新美国安全中心-加强美韩联盟在中国、多边主义以及军事和安全技术方面的合作.pdf

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1、MARCH 2023Peninsula PlusEnhancing U.S.South Korea Alliance Cooperation on China,Multilateralism,and Military and Security Technologies Jacob Stokes and Joshua Fitt更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a oAbout the AuthorsJacob Stokes is a Senior Fellow for the Indo-Pacific Securi

2、ty Program at CNAS,where his work focuses on U.S.-China relations,Chinese foreign and defense policy,East Asian security affairs,and great-power competition.He previously served in the White House on the national security staff of thenVice President Joe Biden.Stokes has also worked as a professional

3、 staff member for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,an advisor for U.S.Senator Amy Klobuchar,and a senior analyst in the China program at the United States Institute of Peace.He is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations.Joshua Fitt is an Associate Fellow with the Indo

4、-Pacific Security Program at CNAS.He focuses on U.S.East Asian security strategy and specializes in Japanese and Korean peninsular affairs.Before joining CNAS,Fitt was a campaign field organizer during the 2018 midterm elections in the Upper Midwest,an earthquake and tsunami disaster relief voluntee

5、r with IsraAID in Japan,and an intern with the Council on Foreign Relations Japan Program.He earned his BA in East Asian studies from Yale University.About the Indo-Pacific Security Program The CNAS Indo-Pacific Security Program addresses opportunities and challenges for the United States in the reg

6、ion,with a growing focus on issues that originate in the Indo-Pacific but have global implications.It draws on a team with deep government and nongovernment expertise in regional studies,U.S.foreign and defense policy,and international security.The Indo-Pacific Security Program analyzes trends and g

7、enerates practical and creative policy solutions around five main research priorities:U.S.-China strategic competition,Indias growing role in the Indo-Pacific,the North Korea threat,American alliances and partnerships,and challenges in South and Central Asia.AcknowledgmentsThe authors are grateful t

8、o Andrew Yeo,Clint Work,Lisa Curtis,and Maura McCarthy for their valuable feedback and suggestions on the report draft.They would also like to thank Steven Honig for his excellent research assistance.Additionally,this paper would not have been possible without contributions from our CNAS colleagues,

9、including Melody Cook,Rin Rothback,Allison Francis,Jake Penders,and Emma Swislow.The views presented here do not represent those of CNAS or any other organization,and the authors are solely responsible for any errors in fact,analysis,or omission.This report was made possible with the generous suppor

10、t of the Korea Foundation.As a research and policy institution committed to the highest standards of organizational,intellectual,and personal integrity,CNAS maintains strict intellectual independence and sole editorial direction and control over its ideas,projects,publications,events,and other resea

11、rch activities.CNAS does not take institutional positions on policy issues and the content of CNAS publications reflects the views of their authors alone.In keeping with its mission and values,CNAS does not engage in lobbying activity and complies fully with all applicable federal,state,and local la

12、ws.CNAS will not engage in any representational activities or advocacy on behalf of any entities or interests and,to the extent that the Center accepts funding from non-U.S.sources,its activities will be limited to bona fide scholastic,academic,and research-related activities,consistent with applica

13、ble federal law.The Center publicly acknowledges on its website annually all donors who contribute.更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a oTABLE OF CONTENTS01 Executive Summary02 Introduction03 U.S.-ROK Seek Closer Coordination on China Policy05 U.S.-ROK Alignment on Minilateral

14、 and Multilateral Initiatives08 U.S.-ROK Cooperation on Military and Security-Related Technologies12 Policy Recommendations14 Conclusion更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a oINDO-PACIFIC SECURITY|MARCH 2023Peninsula Plus:Enhancing U.S.South Korea Alliance Cooperation on China,

15、Multilateralism,and Military and Security Technologies1TExecutive Summaryhe United StatesRepublic of Korea(ROK or South Korea)alliance has entered a critical phase.In 2023,the two countries will commemorate the 70th anni-versary of signing their bilateral mutual defense treaty.This year also marks t

16、he first full year under national leaders President Joe Biden and President Yoon Suk Yeol.After several challenging years in the two countries relationship,ties are improving.Better alliance relations have,unfortunately,coincided with a deterioration in the regional and global security environment,s

17、pecifically due to threats from North Korea,China,and Russia.This report examines the U.S.-ROK alliance as it adapts to the new regional context by exploring how the United States and South Korea can sustain and deepen their relation-ship in three vital policy areas:coordination on China,alignment i

18、n minilateral and multilateral settings,and defense technology collaboration.Perhaps the biggest shift in alliance priorities in recent years has been the growing importance of the China challenge.During Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinpings decade in power,Beijing has adopted a more

19、 muscular foreign policy.Both the United States and South Korea have reshaped their approaches toward China in response.ROK concerns about China have grown as Beijing shields Pyongyang and acts aggres-sively elsewhere in the region,including toward Taiwan.But South Koreas approach to China will cont

20、inue to differ from that of the United States.The allies have diver-gent preferences regarding the speed,manner,and degree of partial decoupling with China.Moreover,South Koreas deep trade ties with China will continue to make it vulner-able to Chinese political and economic coercion.More broadly ac

21、ross the region,the 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategies of the Biden and Yoon administrations both place strong emphasis on multilateralism and more robust engagement with the region.The United States and South Korea have many opportunities to expand their coopera-tion beyond the Korean Peninsula,including

22、 through the U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral relationship,engagement with the Quad(the United States,Australia,India,and Japan),deeper involvement with NATO and Europe,and other minilateral and multilateral relationships.Efforts along these lines are integral to the Yoon administrations vision of transfor

23、ming South Korea into a“global pivotal state.”As South Korea prepares for a larger role on the inter-national stage,it must also continue to keep pace with the evolution of North Korean and Chinese military capa-bilities.Over the past several decades,the South Korean defense industry has transformed

24、 from near-complete dependency on foreign hardware to becoming one of the worlds top defense suppliers.The end of U.S.-imposed missile and weapons restrictions on South Korea in 2021 supercharged a series of defense technology moderniza-tion initiatives during former President Moon Jae-ins administr

25、ation,which have continued under Yoon.Given Seouls ambition to build an independent domestic defense industry,the opportunities for innovations driven by American and Korean collaboration on the scientific cutting edge,along with greater defense technology inte-gration,are substantial.In considerati

26、on of the above challenges and opportu-nities,the report recommends that U.S.and ROK alliance policymakers:Identify and build on overlapping priorities in the U.S.and ROK Indo-Pacific Strategies;Broaden the alliance to account for threats from China in addition to North Korea;Encourage Seouls ambiti

27、ons beyond the Korean Peninsula while also acknowledging the concomi-tant pressures of a larger global roleespecially from Beijing;Take a bold approach to boosting U.S.-ROK-Japan trilat-eral cooperation;Facilitate South Koreas deeper integration into minilat-eral coalitions with leading democracies;

28、Create a defense technology development and acqui-sition roadmap for the alliance that strengthens both deterrence and stability;Deepen U.S.-ROK cooperation in the cyber and space domains;Negotiate a U.S.-ROK reciprocal defense procurement(RDP)agreement;and Jointly reexamine from first principles al

29、l options for bolstering allied nuclear deterrence,but be realistic about the negative consequences of drastic changes in capabilities and posture.更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a oCNASDC2TROK investments into the United States,and agreements between the leaders to embark

30、on a“new chapter”and upgrade the relationship to a“global comprehensive stra-tegic alliance.”5 The momentum extended to the release of key strategic documents by each country,including the U.S.National Security,National Defense,and Indo-Pacific Strategies and the ROK Indo-Pacific Strategy.6 Those do

31、cuments all expressed support for a peaceful,stable,and rules-based order in the region.The improvement in U.S.-ROK alliance relations has coincided with a deterioration in the regional and global security environment.The Kim Jong Un regime in North Korea continues its provocative behavior by advanc

32、ing its nuclear and conventional missile capabilities,adopting a law enshrining a new and aggressive nuclear employment doctrine,and,at the time of writing,pre-paring to conduct a seventh nuclear test.7 While Chinese Communist Party(CCP)General Secretary Xi Jinping has made some diplomatic overtures

33、 toward other countries after he secured a third five-year term at the 20th National Congress of the CCP last October,Beijing has continued aggressive military patrols around Taiwan.Beijings diplomatic moves likely represent a tactical recalibration rather than a strategic shift of Chinas foreign po

34、licy.Xis ambitious regional and global objec-tives and willingness to employ economic,political,and military coercion to achieve them persist.Meanwhile,Russias brutal war against Ukraine has demonstrated that the threat of large-scale conventional military aggression under the nuclear shadow is real

35、.Moscows war in Ukraine has raised alarms globally about the potential for similar aggression by China in the Indo-Pacific,especially in light of the deepening China-Russia strategic partnership.This report examines the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance in a dynamic moment marked by enormous security

36、challenges as well as some new cooperation opportunities.While the alliance faces multiple chal-lengesnot least,deterring North Koreathis report focuses on three areas that have been relatively under-studied by policy and academic communities.First,it explores how the allies are responding individua

37、lly and jointly to challenges posed by China.Second,it maps the agenda for alliance cooperation in minilateral and multilateral forums,particularly as Seoul looks to become what Yoon has called a“global pivotal state.”And third,the paper assesses the potential for joint efforts related to technology

38、 with military and security applica-tions,building on earlier CNAS work on cooperation on civilian technologies.8 It concludes with recommenda-tions for U.S.and ROK policymakers.Introductionhe United StatesRepublic of Korea(ROK or South Korea)alliance has entered a critical phase.The two countries c

39、elebrated 140 years of diplomatic ties in 2022 and will commemorate the 70th anniversary of signing their bilateral mutual defense treaty in 2023.1 This year also marks the first full year under President Joe Bidens administration in Washington and President Yoon Suk Yeols administration in Seoul.It

40、 further signals the final transition from an earlier period of relations under U.S.President Donald Trump and ROK President Moon Jae-in during which bilateral rifts and geopolitical tur-bulence shook the foundations of the alliance to a degree not seen in decades.During the Trump-Moon years,both al

41、lies weathered the journey through a stretch of escalating military brinksmanship characterized by“fire and fury”rhetoric that threatened to engulf the Korean Peninsula in conflict.Next came a stint of frenetic diplo-macy between Washington and Pyongyang that saw some breakthroughs but ultimately en

42、ded in failure.That was quickly followed by the upheaval of a global pandemic.The alliances weathering of that period and overall resilience reflect several sources of strength.One is the partnerships deep history going back to the Korean War.Another source is the vast connections between the two so

43、cieties at both the elite and popular levels.The alliance also benefits from extensive institutional links as well as the fact that Washington and Seoul are both liberal democracies with market economies.The greatest source of strength is their enduring mutual strategic interests in countering the t

44、hreat from the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea(DPRK or North Korea)and,increas-ingly,from the Peoples Republic of China(PRC or China)and the Russian Federation(Russia).Recognizing those strengths as well as the challenges the U.S.-ROK alliance had faced in recent years,the Biden administration

45、came into office seeking to enhance alli-ances and partnershipsincluding with South Koreaas the focal point of its foreign policy strategy,both in the Indo-Pacific and globally.2 Translating that agenda into action meant prioritizing early leader-level meetings.Moon was the second world leader to vi

46、sit the White House in early 2021 shortly after President Biden took office.3 Biden then met with President Yoon in May 2022,marking the earliest U.S.-ROK leaders summit of any South Korean presidents term.4Those meetings resulted in several outcomes,including a Special Measures Agreement on allianc

47、e burden-sharing,termination of the Revised Missile Guidelines that previ-ously limited the range of South Korean missiles,a slate of 更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a oINDO-PACIFIC SECURITY|MARCH 2023Peninsula Plus:Enhancing U.S.South Korea Alliance Cooperation on China,Mu

48、ltilateralism,and Military and Security Technologies3PU.S.-ROK Seek Closer Coordination on China Policyerhaps the biggest shift in alliance priorities in recent years has been the growing importance of the China challenge.During Xis decade in power,Beijing has adopted a more muscular foreign policy.

49、Both the United States and South Korea have reshaped their approaches toward China in response.Washington has declared China to be the only country with both the intent to reshape the regional and global order and the power across every dimension to do it.The United States has further declared that“

50、Beijing has ambitions to create an enhanced sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the worlds leading power.”9 In South Korea,having marked 30 years of normalized ROK-China rela-tions in 2022,the policy debate about China is likewise growing in importance and urgency,and potentially s