turn into headwinds, new headwinds are emerging. In particular, the threat of climate change calls for an unprecedented policy-induced reallocation of resources. And it will only intensify war-induced food and energy bottlenecks. Increasing extreme weather events and an interconnected

44、global food supply system raise the risk of disruptions and higher, more volatile prices, not to mention human costs.Expectations of a shift away from fossil fuels have deterred investment (Meyer (2022), threatening energy shortages before clean energy options can catch up to meet demand. This pushe

45、s up inflation.06Policies to deliver the lift needed and avoid the stallThis new and more hostile supply environment has sobering implications for economic policy. We may be approaching what in aviation is called a “coffin corner”, the delicate spot when an aircraft slows to below its stall speed an

46、d cannot generate enough lift to maintain its altitude. It takes skilled piloting to get the aircraft back to a safer, stable place. Continuing to rely primarily on aggregate demand tools to boost growth in this environment could increase the danger, as higher and harder-to-control inflation could r

47、esult.So what needs to be done?Getting the economy back to a durable path starts with a reset to macroeconomic policymaking. As demand side policies cannot substitute for supply tailwinds, we need to be realistic about what these policies can deliver and more keenly aware of the associated costs. Wh

48、en economic disturbances come from supply as well as demand, the “divine coincidence” breaks down. In this environment, central banks cannot hope to smooth out all economic air pockets, and must instead focus first and foremost on keeping inflation low and stable (BIS (2022). Monetary policy needs t

49、o meet the urgent challenge of dealing with the current inflation threat.Fiscal policy should also be aware of tighter limits on what demand management policies can deliver. In a world of unforgiving supply, what fiscal stimulus adds to demand may need to be taken away by monetary policy tightening. Scarce fiscal resources should instead be used to tackle supply constraints head on, including those