国际战略研究中心-中国公司在阿根廷：中国的国际航天产业参与（英）.pdf

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1、JANUARY 2023AUTHORSSamantha LuBriana BolandLily McElweeCCP Inc.in ArgentinaChinas International Space Industry EngagementA Report of the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a oJANUARY 2023AUTHORSSamantha LuBriana BolandLily McElweeCCP Inc.in A

2、rgentinaChinas International Space Industry EngagementA Report of the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a oIII|Samantha Lu,Briana Boland,and Lily McElweeAbout CSISThe Center for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS)is a bipartisan,nonpro

3、fit policy research organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas to address the worlds greatest challenges.Thomas J.Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 2015,succeeding former U.S.senator Sam Nunn(D-GA).Founded in 1962,CSIS is led by John J.Hamre,who has served as pres

4、ident and chief executive officer since 2000.CSISs purpose is to define the future of national security.We are guided by a distinct set of valuesnonpartisanship,independent thought,innovative thinking,cross-disciplinary scholarship,integrity and professionalism,and talent development.CSISs values wo

5、rk in concert toward the goal of making real-world impact.CSIS scholars bring their policy expertise,judgment,and robust networks to their research,analysis,and recommendations.We organize conferences,publish,lecture,and make media appearances that aim to increase the knowledge,awareness,and salienc

6、e of policy issues with relevant stakeholders and the interested public.CSIS has impact when our research helps to inform the decisionmaking of key policymakers and the thinking of key influencers.We work toward a vision of a safer and more prosperous world.CSIS does not take specific policy positio

7、ns;accordingly,all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).2023 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.All rights reserved.更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a oIV|CCP Inc.in ArgentinaAcknowledgmentsThe authors would like

8、to thank Jude Blanchette for making this project possible and Hanyue(Amy)Ouyang for invaluable initial research support.This report greatly benefited from the insights of Dana Kim,Joe Bermudez,Jennifer Jun,and the rest of the iLab satellite imagery team.The authors would also like to thank the membe

9、rs of the CSIS Aerospace Security ProjectKari Bingen,Kaitlyn Johnson,Thomas G.Roberts,and Makena Youngwho helped us to better understand and explain the space industry.This report was made possible through the generous support of the Smith Richardson Foundation.更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行

10、研君胃：s o s o b a o g a oV|Samantha Lu,Briana Boland,and Lily McElweeExecutive Summary This“CCP Inc.”case study examines Chinas state capitalism in the space sector by unpacking key Chinese business deals and state projects in Argentina.To Beijing,the space sector is strategically important for nation

11、al military,economic,and technological development and is therefore more closely tied to the state than most other industries.As demonstrated by projects in Argentina,these close ties can benefit Chinese party-state actors who go overseas by providing material state supportbut they can also become a

12、 liability by rousing skepticism among host countries and potential business partners regarding Chinese firms motivations.To explore these elements of the CCP Inc.ecosystem,this report examines two cases of China-Argentina space collaboration:first,the construction of Chinas first international deep

13、 space ground station,and second,the dynamics of Chinese business collaboration with Argentine satellite technology start-up Satellogic.更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a o1|CCP Inc.in ArgentinaContentsExecutive Summary VIntroduction 21|Chinas Space Program and China-Argenti

14、na Space Cooperation 4Chinas Growing Space Presence:Goals and Strategy 6Two Decades of Steadily Deepening China-Argentina Relations 8China-Argentina Space Cooperation 92|Chinas First International Deep Space Station 11The Espacio Lejano Station Agreement 13Construction and Management in Neuqun 14Sus

15、picions Surrounding CCP Inc.at the Espacio Lejano Station 153|Satellogic and Chinas Commercial Space Sector 18Satellogics History of Partnership with Chinese Firms 18Satellogics Shift Away from CCP Inc.20Chinas Constrained Commercial Space 22Conclusion 24About the Authors 25Endnotes 26更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报

16、告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a o2|Samantha Lu,Briana Boland,and Lily McElweeIntroduction What does Chinas expanding space sector reveal about the countrys state capitalist economic system?This case study examines the CCP Inc.ecosystem of Chinese regulators,state-owned and private fina

17、nciers,technology companies,and military entities key to becoming what Chinese leader Xi Jinping has termed a“great space power”(航天强国).1 Chinas ambitions include developing world-leading space technology and systems,pursuing deep space exploration,and shaping the norms of global space governance.Tow

18、ard these goals,China continues to enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperation with a growing number of countries.2 This case study examines how the complex ecosystem of Chinese party-state actors servesand sometimes limitsBeijings space ambitions by investigating Chinese commercial and state-bac

19、ked investments in Argentinas space sector.Chinas broader state capitalist system has evolved since Xi Jinping assumed power in 2012.The Chinese Communist Party(CCP)extended its control over both Chinas private sector and state-owned enterprises(SOEs),while SOEs merged and consolidated into bigger e

20、ntities with more expansive networks of subsidiaries,as part of an initiative to improve efficiency.3 State investment has taken on increased importance as a method for steering Chinese companies toward the pursuit of strategic objectives.These developments have created a complex ecosystem in which

21、state-owned and private-owned Chinese companies are subject to state and party influence via an array of financial,ownership,and personnel conduitsbut are still able and encouraged to pursue commercial aims within the bounds of the CCPs strategic interests.This new paradigm of Chinese state capitali

22、sm is known as the“CCP Inc.”system.4Globally,CCP Inc.benefits Chinese companies;rather than go it alone,Chinese companies enter new markets and projects as part of an ecosystem of government and commercial entities in pursuit of common economic goals.Yet CCP Inc.can also be a liability for Chinese f

23、irms,engendering skepticism 更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a o3|CCP Inc.in Argentinaoverseas about their motivations;close connections with CCP and state actors make it difficult for individual Chinese firms to distance themselves fully from broader party-state aims when a

24、pproaching potential partners abroad.5 The effectiveness of CCP Inc.varies substantially by country and industry,depending on Chinas diplomatic relationships with the target state and the degree of CCP control over the sector in question.This case study explores how CCP Inc.has enabled Chinas space

25、sector to grow its international footprint through key projects in Argentina.From the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System to successful explorations on the far side of the moon and a mission to Mars,Chinas national space capabilities have improved dramatically in the past three decades.6 Along with e

26、ye-catching interplanetary missions,Chinas space sector recently underwent a less publicized structural transformation.In 2014,China opened the sector to private investment,expanding the role of commercial actors in the countrys space program.7 However,as this case study shows,the core of the sector

27、 remains closely linked to state agencies,SOEs,and military organizationseven more so than other industries examined in this series of CCP Inc.case studies.8Chinas space cooperation with Argentina illustrates how state,military,and commercial entities have broadened the overseas footprint of Chinas

28、space sector.Space cooperation between China and Argentina began through diplomatic channels.In the early 2010s,amid deepening bilateral relations,Argentina agreed to host Chinas first international deep space ground station:the Estacin de Espacio Lejano(Spanish for“deep space station,”referred to i

29、n this report as the“Espacio Lejano Station”),which was constructed by Chinese SOEs that had track records of working on Peoples Liberation Army(PLA)contracts and is now managed by a Chinese military-linked state entity.As commercialization of the Chinese space sector has grown,commercial deals by p

30、rivate Chinese companies have also become an increasingly important part of China-Argentina space cooperation,particularly through deals focused on satellite technology.This case study proceeds in three parts.Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction to Chinas space sector and China-Argentina space co

31、operation.Chaper 2 examines the development of the Espacio Lejano Station,which remains a source of controversy within Argentina and internationally due to its links to the PLA.9 Finally,Chapter 3 explores the role of Chinese commercial space engagement in Argentina through examination of deals betw

32、een Chinese companies and Argentine satellite imagery start-up Satellogic.更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a o4|Samantha Lu,Briana Boland,and Lily McElwee1Chinas Space Program and China-Argentina Space Cooperation Compared to the more established industrial sectors examined

33、in previous CCP Inc.case studies on mining,financial services,energy,and telecommunications,Chinas space industry is relatively new and quickly evolving.It is also tightly interwoven with government and military bodies to a degree unparalleled by market economies,even those with substantial state in

34、volvement in the space sector.10 To understand this deep integration,one need only look at the composition of Chinas space sector today,which consists of three primary groups of actors(see Figure 1):the state-owned“national team”of government agencies and major SOEs;entities linked to the PLA;andsin

35、ce 2014,when deregulation opened the door for private investmentsa burgeoning set of commercial actors who are interlinked with the other two groups.As a window into CCP Inc.,the evolution of Chinas space industry over the past decade demonstrates how Chinas state capitalism can simultaneously open

36、more opportunities for commercial development while maintaining tight state control over private sector involvement in a strategic industry.The important role of the PLA in this sector also impacts how international companies and governments engage with Chinas space industry,as demonstrated by the p

37、rojects in Argentina detailed in the second and third sections of this report.更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a o5|CCP Inc.in ArgentinaFigure 1:Three Overlapping Actors in Chinas Space Sector:State,Commercial,and MilitarySource:Authors research based on multiple sources cit

38、ed throughout this report.The“national team”of Chinas space industry is the well-established core of the national space program,compared to the countrys relatively new commercial space sector.11 It consists of government agencies,central SOEs,and hundreds of SOE subsidiaries.Two state agencies,the S

39、tate Administration for Science,Technology,and Industry for National Defense(SASTIND)and the China National Space Administration(CNSA),oversee Chinas space industry as civilian administrators,while the Chinese Academy of Sciences(CAS)plays a key role in aerospace research and technology development.

40、Marc Julienne,head of China research at the French Institute of International Relations,has described SASTIND as the“nerve center”for the countrys space program;as the name suggests,the organization is focused on defense.12 According to Chinas State Council,it was established to serve“the needs of n

41、ational defense,military forces,national economy,and military-related organizations,”in addition to the“coordination of communications and cooperation on the use of nuclear power and space activities with countries and international organizations.”13 Under the purview of the State-owned Assets Super

42、vision and Administration Council(SASAC),two SOEsChina Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation(CASC)and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation(CASIC),each with hundreds of subsidiariesform the core of the governments aerospace research and development(R&D)and defense sector.14Military

43、-linked SOEs Entities oficially under mixed authority CLTCSASTINDCNSAPLA Strategic Support Force(PLASSF)Private InvestorsCASPrivate start-ups Military-linked SOEs Entities officially under mixed authority(CLTC)Companies with state ownership,private investors,and links to the PLA Private investment f

44、unding dual-use technology(MCF)SOE subsidiaries receiving private financing or pursuing profit as a main motive Public-private partnershipsCore SOEs:CASC,CASICVenture capitalTech companiesSpace Systems Department“National Team”Commercial SectorMilitary Links更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：

45、s o s o b a o g a o6|Samantha Lu,Briana Boland,and Lily McElweeIn 2014,Chinese regulators lifted numerous restrictions on private investment in the space sector,resulting in a growing number of start-ups and new,mixed-ownership SOE subsidiaries with private investors,which together comprise Chinas c

46、ommercial space sector.At the time,the State Council released a statement commonly referred to as“Document 60,”which encouraged“private capital to participate in the construction of national civil space infrastructure”such as satellite launch and operations,as well as ground systems.15 Later,the Sta

47、te Councils 2016 white paper on space highlighted efforts“to increase the level of commercialization of the space industry”by encouraging the participation of“nongovernmental capital and other social sectors”in space-related activities.16 Even with this government backing for commercialization,new p

48、layers joined a preexisting ecosystem of government and military-linked entities.According to the white paper,“commercialization”does not require that funding come solely from nongovernment actorsrather,“commercial”entities can be funded by both government and nongovernment actors.17 Some analysts e

49、stimate that the number of commercial space sector companies is over 200 but note that this figure would vary based on how broadly“commercial”is defined.18 Commercial companies often share close institutional and personnel connections with the“national team.”For example,a 2019 study by the Institute

50、 for Defense Analyses found that many founders and executives of Chinese start-ups in the field were previously affiliated with CAS or with the major SOEs in the aerospace sector.19 The military plays a direct role in Chinas space program through the PLA Strategic Support Force(PLASSF),which assumed