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1、C O R P O R AT I O NRESEARCH REPORTASSESSING THE PROSPECTS FOR IN THE INDO-PACIFICGREAT POWER COOPERATIONSCOTT W.HAROLD,NATHAN BEAUCHAMP-MUSTAFAGA,SOO KIM更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a oFor more information on this publication,visit www.rand.org/t/RRA597-2.About RANDThe

2、RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure,healthier and more prosperous.RAND is nonprofit,nonpartisan,and committed to the public interest.To learn more about RAND,visit www.rand

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6、ANDs publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.Published by the RAND Corporation,Santa Monica,Calif.2023 RAND Corporation is a registered trademark.Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.ISBN:978-1-9774-076

7、4-1Cover:Porcupen/Adobe Stock;Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Bobby J Siens/U.S.Navy.Limited Print and Electronic Distribution RightsThis publication and trademark(s)contained herein are protected by law.This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only

8、.Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited;linking directly to its webpage on rand.org is encouraged.Permission is required from RAND to reproduce,or reuse in another form,any of its research products for commercial purposes.For information on reprint and reuse permissions,please

9、 visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a oiiiAbout This ReportThe 2018 National Defense Strategy(NDS)starts with the assertion that“Interstate strategic competition,not terrorism,is now the primary concern in U.S.national security.”Even the NDS

10、,however,acknowledges the need for cooperation with competitors,albeit“from a posi-tion of strength and based on our national interests.”As part of a larger study of cooperation in an era of strategic competition,we assessed the potential for U.S.security cooperation with China and Russia in the Ind

11、o-Pacific.The other volumes in this series are Vanishing Trade Space:Assessing the Prospects for Great Power Cooperation in an Era of CompetitionA Project Overview,RR-A597-1,by Raphael S.Cohen,Elina Treyger,Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga,Asha Clark,Kit Conn,Scott W.Harold,Michelle Gris,Marta Kepe,Soo Ki

12、m,Ashley L.Rhoades,Roby Valiaveedu,and Nathan Vest Assessing the Prospects for Great Power Cooperation in Europe and the Middle East,RR-A597-3,by Elina Treyger,Ashley L.Rhoades,Nathan Vest,Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga,Raphael S.Cohen,and Asha Clark Assessing the Prospects for Great Power Cooperation i

13、n the Global Commons,RR-A597-4,by Raphael S.Cohen,Marta Kepe,Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga,Asha Clark,Kit Conn,Michelle Gris,Roby Valiaveedu,and Nathan Vest.The research reported here was commissioned by Headquarters Air Force A-5 Strategy Section and conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program

14、of RAND Project AIR FORCE as part of a fiscal year 2020 project“China,Russia,and the United States:Intersecting Points of Cooperation and Competition.”This research was completed in September 2020,before the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and before the U.S.military with-drawal from Afgha

15、nistan in August 2021.It has not been subsequently revised.The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S.Department of Defense or the U.S.government.RAND Project AIR FORCE RAND Project AIR FORCE(PAF),a division of the RAND

16、Corporation,is the Department of the Air Forces(DAFs)federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses,supporting both the United States Air Force and the United States Space Force.PAF provides the DAF with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the develop-men

17、t,employment,combat readiness,and support of current and future air,space,and cyber forces.Research is conducted in four programs:Strategy and Doctrine;Force Modernization and Employment;Workforce,Development,and Health;and Resource Management.The research reported here was prepared under contract F

18、A7014-16-D-1000.更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a oAssessing the Prospects for Great Power Cooperation in the Indo-PacificivAdditional information about PAF is available on our website:www.rand.org/paf/.This report documents work originally shared with the DAF on September

19、30,2020.The draft report,issued in September 2020,was reviewed by formal peer reviewers and DAF subject-matter experts.AcknowledgmentsThis project would not have been possible without the support of many people.First,we would like to thank LeeAnn Borman,Scott Wheeler,Gerry Sohan,and Jim Welton of th

20、e Headquarters Air Force A-5 Strategy Section for sponsoring the project and guiding it through its many phases.RAND Project AIR FORCE Strategy and Doctrine Program Direc-tor Stacie Pettyjohn provided invaluable feedback and guidance on earlier briefings and draft of this report.We also would like t

21、o thank our internal reviewer,Jeffrey W.Hornung,and our external reviewer,Elizabeth Wishnick,for their insightful comments.更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a ovContentsAbout This Report.iiiTables.viiSummary.ixCHAPTER ONEIntroduction.1Data and Methodology.4Thesis and Overview

22、 of the Report.8CHAPTER TWOAmerican,Chinese,and Russian Objectives in the Indo-Pacific.11American Objectives in the Indo-Pacific.13Chinese Objectives in the Indo-Pacific.14Russian Objectives in the Indo-Pacific.16Mapping the Trade Space in the Indo-Pacific.17CHAPTER THREEMaintaining a Peaceful and O

23、pen Regional Order.21Understanding the Equities.22Space for Cooperation.34Second-Order Effects of Cooperation.44Conclusion.44CHAPTER FOURPromoting and Preserving Regional Alliances.45Understanding the Equities.45Space for Cooperation.54Second-Order Effects of Cooperation.57Conclusion.57CHAPTER FIVEE

24、xpanding Strategic Cooperation with Indonesia,Malaysia,and Vietnam .59Understanding the Equities.59Space for Cooperation.70Second-Order Effects of Cooperation.73Conclusion.73CHAPTER SIXManaging Cross-Strait Differences Between China and Taiwan.75更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a

25、o g a oAssessing the Prospects for Great Power Cooperation in the Indo-PacificviUnderstanding the Equities.75Space for Cooperation.82Second-Order Effects of Cooperation.86Conclusion.86CHAPTER SEVENAchieving the Denuclearization of North Korea.89Understanding the Equities.89Space for Cooperation.101S

26、econd-Order Effects of Cooperation.106Conclusion.107CHAPTER EIGHTCountering Terrorism and Violent Islamist Extremism in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia.109Understanding the Equities.109Space for Cooperation.120Second-Order Effects of Cooperation.123Conclusion.124CHAPTER NINEIndias Regional Role and S

27、trategic Orientation.125Understanding the Equities.125Space for Cooperation .135Second-Order Effects of Cooperation.137Conclusion.138CHAPTER TENConclusions and Recommendations.139Cooperation and Competition in the Indo-Pacific.140Recommendations for the U.S.Government.142Recommendations for the Join

28、t Force.151Recommendations for the U.S.Air Force.154Final Thoughts.155Abbreviations.157 References.159更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a oviiTables 3.1.Interest in Cooperation onPromoting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.34 4.1.Interest in Cooperation onStrengthening Regional Al

29、liance Architectures.54 5.1.Interest in Cooperation onExpanding Relationships with Indo-Pacific Nations.71 6.1.Interest in Cooperation onthe Peaceful Resolution of the Cross-Strait Dispute.82 7.1.Interest in Cooperation onDPRK Denuclearization.102 8.1.Interest in Cooperation onCountering Terrorism i

30、n South and Southeast Asia.120 9.1.Interest in Cooperation onDeepening U.S.Relationship with India.136 10.1.Interest in Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.140 10.2A.Obstacles to Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific:China.141 10.2B.Obstacles to Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific:Russia.141 10.3.Second-Order Imp

31、lications of Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.143更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a o更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a oixSummary1IssueGreat power competition with China and Russia may be the defining characteristic of the next several decades of the

32、 21st century.An understanding of whether it is possible to coop-erate with either country(or both)on key U.S.policy goals and,if so,what implications such cooperation might carry for relations with the other power,is an important component of assessing the best pathway forward for U.S.foreign and d

33、efense policies.Cooperation with China and/or Russia might help tamp down intensifying strains in the Indo-Pacific region;help advance key shared interests;and/or prove useful in enhancing the ability of the United States to compete vis-vis the other power.Across seven key U.S.policy goalsmaintainin

34、g a peaceful and open regional order;promoting and preserving regional alliances;expanding strategic cooperation with Indonesia,Malaysia,and Vietnam;managing cross-Strait differ-ences between China and Taiwan;achieving the denuclearization of North Korea;countering terrorism and violent Islamist ext

35、remism in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia;and shaping Indias regional role and strategic orientationwhat is the trade space for cooperation?What are the obstacles to such cooperation?And how might cooperation with one power affect the other?ApproachWe began by looking at official U.S.,Peoples Republi

36、c of China(PRC),and Russian policy documents,statements,and government press releases,as well as the record of the two coun-tries actual behavior.We also analyzed secondary sources on PRC and Russian foreign and defense policies to gain additional insight into how leaders in Beijing and Moscow asses

37、s the desirability of engaging with Washington across these seven issue areas.2 We then gauged the extent of alignment,identified conflicting interests,estimated each countrys perceived stakes,and looked for any evidence of past willingness to bargain.Assessing the obstacles to cooperation,we evalua

38、ted issues of trust,audience costs,differing definitions of key terms,1 This research was completed in September 2020,before the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and before the U.S.military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021.It has not been subsequently revised.2 At the outset of th

39、e study,we had planned to travel to China and Russia to better understand the per-spectives of officials and subject-matter experts in those nations on the questions at the heart of our study.Unfortunately,the rapid worsening of relations,combined with the COVID-19 pandemic,precluded this approach,f

40、orcing us to rely more heavily than we would have preferred on written sources.As a conse-quence,some behind-the-scenes nuances or developments occurring after the release of these official docu-ments may not be captured in our analysis.更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a oAs

41、sessing the Prospects for Great Power Cooperation in the Indo-Pacificxthird-party problems,perceptions of an issues immediacy(or lack thereof),issue linkages,legal constraints,and capacity/capabilities to act.Finally,we explored second-order effects of cooperation on U.S.relations with the other par

42、ty.ConclusionsOur review of Chinese and Russian views of the seven issues at the heart of U.S.policy in the Indo-Pacific reveals largely irreconcilable differences in policy goals.In particular:Both China and Russia regard a free and open Indo-Pacific as cover for U.S.interests that comes at their e

43、xpense,though the region is far more important for China than for Russia.Both countries are hostile to the current U.S.-centric regional alliance architecture and seek to undermine it to enhance their own influence.Neither country is eager to see the United States deepen strategic cooperation with I

44、ndo-nesia,Malaysia,or Vietnam,with China worried about the impact on regional competi-tion and Russia concerned that these countries might shift their defense purchases to the United States.China regards U.S.efforts to support and defend Taiwan as interference in its internal affairs;Russia is large

45、ly irrelevant to this issue.Although both China and Russia oppose North Korean acquisition of nuclear weapons,they regard U.S.efforts to compel North Korea to abandon them through sanctions as destabilizing and unlikely to succeed,and do not support the U.S.approach.Both powers criticize U.S.counter

46、terrorism efforts in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia as a way to erode U.S.global influence and impose costs on Washington,with Russia hoping to tie the United States down in Afghanistan.Neither country is supportive of deepening U.S.-India strategic ties,with China seeing this as a form of containme

47、nt and Russia regarding it as likely to come at the expense of New Delhis traditionally warm relations with and reliance on Moscow.Recommendations In light of the stark divergence in Chinese and Russian interests and views and those of the United States across the priority issues in the Indo-Pacific

48、 region,our key recommendations are as follows:Do not assume that opportunities for cooperation or to divide China and Russia exist but have been overlooked.Prepare for long-term competition but avoid conveying an impression that this connotes a U.S.goal of regime change.更多细分领域报告请关注搜搜报告（s o s o y a

49、n b a o），行研君胃：s o s o b a o g a oSummaryxi Continue to leverage existing U.S.-China military risk reduction mechanisms;expand these to new domains if possible and encourage China to abide by them when engaging with U.S.allies and partners.Do not premise U.S.policy on North Korean denuclearization or

50、 withdrawal from Afghanistan on eliciting substantial Chinese or Russian cooperation,but maintain open lines of communication to deconflict in the event of a North Korean collapse.Minimize the impact of cooperation with China or competition with Russia on ties with India,Indonesia,Malaysia,and Vietn